DATE: June 17, 1992
CASE NO.  91-ERA-45
          92-ERA-8


IN THE MATTER OF
SANG JOO KIM,
          PLAINTIFF,

v.

THE TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
RESPONDENT .


BEFORE: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


           FINAL ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
                      AND DISMISSING CASES
    The captioned cases, which are before me for review, arise
under the employes protection provision of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C.  5851
(1988).  On April 14, l992, the parties executed a Settlement
Agreement and General Release and submitted it to Administrative
Law Judge Steven E. Halpern.  On April 28, 1992, Complainant sent
to the ALJ copies of letters dated April 17, 21, and 22, 1992,
which indicated Complainant's rescission of the settlement
agreement and discharge of Jules Epstein as counsel.  On April
29, 1992, Epstein wrote the ALJ explaining the nature of
the problem, indicated that notwithstanding the previous
correspondence the settlement agreement remained in place, and
that David Kairys of the same firm represented Complainant.
    On May 1, 1992, Complainant executed a "Reconfirmation of
Settlement," in which he stated that, "I reconfirm the settlement in
the above matter and hereby withdraw any and all earlier rescissions
and renunciations of that settlement which I have made." 
Reconfirmation ¶ 2.  The ALJ thereupon issued his recommended
Decision and Order Approving Settlement.
    On May 28, 1992, Complainant wrote to the Secretary requesting 
[PAGE 2]
that any Order approving Settlement be withheld. Complainant alleged
that, "since I signed the settlement agreement against my voluntary
will, new information has been uncovered which changes the
fundamental premise underlying the formula initially put in place
for the negotiation."  On June 1, and June 3, 1992, Complainant sent
the Secretary particulars to support his May 28 request.  On June 9,
1992, by Notice from the Director of the Office of Administrative
Appeals, Complainant's letters of May 28 and June 1, and June 3,
1992, were served on the parties and placed in the
administrative record.
    The terms of the parties' agreement have been carefully
reviewed.  I note that the agreement encompasses the settlement
of matters arising under various laws, only one of which is the ERA. 
See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and General Release
¶ 6-7. For the reasons set forth in Poulos v. Ambassador
Fuel Oil Co,. Inc., Case No. 86-CAA-l, Sec. Order,
November 2, 1987, slip op. at 2, I have limited my review of the
agreement to determining whether its terms are a fair, adequate, and reasonable
settlement of Complainant's allegations that Respondent
violated the ERA.
    I also note that certain language in the agreement could be
construed as a waiver by Complainant of causes of action he may
have which arise in the future.  See, e.g., Settlement Agreement
and General Release ¶ 5.  Because a waiver of Complainant~s
rights based on future employer actions would be contrary to
public policy, I interpret these provisions as limited to a waiver
of the right to seek damages in the future based on claims or
causes of action arising out of facts or any set of facts
occurring before the date of the agreement. See Polizzi
v. Gibbs and Hill, Case No. 87-ERA-38, Sec. Order
Rejecting in Part and Approving in Part Settlement Submitted by
the Parties and Dismissing Case, July l8, 1989, slip op. at 9, and
cases cited therein.
    As so construed, I f ind the terms of the agreement to be
fair, adequate, and reasonable.  Complainant's bare allegations
that he was coerced into signlng the agreement, that he did not
fully understand it, that he was not executing the agreement
voluntarily and with full knowledge of its contents, and that
he signed the agreement without reading it (Letter from Sang
Joo Kim to Linda [sic] Martin, dated June 1, 1992) are not
persuasive. The record shows that Complainant thoroughly reviewed
a written draft of the settlement agreement and made substantial
comments on it.  Letter from Sang Joo Kim to Messrs Kairys and
Epstein, dated March 30, 1992.  Moreover, Complainant signed the
final agreement, in which he warranted that he had read and fully
understood all of the provisions and effects of the 
[PAGE 3]
Agreement. Settlement Agreement ¶ 11.  He was
represented at all times by counsel.  The Secretary has
previously considered whether one party may disavow a
settlement before the Secretary has reviewed it,
specifically addresslng a claim of lack of consent and
attorney coercion.  Macktal v. Brown & Root, Case
No. 86-ERA-23, Sec. Order Rejecting in Part and Approving
in Part Settlement Between the Parties and Dismissing
Case, Nov. 14, 1989, Slip op. at 4-10.   The Secretary's
disposition on that issue was expressly upheld.  Macktal
v. Secretary of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, l157 (5th Cir.
1991).  The record here similarly contains no showing of
coercion or other impropriety that would justify
renunciation of the settlement agreement.  See
Petty v. Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130 (4th Cir.
1988); Riley v. American Family Mutual Insurance
Co., 881 F. 2d 368, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1989) .
Accordingly, these cases are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
See, Settlement Agreement and General Release
¶ 12; Complainant's Reconfirmation of Settlement,
dated May 1, 1992, ¶ 2.
     SO ORDERED.               
                                  LYNN MARTIN
                                  Secretary of Labor

Washington, D. C.