U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Date: June 2, 1997
Case No.: 97-ERA-29
In the Matter of:
Ming-Huei Lee, Complainant
v.
Northeast Utilities
Respondent
RECOMMENDED DECISION APPROVING SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
This is a proceeding arising under the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§5851 (hereinafter "the Act" or "the ERA"), and the implementing
regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Parts 24 and 18. Complainant Ming-Huei Lee (hereinafter
Complainant Lee) has alleged Respondent Northeast Utilities (hereinafter Respondent) retaliated
against him when it terminated his employment as a part of a planned reduction in force in January
1996. Respondent has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Complainant's
claim is barred by a fully executed, valid and binding General Release and Covenant Not to Sue.
[Page 2]
This Judge has determined that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
is proper. The law, however, requires that a settlement agreement which presumes to release liability
for an ERA claim shall be approved by the Administrative Review Board if fair, adequate and
reasonable. Furthermore, the agreement must be found to have been entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. These legal criteria have been met by the conclusive evidence presented in support of
and in opposition to Respondent's Motion and I therefore recommend the agreement be approved,
that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that the complaint be dismissed with
prejudice.
Standard of Review
The standard for granting summary decision is set forth at 29 C.F.R.
§18.40(d). This section, which is derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, permits an ALJ to
recommend summary decision for either party where "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." 29 C.F.R. §18.40(d). The non-moving party must present
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
Gillilian v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 91-ERA-31 (Sec'y 8/28/95)(Citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The determination of whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists must be made viewing all the evidence and factual inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-movant. Id. (Citing OFCCP v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
88-OFC-24 (Asst. Sec'y 10/13/94)). See AlsoLaniok v. Advisory Committee,
935 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying summary judgment based on the existence of genuine issues
of material fact which the trial court had incorrectly assumed in favor of moving party); George
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 739 F.Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying summary judgment even
though many of the Bormann factors, as discussed below, weighed in defendants' favor
because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether plaintiff voluntarily executed the
release).
This Administrative Law Judge, acknowledging that summary decision is
rarely granted, has applied this standard to the case at hand and concludes that Respondent's Motion
shall be and the same is hereby GRANTED.
1Attached to the letter given to
Complainant was a list of job titles and ages of those to be laid-off. There were no names on the list,
nor did the list identify how many of these people had filed safety concerns in the past. Accordingly,
Complainant Lee did not know, at the time he was laid-off, that other terminated employees had also
raised safety complaints.
2Complainant Lee would later come
to find out that the evaluation used to determine who would be affected by the lay-off was called the
matrix or the matrix evaluation.
3Complainant Lee's 1993 performance
evaluation was missing and there was no evaluation for 1995 because, according to Virginia Fleming
in Respondent's Personnel Office, no performance review was done in that year.
4Although Complainant indicates this
as the first time he learned of the matrix evaluation, see affidavit para. 19, I note he truly
first learned of the evaluation, although not by its specific name, when he spoke with the unidentified
woman in Human Resources sometime between January 11 and January 29, 1996.
6It is not clear from Complainant Lee's
affidavit or his opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment as to when he came into possession
of this letter.
7As the affidavit recites, this is a belief
of Complainant Lee and the allegation is not supported by specific fact.
8This language is further discussed
infra, at pp. 7-8.
9At page 1, paragraph 1, Complainant
releases and forever discharges Respondent "from any and all claims, charges, grievances,
demands, actions or liabilities of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, suspected or
unsuspected,..., including but not limited to claims, charges, grievances,, demands, actions or
liabilities of any nature, arising from or relating in any way to any act or omission occurring prior to
the date of this Release..." At page 1, paragraph 3, Complainant releases Respondent from
"any and all claims that I have or may he had against the [Respondent], including ... any
statutory or common law claims, including but not limited to claims for ... wrongful discharge or
violation of public policy. At page 1, paragraph 4, Complainant agrees he will "never institute
a claim, grievance, charge, lawsuit, or action of any kind against the [Respondent] including but not
limited to claims related to my employment or termination from my employment..."
10Complainant Lee's ERA claim
was originally consolidated with complaints of three other complainants because of the similarity of
issues. The complaints were subsequently bifurcated because there are no allegations in Complainant
Lee's complaint, numbered 97-ERA-29, over which this Judge may retain jurisdiction. In
comparison, the three other complainants have alleged retaliatory conduct which post-dates their
individual releases. Accordingly, this Judge has retained those complaints for a hearing on those
blacklisting matters.
11Also in this regard, I found it
interesting that while Complainant Lee relies on advice allegedly given to Complainant Collins by
Attorney Heagney, Complainant Collins does not mention this advice in his affidavit nor in his
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
12Ms. Guerard admits that
Complainant Lee did meet with her to discuss his particular circumstances, but states that he did not
attempt to re-negotiate the release terms.
13Other complainants in this once
consolidated matter have alleged an attempt and a failure to negotiate terms of the release by another
employee. Although Complainant Lee has not attested that this failure to negotiate by the other
employee played any role in Complainant Lee's failure to attempt to negotiate at all, it is appropriate
to comment on this fact in anticipation of Complainant Lee raising the issue on review. I find the
other employee's attempt to negotiate the release irrelevant for the reason that the attempt post-dates
Complainant Lee's signing of the release. Logically, this subsequent failure to negotiate could have
no impact on Complainant Lee's previous execution of the release without attempt to negotiate. My
finding of irrelevancy is specifically premised upon the timing in this case. Let it be known, however,
that I further question whether Complainant Lee could properly have relied upon another employee's
failure to negotiate in reaching a determination that his own personal attempt to negotiate would be
futile.
14The Court of Appeals noted,
however, that its conclusion should not be misconstrued to indicate that the employer's unwillingness
to negotiate is irrelevant in considering the voluntariness of a waiver. On other facts, the Court
indicated it may deny an employer's motion for summary judgment due to its alleged unwillingness
to negotiate the terms of a waiver. Bormann, supra, at n. 1.
15Complainant Lee further attests
that he has never been called for an interview in regards to these advertisements. This failure to hire,
however, is the subject of a new complaint recently filed by Complainant Lee with the Department
of Labor on May 22, 1997. As I have no jurisdiction over that complaint until such time as the
investigation is completed and the complaint is forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law
Judges, Complainant Lee's Motion to Include Retaliation Claims against Respondent in the current
proceeding is DENIED. In this regard, see Order Denying Complainant Lee's
Request to Consolidate Complaints.