Complainant was unable to do this work properly because of a lack of: (1) accounting codes on the bills describing tasks performed; (2) computer expertise; (3) communication with work assignment managers and contractors; and (4) timely billing and notice of fund transfers resulting in a series of e-mails between budget, finance, and Complainant and delayed contractor payments. (Tr. 50-58, 67, 71, 79, 86-88, 96, 106, 108, 110-113, 115, 121, 124,126; CX-69). Faced with a lack of necessary information, Complainant either certified the bills blindly or later refused to sign any bills because she was concerned about possible criminal prosecution under the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C.§ 1341 et. seq. for authorizing payment without necessary funding to support such payments. ( Tr. 134, 135, 188, 1124-1128). As of the initial hearing date, Complainant had refused to sign thirty one (31) outstanding bills because of an inability to track costs. (Tr. 109, 110). In addition, Complainant was unable to ascertain fund balances notwithstanding her access to funding data over Respondent's financial warehouse web site due to a lack of initial balances and accounting codes match working performed to funding sources. (Tr. 192-195).

   In attempting to do her Project Officer duties, Complainant sought help from Marsala, a finance officer and accountant with Respondent's Cincinnati Finance Center, who in turn was responsible for making sure the contractor bills were paid and that Project Officers properly verified and allocated costs. (Tr.45-50). On August 28, 2002, Complainant e-mailed Marsala stating, that she was unable to track old IGA billings because of limited information. Marsala replied that he could not tell her how to allocate bills and it was up to her office to figure out how to do so. (CX-69, p. 3). Subsequent e-mails in September, 2002, between Allen, Barrow, and Complainant resulted in a meeting in Complainant's office on September 12, 2002, with Rebecca Kemp, Allen, and Bettencourt. As a result, Complainant was able to process $600,000.00 in bills and credits but still was unable to resolve "huge discrepancies" between EPA and GSA accounting systems. (CX-69, pp. 7-21).

   Accounting problems continued the following year, with the ACS contractors failing to be paid for nearly four months and considering pulling their employees off the job. (CX-69, pp. 23, 26). Allen, Senior Budget Analyst, acknowledged having problems with getting timely and accurate information from GSA, and admitted that if he approved payment of funds without the funds being available he could be subject to incarceration under the Anti-Deficiency Act. (Tr. 133-135, 143, 542). At Barrow's request, Allen and another Accountant, Ferrazoula, developed a spread sheet with contractor names and hourly rates using information from the Financial Data Warehouse, a website creation of EPA, to help Complainant match tasks to bills. (Tr. 637-638). However, specific information associating accounting codes to tasks was apparently not available to Allen when he created the spread sheet; rather he depended upon the Project Officer to know the work in question and allocate it to the proper account. (Tr. 165-167, 175,176, 192-195). Allen even attempted to reconcile account balances with Debbie Eastis of GSA, but was apparently unsuccessful in getting Eastis to do her part. (Tr. 170).

   Adding to Complainant's job difficulties, was the fact that the IAG in question had never been audited or reconciled since its inception in 1993. When the audit was completed in June, 2000, it resulted in Respondent being credited with $1,500,000 in overpayments. (Tr. 522-525). As a result, Respondent decided to reduce the funding by approximately $500,000 each year from the normal budget of $1,000,000, thereby achieving a reduction of the surplus over a three year period. (Tr. 319-322, 604-620). A second reconciliation was performed about 1½ years later, at Barrow's request, because of difficulties that Complainant was having in tracking or associating costs with work performed. (Tr. 637). As discussed, infra, in Section II B, Respondent withheld details of the reconciliations from Complainant. (Tr. 620-622, 1586, 1587). GSA added to the problem by failing to require contractors to supply codes for what they had done further. (Tr. 596-600, 626-632). Indeed, it took Respondent's accounting staff hundreds of hours to reconcile account balances. (Tr. 589, 590).

