Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (U.S. 1984) is a Supreme Court decision holding that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity, and that judicial immunity is not a bar to an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In other words, Slavin was threatening Judge Barnett with a civil rights lawsuit because she disqualified him for misconduct and OALJ later memorialized the order in its research materials.
[Page 54]
The ARB later affirmed the ALJ's decision on the merits. Johnson v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, ARB No. 97-057, ALJ Nos. 1995-CAA-20, 21 and 22, USDOL/OALJ Reporter at 12 [HTML] (ARB Sept. 30, 1999) [EX 3-E]. During the appeal to the ARB, Slavin submitted an autopsy report on the presiding ALJ who had died subsequent to issuance of the recommended decision the matter. The ARB noted that Slavin ostensibly filed the autopsy report to demonstrate that the ALJ was in some way unbalanced, and therefore her rulings were tainted. In ruling on whether it would receive the autopsy report into evidence, the Board wrote:
An administrative law judge's decisions stand or fall on their merits. We have reviewed the record in this case, and find nothing improper in any of the rulings of the presiding ALJ. Indeed, it is clear that the ALJ went to extraordinary lengths to be fair and objective to Complainants, notwithstanding the difficult behavior of their counsel.
Attorneys have a professional obligation to demonstrate respect for the courts. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.5 and 8.2 (1999); 29 C.F.R. §18.36. It is clear to us - as it no doubt was clear to counsel - that the autopsy report is completely irrelevant to the merits of Complainants' challenge to the ALJ's rulings. To the extent that the report is offered by counsel in an effort to sully the reputation of the ALJ posthumously, such a personal attack is contemptible. The May 22, 1998 letter and autopsy report are excluded from the record in this case.
Id. at 12-13 [HTML].
At a later trial relating to State of Tennessee disciplinary proceedings against Slavin, In Re Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Docket No. 2000-1185-O-LC, one of Slavin's clients testified that the autopsy report was submitted by Slavin to the ARB against her wishes:
Q. Did Mr. Slavin take any action with regard to Judge Barnett without your consent?
A. There were a lot of letters that went back and forth between Mr. Slavin and Judge Barnett that I thought were out of order, concerning things that weren't related to our case at all. And then Judge Barnett, unfortunately, committed suicide during our trial, before we even got to trial.
Q. Did Mr. Slavin ask you to obtain any document regarding her?
A. After her suicide, he asked me if we could get the autopsy report, because I lived in Maryland and she lived in Maryland.
Q. Did you get it?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What did he do with it?
A. Well, he sent it to the ARB to the law judges with the letter.
Q. Did you specifically tell him not to file it?
A. Yeah. I didn't know he was going to do it. And when I found out, I was beside myself. That was never our intention. When we talked on the phone and he said send him a copy, I said, "You're not going to sent it, are you?" And he said, "No, I'm not going to send it." But he did send it.
Q. Did there come a time when you terminated Mr. Slavin's representation of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. We were going to -- This hearing has dragged on since 1995. We finally had a new Judge assigned to our case, Judge Sutton. And he said that we would go to hearing in February. Mr. Slavin was not ready, by his own admission. ...
Excerpt from Transcript of February 12, 2002 Trial in Disciplinary District II of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, In Re Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Docket No. 2000-1185-O-LC, Transcript Volume II, pages 337-338 (direct examination of Virginia Johnson by Laura Chastain, Disciplinary Counsel, Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility). [EX 3-F]
In fact, on January 23, 2000, Ms. Johnson and her co-Complainants wrote to Judge Sutton advising him that they had terminated their professional relationship with Slavin. [EX 3-G] In the letter to Judge Sutton they explained that Slavin had failed to prepare the cases, had been uncommunicative, had misrepresented them through his past use of caustic and inflammatory remarks
[Page 55]
to the Respondent and Judge Barnett, had repeatedly failed to meet deadlines in related cases, repeatedly failed to follow requests and instructions of the clients, repeated refusals to contact witnesses to arrange for their testimony at the hearing, and failure to communicate on whether he had submitted to Judge Sutton an amended witness and exhibit list. Attached to the letter to Judge Sutton is the Complainants' letter to Slavin terminating his services:
Dear Ed:
This is to advise you that, pursuant to our December 19, 1999, letter, we the undersigned have no choice but to terminate our professional relationship with you, effective immediately. In spite of a request in our December 1999 letter, we have never received any substantive response from you to that letter. Additionally, to date, you have not apparently contacted a single witness for our February 22, 2000, hearing. It does not appear to use that you have been prepared for our hearing on the previously scheduled dates, and it does not appear that you are prepared for the date in February as well. We believe that your lack of preparation for the upcoming hearing almost certainly dooms us to failure. This behavior can no longer be tolerated or ignored by the undersigned. ...
