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USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Stoner v. General Physics Corp., 1998-ERA-44 (ALJ Sept. 4, 1998)


U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
7 Parkway Center
875 Greentree Road, Room 290
Pittsburgh, PA 15220

412/644-5754

DATE ISSUED: September 4, 1998

CASE NO.: 1998-ERA-44

In the matter of

EDWARD D. STONER
    Complainant

v

GENERAL PHYSICS CORP.

and

NIAGARA MOHAWK CORP.
    Respondents

RULING AND ORDER ON RESPONDENTS' MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL
AND
ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE WHY DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

AND

DOCKETING ORDER

Background, Motions and Contentions

   A hearing is scheduled, in the above-styled proceeding, on October 6, 1998, in Skaneateles, New York. On August 27, 1998, counsel for respondent, Niagara Mohawk


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Corporation (hereinafter "Niagara"), Mr. Thomas D. Keleher, Esq., filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Dismissal for Failure to Comply With Procedure should not be granted. Mr. Keleher argues the Order should issue because the complainant failed to serve copies of his appeal from the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) determination in accordance with the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d).1

   In support of his motion, Mr. Keleher cites the administrative law judge's decision and order in Webb v. Numanco, LLC, 98-ERA-27 & 28 (ALJ July 17, 1998) as authority. In Webb, distinguishing Jain v. Sacramento Municipal Utility, 89-ERA-39 (1989), the judge dismissed an Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) whistleblower's complaint for failure to timely serve copies of the request for a hearing on the respondents as required by the regulations.2 Finding "inherent prejudice" to the respondents, the judge recommended dismissal of the complaint ruling that he lacked jurisdiction because the complainant failed to perfect a timely appeal by failing to properly serve the respondents.3 Niagara argues the Webb decision is fully supported by cases such as Staskelunas v. Northeast Utilities Co., 98-ERA-8 (ARB May 4, 1998)(whistleblower protection provisions require expedited filing and a complainant who relies on alternative methods for delivery, e.g., by mail, assumes the risk that the request may be beyond the due date) and Degostin v. Barlett Nuclear Inc., 98-ERA-7 (ARB May 4, 1998)(time limits for requesting hearing must be strictly construed).

   On September 3, 1998, General Physics Corporation (hereinafter "General Physics"), through its counsel, Peter D. Carmen, Esq., joined in Niagara's motions adding specific requests for dismissal, deeming the OSHA Determination to be the final order of the Secretary, and for such other relief as may be just and proper. General Physics essentially argues that the complainant's failure to timely serve it with a copy of his request for a hearing divests the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) of jurisdiction. It argues the complainant was derelict in failing to serve a copy on the same day and secondly by failing to serve a copy by the regulatory means specified.

   The complainant's counsel, Mr. David Blum, Esq., avers because of the short time frames involved in this action he was unable to adequately research the issues presented in the Niagara motion and his client was unavailable to make an affidavit. He points out that: (1) his client was not represented by counsel in his dealings with the Department of Labor;4 (2) Mr. Stoner timely instituted the proceeding; (3) there is some evidence Mr. Stoner may have provided the respondents with notice; (4) he questions whether the rules permit a ruling on the motion solely based upon


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Niagara's hearsay allegations; and, the finding of " Clear and Conclusive Evidence'" appears to be clearly and conclusively erroneous." Finally, he argues dismissal would "serve no end of justice and would fail to achieve the purposes of this tribunal."

Facts

   The complainant filed his whistleblower complaint with OSHA on April 15, 1998. OSHA provided Niagara Mohawk with a copy of the complaint on April 20, 1998. After an investigation, the Regional Administrator determined the complaint to be without merit. On July 10, 1998, the Administrator informed the parties of the results of his investigation. OSHA's letter informed the complainant of the procedures necessary to pursue the matter further, including the requirement of sending a copy of any hearing request to the respondents on the same day as it is sent to the Office of Administrative Law Judges.5 In a letter, dated July 14, 1998, sent by facsimile to the Office of Administrative Law Judges, the complainant expressed his desire for a formal hearing. The complainant's letter reflects that copies were purportedly sent to P.D. Carmen of General Physics, Patricia Clark of the Department of Labor (DOL), and to R.A. Laberge of Niagara Mohawk. It appears the complainant may not have been represented by counsel at the time he requested the hearing.