   Respondent assigned Complainant Project Officer duties knowing full well that she lacked the necessary computer expertise to evaluate what work contractors had performed, and further, had no way to receive such information because of a refusal by work assignment managers to tell her what had been done. Respondent proffered no reason for this assignment nor its refusal to reassign her to other duties. Such an assignment can only be described as pervasive harassment constituting adverse action and hostile working conditions.

II B. Withholding of Information on IAG Funding (Allegation # 10)

   Besides needing to know what work contractors performed on given task, Complainant, as Project Officer, needed to know fund balances so as to avoid approving expenditures without sufficient funds and running afoul of the Anti-Deficiency Act. Complainant alleges that funding information was deliberately withheld from her so as to make her job more difficult, and that she was specifically prohibited from talking to Eastis or Spratling about such issues. Comptroller, Bramlett, who was responsible for having a 7 year reconciliation or audit of IAG funds that resulted in a $1,500,000 credit to EPA, admitted that she instructed those connected with the audit not to provide Complainant with the result of the audit. Rather, she instructed Complainant to organize her office, keep folders of invoices, and fill in a schedule that Allen had developed. (Tr. 620-622). Bramlett knew, moreover, that Complainant was having difficulty with tracking funds even after a second reconciliation was performed in July, 2000, but took no apparent action to provide her with that information other than to encourage use of a spreadsheet developed by Rich Farrazoula and Allen. (Tr. 637-638). Bramlett knew that Complainant was concerned about approving expenditures without available funds. ( Tr. 649, 655, 656).

   The first record of any apparent tardiness came on July 1, 2002, when Barrow notes Complainant reported to work at about 10:00 a.m. (RX-26, p. 3). Barrow apparently took no action but in a mid-year appraisal on August 29, 2002, he brought up the issue of coming to work late with Complainant, who responded that she was in the bathroom. (RX-13). On February 6, 2003, Complainant apparently reported to work late, whereupon Barrow asked her to come to work on time and to provide him with written justification for her tardiness. (RX-27, p. 3). On February 18, 2003, Complainant e-mailed Barrow stating that she made up the time she was late by working additional time, and that she would not be missing work if it were not for health problems caused by EPA's harassment and hostile work environment. (RX-8). Barrow replied by asking Complainant to consider a flexible compressed schedule if her coming and leaving times were going to vary.

   After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds no credible evidence of improper surveillance or questioning by Barrow. Rather, it appears that Barrow was merely performing routine and necessary supervisor duties when questioning Complainant. Thus, I find no evidence of harassment and, in turn, no evidence of a hostile work environment.

II D. Idling, Bypassing and Undermining Complainant's Authority While Subjecting Her to Inappropriate Supervision (Allegations # 2 and #3)

   Complainant alleged Respondent treated her as a figurehead concerning administrative office staff plan changes by letting contractors attend staff meetings and make requests through Barrow without allowing her the opportunity to first address those issues, while denying her the ability to make routine decisions, such as the best utilization of contractor resources of funds regarding information center support, floor support, and use of a labor pool to work on help desk tickets and subjecting her to inappropriate supervision by White.

   Concerning the allegation of denying Complainant the ability to make routine decisions, such as the best utilization of contractor resources for information center or floor support, or the use of the labor pool to work at help desks, Complainant sent Barrow an e-mail on November 26, 2002, indicating both short-term and long-term staffing plans, assigning information center work to employees Sharon P. and Melissa, with Rick Sheckell, developing justification for additional hardware support to include computer room printers, floor printers and juke box support, with the elimination of a hardware technician. (RX-70). Thereafter, a disagreement developed between Complainant and Sheckell, with Sheckell wanting to change the entire structure of the help desk/information center. When informed of the dispute, Barrow remarked that it was beginning to look like a turf war and suggested another meeting to work out a compromise. Complainant responded by telling Barrow she was being unjustly criticized for suggesting a compromise solution. (RX-22).