This decision was reached after much soul searching and reluctance, and certainly not without appreciation for your past efforts. However, the legal proceedings involving the undersigned have been going nowhere for almost five years and we have too much to lose by sitting back and allowing the case to be lost because of lack of preparation. In fact, we have yet to have a Labor Department investigation as required by law. Yet, on February 22, we will be in a hearing on post complaint retaliation for which you appear to be totally unprepared. Despite our repeated requests, .we do not know what strategy you intend to pursue (if any), or even exactly what we must prove in order to prevail. We have begged and pleaded with you to move these cases forward and you have done nothing that we, the clients, have both requested and finally demanded that you do. On more than one occasion, we have sent you information and asked you to file additional complaints, but you have not complied with those requests and have never told us why you have not done so. You have been verbally abusive to DOE counsel in the past, as well as provoking the previous DOL Judge to the point that she barred you from practicing before her again. This, unfortunately, has all been to our detriment. We fear that you are using us as your political soapbox to "take shots" at the Department of Energy, and it seems at times that, rather than you working for us, we work for you. Our health has suffered and our situation continues to deteriorate, and it is imperative that these legal matters come to a conclusion as soon as possible. We retained you with high hopes of a positive outcome. However, this matter has dragged on for five years with no end in sight. This matter has taken its toll financially, emotionally and physically on all of us. We realize that we are at the point that we may have to represent ourselves in the future. We realize this may be foolish and most unproductive, but you have left us with no choice.
[EX 3-G] The Complainants ultimately did prevail before Judge Sutton using a new attorney. McQuade v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, 1999-CAA-7 (ALJ July 31, 2001). While on appeal to the ARB, the case settled. McQuade v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, ARB Nos. 01-093, 01-094; ALJ Nos. 1999-CAA-7, 1999-CAA-8, 1999-CAA-9, 1999-CAA-10 (ARB Nov. 28, 2001).17
1 The caption has been amended to include a new case number to distinguish between this matter as it relates to Somerson's 2004-STA-12 complaint, and the more general question of Slavin's qualifications to appear before OALJ globally (2004-MIS-2).
2 ALJ Exhibits in this Decision are cited as [EX # ]. A list of such exhibits is found in this decision, infra.
3See, e.g., Tadeusz Kucharski, in re Judicial Inquiry re Miroslaw Kusmirek, 2000-INA-116 (BALCA Sept. 18, 2002) (Chief ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing into whether lay representative forged documents; representative given a six month suspension for being recklessly negligent in maintaining a willful ignorance about the details of the application and in relying solely on a third party intermediary for communication with his client); Hasan v. Nuclear Power Services, Inc., 1986-ERA-24 (ALJ Sept. 25, 1986) (disqualification of Respondent's law firm where an associate questioned Complainant without his counsel present during a document review); Wilkinson v. Texas Utilities, 1992-ERA-16 (ALJ Aug. 19, 1992) (Complainant's counsel disqualified for failure to appear at hearing; failure to engage in exchange of documents and witness list; dilatory tactics; ex parte communication; felony convictions); Joseph W. Thomas, 2004-MIS-3 (ALJ Mar. 26, 2004) (attorney denied authority to appear before OALJ based on Louisiana suspension; the suspension was, based in part on conduct before DOL OALJ). See also in regard to an ALJ's duty to determine whether an attorney should be disqualified for a conflict of interest Duncan v. United States Secretary of Labor, 69 Fed. Appx. 822, 823 (9th Cir. May 30, 2003) (case below ARB No. 99-011, ALJ No. 1997-CAA-12) and Smiley v. Director, OWCP, 984 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 1993).
