DATE: September 22, 1994
CASE NOS.: 92-CAA-2
92-CAA-5
93-CAA-1
IN THE MATTER OF
C. D. VARNADORE,
COMPLAINANT,
V.
OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
AND MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY
SYSTEMS, INC.
RESPONDENTS.
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
ON ATTORNEY FEE PETITIONS
Counsel representing the Complainant have filed separate fee petitions. The amount
in issue including attorney fees and legal expense exceeds $700,000.
Although of necessity there was some over lapping of functions, the work
assignments of counsel roughly broke down as follows: Mr. Slavin: legal research,
drafting pleadings and briefs as well as written discovery requests and responses; Ms.
Kittrell: witness interviews and preparation, client counseling, document control and other
support functions; and Mr. Stuart: depositions, and examination and cross-examination
of witnesses during trial.
Respondent objects that the hourly rates in the various fee petitions are excessive,
that the hours claimed are insufficiently documented and excessive and that the amount
of the fees sought is disproportionate to the level and extent of the success achieved in this
litigation.
Applicable Principles
To recover costs such as attorney fees, a plaintiff must be a prevailing party. In
this context a party may be considered to have prevailed if they succeeded on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the party sought in
[PAGE 2]
bringing the suit. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). By that
standard Mr. Varnadore is a prevailing party.
The starting point for calculating a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461
U.S. supra at 433. The party seeking a fee award must submit evidence
documenting the hours worked and the rates claimed. If the documentation of hours is
inadequate, the award may be reduced accordingly. Id. at 433. Hours not
reasonably expended are to be excluded. Counsel seeking a fee award should exclude
hours which are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. The same principles
govern here as in the case of an attorney billing his client. Id. at 434. Where
fee petitions insufficiently document the hours reported, a court need not engage in a
detailed item by item reduction of the hours, an impossible burden where the
documentation is inadequate. In these instances the trier of fact has the discretion to
reduce the hours on a percentage basis. SeeEcos v. Brinegan, 671
F.Supp. 381, 398 (M.D. N.C. 1987); Goldstein v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 6
DOL Decisions No. 2 217, 222-223 (1992).
Once the initial calculation of a reasonable expenditure of hours times a reasonable
rate has been made, other factors may result in an upward or downward adjustment of the
fee. Such factors include the results obtained in terms of success or failure in the case of
multiple claims for relief. The number of hours expended are also to be considered in the
context of the level of success achieved. Hensley, 461 U.S. supra at
434.
Finally, the setting of attorney fees is not an exact science. "[A]n hour viewed in
isolation may appear to be reasonable, but be unreasonable in the context of the litigation
as a whole." Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir.
1986).
The GAP Fee Petition
The fee petition of the Government Accountability Project breaks down as follows:
Substantive Attorney Work
Ed Slavin 1,926.7 hrs x $175.00/hr. = $337,172.50
Tom Devine 2.1 hrs x $200.00/hr. = $ 420.00
Don Aplin 27.1 hrs x $175.00/hr. = $ 4,742.50
Robert Banks 30.0 hrs x $190.00/hr. = $ 5,700.00
Substantive Paralegal Work
Nancy Pineles 218.65 hrs x $ 50.00/hr. = $ 10,932.50
Attorney Administrative & Travel[PAGE 3]
Ed Slavin 91.3 hrs x $50.00/hr. = $ 4,565.00
Total = $363,532.50
* * *
Payment Distribution
$371,806.83 To the Government Accountability Project
$ 3,950.00 To Charles Varnadore
(Attachment to Aplin Affidavit)
Stuart and Van Riper
The firm of Stuart and Van Riper requests $111,986.00 as an attorney fee for Mr.
Stuart and $4,410.00 for the services of Mr. Van Riper. The firm further requests
reimbursement of $705.80 for expenses advanced to their client.
Jacqueline O. Kittrell
Jacqueline O. Kittrell requests an attorney fee in the amount of $205,504.00, and
reimbursement of litigation expense in the amount of $3,942.00.
Complainant's Request for Expense Reimbursement
Separate affidavits by Complainant and Mr. Stuart request that Mr. Varnadore be
directly reimbursed the sum of $23,985.99 as litigation expense.
The Hourly Rate
The appropriate hourly rate for the various attorneys representing Complainant is
the threshold issue.
