discharge for unavailability is not a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for discharge. (CX 68) Each of these reasons relates to the grievance procedure and the availability of discharge in response to the unavailability charges. Again, assuming that each of the six reasons provided were legitimate, and Respondent acted in contravention to any negotiated contract providing protection to it's employees, such actions are properly addressed by the grievance procedures provided in those contracts.
Respondent articulates that it dismissed Carmichael for being "unavailable." (JX 18) The disciplinary process with respect to Carmichael's unavailability began prior to his alleged protected activity, and I find that it continued through in accordance with the NMFA to his ultimate discharge. The disciplinary letters of record refer to six instances of unavailability over a six month period. (JX 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) Carmichael has not provided evidence that these instances of unavailability were for any protected activity. Complainant has not demonstrated that discharge for unavailability is a pretext for discharging Complainant in contravention to the STAA. Accordingly, I find that Respondent's discharge of Carmichael for unavailability was not motivated by any protected activity, and therefore does not establish a pattern of retaliation.
[Page 16]
The first fatigue break at issue was taken on April 23, 1998. He asserts that the April 23, 1998 fatigue break constituted protected activity. Polger, supra. Respondent articulates that Carmichael was not disciplined for taking a fatigue break, but for not notifying the dispatcher of his break, and a delay of freight based upon his late arrival in Evansville, Indiana, on April 24, 1998. (JX 22) Complainant contends that his late arrival was due to his fatigue break, which he alleges was taken at 6:15 a.m., and therefore the discipline was for taking a fatigue break, making the delay of freight discipline pretextual. Complainant bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual and that he was discriminated against by Respondent. Moon v. Transport Drivers, Inc. , 836 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1987); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Carmichael admits the underlying facts with respect to the delay of freight discipline issued by Respondent. He admits that he failed to call dispatch regarding the fatigue breaks in question, and that it took nine hours and fifty minutes to travel 297 miles. Dale Oliver testified that estimated times of arrival were established, but not communicated to drivers for routes and that drivers who significantly deviated from those times were disciplined. (Tr. 433) Due to the nature of the industry, insignificant deviations received no discipline. Id . Furthermore, Mr. Oliver testified that he was unaware of Carmichael's fatigue breaks at the time that he made the decision to issue the discipline letter. (Tr. 384)
Carmichael was assigned to drive from Indianapolis, Indiana to Memphis, Tennessee. (JX 22, Tr. 715) During his off-duty time, he tried to rest at a local hotel, but he alleges that he was prevented from sleeping by excessive outside noises. On his return trip he departed for Indianapolis, Indiana, via Evansville, Indiana. Carmichael testified that prior to his arrival in Evansville, he took a fatigue break from 6:15 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. The log, however, memorializes this break as having occurred at 10:00 a.m., after his arrival in Evansville. Complainant explains this discrepancy as a "mistake" in logging his hours. When confronted with the impossibility of taking the fatigue break and making it to Evansville at the time he did, Carmichael testified that he "might" have made a further mistake in documenting a lunch period as well, logging the break as longer than he actually took. (Tr. 913) I accord more weight to the log book as an accurate chronicle of Mr. Carmichael's run, and less weight to Complainant's inconsistent testimony. Accordingly, I find that Complainant's April 24, 1998 fatigue break was taken as memorialized in his log. Therefore, the discipline for April 24, 1998 delay of freight discipline could not have been related to a fatigue break taken after arriving in Evansville.
Furthermore, Complainant took and logged fifteen fatigue breaks between April and September of 1998 with no disciplinary action taken. Still further, Respondent provides evidence of fourteen other employees taking fatigue breaks without disciplinary action, and of seven employees with delays of freight receiving the same penalties prescribed under the collective bargaining agreements with no fatigue breaks. (RX O) Similarly situated employees subjected to similar disciplinary proceedings suggests that Carmichael's discipline was not retaliatory. Moon , supra. Carmichael acknowledged that he took and logged a "substantial number" of fatigue breaks during his twenty-four year employment with Respondent with no disciplinary action taken. (Tr. 822) Accordingly, Carmichael has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the April 28, 1998 discipline for delay of freight was motivated by his fatigue break.
[Page 17]
The second fatigue break occurred on May 1, 1998. (JX 23) Carmichael asserts that he was disciplined for this break in contravention to the STAA. Respondent asserts that even without considering the fatigue break, Carmichael averaged approximately thirty miles per hour on this route and that Complainant failed to call to notify the dispatcher that he would arrive late. Complainant testified that his high sugar levels caused his fatigue, and that even though he was off duty for more than twenty-seven hours prior to this run, he couldn't rest. These facts do not demonstrate that Respondent's articulated reason for discharging Carmichael are pretextual. Mr. Ping testified that even subtracting out the time it took for Carmichael's fatigue break, he would still have been disciplined for averaging less than thirty miles per hour, which is too slow for a professional driver. (Tr. 240) Messrs. Ping, Oliver, and Gregory agree that averaging thirty miles per hour is unreasonable. (Tr. 258, 486, 643) Complainant has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been disciplined for the excess time taken on this run, nor that he was disciplined for taking a fatigue break.