   Niagara avers that neither OSHA, General Physics Corporation or its counsel, Peter Carmen, Esq., Niagara's counsel, Bond, Schoeneck & King, LLP, or Niagara itself ever received copies of the complainant's request for a hearing. In a sworn affidavit, Mr. Carmen, avers that General Physics was never served with a copy of the complainant's request for a hearing.6 Mr. Carmen also believes neither the Regional OSHA Administrator nor Niagara were served by the complainant. General Physics had still not been served by the complainant as of September 3, 1998, the date of its motion.

   My Notice of Hearing was issued on July 28, 1998. On August 28, 1998, Mr. Mark Blum, Esquire, entered his written appearance on behalf of the complainant.

The Law

Service of Pleadings

   The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (hereinafter "the Act" or "ERA"), under which this action was initiated, contains no explicit provisions concerning service of copies of documents seeking an administrative review of the initial determination by the Occupational Safety and Health


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Administration following its investigation of a covered employee's complaint. However, the implementing regulations, found in 29 C.F.R. Part 24 do. The Act does establish specific time frames in which a "complaint" must be filed, investigated, for the issuance of a final order by the Secretary, and for appellate review of the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b) and (c). The regulations say the procedures are established for the purpose of "expeditious handling of complaints by employees . . . of discriminatory action by employers." 29 C.F.R. 24.1(b).

Part 24 Procedures

   Part 24, 29 C.F.R., refers to the aggrieved employee's first filing, instituting the initial OSHA investigative stage, as a "complaint." 29 C.F.R. § 24.3. "Upon receipt of a complaint under this part, the Administrator shall notify the person named in the complaint . . ."7 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(a). After the Administrator has completed an investigation and issued a "notice of determination," the aggrieved employee has five business days within which to request a hearing "on the complaint." 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(2). "If a request for a hearing is not timely filed, the notice of determination shall become the final order of the Secretary." 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(2). The section also provides:

A copy of the request for a hearing shall be sent by the party requesting a hearing to the complainant or the respondent (employer), as appropriate, on the same day that the hearing is requested, by . . .

29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(3).

Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings

   Part 18, 29 C.F.R., Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, states:

These rules of practice are generally applicable to adjudicatory proceedings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, United States Department of Labor . . . To the extent these rules may be inconsistent with a rule of special application as provided by statute, executive order, or regulation, the latter is controlling. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States shall be applied in any situation not provided for or controlled by these rules, or by any statute, executive order or regulation.

29 C.F.R. § 18.1(a). Since Part 24, 29 C.F.R. contains rules of special application concerning service of copies of hearing requests it governs over Part 18. However, Part 18 contains useful definitions. It states that a "complaint" means:


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any document initiating an adjudicatory proceeding, whether designated a complaint, appeal or an order for proceeding or otherwise.

29 C.F.R. § 18.2(d). The complaint is also a "pleading." 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(i). An "adjudicatory proceeding" means "a judicial-type proceeding leading to the formulation of a final order." 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(a). Part 18 has separate definitions of the terms "complaint" and the terms

"commencement of proceeding." The latter terms are defined as "the filing of a request for hearing, order of reference, or referral of a claim for hearing."8 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(o). Part 18 requires service of complaints and pleadings upon parties. 29 C.F.R. § 18.3.