The GAP Attorneys
A. Mr. Slavin
Mr. Slavin has been licensed to practice law since 1986. During his four year
employment with GAP he specialized in employment discrimination cases, whistleblower
[PAGE 4]
proceedings and "policy". He seeks $175.00 an hour. He justifies this rate on the ground
that it is consistent with the hourly rate of Mr. Van Riper who graduated from law school
at the same time and consistent with the hourly billing rate for four to six year associates
in Washington, D.C. in the period 1991-1993. (¶ 39 Slavin Affidavit).
Billie Pirner Garde, Esq., filed an affidavit in support of Mr. Slavin's request. She
states that the $175.00 hourly rate sought for Mr. Slavin's work is reasonable in any legal
market in which she has practiced.
David Stuart, Mr. Slavin's co-counsel, submitted an affidavit stating that rates in
the Knoxville area ranged from $90.00 to $200.00 for partners and associates. It is his
opinion that attorneys of Mr. Slavin's qualifications and experience are entitled to an
hourly rate of $160.00.
B. Mr. Aplin
Mr. Aplin, who is a 1983 law school graduate filed an affidavit. His own affidavit
does not, however, spell out the justification for the $175.00 hourly rate, he requests. Mr.
Slavin's affidavit asserts the $175.00 rate for Mr. Aplin is consistent with typical billing
rates for four to six year associates in Washington, D.C. law firms. (Slavin Affidavit
¶¶ 39-40).
C. Mr. Stuart and Mr. Van Riper
Mr. Stuart was admitted to practice in 1979. His affidavit states that rates for
environmental and labor law lawyers in the Knoxville area ranges from $90.00 (associates)
to $200.00 (senior partners). He believes that the appropriate hourly rate for an attorney
of his qualifications in the relevant period is at least $190.00 an hour. Mr. Stuart on the
same basis states that it is his opinion that in the case of Mr. Van Riper the appropriate
hourly rate is $175.00.
In support of the fee petitions of Messrs. Stuart and Van Riper, Bruce Fox, Esq.,
Ronald C. Koksal, Esq., George H. Buxton, Esq., and Sidney W. Gilreath, Esq. have filed
their affidavits. They state they are familiar with hourly rates charged in the Knoxville
area, that the hourly rates in the area for environmental and labor law range from $90.00
to $200.00 or more, and that the $190.00 rate for Mr. Stuart and the $175.00 rate for Mr.
Van Riper are reasonable and appropriate. These affidavits are too conclusory to
persuasively establish either counsel's usual hourly rate or the prevailing hourly rate in the
area.
Mr. Slavin's affidavit insofar as it supports the fee petition of Messrs. Stuart and
Van Riper states it is his professional opinion that Mr. Stuart and Mr. Van Riper "could
bill" respectively $200.00 and $175.00 an hour for their services in the Knoxville area.
His affidavit fails to establish either the usual or customary hourly rate of these attorneys
or the prevailing rate of attorneys with comparable experience in the relevant area.
[PAGE 5]
Ms. Kittrell
Ms. Kittrell was admitted to the practice of law in 1989. She states in her affidavit
that rates for lawyers practicing environmental and labor law range from approximately
$90.00 dollars for associates to over $200.00 for senior partners. It is Ms. Kittrell's belief
that an hourly rate of at least $160.00 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate in her case.
Mr. Stuart filed an affidavit stating that in his opinion attorneys with the qualifications,
training and experience of Ms. Kittrell are entitled to an hourly rate of $160.00. Mr.
Slavin's affidavit stating that Ms. Kittrell "could bill" $150.00 an hour in the Knoxville
area establishes neither Ms. Kittrell's usual and customary hourly rate nor the prevailing
hourly rate for attorneys with comparable experience in the Knoxville area.
Respondents' Hourly Rate Evidence
Respondent asserts four recent decisions of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee establish the relevant hourly rates in the Knoxville area in
a fee shifting context..[1] Respondent contends these decisions are the best evidence of
the prevailing rates for attorneys in the Knoxville area.
The Knoxville Bar Association Survey on which Respondent also relies shows that
the hourly rates charged by the lawyers in the various experience categories are extremely
diverse. (See Appendix B). Moreover, no showing has been made that the
respondents to the survey constitute a representative sample of the general population of
lawyers in the Knoxville area. Those results are accordingly not dispositive in this
proceeding. To some extent, however, the survey results roughly correlate to the U.S.
