U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
Heritage Plaza Bldg, 5th Floor
111 Veteran's Memorial Boulevard
Metairie, LA 70005
CASE NO.: 97-ERA-53
In the Matter of
CURTIS C. OVERALL
Complainant
v.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Respondent
APPEARANCES:
Charles W. VanBeke, Esq.
Wagner, Myers & Sanger
P. O. Box 1308
Knoxville, TN 37901-1308
For the Complainant
Thomas F. Fine, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel
Angela Tyson Floyd, Esq.
Office of the General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, TN 37902-1499
For the Respondent
BEFORE:
CLEMENT J. KENNINGTON
Administrative Law Judge
PRELIMINARY ORDER GRANTING RELIEF AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
On April 27, 1998, the Administrative Review Board remanded this case
to
[Page 2]
me for issuance of a preliminary order pursuant to 63 Fed. Reg. 6624 (Feb. 19, 1998), to be
codified
at 24 C.F.R. § 24.7 (c)(2). That regulation states:
(2) In cases brought under the Energy Reorganization
Act, when an administrative law judge issues a recommended
order that the complaint has merit and containing the relief
prescribed in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the administrative
law judge shall also issue a preliminary order providing all of
the relief specified in paragraph (c)(1) of this section with the
exception of compensatory damages. This preliminary order
shall constitute the preliminary order of the Secretary and
shall be effective immediately, whether or not a petition for
review is filed with the Administrative Review Board. Any
award of compensatory damages shall not be effective until
the final decision is issued by the Administrative Review Board.
In accord with the remand order I hereby issue the following preliminary order and
supplemental
order on attorney's fees and costs providing that:
(1) TVA shall reinstate Overall to his former position of power plant
maintenance specialist (SD-4) at Watts Bar, or, if no longer available, to a substantially
equivalent
position with back pay from November 4, 1995, until his reinstatement and provide him with
such
other benefits as he would have been entitled to had he not been discriminated against. TVA
shall
receive credit for all compensation and wages paid amounting to $13,415.99 with the exception
of
his earnings from unemployment compensation amounting to $6,240.00.1
1 Attached as Exhibit 1 to this
Preliminary
Order, is a recent Amended Joint Stipulation No. 34 signed by the parties reflecting additional
expenses incurred by Claimant as well as earnings following his layoff by TVA.
2 All of these expenses are set
forth
in the attached Amended Stipulation No. 34.
3Mr. Van Beke filed a Petition for
Attorney Fees and Expenses with supporting affidavits on April 20, 1998 and a Supplemental
Petition for Attorney Fees on April 27, 1998. Mr. Fine filed a response on behalf of TVA.
Copies
of these documents are attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 respectively. In his response Mr. Fine
asserts
the following: (1) travel time for depositions should be listed separately and charge at a lower
rate;
(2) 10.4 hours charged for the motion for an extension of time to respond to TVA's motion for
summary judgment is excessive; (3) 64.7 hours charged for Claimant's response to TVA's
motion
for summary judgment is excessive; (4) 18.5 hours charged for the time spent by Ms. Boulton in
researching the issue of compensatory damages is excessive; (5) 41.5 hours charged by Ms.
Boulton
for reading and indexing the hearing transcript is excessive; (6) 217.65 hours of time charged for
a post hearing brief is excessive; (7) the fee of Dr. W. T. Becker, metallurgical consultant to
evaluate metallurgical reports is unwarranted because any information supplied by Dr. W. T.
Becker
relative to the ice basket screw issue was irrelevant.
My review of the fee petitions indicates that travel time for depositions
was
properly listed on 3 separate occasions for a total of 23 hours ( 10/23/97-8 hours; 10/27/98-9
hours;
12/31/97-6 hours). The hourly rate for travel is excessive and is reduced 50 percent to $100.00
per
hour for a total compensation of $2,300.00. Jenkins v. United States Environmental
Protection
Agency, 92-CAA-6 (Sec'y Dec. 7, 1994).
The times charged for the motion for summary judgment and motion for
extension of time appear to be reasonable and will not be reduced. However the time charged by
Ms.
Boulton for reading and indexing the hearing transcript (41.5 hours) is excessive and is reduced
by
50 percent to 20.75 hours. McCafferty v. Centerior Energy, 96-ERA-6 ( ARB Sept 24,
1997). In like manner the time charged for brief writing of 147 hours by Ms. Boulton and 67.2
hours
by Mr. Van Beke is excessive considering the number of hours of pre-trial preparation and
research
particularly with regard to the motion for summary judgment which was allowed in full.
Accordingly the time spent by Ms. Boulton and Mr. Van Beke is reduced by 50 percent to 73.5
hours
for Ms. Boulton and 33.60 hours for Mr. Van Beke.
I find nothing objectionable in the expenses charged for the services of Dr.
W.T. Becker. However, I find, that the supplemental fee of 18 hours charged for fee petition
preparation is excessive and is reduced to 8 hours.