Part 24 History

   The Department of Labor (DOL) first sought to amend the regulations governing employee "whistleblower" protection provisions, in a March 16, 1994 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in order to implement Section 2902 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, P.L. 102-486 (106 Stat. 2776)(October 24, 1992).9 59 FR 12506. The DOL proposal provided that a copy of a request for a hearing "shall be sent by the complainant to the respondent (employer) on the same day that the hearing is requested . . ." 59 FR 12509. The DOL followed an interim rule requiring such service pending the effective date of the final rule. 59 FR 41874-01. Section 2902 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 itself did not create any such requirement. The March 11, 1998, amendments to 29 C.F.R. § 24.4 set forth explicit rules for service of copies of the hearing request. Webb v. Numanco, LLC, 98-ERA-27 & 28 (ALJ July 17, 1998). As the judge in Webb pointed out, the explanatory notes to the promulgated regulations said, "Sec. 24.4 is revised to make it clear that service of copies of the appeal must be done by the party appealing." Webb citing 63 FR 6613 at 6617 (Feb. 9, 1998).

   Part 24 clearly provides that the Administrator's "notice of determination" will not become the Secretary's final order and is inoperative if the complainant timely files the hearing request. 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(2). The current provisions for the same day service of a copy of the hearing request is contained in a separate paragraph which also specifies that a copy shall be sent to the OSHA Assistant Secretary and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, DOL. 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(3).

Administrative Procedures Act

   The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) applies to all adjudications required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). The notice provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act must be complied with when an adjudicatory proceeding is conducted under the APA. The APA states notice must:


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(1) be timely;
(2) inform the parties of the time, place, and nature of the hearing;
(3) inform the parties of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and,
(4) inform the parties of the matters of fact and law asserted.

5 U.S.C. § 554(b). "When private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceedings shall give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 554(b). The purpose of these "notice" provisions, to inform the parties of matters of fact and law asserted, is satisfied when the respondent understands the issues and is given the full opportunity to defend itself. Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1992) cert. den. 93 S.Ct. 2730, 412 U.S. 918, 37 L.Ed. 2d 144.

Due Process

   Constitutional "due process" requires parties to any final agency proceeding affecting constitutionally protected interests be given notice of such proceedings which not only informs them proceedings have been instituted, but also contains sufficient information to allow preparation and presentation of objections. Stein, Mitchell, & Mezines, Administrative Law, Vol. 4, Section 33.03[2] (1990). "Alleged procedural irregularities in the pleadings will not invalidate the proceedings unless the irregularities were so serious as to prejudice a party." Stein, Mitchell, & Mezines, Administrative Law, Vol. 4, Section 33.03[3] (1990) citing Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1977).

Jurisdictional Matters

   Other than the United States Supreme Court, every other federal court or administrative tribunal draws its jurisdiction wholly from Congress. 32 Am Jur 2d, Organization of Federal Courts, Section 3, citing Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226. It is well settled that federal jurisdiction cannot be extended or abridged by rule of a court, such as a rule related to pleadings. 32 Am Jur 2d, Organization of Federal Courts, Section 6, citing Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed 1148. The law authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure do not authorize it to alter jurisdiction: no substantive rights are to be abridged, modified or enlarged. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and Alley v. Federal Nat. Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir.). In fact, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 82 states that "[T]hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts or the venue of actions therein."

   Congress has the exclusive power to regulate practice in federal courts and may legislate the form and effect of process. 32 Am Jur 2d, Organization of Federal Courts, Section 6, citing Keary v. Farmers & Merchant's Bank, 41 U.S. 89, 10 L.Ed. 897; Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed 253; and, Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. 166, 18 L.Ed. 768. The test of whether a procedural rule violates the Rules Enabling Act, authorizing the Federal Rules, is whether it really regulates procedure; that is, the


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judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law. 32 Am Jur 2d, Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 505.