   Regarding the issue of idling, Complainant testified without contradiction, that most of the time she has nothing to do, as opposed to contracting, where she frequently worked from 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Tr. 1643-1645, 1560). While Barrow has assigned Complainant meaningful work on a Region 4 Laboratory Information System (LIM) that created a normalizing database linking data so that tables from various projects could relate to one another on a Field Employee Training System (FETS) that tracked or kept records of persons who could be first responders in case of environmental or terrorist attacks, Complainant has enough work to keep her busy only 25 to 50% of the day. (Tr. 1309-1343, 1912, 1913; CX-70A, 71A, and 80).

   After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds no credible evidence of Barrow either bypassing, undermining her authority or subjecting her to improper supervision. However, there is ample evidence that Complainant has been idled, in large part by Respondent. Evidence of the idling can be seen not only from Complainant's testimony, but also from the plethora of wordy e-mails Complainant generated on work time. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a person being fully occupied with job duties and generating the amount of vociferous e-mails which Complainant did. Idling constitutes adverse action in that it deprives a person, such as Complainant, of meaningful work thereby seriously changing the terms or conditions of her employment.

II E. Refusal to Implement any Provision of the September 24, 2002, RDO including Reassignment of Complainant to Contracting Duties while Filling a Frivolous Petition for Review of the September 24, 2002 RDO (Allegations #s 5, 6, 13)

   Respondent readily admits that it has not implemented any provision of the September 24, 2002 RDO, but rather, has filed an appeal with the ARB while refusing to reassign Complainant back to contracting duties. Indeed, that was the testimony of Meiberg, Deputy Regional Administrator. (Tr. 224-227, 252). Respondent also admits that none of its administrators, including Meiberg, (Deputy Regional Administrator); Wright (Assistant Regional Administrator), Palmer (Regional Administrator), and Farmer (Deputy Assistant Regional Administrator) read the RDO, but instead, received a short briefing about the RDO from Respondent's Counsel, Karrol Berrien. (Tr. 220-222, 359, 452, 869).

   Meiberg testified that Respondent assigned employees to jobs dependent upon agency needs and a determination how best to fulfill those needs. (Tr. 246). Meiberg admitted that Complainant's work status has remained the same as it was prior to the RDO. When asked why Complainant had not been reassigned to contracting, Meiberg pleaded ignorance of the reason except to say it was a management right and a question of need for her services. (Tr. 257, 258). Farmer testified that he knew of no reason why Complainant could not be reinstated to contracts. (Tr. 959). Barrow testified that he talked to Wright about reassigning Complainant in view of her ongoing complaints, suggesting she could be better used in another area but that Wright, who is over contracting, merely said he would have to revisit that issue. (Tr. 1353, 1354).

   Indeed, Respondent has no rational or justifiable reason for keeping Complainant in the Information Management Branch as an Information Resources Coordinator, a position for which she is not fully qualifiedas set forth in Erickson I, and one in which the Project Officer is normally filled by a person with scientific or technical background. (Tr. 472). Considering the fact that Complainant neither has the ability to track funds, because of inherent deficiencies in both Respondent and GSA accounting systems, nor the ability to verify contractor compliance, because of a lack of technical expertise and a refusal of work assignment managers to communicate with her, it is apparent she has been given work that is impossible to perform. This leads to only one conclusion: Respondent is harassing Complainant in the hope that she will quit, thereby ridding itself of a loud vociferous and persistent Whistleblower. It is also apparent that supervisors above Barrow, including Wright, are responsible for this decision for while they have every right to appeal the RDO, they do not have the right to continue Complainant's harassment.Respondent's refusal to implement any recommended changes including a reassignment back to contracts, constitutes both adverse action and creation of hostile working conditions.

