FLUOR HANFORD, INC. and MASTER-LEE HANFORD, Respondents.
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT
MASTER-LEE AND FLUOR HANFORD'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DECISION AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
This consolidated matter arises under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 et seq. ("ERA" or the "Act"), and the regulations promulgated thereunder at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. This statutory provision and implementing regulations protects employees from discrimination in retaliation for engaging in protected activities such as reporting safety violations. Complainant David A. Hannum ("Complainant") proceeds pro se and alleges that Respondents Master-Lee Hanford ("Master-Lee") and Fluor Hanford, Incorporated ("Fluor Hanford" or "Fluor") retaliated against him for voicing safety concerns relating to nuclear operator training procedures at Fluor Hanford. Both Master-Lee and Fluor Hanford have moved for summary decision, denying any retaliation against Complainant. After reviewing the parties' submitted evidence and arguments, I communicated to them in a telephone conference on March 19, 2004 my tentative decision to grant both motions effectively vacating the hearing date previously set for March 22, 2004.
Procedural History
On June 12, 2003, Complainant filed a complaint with the Department of Labor alleging that he had been terminated and blacklisted from employment by Respondents Master-Lee and Fluor Hanford for raising nuclear safety concerns. On August 13, 2003, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued a Notice of Determination to Complainant dismissing his complaint against Respondents on grounds of untimely filing. By Order of October 10, 2003, Complainant's claim of retaliatory termination against Master-Lee was dismissed as untimely, but Complainant's claim of retaliatory blacklisting was permitted to proceed. By Amended Complaint, Complainant alleged that Master-Lee and Fluor Hanford engaged in retaliatory blacklisting by issuing and maintaining a "stop access" order against him.
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Master-Lee filed its first summary decision motion on November 17, 2003, but by Procedural Order issued December 15, 2003, I took such motion under advisement until discovery reached completion. On March 2, 2004, Master-Lee timely filed a renewed motion for summary decision and accompanying brief, with attached exhibits A through E, consisting of selected excerpts from the Depositions of Mr. Charles MacLeod, taken February 13, 2004; Mr. Rick Largent, taken February 10, 2004; Mr. Nick Liewer, taken February 10, 2004; Complainant David Hannum, taken February 20, 2004; and Mr. John Robinson, also taken February 20, 2004. On March 2, 2004, Respondent Fluor Hanford timely filed a summary decision motion, with attached excerpted deposition transcripts of Mr. Robert Heck, Mr. Fritz Strankman, Ms. Shannon Strankman, Ms. Claudette Lang, and Ms. Jackie Slonecker, each taken February 11, 2004; Mr. David Van Leuven, Mr. Robert Day-Phalen, Mr. Charles MacLeod, and Mr. Kenneth Norris, each taken February 13, 2004; and Mr. John Robinson and Complainant.
Complainant filed a timely response, and submitted in support of his response the following: a "position statement" letter on behalf of Fluor Hanford to the Human Rights Commission, dated April 28, 2003; a letter from Complainant to Fluor Hanford dated March 26, 2002; a facsimile dated June 12, 2002 from Fluor consisting of information related to Complainant; and selected excerpts from the depositions of Ms. Shannon Strankman, Ms. Jackie Slonecker, Mr. Rick Largent, Mr. Nick Liewer, Mr. Charles MacLeod, and finally, Mr. John Robinson. Complainant also timely filed a Pre-Hearing Statement on March 9, 2004 with attached proposed exhibits 1 through 133 (hereinafter referred to as "CX"). Having fully considered the allegations, arguments and submissions of the parties, I find and conclude that the motions for summary decision should be granted for the reasons stated below.
Issues for Determination
Whether a genuine issue of material facts exists with regard to whether Complainant has established a prima facie case that either or both Respondent Master-Lee and Respondent Fluor Hanford discriminated against him in violation of the ERA, and whether Complainant's complaint was timely filed.