4 A supplemental Official Notice of Prior Judicial Proceedings was issued on February 17, 2004 providing Slavin with notice of three additional ARB decisions over which official notice is being taken in this Judicial Inquiry. [EX 32-L] Additional official notice has also been taken in this decision of several ruling issued by the ARB and ALJs subsequent to issuance of the Notice of Judicial Inquiry.
5 Slavin, in contrast, repeatedly requested a hearing on the merits of Somerson's 2004-STA-12 complaint.
6 Slavin complains bitterly that the Notice of Judicial Review was issued on Christmas Eve. The only holiday, however, that would have fallen between the time Slavin would have been likely to received the Notice and the due date for response was New Year's Day. The original response due date was not until January 15, 2004 -- ample time to fashion a response. In addition, as noted earlier, Slavin was subsequently given an extension until February 20, 2004 to respond.
7 Moreover, this is not a whistleblower proceeding but a proceeding regarding on an attorney's qualifications to appear before OALJ which only incidently is occurring preliminary to a whistleblower adjudication. Thus, the caselaw on discovery in whistleblower proceedings cited by Slavin is out of context.
8 Somerson communicated the existence of these websites to counsel, thereby inviting them to be viewed.
9 Somerson was later found by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida to be in contempt of the earlier consent order because of his behavior in Case No. 2002-STA-44 and fined $5,000. In re Somerson, No. 3:02-cv-1158-J-20TEM, 3:02-cv-121-J-20TEM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2003), appeal dismissed for want of prosecution No. 03-15112-H (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2004). [EX 15-J] The district court found that the following materials originated and published by Somerson violated the consent order: (1) An e-mail directed to a prospective witness, Eli Gray, titled "ELI GRAY WEARING STRIPES," whereby Somerson suggested that "all that remains are the criminal charges and resulting indictments" for "conspiracy, racketeering to name a few" and demanded "Turn yourself in before we have to hunt you down like a dog." (2) An e-mail directed to Larry Cole , who had previously testified and was identified for recall, which stated "I should have asked him 'do I need to tell them to bring an ambulance or a Hearst'"and in another e-mail (titled "Every breath you take, every move you make, I'll be watching you") states "You asked for it *shithead*, now you gotta BELLY-FULL of trouble. (You ain't seen nothin yet)." The e-mail also calls Mr. Cole "truly evil" and an individual who is "guilty of extreme perjury in a Federal Truck Safety Case (2002-STA-44 Somerson v. Mail Contractors of America)." (3) Repeated e-mails to opposing counsel, Oscar Davis, with derogatory remarks like "Choke on this Cracker-Head" and "I'll bet you run of bacon around your blubber-ball waist before you run of server space - your peckerhead!" and "You don't have the balls." The e-mails include links to websites, including one with a picture of opposing counsel with large headings such as "Oscar Davis Sucks! ... This Rude Loudmouthed Hay-Seed Racist Baffoon from Arkansas Actually 'Practices' Law?" The district court found that Somerson's e-mails and websites were "of a harassing nature, and are hostile and crude to say the least."
10 Attempts to intimidate a witness or other person in any proceeding before any department or agency of the United States is a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
11 Although the ALJ did not specifically cite it as a grounds for dismissal, during the hearing when Slavin was given an opportunity to state why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Slavin chose to attack the ALJ's integrity, alleging that he had been hostile toward protected activity. See Slip op. at n.12 and surrounding text.
12 For additional background on the reason for referring this matter to OPM to assist in finding a non-DOL judge, see In the Matter of Slavin, 2002-SWD-1, USDOL/OALJ Reporter at n.11 [HTML] (ALJ July 26, 2002).
