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Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. , 89-CAA-1 (ALJ June 22, 1989)


U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
2600 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, New Jersey 08104

DATE: June 22, 1989
CASE NO. 89-CAA-1

IN THE MATTER OF

ROBERT S. TRACY
    Complainant

    v.

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
    Respondent

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

    I. Introduction

    This case involves a complaint under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622.

    This matter is being considered pursuant to my order of March 3, 19891 in which I ruled that the case involves a threshold issue of the timeliness of the complaint which does not require a formal hearing. At this juncture only the timeliness question is under consideration.

    Pursuant to my order, the parties submitted sworn statements, other documents, and briefs. In addition, on May 19, 1989


[Page 2]

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (hereinafter Consolidated) moved pursuant to 29 C.P.R. § 18.40 for dismissal of the complaint because it was not timely filed.

    Section 7622(b)(1) of the Act states:

Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of subsection (a) of this section may, within thirty days after the violation occurs, file . . . a complaint with the Secretary of Labor . . . .

    II. Background

    Complainant Robert S. Tracy is an employee of Respondent Consolidated. on August 9, 1988 (all dates herein are in 1988, unless otherwise indicated) Complainant was assigned to perform work splicing cables in Bronx, New York, at an underground site entered by a manhole, and he observed oil there. Complainant told a Consolidated supervisor that the oil should be tested for PCBs. The supervisor obtained a sample from the site, but Complainant objected because this sample contained less oil than was in other areas of the site. The supervisor's sample was taken from the site and tested while Complainant waited there. A report of the test was communicated to the site by radio and the supervisor told Complainant "it was safe for me to go down and go to work." Complainant objected, stating that the oil on the walls of the site had not been tested and the air had not been tested for the possibility of explosion. The supervisor replied that it was safe to go to work. Complainant responded, "I would work any other place, but I felt it was not a safe working environment." The supervisor told Complainant to call the office for another job assignment and that it was possible that disciplinary action against Complainant would follow. At the office later that day Complainant attended a meeting during which he was informed by another Consolidated representative that it was possible there would be disciplinary action against him. (Tracy deposition 2/2/89)

    On August 22 Complainant attended a meeting regarding the events of August 9 at which Consolidated representatives and those of his trade union, the Utility Workers of America, Local 1-2 (Union), were present. Complainant was told he was being suspended, beginning immediately, for two days because of "insubordination." In actuality, he was suspended from work beginning at the termination of the meeting about 8 or 8:30 A.M. on August 22 until 11 P.M. on August 23. He worked on the 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. shift August 23 - August 24. (Tracy deposition 2/2/89)


[Page 3]

    On October 11 Complainant's counsel, Kevin G. Jenkins, Esq., mailed a letter, which constitutes his formal complaint, to the Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor. This letter is headed "Clean Air Act Whistleblower Complaint," and states:

I write to you on behalf of [Complainant], an employee of Consolidated . . . to file a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 7622, the whistleblower provision of the Clean Air Act.

In August [Complainant] . . . identified material he believed to be PCB's.

[Complainant], a union shop steward, protested to the Company but the Company continued work around the toxic substance.

[Complainant] was given a two day suspension . . .

We assert that this action . . . is a retaliatory action prohibited by Section 7622 . . . .

    In a letter dated November 23 the Department of Labor notified Complainant that his complaint dated October 11 was untimely because it had been filed after the expiration of the 30-day limitation period in the Clean Air Act. (It was also noted that the complaint was not received until October 31.) The letter further stated that no further action would be taken regarding this matter. By telegram dated November 30 Complainant appealed the decision.

    III. Analysis

    Complainant has not questioned that the alleged violation of the Act took place on August 22 when his two-day suspension from work began and that the 30-day statute of limitations began to run on that date. Therefore, unless circumstances exist which warrant tolling the limitation period, the time for filing a complaint expired on September 21, and the complaint dated October 11 was untimely.

    Complainant's counsel's brief submitted May 19, 1989 argues:

Although the language of the Act requires a complaint to be filed within 30 days after the occurence (sic) of the alleged violation, the Department of Labor's regulation provide (sic) for the equitable tolling of this time limitation where there are extenuating circumstances.


[Page 4]

The brief refers to 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(d)(3) for the foregoing proposition.

    It is true that 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(d)(3) provides for tolling of the 30-day period for filing a complaint "on recognized equitable principles or because of strongly extenuating circumstances." But this regulation pertains to a complaint under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq.), not the Clean Air Act. Complainant's brief states that he filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration under "that Act" and 29 C.F.R. 1977.15. However, the complaint dated October 11 under consideration herein was filed, by its own terms, under the Clean Air Act.2

    The regulations applicable under the Clean Air Act are contained at 29 C.P.R. Part 24. Section 24.3, which sets forth the procedure for filing a Clean Air Act complaint, contains no exception to the 30-day filing period, nor circumstances under which it may be tolled. I have found no controlling precedent involving 29 C.F.R. Part 24. Therefore, I conclude the statute of limitations is tolled only if Complainant establishes that Consolidated deliberately misled him to reasonably believe his suspension would be rescinded and that, thus, there was no violation of the Act on which he need file a complaint.3

    Indeed, Complainant submits that "equitable tolling" is appropriate where "the late filing . . . was caused by deception on the part of the employer," citing Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman and Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984), a case involving the occupational Safety and Health Act. Complainant argues that Consolidated "intentionally misled [Complainant's] representative that the case would be resolved" and he "was led to believe by [Consolidated] that the suspension issue would be resolved and that there would not be a need to file an action under the Clean Air Act." Complainant states he did not delay filing the complaint because he was waiting for the result of the grievance-arbitration proceeding which had been initiated, or "OSHA's investigation."