Discussion
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d), an administrative law judge may enter summary decision for either party if the pleadings, affidavits, material obtained by discovery or otherwise show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. In determining whether summary decision is appropriate, the administrative law judge must consider all the materials submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Han v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and once discharged, the non-moving party must show by evidence beyond the pleadings themselves that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial," there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to summary decision. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory or discriminatory action under the ERA, a complainant must show that (1) the complainant engaged in protected activity; (2) the respondent employer was aware of complainant's engagement in protected activity; (3) the respondent employer subjected complainant to an adverse employment action with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; (4) the respondent is within the term "employer" as defined by § 5851(a)(2) of the ERA; and (5) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Bauer v. U.S. Enrichment Corp., 2001-ERA-9 (ARB May 30, 2003); Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 1998-ERA-40, 1998-ERA-42 (ARB Sept. 29, 2000).
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Complainant began work with Respondent Master-Lee, a subcontractor to Respondent Fluor Hanford, Inc. in March of 2001. Complainant was hired to work at a Department of Energy ("DOE") clean-up site, the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project, as a Senior Task Analyst conducting operation and training classes for the employees of Respondent Fluor Hanford, Inc. Complainant has alleged that between March and April 2001, he made the following recommendations and criticisms to Fluor management: that the nuclear operator task analysis for the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) was "severely deficient" and failed to comply with DOE regulations; that Fluor management did not follow DOE regulations and Fluor Training Procedures related to the development of operator training and related to the qualification of contract instructors; that a nuclear incident involving fissionable materials had occurred because of improper handling procedures and severely deficient nuclear operator training materials; and finally, that the removal of an armed security guard from a fissionable materials storage area was improper. Complainant's Pre-Hearing Statement at 1-8. Complainant further alleged that Fluor employees harassed him during the course of his employment.
On July 12, 2001, Respondent Master-Lee terminated Complainant at the request of Fluor Hanford, allegedly due to Complainant's "performance deficiencies." Following his termination, Complainant submitted a letter to the Washington State Attorney General office, who suggested that Complainant contact the Human Rights Commission and Office of the Insurance Commissioner. CX 92. On July 25, 2001, Complainant contacted the DOE, Office of Special Concerns ("SCO") regarding his "retaliation for not following a direction" given by a Fluor Hanford manager. CX 93. According to the SCO Disposition Form, Complainant reported that in July 2001 he had forgotten his security badge and was "bullied" for it, in that the supervisor required him to buy donuts per some unwritten practice at Hanford; that his training class in July 2001 was wrongly perceived as "a disaster" when computer failure was to blame; and that part of Complainant's "layoff was due to Robert Day-Phalen finding out" about his purchase of a house during the later part of his employment. CX 94. Because the SCO was unable to address these issues, it referred the matter to Fluor Hanford's Employee Concerns Program ("ECP"), who investigated and concluded that "retaliation and intimidation was not substantiated." CX 94. Complainant had repeated to the ECP his allegations initially communicated to the DOE SCO, for instance, that he was "strong-armed" by the Fluor manager for forgetting his badge. Id. According to the ECP report, Complainant was informed that because Complainant felt that his firing was in retaliation for "not bringing donuts" as directed, this did not fall under the ambit of legally protected activities such as taking action to prevent harm to the environment. Id. at 7.