Discussion of Facts and Law

   Neither the ERA nor Section 2902 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 make service of a copy of the hearing request on OALJ, OSHA, DOL or the parties either a prerequisite to hearing such matter or obtaining jurisdiction over such matters. Nor do the regulations address the status of these procedural service rules or the ramifications of non-adherence to the established rules. The ERA establishes specific time frames in which a "complaint" must be filed and investigated, for the issuance of a final order by the Secretary, and for appellate review of the matter. Many of these time frames may constitute jurisdictional matters, but that issue need not be resolved here. The Administrative Procedures Act, applicable here, requires "prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law" when private persons are the moving parties.10

   The resolution of this motion calls for a determination of exactly what function a complainant's request for a hearing serves. Is it a "complaint" or a "pleading other than a complaint"? The hearing before an administrative law judge is an adjudicative proceeding. Under 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(d) any document which begins an "adjudicative proceeding" is a "complaint". However, Part 24 refers to the aggrieved employee's initial submission to OSHA as the "complaint." In ERA cases, such as this, the request for a hearing does not serve the traditional purposes of a complaint while the complainant's initial submission to OSHA does. That is, it notifies the respondents of the issues controverted in fact or law.

   "The filing of a complaint is the first procedural step for the commencement of a federal action." Moore's Federal Practice Rules Pamphlet 1988, Part 1, Section 3.4 (1989). A "complaint" is generally defined as:

the pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . (which) contain(s): (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.

Black's Law Dictionary, (Fifth Edition 1979), page 258.

   So, while the Part 18, 29 C.F.R., definition of what constitutes a "complaint," is informative, it is not conclusive in matters instituted under Part 24, C.F.R. The complainant's initial submission to OSHA, rather than his request for a hearing, is called the "complaint," in Part 24, and serves the purpose of the same. The initial complaint is the first procedural step for the commencement of a "federal action."11 The subsequent request for a hearing


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appears to be merely an ancillary pleading such as referred to in FRCP 5 although it is also a document "commencing the proceeding", as defined in 29 C.F.R. §18.2(o).12

   Even if the request for a hearing is considered a "complaint," the lack of a complaint is generally not held to be jurisdictional where no statute of limitations issues are involved. Moore's Federal Practice, Section 3.04, (2nd Ed. 1989) citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed. 591 (1975)(where the plaintiff's papers were sufficient to apprise the defendants of the nature of the claim and invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction).

   I cannot agree with the judge's reasoning in Webb v. Numanco. I believe that Jain v. Sacramento represents the better resolution of such matters.13 I find the cases concerning timely filing relied upon in Webb inapposite to the matter in issue.14 Nor can I find any "inherent prejudice" in a complainant's failure to properly serve an opposing party with a copy of a request for a hearing.15 In Jain, the copying requirements, then in effect, with which the complainant had not complied, were found to be merely directive rather than jurisdictional in nature. The jurisdictional requirements of the regulation were found met by the complainant's filing of a request for a hearing with the Chief Administrative Law Judge. I observe that the present "service" provision is contained in a paragraph separate from that stating that a failure to timely request a hearing makes the notice of determination the final order of the Secretary. Nothing in the regulations indicates that a failure to serve a copy of the hearing request is either jurisdictional or that such a failure affects the validity of the filing. Paragraph 24.4(d)(2) only states that failure to timely file a hearing request will result in the notice of determination becoming the final order of the Secretary. "Filing" is nowhere equated with sending a copy of the hearing request to a respondent.

   A comparison of the nature of the specific procedural rules established in Part 24, which lack an explicit statutory basis, with the nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules promulgating authority strongly suggests the former procedural rules, created by an executive agency, can have no jurisdictional impact.

   In addition to finding no explicit statutory authority for the provision requiring same-day service of a copy of the request for a hearing sent to the Chief Administrative Law Judge, I conclude that the potential prejudice of such dereliction is cured by the requirement, followed in this case, that the administrative law judge notify the parties, within seven calendar days following the receipt of a hearing request, of the day, time and place for hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 24.5(a). The respondents have alleged no prejudice and have not sought any continuance. They have been aware of this matter since April 20, 1998. Further, when as here, the Administrator initially notifies employers of the complaint and later provides


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respondents with copies of the employee's complaint and the results of the Administrator's investigation along with a notice of determination the latter employers are fully apprised of issues controverted in fact or law. Due process, the APA, and the ERA require no more.