District Court awards on which Respondent relies. (Compare Appendix A and
B).
The Appropriate Hourly Rates
Establishing the appropriate hourly rate in this case presents some difficulty, since
none of Complainant's counsel attempted to establish their usual and customary hourly
rates. The affidavits presented by Complainant's counsel moreover are too vague and
conclusory to persuasively support a finding of the prevailing hourly rate in the Knoxville
area for lawyers in the relevant experience categories. Under the circumstances, the most
credible evidence are the hourly rates allowed by local courts in similar fee shifting cases
and in other employee protection cases before the Department of Labor.
Despite some variation in the fees set, the Anderson, Richmond,
Kayser-Roth Hosiery, and Campbell cases afford support for a finding
that a $100.00 hourly rate is the usual rate in the relevant area in a fee shirting context.
(See Appendix A). Another precedent in point is De Ford v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 90 ERA-60 (1993), ALJ's Recommended Supplemental Decision
and Order on Attorney Fees. De Ford is an employee protection case before the
Department of Labor involving one of the environmental statutes. In that case, the
Administrative Law Judge's recommended decision set the following rates for four of the
lawyers also involved in this proceeding
[PAGE 6]
as follows:
Edward Slavin $100.00/hour
Donald Aplin $100.00/hour
David Stuart $125.00/hour
Christopher Van Riper $100.00/hour
The De Ford decision further awarded an hourly rate of $150.00 for Slavin and
Van Riper for their time during the week of trial and $175.00/hour for David Stuart's trial
time.
The De Ford case is the precedent most closely on point. It is a
Department of Labor employee protection case under an environmental statute, tried in the
Knoxville area, involving the majority of Complainant's counsel participating in this
proceeding. The hourly rates in De Ford with an adjustment for inflation will
be applied here.[2]
Ms. Kittrell acted essentially in a junior capacity to Messrs. Slavin and Stuart. Her
rate, accordingly, will be set $10.00 below that of Mr. Slavin. Her rate will be set at
$90.00 and adjusted for inflation. She will be awarded an hourly rate of $130.00 for time
expended at trial.
Compensation For Hours Reasonably ExpendedGAP
The "Hours Document" itemizing the hours expended by the GAP attorneys was
created by Donald Aplin, GAP's managing attorney, after reviewing the underlying data
such as the original time sheets and conferring with GAP's lead attorney, Mr. Slavin.
GAP did not exercise "billing judgment" in the preparation of this fee petition. In this
connection, Mr. Aplin, stated:
I, in consultation with the GAP lead attorney in this case, Edward
Slavin, reviewed the time recorded and determined whether the full time
entered should reasonably be submitted. Based on the volume of the record,
length of hearing, and the specific circumstances and environment
surrounding this particular litigation, our professional judgment was that no
reductions be made for time entered on time sheets. In short, the hours
recorded reflect the reasonable hours for the conduct of the litigation.
(Aplin Affidavit p. 4)
The Hours Document contains numerous items inadequately describing the
work performed and so vague that an informed determination on precisely what was done
or whether it was necessary is precluded. The following items are illustrative but do not
constitute an exhaustive listing:
12-24-91 Review File
1-14-92 [Drafting, teleconference] strategy, interviews
1-15-92 [Drafting, teleconference] strategy, interviews
[PAGE 7]
1-16-92 [Drafting, teleconference] strategy, interviews
1-17-92 [Drafting, teleconference] strategy, interviews
3-14-92 Review documents
4-20-92 Review & strategy
4-21-92 Review & strategy
2-08-92 [Legal Research, drafting] Pleadings, investigation and research
7-27-92 Trial strat, calls
5-4-92 Review documents, draft and file motions
12-13-91 Research, consultation
2-25-92 Calls to client and co-counsel
3-20-92 Strategy
3-24-92 Strategy
4-20-92 Research & strategy
5-2-92 Organization
Entries such as "legal research" or "trial prep" and similar descriptions are too
vague to permit meaningful review. H. J., Inc. v. Flygt Corporation, 925 F.2d
257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991). In short, such entries prevent a finding on the central issue,
namely, a determination that the hours were reasonably expended. Ecos, Inc. v.
Brinegan, 671 F.Supp. 381, 396 (M.D. N.C.).