Following Complainant's termination from Master-Lee, Complainant "conducted my own investigation" of the reason for his termination, consisting of "calling up people and asking them if they knew why my [Complainant's] work ended." A few days following Complainant's termination, Complainant allegedly visited Fluor's corporate offices unannounced in order to contact a Fluor corporate officer. On July 20, 2001, Complainant met with Mr. Nick Liewer, Personnel Manager at Master-Lee Hanford, who inquired of Complainant as to whether he had attempted to contact a Fluor officer. Apparently, Mr. Liewer had learned of the event from Mr. Rick Largent, Operations Manager at Master-Lee, who in turn had learned of it through Mr. John Robinson of Fluor Hanford. As part of his investigation, in September 2001, Complainant also contacted Ms. Claudette Lang, the secretary to Mr. Robert Day-Phalen, Fluor's acting Training Manager. Apparently there is a dispute as to what occurred during the telephone conversation between Ms. Lang and Complainant; Ms. Lang testified in deposition that Complainant had asked for Mr. Day-Phalen's home address, that during the conversation she had become "scared" and following its termination had called the Day-Phalen residence, to ensure or at least warn of their physical safety. Mr. Day-Phalen in his deposition testimony stated that, while at a bowling alley, he had received a phone call from Ms. Lang and as a result he immediately went home. Mr. Day-Phalen further testified that in October 2001, a representative from the Benton County Sheriff's Department met with training department employees for awareness training regarding concerns about Complainant.
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In October or November 2001, Complainant continued his erratic behavior of showing up unannounced to continue his personal investigation. He spoke with Mr. Bob Heck, Fluor's Vice President/Project Director of the Spent Fuel Project. Mr. Heck testified via deposition that Complainant had called him late at night to discuss his termination from Master-Lee. In November 2001, Complainant visited the residence of Mr. Fritz Strankman, and spoke with a woman there, apparently the wife of Mr. Strankman. Mrs. Strankman in her deposition testimony recalled a conversation between herself and Complainant; Complainant, however, apparently doubted that the woman, Mrs. Stankman, whom he had asked to be deposed was the woman he had spoken to in November.
On December 3, 2001, Respondent Fluor Hanford, through their in-house counsel, Mr. Charles MacLeod, placed a "Stop Access" or "Denial of Site Access" on Complainant, effectively denying Complainant access to Fluor Hanford sites and making him ineligible for hire there. Complainant was unaware of this status until being informed of it by Mr. MacLeod on February 14, 2002. Complainant filed a second concern with the DOE SCO requesting to know why his site access had been denied and iterated his initial statements made in 2001 to the SCO. The concern, being "an employee employer issue," was referred to Fluor Hanford's ECP on February 22, 2002, which was in turn referred to Fluor Hanford's legal department. CX 98. On March 26, 2002, Complainant submitted a four-page, single-spaced letter to Mr. Van Leuven of Fluor Hanford, iterating the events surrounding his termination and requesting information regarding his "stop access" status. CX 99. Mr. Van Leuven referred the letter to Fluor's legal department.
On March 28, 2002, Complainant filed a charge of discrimination against Master-Lee Hanford with the EEOC and Washington State Human Rights Commission. CX 123. Complainant alleged that during his employment he was "the target of unwanted sexual attention"; and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment because he "failed to follow a manager's demand that I buy donuts." He further alleged that he had been discharged because of his religion, age, the potential high costs of health care associated with his daughter, and finally, because of his "complaints about decreased security measures and about poor management procedural practices." Id. Complainant's charge was later dismissed, and the EEOC issued him a Right To Sue letter. Complainant's Deposition at 59-60. Complainant did not subsequently sue because "there were other circumstances that came into play" and "it just never did happen." Id. at 60.
Complainant filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request to the DOE on February 20, 2002, requesting his security files and personal files that contained "any derogatory information." Due to the operation of a contract between Fluor Hanford and the DOE, the information Complainant sought was not considered a government record and therefore could not be supplied. On April 2, 2002, Complainant wrote a letter to the Director of the DOE, asking for the Director's support in resolving the matter of Fluor Hanford's "burying" of information. CX 102. On April 4, 2002, the DOE, Office of Hearings and Appeals, interpreted Complainant's letter as a FOIA appeal and assigned it a case number, which was ultimately denied on May 2, 2002. CX 104.
On April 11, 2002, Complainant visited the corporate offices of Fluor Federal Services and Respondent Fluor alleges that due to his behavior, Complainant had to be escorted by security off the premises. A Patrol Log described the event as, "Hannum wanted to talk to VanLueven about possibly getting his job back. The Richland unit arrived and then left without incident, because Hannum had not committed a crime." CX 112.
