ARB CASE NO. 06-098
ALJ CASE NO. 2006-STA-014
DATE: November 30, 2006
In the Matter of:
FRANCES HOPKINS,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
SUGAR MOUNTAIN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
and
LARRY TACHOVSKY,
RESPONDENTS.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
FINAL DECISION AND
ORDER
Francis
Hopkins filed a whistleblower complaint with the United States Department of
Labor alleging that his employer, Sugar Mountain Transportation Co., and its
owner, Larry Tachovsky, violated the employee protection provisions of the
Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA).[1]
The STAA prohibits certain employers from retaliating against employees who
complain about or report violations of commercial motor vehicle safety
requirements.[2]
Hopkins alleged that he was fired shortly after he voiced concerns about his
company truck’s radiator and front end alignment.
[Page 2]
After
investigating Hopkins’s allegations, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) found that Sugar Mountain and Tachovsky did not violate
the STAA.[3]
Hopkins objected to the OSHA finding and requested a hearing.[4]
The Department of Labor’s Office of Administrative Law Judges scheduled the
hearing for June 7, 2006. But on or about April 26, 2006, Hopkins, through his
attorney, moved to dismiss the proceedings because Tachovsky was insolvent and
because “it is not in [the] interest of judicial economy, nor is it worth
expending funds to pursue an insolvent Respondent.” The ALJ recommended that
we dismiss Hopkins’s request for a hearing and affirm OSHA’s finding that Sugar Mountain and Tachovsky did not violate the STAA. In so doing, the ALJ relied upon 29
C.F.R. § 1978.111(c), which permits a party to withdraw his objections to the
OSHA finding at any time before that finding becomes final.
The
Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Administrative Review Board the
authority to issue final agency decisions under the STAA and the implementing
regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part § 1978.[5]
We automatically review an ALJ’s recommended STAA decision.[6]
Since the ALJ properly applied 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c) in dismissing Hopkins’s request for a hearing, we AFFIRM that decision and the OSHA finding that
neither Sugar Mountain nor Tachovsky violated the STAA.
SO ORDERED.
OLIVER M. TRANSUE Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[2] “A person may not discharge an employee, or
discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, or
privileges of employment, because . . . the employee, or another person at the
employee’s request, has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a
violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or order,
or has testified or will testify in such a proceeding . . . .” 49 U.S.C.A. §
31105(a)(1)(A). (West 1997).
[3] OSHA Letter dated February 10, 2006. OSHA
investigates STAA complaints and issues findings as to whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the employer has violated the STAA. If
reasonable cause does exist, OSHA accompanies that finding with a preliminary
order that provides certain prescribed relief. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1978.103,
1978.104. (2006).
[4]See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.105(a). Unless
a party files a timely objection to OSHA’s findings or preliminary order or
both, the findings or preliminary order become final. 29 C. F. R. §
1978.105(b) (2).