II F. False and Unfounded Criticism by Barrow (Allegations # 8, 12 and 15)

II G. The November 6, 2002 Meeting Conducted by Wright (Allegation #7)

   On November 5, 2002, Janice Fowler sent an e-mail to all policy and management personnel including facilities, financial and information technology, and civil rights employees, advising that Wright would conduct a meeting of all hands the following Wednesday, November 6, 2002, in the 9th floor conference room at 1:30 p.m. (RX-76). On the following day, Wright held the meeting as scheduled with about 100 employees in attendance.

    Wright testified that he told all employees they would be accountable for carrying their own weight and working as a team; what occurred in the past was history and his objective was to move forward. (Tr. 355, 356, 432-437). Wright stated that he was not going to take responsibility for what happened in the past when he was not in charge. Wright admitted that Complainant asked questions, but could not remember what was asked, although he did remember saying he wanted to start off with a clean slate, referring to himself as a new coach. (Tr. 360-364). Wright denied being rude and stressed again his objective was to start with a clean slate. (Tr.403-408, 432-437).

II H. Refusal to Transfer Complainant to Contracting Specialist Positions (Allegation # 17)

   In April, 2003, Respondent through its personnel office, posted two job vacancy announcements for GS-11/12 contract specialists with a salary range of $47,639.00 to $74,336.00. The period for applying was from April 16-29, 2003.Candidates were required to submit various documents with their application, including a college transcript showing that the employee met the education requirements of the position. The education requirements included a 4 year course of study leading to a bachelor's degree with a major in any field, or 24 semester hours in a variety of fields from accounting, business, or law to organization and management, or graduate education in such fields. Employees holding GS-1102 positions were considered to have met this requirement"for positions they occupy on January 1, 2000." (CX-72). Complainant applied for these positions, but did not submit a copy of her college transcripts and did not occupy or hold a GS-1102 position.

    Personnel Staffing Specialist, Maurice Holmes, processed the applications for these positions but did not put Complainant name on a certified list of eligibles because of Complainant's failure to include her college transcripts. (Tr. 800-808). Holmes testified, that even if an applicant had a copy of his/her college transcript in their personnel file, he would not certify them as eligible, because the announcement requires a submission with the application. Further, the same procedure is followed by all other staffing specialist in Respondent's region. (Tr. 834, 841). In Complainant's case he treated her like all other applicants and coded her as failing to comply and did not look further at her application. (Tr. 853-855). Holmes' action in not certifying Complainant, constitutes adverse employment action, in that it prevented her from being considered for a contract specialist position.

   Complainant argues, that had she been reinstated to contracts, she would have been in a GS-1102 position, and thus, would have been on a certified list of eligibles and presumably selected for one of the two contract specialist positions. However, as of the hearing date Mills had made no selection for anyone of these positions and could not consider Complainant since she was not on the certified list. (Tr. 694, 695). Mills testified that Complainant would be selected for one of these positions if she was on a certified list and was found to be the most qualified. (Tr. 706). However, he did not think that if Complainant was reinstated to contracts that they would have a good working relationship because of Complainant's general disregard for management and his belief that Complainant does not think he (Mills) is entitled to his present position. (Tr. 720-724).

   As the record stands, the Court finds no evidence to suggest that Holmes intentionally discriminated against Complainant because of her protected activities. Holmes treated Complainant like any other applicant. However, it is also clear that had Respondent restored her to a contracting position, it would not have been necessary for Complainant to supply a college transcript in order to be placed on a certified list of eligibles. (Tr. 828). By excluding her from that list, Respondent perpetuated and continued its discrimination against Complainant as found in Erickson I.

III. Confiscating Nine Hours of Annual Leave Effective May 8, 2003 (Allegation # 18)

   On May 21, 2003, Complainant learned that Barrow had charged her with leave for missing work May 8, 2003. Previously, Complainant had requested, and Barrow had approved, annual leave for May 6 and 7, 2003. Barrow expected Complainant to be at work on May 8 , 2003, inasmuch as, she had not requested leave for that date, nor called in to explain her absence. Barrow did not learn of Complainant's absence until a dispute arose between two contractor employees and a male EPA employee requiring Complainant's assistance.