On April 22, 2002, Complainant submitted another letter to the DOE, repeating his objective of gaining access to the "derogatory information that has been used against me in my pursuit to gain employment," and stating, on the basis of representation from Mr. Norris in a telephone conversation the same day, that "the DOE has this information and is not revealing it me." CX 103. Complainant later submitted a letter dated May 29, 2002, to Congressman Doc Hastings, asking for his assistance in resolving his "ongoing problem." CX 105.
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On June 14, 2002, the DOE Manager responded to Complainant's April 22, 2002 letter and interpreted it as a "concern" regarding Complainant's access status, which was then investigated by the DOE/SCO. The DOE/SCO concluded that Complainant was "terminated for legitimate business reasons" and as a result of "post termination activities and behaviors exhibited with FHI representatives, on December 3, 2001, FHI [Fluor Hanford] initiated the process for a ‘Denial of Site Access.'" CX 106.
Complainant submitted a letter to Mr. Norris in October 2002, which was referred to Mr. MacLeod who, on November 4, 2002, denied Complainant's allegations that Fluor Hanford had "misled" the DOE and United States Congress. CX 99.
On May 1, 2002, Complainant appeared at a job fair held at a local college. Respondent Fluor alleges that Complainant "bothered" representatives of a subcontractor of Fluor to the point that police assistance was requested. Complainant denies any such conduct, but admits to being present at the job fair.
On June 18, 2002, Complainant and Mr. MacLeod saw each other at a convenience store. Complainant inquired as to his lack of security status, and Mr. MacLeod responded that because of his behavior Complainant would continue to be on the stop access list.
On June 26, 2002, Complainant visited the FFS offices. Complainant submitted a letter to Mr. Liewer on June 25, 2002, requesting information regarding the "accusation" about having "attempted to force my way past the Fluor secretary in an attempt to enter the office of the President." CX 115. On June 27 and June 29, 2002, Complainant wrote a letter to Mr. Largent and Mr. Charveneua of Fluor Federal Services requesting information about the same accusation. CX 116.
Complainant filed a duplicative complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission and the EEOC on March 14, 2003, against Fluor Hanford. CX 122. Complainant alleged that the stop access maintained by Fluor Hanford adversely affected his ability to obtain employment, and that Fluor initiated the stop access in retaliation for complaining about discrimination. Id. On April 28, 2003, Fluor Hanford, through Mr. MacLeod, responded to the EEOC investigation with a position statement asserting that the stop access was placed on Complainant due directly to "numerous instances involving Mr. Hannum in which employees of FH and its subcontractors felt threatened by Mr. Hannum's actions." CX 129. Apparently the Washington state commission issued a "no cause" determination to Complainant's March 2003 complaint. Id.
Respondent Master-Lee's Motion for Summary Decision
Respondent Master-Lee argues it is entitled to summary decision because Complainant will be unable to meet his burden to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, Respondent Master-Lee asserts that it neither issued nor maintained the stop access order, the basis of the alleged blacklisting claim, nor did it provide Fluor with any information that led to the issuance of such order. As such, Master-Lee argues, summary decision is proper because Complainant has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Master-Lee subjected Complainant to an adverse employment action.
Complainant alleges, inter alia, that Master-Lee retaliated against him by "conspiring" with Fluor Hanford in order to assist Fluor Hanford to place a stop access on him, and also by "cooperating with Fluor Hanford in communicating false accusations to conceal the true facts related to the placement of a Stop Access." Complainant's Response at 3; Complainant's Pre-Hearing Statement at 8-9. A party opposing a summary judgment motion must produce "specific facts showing there remains a genuine factual issue for trial and evidence significantly probative as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed." Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Stenkl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 393, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). Purely conclusory allegations with no concrete, relevant particulars will not bar summary judgment. Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. 840 F.2d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988). When a non-moving response "consists of nothing more than mere conclusory allegations then the court must enter judgment in the moving party's favor." Peppers v. Coats, 887 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1989).