13 Prior to March 1, 2003, the conduct of Tennessee lawyers had been governed by ethics rules patterned after the 1969 American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility (MCPR). Rule 8.3 of the new TRPC, like the MRPC and old ABA MCPR, provides that a lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or that is made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. The Tennessee Rule in effect prior to March 1, 2003, however, only provided that a lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false. In the Greene case, the ARB observed that:
The ALJ found that Counsel had knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement regarding the integrity of the ALJ and other Federal officials in the January 8, 2002 motion for the ALJ's recusal that was filed with the ALJ. Ord. of Disqualif. at 2-3, 19-20, 23. Specifically, the ALJ found that Counsel's assertion that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between HUD and DOL regarding the ALJ's assignment to hear the Greene DOL case "was established in secrecy, with HUD and DOL OALJ picking HUD and one of its judges to decide the case before OPM was contacted" was made without adequate support and also with reason to know that the statement was false. Id. at 3, 19-20; see n.1 supra regarding OPM assignment of ALJ pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 930.213 (2001).
In re Slavin, ARB No. 02-109, ALJ No. 2002-SWD-1 (ARB June 30, 2003), USDOL/OALJ Reporter at 10 [HTML]. [EX 16-B] The ARB affirmed the ALJ's finding that Slavin had acted with reckless disregard for the truth of his accusation of improper contacts and collusion in the assignment of a presiding judge, and did not reach the question of whether Slavin did so knowingly. When the ARB "has ruled on a question of law, the law of the case doctrine binds an administrative law judge acting after a remand of the case." Stephenson v. NASA, ARB No. 98-025, ALJ No. 1994-TSC-5 (ARB July 18, 2000). Since the ARB found that Slavin engaged in misconduct when he made accusations about the integrity of judicial offices with reckless disregard for whether such statements were true, that ruling is the law of the case for purposes of this Judicial Inquiry even though the ARB did not reach the question of whether he knew the statements were false, as found by the presiding ALJ. Moreover, even if Slavin was technically not in violation of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Responsibility in effect at the time about making false statements about judges, he clearly violated MPRC 8.3 and the clear weight of authority in other jurisdictions. See the discussion of the First Amendment rights of attorneys during in-court proceedings, infra in this decision. See also MRPC 8.5 and TRPC 85 (in applying choice of law on disciplinary conduct, where the conduct is in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits govern, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise).
14 The ALJ in Rockefeller provided Slavin the opportunity for a hearing on disqualification, but Slavin did not afford himself of this opportunity. Rockefeller v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 1998-CAA-10 and 11, USDOL/OALJ Reporter at 5 [HTML] (ALJ Sept. 28, 1998)
15 The presiding ALJ waived confidentiality regarding the Committee's report.
16 As noted in the Chief ALJ's referral of unprofessional conduct to the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, shortly after Judge Barnett disqualified Slavin, Slavin filed a barrage of voice mail, faxes and e-mails with the National Office of OALJ. For example, on March 27, 1997, Slavin sent the Chief ALJ a fax demanding a list of all persons to whom the research newsletter referencing Judge Barnett's order of disqualification had been sent, among other information. Slavin requested that the Chief ALJ send a copy of Slavin's response to the judge's order to show cause and opening brief to the ARB to every person who received the newsletter or "hit" the Internet posting of the newsletter, stating that "This would mitigate damages in the event of the need to file a Pulliam v. Allen type lawsuit against Judge Barnett or those responsible for writing her orders and posting them on the Internet." [EX 24-S]
The newsletter Slavin complained about is merely a report of whistleblower decisions. Casenotes from newsletters are integrated into OALJ whisteblower digests and made available to the public for research purposes. This is the text from the February/March 1997 newsletter that Slavin was complaining about, a rather bland casenote that simply states without embellishment that the ALJ had disqualified the Complainant's attorney:
[N/E Digest IX M 2]
ATTORNEY CONDUCT; ORDER BARRING FUTURE APPEARANCES
In Johnson v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, 95-CAA-20, 21 and 22 (ALJ Feb. 4, 1997), the presiding ALJ ordered Complainant's attorney permanently barred from appearing before her in this or any other matter. This order was preceded by an order to show cause issued pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.29, 18.34 and 18.38, and was based on the ALJ's finding of "a continuing pattern of willful misconduct, including the making of prohibited ex parte communications, engaging in disruptive actions, violating [the ALJ's] orders, and failing to abide by [the OALJ's] rules of practice." SeeJohnson v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, 95-CAA-20, 21 and 22 (ALJ Feb. 4, 1997)
Slavin continued in his letter to the Chief ALJ: "By the way, as one constructive suggestion on your predicament, if you were to invite me to speak at the OALJ training seminar in Williamsburg, Virginia, this could mitigate damages and go a long way toward reversing the chilling effects on protected activity as a result of the invidious discrimination and disinformation that have been perpetrated against me by Judge Barnett and minions. I will keep those dates open on my calendar and look forward to hearing from you." Slavin also added a postscript referencing an earlier telephone communication to the Chief ALJ requesting that Slavin be invited to attend an upcoming ALJ training conference: "P.S. I have not heard from you as to the identity of any outside speakers appearing at the ALJ conference. Why? En masse ex parte contacts could take place there with counsel for the frequent parties before OALJ (e.g., the Solicitor and corporate lawyers). If I do not hear from you soon, injunctive relief may be sought to enjoin the meeting."