   Since Complainant failed to either call in or request leave for May 8, 2003, Barrow assumed Complainant was taking an additional day of annual leave. The following day, Friday, May 9, 2003, was a scheduled off day for Complainant, who worked a compressed schedule of 8:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday. Barrow had no further contact with Complainant until the following Monday, May 12, 2003, when she telephoned him requesting a schedule change with her day off being changed from Friday to Monday. Barrow approved Complainant's request and asked Complainant whether she had come to work on May 8, 2003. Complainant responded that she had come by the office at 6:00 p.m. to deliver pre-hearing submissions to Respondent's Counsel. Barrow took this response as confirmation of the fact that she taken an extra day of annual leave on May 8, 2003 and charged her leave for that day. (Tr. 1803-1817, 1837, 1882).

   Complainant was in trial before the undersigned on May 13 through May 16, 2003. On May 19, 2003, Barrow left a voice message for Complainant telling her he had charged her with annual leave on May 8, 2003, but that if she requested administrative leave for that day he would see about getting it approved. On May 21, 2003, Barrow reminded Complainant of the voice message he had left for her. Complainant responded that she had worked at home on FETS 5 hours each day of her annual leave, May 6 and 7, 2003. Barrow asked her to e-mail him detailing the work she had performed on those days and he would review what she said and amend her time card accordingly. Barrow further stated that he could not read her mind and it was her responsibility to notify him what she was doing. (Tr. 1838-1840).

   On June 6, 2003, Complainant e-mail Barrow detailing the work she had done on May 6, and 7, 2003. Barrow reviewed her response and amended her time card showing Complainant in duty status from May 6 through May 8, 2003.

   Respondent contends that Barrow initially charged Complainant annual leave not in retaliation for protected activities, but only because Complainant failed to request leave in advance and to notify Barrow that she was not coming to work on May 8, 2003. (RX-83). Charging or taking away annual leave constitutes adverse action. However, there is no evidence to suggest any discriminatory conduct by Barrow in initially charging Complainant with annual leave. Rather, the record shows and the Court finds that Barrow had ample reason to believe that Complainant was taking another day of annual leave on May 8, 2003, and thus, was justified in initially charging her with annual leave on that day.

III. DISCUSSION

   No employer, subject to the provisions of the whistleblowing statutes, "may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because the employee . . . engaged in any [protected activity]." 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(a) (2001). A complainant has thirty days from the time of the employment action to file a complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(b) (2001). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Whistleblower statutes, the complainant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. The employer is subject to the act and the employee is covered under the act;

2. The complainant engaged in protected activity under the act;

3. The employer took adverse action against the employee;

4. The employer knew or had knowledge that the employee was engaging in protected activity; and,

5. The adverse action against the employee was motivated by the fact that the employee engaged in protected activity.

See American Nuclear Resources, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor, 134 F.3d 1292, 1295 (6th Cir. 1998); Kahn v. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 277 (7th Cir. 1995); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984).

   It is well-settled that in arriving at a decision in this matter the finder of fact is entitled to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 466 U.S. 844, 855, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2189, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982). When the proof of ones case depends on subjective evidence, a credibility determination is a critical factor and the ALJ should explicitly discredit such testimony or the fact that the evidence is incredible must be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding. Tieniber v. Heckler 720 F.2d 1251, 1255 (11 Cir. 1983); Bartlik v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 88 ERA 15 (Sec'y Dec 6, 1991).

