DATE:  March 17, 1995
CASE NO. 91-ERA-48


IN THE MATTER OF

L. CRAIG WAGERLE,

          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 

          RESPONDENT.


BEFORE:  THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                       ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION

     Complainant, L. Craig Wagerle, Ph.D., seeks reconsideration
of the March 9, 1992, Final Order of Dismissal in this case
arising under the employee protection provision of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988) (ERA). 
I deny the request. [1] 
                            PROCEDURAL HISTORY
     In June 1991, Wagerle complained that Respondent, the
Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania ("the University"),
engaged in various retaliatory actions against him because he
supported the complainant in a separate ERA complaint against the
University.  Acting on behalf of the Secretary, the Wage and Hour
Administrator investigated the complaint and determined that
there was reason to believe that the University had retaliated
against Wagerle in violation of the ERA.  The University sought a
hearing on the complaint.
     While the case was awaiting hearing, Wagerle submitted a
Motion to Dismiss his complaint, in the absence of a settlement,
because he believed "he [was] unable to obtain relief sought 
[PAGE 2]
[through] this hearing and that further expenditure of funds
[was] not warranted in view of the circumstances present." 
October 15, 1991 Motion to Dismiss.  The University earlier had
submitted a letter confirming that it had no objection to
withdrawal of the complaint "provided that it is with prejudice." 
October 4, 1991 letter of The University's Attorney to the ALJ. 
Complainant's counsel submitted a letter to the ALJ confirming
Complainant's intention that the complaint be dismissed with
prejudice.  October 24, 1991 Letter of Robert Lees.  Accordingly,
The ALJ recommended dismissal with prejudice.  October 25, 1991
Order of Dismissal - Recommended.  
     Wagerle did not respond to the former Secretary's invitation
to clarify whether he agreed to dismissal with prejudice. 
See November 18, 1991 Order Establishing Briefing
Schedule.  A Final Order dismissing the complaint with prejudice
was issued on March 9, 1992.  Approximately ten months later, Wagerle
submitted a request to reconsider the Final Order.
                                 ANALYSIS
     Wagerle argues that the University's counsel and the Vice
Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics "made a number of offers
of assurance" concerning Wagerle's working conditions that
induced him to seek dismissal of his complaint.  Comp. Essay at
37.  After receiving such assurances, however, Wagerle signed a
document stating that there was no consideration given for his
motion to dismiss the complaint.  October 15, 1991 Motion to
Dismiss at 1.    
     Wagerle states that his counsel "led [him] to believe that
[the] ALJ and [the] University required that withdrawal should be
with prejudice."  Comp. Essay at 39.  After learning of the
University's position on dismissal, Wagerle asked his counsel for
an explanation of the meaning of the phrase "with prejudice." 
Comp. Essay at 39.  The reported explanation from his counsel is
accurate: dismissal with prejudice "means you can't bring [this
complaint] up again."  Id.  Nevertheless, Wagerle faults
his counsel for not explaining that in seeking dismissal with
prejudice, he would give up his right to sue.  Id.  In
view of Dr. Wagerle's education level (Ph.D.), I find that he
should have known that withdrawing a complaint with prejudice
terminates the complaint at issue and prevents the complainant from
raising the same complaint again.  Accordingly, the request for
reconsideration is denied.  
     SO ORDERED.




[PAGE 3]
                              ROBERT B. REICH     
                              Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.  






[ENDNOTES]
           
[1]  Complainant called his pro se request for
reconsideration: "Essay: In support of the Appeal, dated December
30, 1993, to the Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor,
For Reconsideration of the Final Order of Dismissal, dated March
9, 1992" ("Comp. Essay").  Complainant sent copies of his essay
to numerous parties, but apparently he did not serve a copy on
Respondent.  In light of the denial of reconsideration,
Complainant's failure to serve Respondent was not prejudicial.