Slavin also sent other communications to OALJ. For example, Slavin sent several e-mails to OALJ's computer specialist complaining about the Internet posting of the research newsletter suggesting that OALJ management was acting illegally and that the computer specialist's work on the web site contributed to that illegality.
Because of Slavin's harassment of court personnel, such as threatening OALJ staff with lawsuits, on April 2, 1997 the Chief ALJ wrote to Slavin informing him that OALJ would no longer accept filings from him except by regular mail unless Slavin obtained prior permission or unless permitted by statute or regulation. [EX 31]
17 Interestingly, Slavin sought to be reimbursed for attorney fees for his work prior to termination. Judge Sutton denied Slavin's petition based on lack of standing. McQuade v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, USDOE, 1999-CAA7, 8, 9 and 10 (ALJ June 18, 2002). Slavin's appeal of the denial of his attorney fee petition was dismissed by the ARB because Slavin failed to timely file his appellate brief. McQuade v. Oak Ridge Operations Office, ARB No. 02-087, ALJ Nos. 1999-CAA-7 to 10 (ARB Oct. 18, 2002).
18 The frivolous nature of the underlying complaint is dealt with elsewhere in this decision.
19 Pursuant to my duty to determine whether an attorney should be disqualified for a conflict of interest, Duncan v. United States Secretary of Labor, 69 Fed. Appx. 822, 823 (9th Cir. May 30, 2003) (case below ARB No. 99-011, ALJ No. 1997-CAA-12) and Smiley v. Director, OWCP, 984 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 1993), I subsequently ordered Slavin to clarify whether he had obtained the prior, informed consent of both clients to the dual representation. Slavin filed a response alleging that he had done so prior to filing the motion to consolidate. I took no further action based on Slavin's representation; however, as the ARB noted in Somerson v. Mail Contractors of America, ARB No. 03-042, ALJ No. 03-STA-11, slip op. at 4 (ARB Oct. 14, 2003), misrepresentations by Slavin make it difficult to take his word at face value.
20 It is not credible to believe that Slavin was unaware of the lack of merit in the Howick complaint given the recent ruling in Somerson. Assuming arguendo that he was oblivious to the import of the ARB ruling, the failure to plead an essential element of a whistleblower complaint is per se evidence of lack of competence, even for a novice attorney, much less an experienced attorney such as Slavin. Failure to amend the complaint to plead the missing element after the presiding ALJ issues an Order to Show Cause why the complaint should not be dismissed on that ground is gross incompetence. Such incompetence in the Howick matter provides clear and convincing evidence of a violation of MRPC 1.1.
21 Slavin has been denied admission to practice before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. See Turpin v. Barker, No. 01-CV-484 (Oct. 18, 2001) (order by Hon. Curtis L. Collier); Selvidge v. Hopkins, No. 00-CV-519 (Oct. 9, 2004) (order by Hon. Leon Jordan); In re Slavin, No. 3:00-CV-519 (Oct. 24, 2000) (denial of motion for Pro Hac Vice admission) (order by Hon. R. Allan Edgar).