Complainant again argues that as no estimated times of arrival were disclosed for these routes, there can be no discipline for not meeting these times. As discussed above, Mr. Oliver regularly disciplined drivers for significantly exceeding reasonable travel times. Mr. Gregory confirms that thirty miles per hour is not a reasonable average for a professional driver. (Tr. 643)
Carmichael was disciplined on May 15, 1998, for a delay of freight occurring on May 13, 1998. (JX 24) There was no fatigue break taken during this run. Carmichael asserts that this discipline is in retaliation for taking and logging the fatigue break on May 1, 1998. Respondent again asserts that this discipline is appropriately given in response to delayed freight caused by Carmichael's late arrival time. Carmichael points to the fact that he was late due to being issued a city tractor for this over-the-road run, and the city tractor would only travel at approximately 55 miles per hour. On his equipment inspection report following the trip to Indianapolis, Carmichael noted no problems with the tractor. (RX N) Vince Pearson, maintenance coordinator for Respondent, testified that the tractor driven by Carmichael on May 13, 1998, had the same transmission and engine as every other truck used by Respondent. (Tr. 951) I find Mr. Pearson's testimony with respect to the equipment driven by Carmichael more persuasive, as he is a maintenance coordinator for the equipment.
Even assuming that Carmichael's tractor was running slow, at a maximum speed of fifty-five miles per hour, this does not demonstrate pretext. Respondent disciplined Complainant for averaging less than thirty miles per hour. Mr. Ping testified that thirty miles per hour is an unacceptable rate of travel for a professional driver. (Tr. 258) Mr. Gregory and Mr. Oliver confirmed this fact. (Tr. 486, 643) I find that Complainant was disciplined for slow travel times and the resulting freight delays. Complainant has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that this discipline was motivated by discriminatory intent.
[Page 18]
Carmichael was discharged on May 27, 1998, for delayed freight. Again, this discipline involves no fatigue breaks, but Complainant asserts that he was disciplined in violation of § 405(a), in retaliation for logging previous fatigue breaks, and grieving discipline. Respondent articulates that it disciplined Complainant for a failure to call CF when he didn't arrive at his scheduled meet location at the appointed time.
Again, Dale Oliver issued this discipline. He testified that he disciplined Complainant for arriving late at his destination with no phone call regarding problems. This discipline was also investigated by Larry Ping, who determined that due to time discrepancies, Complainant was one hour and ten minutes late, rather than the two hours alleged in the discipline. Mr. Ping, however, determined that the discipline was still warranted as Mr. Carmichael was still more than an hour late without a phone call, and that he averaged thirty-nine miles per hour. Mr. Ping investigated Complainants allegations of equipment problems by checking equipment writeups from prior and subsequent drivers. He found no problems. As discussed above, Messrs. Gregory, Oliver, and Ping all opined that average speeds in the thirty to forty mile per hour range were unacceptable. I place substantial weight on Mr. Ping's investigation, as his investigation revealed information in Complainant's favor, but he still deemed the discipline warranted due to unreasonable travel times. Carmichael has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that this discipline was motivated by discriminatory intent.
Carmichael was discharged on September 25, 1998, for delayed freight. He again had an average speed of approximately thirty-seven miles per hour in this run. Mr. Oliver testified that he did not discipline Carmichael for being fatigued, but for failing to call with respect to his nap. Mr. Ping investigated this discipline and determined that it was appropriate considering Mr. Carmichael's travel time. For reasons mentioned above, I again place great weight on Mr. Oliver and Mr. Ping's testimony, and find no discriminatory intent in this discipline. Carmichael has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this discipline was administered in retaliation for taking fatigue breaks. This final discipline was not timely grieved by Carmichael, and his late grievance was ultimately dismissed, and his discharge made final.
Conclusion
It is my belief that Complainant is attempting to circumvent the processes contained in the NMFA, and other contractual provisions, by re-litigating these claims under the rubric of STAA violations since his discharge became final due to the untimely grievance. Carmichael's discipline followed the guidelines provided by the collectively bargained for agreements. He claims discriminatory discipline by managers of CF, and yet acknowledges that these same managers returned him to work several times following his voluntary resignations. Even after repeated warnings and disciplines, Carmichael did not perform his job to the expectations of CF, and was ultimately discharged. He was not disciplined, discriminated against or discharged for any protected activities. Complainant has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, a pattern of retaliation by CF, or discriminatory retaliation for taking and logging fatigue breaks. He was disciplined because it was warranted.
[Page 19]
RECOMMENDED ORDER
In view of the above findings, I recommend that Complainant, Otis J. Carmichael's claim for reinstatement, back pay, and attorney fees be DENIED.
Rudolf L. Jansen
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE : This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in this matter will be forwarded for review by the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-4309, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20210.
[ENDNOTES]
1 In this decision, "JX" refers to Joint Exhibits, "ALJX" refers to the Administrative Law Judge Exhibits, "CX" refers to Complainant Exhibits, "RX" refers to Respondent Exhibits and "Tr." to the Transcript of the hearing.
2 Pursuant to the National Master Freight Agreement and the Indiana Uniform Rules and Regulations, a driver is permitted to continue work during the pendency of the grievance process. (JX 02, 06)
3 A twenty-four hour slide is an employee request for twenty-four hours off.
4 A "meet time" is a designated time for a driver to meet up with another driver to trade equipment.
5 Seventy-two hour notices are considered a voluntary resignation by the employee. (Tr. 491) The driver does not work pending determination of a grievance of a seventy-two hour rule, because the driver effectively quit his job. (Id.)
6 Larry Ping testified that Respondent could not have obtained a full and final discharge based upon the absenteeism. (Tr. 96-97)
7 The August 25, 1998 discharge for unavailability was rescinded by Respondent as it was improperly served on Complainant. (JX 19; Tr. 54)