    Exactly what actions by Consolidated does Complainant contend intentionally misled him into believing the suspension would be resolved in his favor by the company? Complainant's brief states that the Union immediately filed a grievance on his behalf regarding the


[Page 5]

suspension, and Patrick Bencivengo, a Union Business Agent,

initiated negotiations with [Consolidated] management and was told in the first week of September by Robert Tully, Division Manager that he was "attempting to resolve the issue and that the Union and [Complainant] should take no further action." (Citing affidavit by Bencivengo)

    In support of his contentions, on May 2, 1989 Complainant's counsel submitted to the undersigned the following documents;

1. Consolidated's undated two-page statement describing the "Current Infraction," "Prior Infraction," "Disposition" (i.e., two-day suspension starting August 22), and "Employee Comments."

2. Letter dated August 25 to Complainant from the occupational Safety and Health Administration referring to his "discrimination complaint on 8/24/88" docketed under Case No. 2-4174-88-17.

3. Affidavit of Patrick Bencivengo dated April 30, 1989.

    The Consolidated two-page statement and the OSHA letter contain nothing which supports Complainant's contention that he was misled by Consolidated.

    Mr. Bencivengo states in his affidavit that in the first week of September he spoke with Robert Tully, Consolidated's Division Manager and Complainant's supervisor, who

informed me that [Consolidated] was attempting to resolve the issue and advised me that the Union should take no further action at this time.

Mr. Bencivengo further states:

In the last week of September, 1988, Mr. Tully informed me that [Consolidated] would not rescind Mr. Tracy's suspension.

* * *

Prior to September 22, 1988, I believed in good faith that [Complainant's] suspension would be rescinded by [Consolidated].


[Page 6]

    Accepting Mr. Bencivengo's statements at face value, I nevertheless find they fail to establish that Consolidated misled him, the Union, or Complainant, into believing the suspension would be resolved in Claimant's favor. Mr. Tully simply asked Mr. Bencivengo to withhold further action while Consolidated was "attempting to resolve the issue." I construe these words to mean that Consolidated was reviewing the matter internally. There is nothing in Mr. Tully's reported language which conveys the message, or even implies, that the suspension would be resolved in Complainant's favor. There is nothing in the reported language which indicates that there was even the likelihood that the suspension would be resolved in Claimant's favor. At most, Mr. Tully's statements imply the possibility that the suspension would be rescinded. Certainly, this evidence fails to establish that Consolidated purposely or with deception misled Complainant or his representatives into withholding the Clean Air Act complaint until the 30-day period had elapsed. Mr. Bencivengo's "good faith" belief that the suspension would be rescinded is irrelevant because it was not based on actions or statements of Consolidated on which he had a rational basis for believing this.

    Based on the foregoing, and having given Complainant the benefit of all reasonable doubt with regard to the evidence on which he relies, I find that the 30-day statute of limitations should not be tolled and, therefore, the Clean Air Act complaint filed by Complainant was untimely under the Act and the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 24.

    In conclusion, I find there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding the timeliness of the complaint and that the motion of Consolidated to dismiss the complaint as untimely should be granted as a matter of law.

Recommended Order

    It is ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed.

       ROBERT D. KAPLAN
       Administrative Law Judge

Dated: June 22, 1989
Camden, New Jersey

[ENDNOTES]

1 As noted in my order dated February 9, 1989, the parties waived the ninety day requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 5851(f).

2 Apparently Complainant filed an earlier complaint under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. (See reference to OSHA complaint, below.) However, such a complaint is not before we for consideration.

3 I have found only one court opinion touching on tolling of the limitation period in 29 C.P.R. Part 24: English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988). This opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is not controlling as the alleged violation of the Act in the instant case occurred within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. English held that a time-bar defense to a claim might be avoided because of equitable estoppel" where

an employee's failure to file in timely fashion is the consequence either of a deliberate design by the employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakenly have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge. (Citation omitted.)

The Court further explained:

Absent evidence that the employer acted to deceive the employee as to the existence of its (sic) claim or otherwise to mislead or coerce the employee into not filing a claim in a timely fashion, we will not find the employer equitably estopped to plead the bar of untimely filing.

Finally, the Court stated that "even an employer's confirmation of that hope [for a continuing employment relationship] could not estop the employer absent some indication that the promise was a quid-pro-quo for the employee's forbearance in filing a claim." Applying these concepts, the Court rejected as a foundation for equitable estoppel the employer's "repeated assurances that permanent placement was being sought elsewhere in the company" or "assertions of a[n employer] executive that [the employer] did not intend to fire her." English at 963.



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