we noted, "When OSHA has found against a complainant and the complainant withdraws his objections to the findings, the result is a final order upholding the OSHA findings." Sabin, slip op. at 9. See also Von Hubbard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., ARB No. 06-022, ALJ No. 2005-STA-062 (Dec. 21, 2007); Davis v. Fonda Kaye, Inc., ARB No. 05-152, ALJ No. 2005-STA-042 (Sept. 27, 2005). In Sabin, we contrasted the effect of withdrawing an appeal to an ALJ with withdrawing the underlying complaint to OSHA. "The voluntary dismissal of a complaint [to OSHA] can be granted without prejudice where there has been no finding on the merits." Sabin, slip op. at 9. Since Sabin withdrew his objections to OSHA's findings, they became the final decision of the Secretary of Labor.
[Page 5]
The ALJ "treated" Saporito's desired withdrawal of his complaint as if it were a withdrawal of his objection to OSHA's findings, which he concluded meant that the September 16, 2005 dismissal would become the final DOL determination. But this case arises under the environmental whistleblower laws. The environmental whistleblower laws have no counterpart to 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c), which is limited to whistleblower cases arising under the STAA. The general regulations governing the procedures to be followed before the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) are set forth at 29 C.F.R. Part 18, which provide, at § 18.1(a), "[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States shall be applied in any situation not provided for or controlled by these rules . . . ." Since the rules of practice before the OALJ do not address the voluntary dismissal of complaints, the ARB has held that Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs voluntary dismissals of environmental whistleblower cases. Anderson v. DeKalb Plating Co., ARB No. 98-158, ALJ No. 1997-CER-001, slip op. at 2 (ARB July 27, 1999); Nolder v. Raymond Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 1984-ERA-005, slip op. at 3 (Sec'y June 28, 1985) (applying Rule 41 to case arising under Energy Reorganization Act). Where, as here, the respondent has filed an answer to the complaint before the ALJ, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) applies. It provides:
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. . . . Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
A respondent opposing dismissal without prejudice must show that it would suffer legal harm or prejudice if the case is dismissed without prejudice. Anderson, slip op. at 2; Nolder, slip op. at 4. "Plain legal prejudice, however, does not result simply when defendant faces the prospect of a second lawsuit or when plaintiff merely gains some tactical advantage." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Factors the ARB will consider in determining whether a respondent will suffer legal prejudice include:
[T]he respondent's effort expended in and the expense of trial preparation, the complainant's excessive delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal and the fact that respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment.
Anderson, slip op. at 2.
This case arises in the Eleventh Circuit. In Potenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001), the Circuit noted that the district court "enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)." 252 F.3d at 1255. The district court must "weigh the relevant equities and do justice
[Page 6]
between the parties" by "attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate." Id. at 1256. Although a defense motion for summary judgment was pending, the Circuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing dismissal without prejudice, with court costs to be awarded to the defendant if the plaintiff refiled. Id. at 1260. On the other hand, in McBride v. JLG Indus., 189 Fed. Appx. 876 (11th Cir. 2006), the Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the suit with prejudice. In McBride, the district court agreed with the defendant that "considerable time had been expended and expenses incurred"; many extensions had been granted for naught; the plaintiff moved to dismiss while the defendant's motions for summary judgment were pending "solely . . . to avoid an expected adverse ruling"; and the litigation was in a late stage. Id. at 878.
The parties' briefing to the ARB recognizes that FedEx Kinko's must show plain legal prejudice if Saporito's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Applying the above-cited authorities to the record, we believe that showing has been made. FedEx Kinko's expended effort and expense in preparation of the case before the ALJ, including FedEx Kinko's filing an answer to Saporito's complaint, with affirmative defenses, affidavits regarding Saporito's alleged application for re-employment and a motion for an enlargement of time. Saporito delayed and lacked diligence in prosecuting his action, e.g., his delay in responding to the ALJ's Order to Show Cause why he should not dismiss Saporito's underlying complaint as untimely. Although previously advised to seek legal counsel, Saporito gave as his only reason for withdrawing his complaint that he was at an "economic disadvantage" because he could not compensate a lawyer to represent him. Finally, Saporito waited until the ALJ had scheduled the hearing on the merits, and had set and then enlarged the date for filing dispositive motions. This was at a late stage of the litigation, when he was facing a potential adverse ruling on the merits of his case.
Conclusion
Applying the principles of Rule 41(a)(2) and weighing the relative equities between the parties, we hold that Saporito's complaint should be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
WAYNE C. BEYER
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 The environmental whistleblower laws's implementing regulations, found at 29 C.F.R. Part 24, have been amended since Saporito filed the complaint in this case. 72 Fed. Reg. 44,956 (Aug. 10, 2007). It is unnecessary for us to determine whether the amendments apply to Saporito's complaint because they are not implicated by the issue presented and thus, even if the amendments were applicable to this complaint, they would not affect our decision
2 Section 1978.111(c) provides:
At any time before the findings or order become final, a party may withdraw his objections to the findings or order by filing a written withdrawal with the administrative law judge or, if the case is on review, with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor. The judge or the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, as the case may be, shall affirm any portion of the findings or preliminary order with respect to which the objection was withdrawn.