III A. Coverage, Protected Activity, and Knowledge of Protected Action

   The issue of jurisdiction or more properly whether Respondent and Complainant were subject to the employee protection provisions of SDWA, WPCA, SWDA, CAA, and CERCLA, was previously found in Erickson I, at p. 53, fn. 82. The issue of Complainant's protected activity was discussed at length in Erickson I, pp. 59-61 and included: (1) voicing concerns to co-workers and management about Superfund environmental regulations, analytical procedures, policies and practices that wasted funds, and created impossibility of performance issues that retarded the environmental clean up of the Southeastern Superfund site in 1993, (2) interfering in the bidding process for the North Cavalcade Superfund site to change analytical methodology and performance standards in an attempt to eliminate an impossibility of performance issue that would retard environmental cleanup, (3) writing letters to Congress concerning the OIG investigation of her that was opened in part because of her involvement in the North Cavalcade Superfund site, (4) filing whistleblowing complaints and taking environmental concerns to the media, and (5) sending information to Congress regarding possible FOIA violations concerning the destruction of e-mail back-up tapes.

    In this case, there is no question that Respondent and its supervisors were either directly involved with the events of Erickson I or were e-mailed copies of the RDO and/or briefed by Respondent's Counsel about the RDO so as to establish knowledge of Complainant's activities. The only remaining question deals with whether Respondent took adverse action against Complainant and if so, Respondent's motivation.

III B. Adverse Action

   Instances of adverse action in Erickson I included: 1) reassignment of the Southeastern and Bechtel contracts, demoting Complainant to a contract specialist, detailing her out of the Procurement Section and into the Grants Section, and denying her a promotion through a desk audit; 2) canceling Complainant's contract warrant, transferring Complainant out of her career field and into the Information Management Branch, opening an OIG investigation, issuing a "gag order," and stealing her property; 3) Respondents' refusal to disclose the results of the OIG investigation to Complainant so that a final determination of her actions hung over her head like the "sword of Damocles;" and 4) placing Complainant in a dead-end job that she was not qualified to perform.

   In Erickson I1, instances of adverse action include Respondent's action in: (1) refusing to reassign Complainant to contracts while insisting that she perform Project Officer duties approving contractor invoices when she has neither the technical knowledge to understand and evaluate the work performed by computer contractors nor the communication with work assignment managers who refuse to talk with her concerning contractor performance, nor the necessary information from contractor invoices, GSA and EPA accounting systems to properly track cost and work performed, (2) deliberately withholding information from Complainant on fund balances making it impossible to discern if she is violating the Anti Deficiency Act by approving work without necessary funding, and (3) refusing to place Complainant on certified lists of eligibles for contract specialist positions for which she applied in April, 2003.

   Adverse employment action can include the creation of a hostile work environment. Carter v. Electrical District No. 2 of Pinal County, 92-TSC-11 (Sec'y July 26, 1995) (finding a hostile work environment when employees were instructed not to talk to the complainant, called the complainant "inept" and a "s.o.b." and the prevailing attitude was a "loss of trust" directed toward complainant). The Secretary of Labor approved of importing the concept of hostile work environment from employment discrimination cases based on race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in to the whistleblowing statutes. Varnadore v. Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, 92-CAA-2 (Sec'y Jan. 26, 1996) (reissued with non-substantive changes on Feb. 5, 1996). Unlike adverse employment action a tangible job detriment is not a required element in a hostile work environment case. Id. at 92, n.93. Accordingly, to prove the existence of a hostile work environment, in the Eleventh Circuit, a complainant must show:

(1) The employee belongs to a protected group;

(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome harassment;

(3) The harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the employee;

(4) The harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment to create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and

(5) The employer is responsible through either direct or vicarious liability.

Miller v. Kentworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that to establish hostile working environment a plaintiff must show that "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.") (citation omitted).

   Because this case was fully tried on the merits, I find it appropriate to combine a full analysis of Complainant's prima facie case of retaliatory animus with Respondents' burden to show legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for undertaking adverse employment action with Complainant's ultimate burden of persuasion. See Adjiri v. Emory University, 97 ERA 36, p. 6 (ARB July 14, 1998) (stating that it is not necessary to go through the burden shifting analysis once the respondents show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for undertaking a personnel action, rather the question is whether the complainant prevailed on the ultimate question of liability); Ilgenfritz v. United States Coast Guard Academy, 99 WPC 3 (ALJ March 30, 1999).