In summary, this case was hard fought and of necessity required a substantial
expenditure of effort by counsel. Nevertheless, because of the inadequate description on
the Hours Document no determination can be made that all of the time listed was required
to efficiently litigate this case. For the same reasons, it is not possible to determine on
the basis of the fee petition that unnecessary duplication of effort had been avoided.
Accordingly, 25% of the hours for GAP's lead counsel will be deleted with the exception
of the time that counsel devoted to trial and to the drafting of the brief.
Complainant unsuccessfully pursued issues which consumed time better devoted to
other matters. The allegation that Mr. Varnadore had been discriminated against by being
denied a management position was simply without merit. The contention pursued at the
hearing that Ramona Williams, a secretary of Respondent, had destroyed documents
relevant to this case was also without merit. Complainant in addition failed to demonstrate
that protected activity on the Performance and Improvement Committee played a role in
the discrimination he complained of. (Fn. 32 Recommended Decision and Order).
[PAGE 8]
Complainant also did not prevail on his contention that ORNL should be named as a party.
These issues are severable from the rest of the proceeding and 5% of the hours listed on
the Hours Document will be deleted on that basis.
The lengthy and discursive brief filed by Complainant's counsel was long on policy
arguments but short on the factual analysis required which is all important at the trial
level. Ten percent of the hours listed for preparation of the brief will be deleted.
Tom Devine
Tom Devine, Legal Director of GAP, has charged $420.00 at the rate of $200.00
an hour for the following:
6/29/92 Coaching Ed
9/18/92 Edit's on Slavin
11/12/92 Edit Ed's latest
(GAP time sheet p. 5)
Mr. Devine did not file an affidavit. Under the circumstances it is not possible to
determine why an attorney of Mr. Slavin's experience in this area required editing and
coaching by GAP's Legal Director. The $420.00 for Mr. Devine's time is disallowed.
Donald G. Aplin
Donald G. Aplin is the managing attorney for GAP. He reviewed the time sheets
and created "the Hours Document" attached to the fee petition. GAP requests $4,742.50
for time devoted by Mr. Aplin to the fee petition for 27.1 hours work at the rate of
$175.00 an hour.
GAP is entitled to reasonable compensation for preparing the fee petition.
SeeDavis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544
(9th Cir. 1992). However, the Hours Document, prepared by Mr. Aplin, as already noted,
contains numerous charges which are unduly vague and, as a result, meaningful review
of those items is precluded. Accordingly 30% of the time devoted by Mr. Aplin to the
fee petition is disallowed.
Mr. Aplin also requests compensation for 3/4 of an hour apparently for editing or
reviewing Mr. Slavin's work. No showing has been made that such review was necessary
or that it furthered this litigation.
Robert C. Banks[PAGE 9]
Robert C. Banks, Esq., a full time faculty member at Memphis State University has
requested reimbursement in the amount of $5,700.00 for 30 hours at the rate of $190.00
an hour. Professor Banks' time sheet contains extremely general description of his work
on this case, e.g., "Phone conf Es" and "Study File". Under the circumstances, it is not
possible to determine with any degree of precision what Professor Banks contributed to
the outcome of this case or that it was necessary for GAP to associate him. His fee
petition is disallowed.
Media Relations and Congressional Contacts
GAP also seeks reimbursement for time spent on media contacts and Congressional
relations. (Hours Document p. 21). Such work may be reimbursed where counsel shows
that it is "directly and intimately related to the successful representation of a client."
SeeDavis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545
(9th Cir. 1992). Counsel has failed to demonstrate that such contacts had a direct or
significant effect on the outcome of this litigation. These hours are disallowed.
Jacqueline O. Kittrell
Ms. Kittrell's description of her work on the whole is considerably more specific
than the GAP document, although there are items such as:
3/24/92 Document preparation, 8.5 hrs.
direction of paralegal; call to GAP
counsel
which are uninformative. This makes it difficult to determine whether those hours were
reasonably expended. Accordingly, 10% of the hours she listed will be disallowed for that
reason.
Ms. Kittrell's hours spent on the brief will be reduced by 10% for inadequate
factual analysis, and 5% for the expenditure of time on unsuccessful issues. (See
discussion of GAP fee petition).
Stuart and Van Riper
The Stuart and Van Riper fee petition clearly describes counsel's work, accordingly,
there will be no deduction for inadequate documentation. There will be a 5% deduction
for time expended on unsuccessful issues. (See discussion of GAP fee petition).
