which arises under the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1982).
The terms of the Settlement Agreement encompass matters
arising under various laws, only one of which is the ERA. See
page 1, first paragraph. My authority over settlement agreements
is limited to matters arising under statutes which are within my
jurisdiction. See Polizzi v. Gibbs & Hill , Case No. 87-ERA-38,
Sec. Order, July 18, 1989, slip op. at 7 (Order appended);
Egenreider v. Metropolitan Edison Company , Case No. 85-ERA-23,
Sec. Order Approving Settlement, April 11, 1988. Accordingly, I
have limited my review of the Settlement Agreement to determining
whether its terms and conditions are a fair, adequate and
reasonable settlement of Complainant's ERA claim against
Respondent. Except as described below I find the provisions of
the Settlement Agreement to be fair, adequate and reasonable.
In the Settlement Agreement, at #4, Complainant "agrees that
he will not participate in any action of any kind by any present
or former employee of Duke Power, and will not testify or
[Page 2]
otherwise provide evidence in any investigation, hearing, or
trial of any such action, except under subpoena." This
provision, among other things, prohibits Complainant from
voluntarily cooperating with or assisting any state or federal
agency, including the Department of Labor and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, in the investigation and prosecution of
federal or other laws. I held in Polizzi , slip op. at 5-8, that
provisions which have the effect of restricting the
administration and enforcement of law are against public policy.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Polizzi , I find
that the quoted language of the instant Settlement Agreement is
void and thus unenforceable.
There is nothing in the Settlement Agreement or elsewhere in
the record which enables me to determine whether Respondent, the
party in whose favor the void provision runs, intended to agree
to the other provisions of the settlement, if the provision,
which I have found to be void, is severed. Accordingly, the
Respondent is ORDERED to show cause, within 30 days of receipt of
this order, why the provision of the Settlement Agreement which
is void should not be severed and the remainder of the agreement
approved, and the case be dismissed with prejudice. See
Settlement Agreement at #2.
SO ORDERED.
ELIZABETH DOLE
Secretary of Labor
Washington, D.C.
[ENDNOTES]
1 Complainant's attorney advised that
she had contacted Complainant but that Complainant did not authorize the filing of
"a response on his behalf in this matter at this time." Letter of
October 6, 1989, from Susan M. Lebold to the Secretary of Labor.