   In this case, Respondent provided no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for requiring Complainant to perform Project Officer duties, when it knew or should have known, that Complainant was not competent to perform such duties due to a lack of technical training, little or no communication with work assignment managers, poor accounting systems that did not permit a tracking of funds and withholding of information necessary to establish fund balances. Respondent placed Complainant in an untenable situation in which she was not able to verify cost or fund balances, and thus, face potential criminal and civil charges under the Anti-Deficiency Act.

   While Respondent had every right to appeal the previous RDO, it had no legitimate reason to simply keep Complainant in the same position she occupied after her transfer into the Information Management Branch. Respondent provided no legitimate reason for idling Complainant, nor any legitimate reason for telling employees that they should drop their past disputes with Respondent or else face adverse consequences. Moreover, Respondent provided no legitimate reason for failing to place Complainant on a certified list of eligibles for contract specialist positions.

III D. Remedy

   In its brief, Complainant seeks multiple remedies from establishment of a non-hostile work environment; purging of derogatory information from Respondent's files; flexiplace to accommodate her disabilities; reinstatement in contracting to a comparable level of Keith Mills; removal of every manager found substantially responsible for retaliation; joint and several liability of individual managers for damages; back pay, front pay, restoration of sick and annual leave; restoration of time lost due to a refusal to provide official time; $2.5 million in compensatory damages; exemplary damages of $2.5 million, legal fees and expenses; notices to employees informing them of their rights under environmental whistle blower laws; cease and desist orders; injunctive relief; orders requiring mandatory meetings of all employees to allow Respondent to apologize to Complainant and provide for appropriate sensitivity training; orders requiring Respondent to cease and desist from unlawful surveillance and referring appropriate managers to the Justice Department, FBI, and DOL Office of Inspector General for investigation of possible violations of 5 U.S.C. § 1505, 1512, and 1513.

   Having reviewed the previous RDO in Erickson I, the Court finds it appropriate to reissue that Order requiring Respondent to reinstate Complainant to a GS-13 contract officer position effective March 10, 1995, with back pay from that date to present including timely step increases plus interest on that amount in accord with the rate employed by the United States District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. In addition, the Court finds compensatory damages in the amount of $50,000 to be appropriate along with exemplary damages in the amount of $225,000, with a thirty day notice posting throughout Region 4's facilities in Atlanta, containing a short summary of these proceedings setting forth Complainant's protected activity, Respondent's discriminatory action and the remedy found appropriate herein, together with Respondent's recognition of the right of employees to engage in whistleblowing activities free of retaliation. In addition to a notice posting, Respondent shall provide and require its managers to attend meetings, wherein it will provide training on compliance with environmental whistleblowing laws.

III. E Attorney Fees and Costs

   Attorney's fees are available to the prevailing Complainant as authorized by statute. SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B); WPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(c); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971(c); CAA 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(2)(B); and CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9610. No award of attorney's fees for services rendered on behalf of the Complainant is made herein since no application for fees has been made by the Complainant's counsel. Counsel is hereby allowed thirty (30) days form the date of service of this decision to submit an application for attorney's fees. A service sheet showing that service has been made on all parties, including the Complainant, must accompany the petition. Parties have twenty (20) days following the receipt of such application within which to file any objections thereto.

       CLEMENT J. KENNINGTON
       ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

   NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order will automatically become the final order of the Secretary unless, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 24.8, a petition for review is timely filed with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20210. Such a petition for review must be received by the Administrative Review Board within ten business days of the date of this Recommended Decision and Order, and shall be served on all parties and on the Chief, Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.8 and 24.9, as amended by 63 Fed. Reg. 6614 (1998).