[PAGE 10]
Attorney Fees Allowed and Rejected
The deductions and fees allowed for the foregoing reasons may be summarized as
follows:
Attorney Slavin Devine Aplin Stuart Van Riper Kittrell Banks Total
Pretrial
Hours
Requested 1,550.8[3] 2.1 26.35[4] 431.9 18.4 1,056.9 30.0 3,129
Percent
Disallowed 30%[5] 100% 30%[6] 5%[7] 5% 15% 100%
Pretrial
Hours
Allowed 1,085.56 0.0 18.445 403.85 17.48 898.37 0.0 2,430.17
Rate $105.00 .00 $105.00 $130.00 $105.00 $95.00 .00
Pretrial
Hours
Total $113,983.80 .00 ,936.73 $53,340.30 ,835.40 $85,345.15 .00 $256,441.38
Trial
Hours
Requested 159.7 0.0 0.0 157.5 6.8 185.5 0.0 509.5
Percent
Disallowed 5% 100% 100% 5%[11] 5%[11] 5%[11] 100%
Trial
Hours
Allowed 151.72 0.0 0.0 149.63 6.46 176.23 0.0 484.04
Rate[10] $160.00 .00 .00 $185.00 $160.00 $135.00 .00
Trial
Hours
Total $24,275.20 .00 .00 $27,681.55 ,033.60 $23,791.05 .00 $76,781.40
Brief
Hours
Requested 295.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42 0.0 337.7
Percent
Disallowed 15% 100% 100% 100% 100% 15%[12] 100%
Brief
Hours
Allowed 251.35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.7 0.0 287.05
Rate[10] $105.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 $95.00 .00
Brief
Hours
Total $26,391.75 .00 .00 .00 .00 $3,391.50 .00 $29,783.25
Grand
Total $164,650.75 .00 ,936.73 $81,021.85 $2,869.00 $112,527.70 .00 $363,006.03
In short, MMES will be ordered to pay a total of $373,938.53 in attorney fees.
$177,519.98 are payable to GAP, $112,527.70 are payable to Ms. Kittrell, and
$83,890.85 are payable to Stuart and Van Riper.
The Attorney Fee in Relation to the Degree of Success Achieved
Complainant was substantially successful in this litigation in the context of the relief
[PAGE 11]
granted in similar cases. There is no requirement that attorney fees be always
proportionate to the size of a damage award. Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries
Corporation, 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990). The attorney fee award reduced
to some $373,000.00 is reasonable for the results obtained in this case. The litigation
effort required of Complainant in this case far exceeded that required in the more usual
employee protection cases before the Department of Labor. A further reduction of the fee
cannot, accordingly, be justified on that basis.
ExpensesGAP
GAP has applied for reimbursement of the following expenses:
Litigation Expenses (Through 6/30/93)
Long distance telephone $ 3,689.44
Travel and travel expenses 5,979.02
Photocopying 1,750.90
Postage 285.42
Delivery 519.55
Total $12,224.33
Donald Aplin described the preparation of the foregoing schedule as follows:
All out-of-pocket expenses are tracked as the expenses are incurred
by the application of the same three digit accounting code for each case or
project used for time keeping purposes. The out-of-pocket expense report
for this case was created by me after review of GAP's monthly and
quarterly expense reports, as well as reference to the billing statements and
other correspondence with Mr. Varnadore. The expense report is a true and
accurate compilation of the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in this case.
(Aplin affidavit paragraph 18)
The underlying documentation relied upon, such as billing reports or invoices were
not submitted with the fee petition. Accordingly, the request for reimbursement for those
expenses cannot be reviewed in any meaningful way. Within 15 days, GAP is to turn
over to Respondent the available documentation for such expenses. Thereafter counsel are
directed to confer as to whether agreement can be reached on any of these items. To the
extent that there is still a dispute with respect to all or any of the expenses after the parties
have conferred, GAP may renew its application for litigation expense no later than
October 28, 1994.
Stuart and Van Riper
Stuart and Van Riper claim reimbursement for expenditures advanced to
[PAGE 12]
Complainant including primarily parking and Dr. Demers' consulting and deposition fee.
Once Stuart and Van Riper have submitted documentation of the payment to Dr. Demers,
Respondent will be ordered to pay Stuart and Van Riper the sum of $705.00.
Complainant, C. D. Varnadore
Mr. Varnadore is claiming expenses in the amount of $23,985.99 which he either
paid or for which he is liable. The ledger sheet attached to Mr. Varnadore's affidavit is
not accompanied by the requisite underlying data permitting meaningful review.