   Finally, at the time the complainant filed his hearing request with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, it appears he was not represented by counsel. A balancing of the purposes of the Act, i.e., whistleblower protection, and regulatory procedures, i.e., expeditious processing of complaints, versus any potential prejudice to the respondents, under these circumstances, compels a ruling in favor of the complainant on this matter.

Conclusions

   The requirement of 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(3) for a complainant to serve a copy of the request for a hearing on respondents the same day it is filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge is merely directive and not jurisdictional. There is no explicit support for the requirement in the ERA or APA. Although lamentable, the initially pro se complainant's failure to adhere to the requirement does not deprive this tribunal of jurisdiction nor deprive the respondents of either due process or any statutory right. The respondents have not alleged prejudice nor do I find any.

ORDER

   WHEREFORE, the respondents' Motions are DENIED. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 6, 1998, and continue, if necessary, through Friday, October 9, 1998, at the location specified below:

Sherwood Inn
26 West Genesee St.
Skaneateles, New York
(315) 685-8983

       RICHARD A. MORGAN
       Administrative Law Judge

RAM:DMR

[ENDNOTES]

1 On August 28, 1998, because of the close temporal proximity of the scheduled hearing, I issued an Order requiring responses, if any, to the Motion be filed not later than the close of business on September 3, 1998. On September 3, 1998, I issued a Supplemental Order extending the time for replies.

2 The complainant, represented by counsel at the time, requested a hearing of the Office of Administrative Law Judges via facsimile, on May 6, 1998, but used regular mail to inform one of two respondents in a letter dated eight days later. The second respondent was never served a copy.

3 The Administrator has appealed Webb. Briefs are due in the matter on September 14, 1998.

4 At the same time, Mr. Blum states that Mr. Stoner had provided the (OSHA) investigator with his name and address as his attorney and that he was not served with a copy of the final finding.

5 OSHA's letter erroneously stated the complainant had five calendar days to request a hearing when the regulation had been changed to allow five business days.

6 General Physics only received a copy when it asked the OALJ to send one via facsimile on August 5, 1998.

7 "Person" includes corporations and other business entities. 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(h).

8 The Administrative Procedures Act makes the following definitions:

"Adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of an order; "agency proceeding" means an agency process as defined by paragraphs (5)(rule making), (7)(adjudication), and (9)(licensing) of this section. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (7) & (12).

9 Enforcement authority for whistleblower claims, under the Act and the Energy policy Act of 1992, was transferred to OSHA under Secretary's order 6-96, 62 FR 111 (1/2/97). 62 FR 57725-01.

10 The OALJ Notice of Hearing provided the requisite timely notice of the time and place of the hearing, the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held, and the general allegations to be considered. Such notice satisfies constitutional "due process" concerns.

11 The APA defines "agency action" as including "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).

12 Matters would be less confusing if 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(o) was entitled "Commencement of Adjudicatory Proceeding" rather than "Commencement of Proceeding." If an aggrieved employee's initial "complaint" to OSHA, under 29 C.F.R. § 24.3, was not intended to be a "complaint" commencing an "adjudicatory proceeding," perhaps it should be referred to as a "petition," as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 18.2(m). If not, the "complaint," under 29 C.F.R. § 24.3, not the request for an adjudicatory hearing, should clearly be the operative document. Presently, the latter document does not serve the purposes of a legal "complaint."

13 Although I do share the judge's concern that "[t]he logical extension of this (the complainant's) reasoning renders the service requirements of the regulation to be superfluous and basically meaningless."

14 As noted above, failure to comply with statutorily created time limits might constitute jurisdictional defects. See, Staskelunas and Degostin, and cases cited therein, supra.

15 Such inherent prejudice was found in Webb because failure to serve the copy of the hearing request could affect the respondent's ability to respond to a timely appeal by a timely cross-appeal or because it could cause the respondent to rely on an OSHA finding which is inoperative.



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