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The undisputed facts demonstrate that Respondent was responsible solely for Complainant's termination, and not for the issuance and maintenance of the stop access order. The stop access order, forming the basis of Complainant's blacklisting claim, was issued and maintained by Fluor Hanford, a fact testified to by Mr. Charles MacLeod, counsel for Fluor, corroborated by Mr. Rick Largent and Nick Liewer, employees of Master-Lee, and admitted by Complainant himself.
Furthermore, there is no factual evidence indicating that Master-Lee ever communicated information to Fluor relating to Complainant's termination that would serve as a basis for the issuance of a stop access order. The only facts in this regard concern a telephone conversation in July 2001 whereas Fluor employee John Robinson called Rick Largent at Master-Lee to advise Mr. Largent that Fluor was sending a letter to Master-Lee regarding Complainant. Mr. Largent then called Mr. Liewer of Master-Lee and informed him that he had received a phone call from Mr. Robinson of Fluor, who had raised concern over an apparent incident involving Fluor Vice President Mr.Van Leuven.
1 Complainant has raised this issue repeatedly since at least April 2002 in prior filings with the DOE and in numerous letters to Fluor-Hanford executives and to his Congressman. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, infra.
2 The earlier cases cited by Complainant of Garn v. Benchmark Technologies, 88-ERA-21 (Sec'y Sept. 25, 1990) and Egenreider v. Metro Edison Co, 85-ERA-23 (Sec'y Apr. 20, 1987). are distinguishable and no help to Complainant here. In Garn, the ARB found that complainant's discovery on February 18, 1988 that he had been placed on a no access list allowed his February 22, 1988 complaint filing to be timely despite the fact that the actual placement of complainant's name on the no access list occurred outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Here, Complainant discovered his placement on Fluor's no access list no later than April 2002 when he referenced so in a letter to the DOE. The 180 days began to run on April 22, 2002 when Complainant discovered the effect of his name being on Fluor's no access list. Similarly, Egenreider is also distinguishable because in that case the ARB remanded to allow a full evidentiary hearing on the employer's actions taken against the complainant within the applicable statute of limitations. Here, there are no such actions alleged against Fluor after December 12, 2002 as, by then, Fluor had already placed Complainant's name on the no access list for his post-termination erratic behavior.
3 I note that this is the first forum in which Complainant has alleged with any sort of specificity or priority that he made complaints to Fluor management regarding safety procedures. Complainant's July 2001 filing with the DOE SCO consisted of the charge that Complainant had been retaliated against for not buying donuts in contravention of a manager's direction, and possibly for buying a house and the expensive health needs of his daughter. These same charges were repeated at the Fluor Hanford ECP level. It was not until a March 28, 2002 filing with the EEOC against Master-Lee that Complainant mentioned complaints about poor management procedural practices.
Complainant charged Fluor with discrimination based on the same reasons following the placement of the stop access and incorporated by reference his previous EEOC filing against Master Lee. This is relevant only to the inquiry as to Complainant's first two elements of the primafacie case---protected activity and respondent's knowledge of such---not to whether Complainant established the fourth element, inference of a causal relationship. See Paynes v. Gulf State Utilities Co., 1993-ERA-47, at 6-7 (ARB Aug. 31, 1999).
4 For reference, Complainant's July 2001 filing with the DOE SCO consisted of the charge that Complainant had been retaliated against for not buying donuts in contravention of a manager's direction, and possibly for buying a house and the expensive health needs of his daughter. These same charges were repeated at the Fluor Hanford ECP level.
5 I acknowledge that improper motivation must be present to constitute "adverse action," see Garn v. Toledo Edison Co., 88-ERA-21 (Sec'y May 18, 1995), but for purposes of analysis I will assume without deciding that the action of placing Complainant on the denial of site access list was adverse to Complainant.