order to submit settlement agreement which was denied by my order of September 29, 1989. By letter dated October 31, 1989 counsel for Respondent submitted a copy of the settlement agreement signed by both parties and a copy of the general release signed by Complainant. Counsel for Complainant also submitted a copy of the settlement on November 1, 1989. The Settlement has been carefully reviewed and, with the exceptions discussed below, I find it fair, adequate and reasonable.

   Paragraph 8 of the Settlement requires Complainant not to "participate in, aid, encourage, support or assist in any other claims which may be brought against [Respondent]." Paragraph 12 of the Settlement requires Complainant not to "disclose except as required by law, any complaints or claims ever made about his employment at [Respondent]."

   Paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Settlement here would restrict Complainant from providing information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or any other agency. Such information could be relevant and material to law enforcement investigations by the NRC or other agencies, including investigations by the Department of Labor under the ERA or other laws. Paragraphs 8 and 12 also would prohibit Complainant from voluntarily testifying taking part in, or assisting in any law enforcement proceeding involving an alleged violation by Respondent of the ERA.

   I previously considered a similar provision in an ERA case. See Polizzi v. Gibbs & Hill, Inc., Case No. 87-ERA-32 Sec. Order July 18, 1989. As I held in that case, these provisions would have the effect of drying up channels of information for the Department of Labor in ERA cases and under other laws, as well as for other agencies in carrying out their responsibilities. For the same reasons as set forth in Polizzi v. Gibbs & Hill, Inc. slip op. at 5-7, which I adopt and incorporate here (copy appended), I find paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Settlement void as against public policy, to the extent that they would prohibit Complainant from communicating to federal or state enforcement authorities as identified above.

   The remainder of the Settlement may be enforceable if "performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential part of the agreed exchange." EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, & 194(l) (1981)). See also Nichols v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I]f less than

all of a contract violates public policy, the rest of the contract may be enforced unless the unenforceable term is an essential part of the contract.") Thus, in McCall v. United States Postal Service, 839 F.2d 664 (Fed. Cir. 1988), an employee had settled an action challenging his removal by agreeing that, upon reinstatement for a one year probationary period, he would not appeal any disciplinary action taken against him and also waived his right to file a charge with EEOC. The court held that "even if [the employee's] attempted waiver of his right to file EEOC charges is void, that would not affect the validity of other portions of the agreement." 839 F.2d 664, 666 at *.