22 I also observe that shortly after the ARB issued a decision in Smith v. EBASCO Constructors, 1993-ERA-16 (ARB Aug. 27, 1998), Slavin wrote to Ms. Attwood and the then Chair of the ARB, complaining that the Board had issued an insulting decision slashing the ALJ's compensatory damage award. [EX 24-B] Slavin wrote: "Why? Who are your? What is your purpose for taking your job at the ARB? Why did you become a lawyer?... American workers will now be killed in unsafe workplaces because of the chilling effects of this dangerous deeply insensitive, offensive decision, which fails to compensate Mr. Smith for what was done to his life. ARB's decision ranks with the Dred Scott decision among the injustices in American history...." The letter goes on to allege that the decision lacked compassion and intellectual integrity and was a "disgrace to the human race." Slavin stated that the decision was "mean-spirited, penny-pitching, hamhanded, and highhanded" and read like the ARB "did not read the briefs, did not read the record, and decided to 'tilt' toward Corporate America...." Slavin wrote that the decision "reads as if it were written by some effete snob with limited life or work experience, who looks down their [sic] nose at working people and their suffering." The decision, Slavin wrote, was "cruel, indecent and totally outside the pale of civility, mocking Mr. Smith for asking for damages consistent with those awarded in federal state courts." This letter was copied on a wide variety of persons.
23 In Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Slavin, No. 154861-3 (Tenn. 2002), a Tennessee court imposed on Slavin a three year suspension from the practice of law for a variety of violations, such as obtaining a continuance under false pretenses, not returning clients' files timely, and severely damaging his clients by following a personal agenda. [EX 29] An appeal of this holding is on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
24 In the Notice of Judicial Inquiry Slavin was expressly directed not to fax or e-mail his response. Slavin, however, apparently cannot conceive of why he should be required to comply with such a directive. Thus, in evidently purposeful defiance of that directive, Slavin has faxed all filings related to this matter without seeking prior permission. OALJ rules of practice do not permit filings by fax unless permitted by statute or regulation or with prior permission of the presiding ALJ. 29 C.F.R. § 18.3(f).
25 For example, in In the Matter of Daniel Friedland, 416 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1981) ), cert. denied, Friedland v. Disciplinary Com'n of Indiana Supreme Court, 454 U.S. 857, 102 S.Ct. 308, 70 L.Ed.2d 153 (1981), the lawyer filed charges against members of the Disciplinary Committee and witnesses in the lawyer disciplinary hearing. The lawyer attempted to use the lawsuit to intimidate and discredit those who administered and prosecuted grievances against him. In holding that the lawyer was not protected by the First Amendment, the court recognized the harm to judicial integrity. The court held "It is the Constitutional duty of this Court, on behalf of sovereign interest, to preserve, manage, and safeguard the adjudicatory system of this State. The adjudicatory process cannot function when its officers misconstrue the purpose of litigation. The respondent attempted to influence the process through the use of threats and intimidation against the participants involved. This type of conduct must be enjoined to preserve the integrity of the system. The adjudicatory process, including disciplinary proceedings, must permit the orderly resolution of issues; Respondent's conduct impeded the order of this process" (416 N.E.2d at 438). See also Admonition Regarding A.M.E., 533 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1995) (conduct designed to chill ethics complaint, which thereby interferes with disciplinary process, is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
26 Not until a February 23, 2004 filing with the ARB does Slavin even make any reference to the reason for the delay in scheduling a hearing on Somerson's complaint, to wit: "Fully 85 days after Mr. Somerson requested a hearing, none has been scheduled and OALJ is harassing his attorney and trying to deny Mr. Somerson the right to counsel of his choice." [EX 32-N] Even this reference is oblique, at best.
Likewise, Slavin recently filed a letter with the ARB in Anderson v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004-ERA-15, complaining about delay in OALJ scheduling of a hearing for Ms. Anderson, a copy of which was faxed to this office. The letter, however, fails to disclose to the ARB the reason for the delay -- that the Anderson case was stayed pending resolution of this section 18.34(g)(3) proceeding. Such lack of candor is an aggravating factor supporting disqualification of Slavin to appear before DOL OALJ.