Complainant is directed to turn over to Respondent the relevant invoices, billing statements
and cancelled checks. Thereafter the parties are directed to confer on Complainant's
request for reimbursement of litigation expense. If the parties are unable to reach
agreement after such discussions, Complainant may resubmit his request for reimbursement
no later than October 28, 1994.
Ms. Kittrell
Ms. Kittrell requests reimbursement for $225.00 for parking expense and $3,717.00
for reporting and court costs. Once Ms. Kittrell has submitted documentation for the
$3,717.00 requested for reporting and court costs, Respondent will be ordered to reimburse
her for such expenses.
ORDER
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., is ordered to pay the following amounts for
attorney fees:
$177,519.98 to the General Accountability Project
$112,527.70 to Jacqueline Kittrell
$83,890.85 to the firm of Stuart & Van Riper
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a ruling on litigation expense is deferred pending
further documentation in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this Order.
[PAGE 13]
THEODOR P. VON BRAND
Administrative Law Judge
TPvB/jbm
APPENDIX A
In Anderson, the Court reduced the requested hourly rate from $125.00
to $100.00 an hour. The court expressly noted that the pleadings showed neither the years
that the lawyer had been admitted to practice or his normal billing rate. The Court held
that absent evidence of the normal billing hourly rate or that the lawyer had the experience
necessary to command such a fee, the $125.00 hourly rate was not reasonable. The Court
further held that the fees requested and approved in the Jones case constituted
substantial evidence of the customary fee for similar cases in the relevant area.
In Richmond wherein the trial took place in July 1990, the court's
decision found the $100.00 hourly rate requested reasonable.
In Jones, the Court found reasonable in light of counsel's experience the
following rates which counsel stated were their usual and hourly rates:
Hourly Rate
E. H. Rayson $130.00
Hale $ 85.00
Cooley $100.00
Evans $ 85.00
Walter $ 70.00
R. A. Rayson $ 70.00
Burgin $ 70.00
In Campbell the Court found reasonable hourly rates of $95.00 and
$85.00. The decision is silent on the experience of the attorneys in question.
[PAGE 14]
APPENDIX BSurvey Results Re Hourly Rates
Percent of Lawyers
Experience CategoryHourly Rate Charging That
Rate
Over 20 years
(67 lawyers responding)
$61 - 75 3%
$76 - 100 36%
$101 - 125 12%
$126 - 150 19%
$151 - 175 4%
$176 - 200 6%
$201 or mor 3%
16-20 years
(46 respondents)
$76 - 100 33%
$101 - 125 30%
$126 - 150 20%
$151 - 175 2%
No information 15%
10-15 years
(46 respondents)
$51 - 60 2%
$76 - 100 17%
$101 - 125 40%
$126 - 150 21%
$151 - 175 7%
$176 - 200 2%
No information 12%
5-9 years
(54 respondents)
$61 - 75 4%
$76 - 100 54%
$101 - 125 24%
$126 - 150 11%
No information 7%
2-4 years
(26 respondents)
$61 - 75 8%
$76 - 100 58%
$101 - 125 8%
$126 - 150 4%
$151 - 175 4%
[PAGE 15]
$176 - 200 4%
No information 15%
[ENDNOTES]
[1] Anderson v. Imperial Reading, Inc., No. 3-91-131 (E.D. Tenn. 1993);
Richmond v. McElyea, 3-88-327 (E.D. Tenn. 1993 & 1990); Jones v.
Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., No. 3-89-545 (E.D. Tenn. 1991); Campbell v.
Rust Engineering Co., No. 3-88-924 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) aff'd as
modified, 927 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1991) (table), cert. denied,
U.S. , 116 L.Ed.2d 354 (1991).
[2] See tabulation "Attorney Fees Allowed and Rejected" infra and note 8
infra. The De Ford trial was in December 1990; the bulk of the
trial in this proceeding was in July 1992. Accordingly, December 1990 and July 1992
are the appropriate reference points for adjusting the hourly rate for inflation.
[3] 11.8 hours deducted for media relations and Congressional contacts.
[4] .75 hours deducted for editing Slavin's draft of attorney fee petition.
[5] 25% inadequate documentation; 5% pursuit of unsuccessful issues.
[6] 30% inadequate documentation.
