during which Plaintiff requested an additional stay of proceedings for 60 days due to medical reasons. He was instructed to file a written request by July 13, 1989, with medical documentation regarding his disability. On July 17, 1989, the Plaintiff filed a request for stay of proceedings for sixty days. With his motion he filed a letter from T. A. Biller, a counseling psychologist, stating that the Plaintiff would likely be able to handle a court appearance more successfully in 2 or 3 months. He also filed a portion of an examination note, dated March 30, 1989, from Dr. McGraw regarding a reaction to gold injections. On August 1, 1989, an Order was issued staying further proceedings until September 15, 1989.

    On October 11, 1989 an Order was issued directing the Plaintiff to file a written response stating whether he was prepared to go forward with the two consolidated cases. The Order stated "... if the Plaintiff feels that he is unable to proceed with his hearing due to medical reasons he must file a written report by a licensed medical doctor giving the state of his health and listing the reason(s) that he is unable to attend a hearing. The report must be based on a current medical examination, that is, an examination conducted within thirty days of its filing in these proceedings. If no response is filed by the Respondent [should have read Plaintiff], the cases will be scheduled for hearing."

    The Plaintiff filed a response on November 22, 1989 stating that he felt unable to go forward with a hearing on the two cases. He also filed a "Attending Physician's Statement of Disability" dated October 25, 1989 signed by Dr. Donaldson and a note dated November 14, 1989 from Dr. Donaldson stating that he was in the process of gaining approval for the (Plaintiff) to enter the Rehabilitation and Pain Management Services Program at East Ridge Community Hospital.

    On December 7, 1989, an Order was issued stating that Plaintiff's response was not in compliance with the previous Order requiring a current (within 30 days) doctor's examination and did not give the reasons that he was unable to go to hearing nor state when he would be available to proceed to hearing. The two cases were scheduled for hearing on April 2, 1990.

    On December 18, 1989, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 7, 1989, scheduling

the case for hearing on April 2, 1990. With his motion he filed a letter from Johnna L. Eberle, RN, at Memorial Hospital stating that Mr. Billings had undergone Coronary Bypass Surgery on November 30, 1989 and would be hospitalized for approximately 10 to 14 days. On January 27, 1990, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Continuance stating that he had suffered a heart attack on November 22, 1989 and underwent Bypass Surgery. He submitted a letter from Dr. Berglund stating that he [Billings] could not proceed with legal hearings until his clinical situation allowed. On February 8, 1990, this Administrative Law Judge wrote to Dr. Berglund asking for a report on Mr. Billings' medical condition, his prognosis and when Dr. BergLund felt that the Plaintiff's condition would allow him to go forward with his hearing. On February 20, 1990, Dr. Berglund replied that "He appears to be gaining strength, but I feel it would be in his best interest to be re-evaluated in two months before subjecting him to the stresses of legal proceedings." On March 6, 1990, an Order was issued canceling the hearing scheduled for April 2, 1990, with a new hearing date to be scheduled after Plaintiff's re-evaluation which was to take place on or about April 20, 1990.

    On March 9, 1990, the Plaintiff filed a request that the cases be separated and that Judge Hillyard be disqualified from hearing the cases.

    A telephone conference was held on June 8, 1990 with the Plaintiff, attorney for the Defendant, and the Administrative Law Judge, at which time the Plaintiff stated that he was ready to go forward with his hearings. A hearing date was agreed upon with the parties and the hearings were scheduled for August 13, 1990 in Knoxville, Tennessee, with pretrial submissions to be filed by July 23, 1990. The Plaintiff expressed concern that a consolidated hearing of all five complaints would be too lengthy and complicated. The Administrative Law Judge advised him that the cases would be severed for the purpose of filing of pleadings, however, after the prehearing submissions were filed, the cases may be consolidated in order to expedite the hearing process and lessen the expenses to all parties. The parties were told that a decision on whether to consolidate one or more of the cases for hearing would be made after review of the prehearing submissions and would depend on the similarity of issues and duplicity of witnesses. Plaintiff was also advised that his motion for disqualification of Judge Hillyard was denied.

    On June 12, 1990 several Orders were issued. A Notice of Hearing and Prehearing order was issued scheduling the hearing to commence on August 13, 1990 and requiring the parties to file a list of witnesses with summary of testimony, a statement of the issues, a list of exhibits, preliminary motions and an estimate as to the length of time required for hearing. The order provided a notice, "That failure to timely comply with this prehearing order, without good cause shown, may result in the dismissal of the proceeding or the imposition of other appropriate sanctions against the offending party." An Order was issued severing the five cases for the purpose of the filing of motions and pretrial submissions. This Order provided that after review of the pretrial submissions of the parties, a determination would be made on whether to consolidate one or more of the cases for hearing. Such a determination was to be made after review of the list of issues, witnesses and exhibits. Other Orders were issued denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse and lifting the Stay of Proceedings.

    On July 18, 1990, the Defendant filed a motion to extend the time for the filing of its pretrial submission until July 30, 1990. This motion was granted by Order dated July 19, 1990.

    On July 20, 1990, the Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting that the five cases be separated for hearing and requested a time extension for the filing of his pretrial submission. Plaintiff stated that the request for information in all five cases was too overwhelming. He submitted a letter from Dr. Berglund stating that "...He [Plaintiff] would benefit from having his trials staged in single events rather than all five at the same time since it is unlikely that he would be able to handle the stress level." Plaintiff wrote on July 25, 1990, requesting that only one particular case be identified for hearing.

    On July 30, 1990, the Defendant filed its prehearing submission. The Defendant estimated that a hearing on all five complaints could be completed in one to one and one-half days.

    On July 31, 1990, a telephone conference was held with Plaintiff, attorney for the Defendant and this Administrative Law Judge. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the prehearing submissions and determine which cases could actually be consolidated for hearing after reviewing the prehearing submissions and the similarity of issues and witnesses. Mr. Billings

stated that he had made no attempt to obtain the information necessary for the prehearing submission until the week of July 23rd, the date that the prehearing submission was due. Plaintiff stated that he would like to continue the cases for six months and then handle them on a one case at a time basis. The Defendant stated that the issues in all five cases, other than 90-ERA-2, were related and should be tried together. Because the Plaintiff was unprepared to discuss the hearings, the conference was concluded with no further discussion or decisions.

    On August 2, 1990, an Order was issued canceling the hearing because Plaintiff failed to file prehearing submissions and was not prepared to go forward with the hearing. By letter filed August 9, 1990, the Plaintiff requested the status of his cases and said that he felt he could participate in one case at a time.

    On August 9, 1990, an Order was issued extending the time for filing of the Plaintiff's prehearing submission until September 14, 1990. This Order provided a notice, "Failure to timely comply with this Order without good cause will result in the DISMISSAL of the proceeding or the imposition of other appropriate sanctions. " The Plaintiff has not filed any response to this Order. A second Order was issued on August 9, 1990, denying the Plaintiff's motion to separate. This order again advised the Plaintiff that no determination had been made as to which cases, if any to consolidate for hearing but that determination was to be made after reviewing the list of issues and witnesses to be furnished in the prehearing submissions of the parties. This order stated that the cases had already been severed by order issued on June 12, 1990. Therefore, the motion to separate was denied as being moot.

    The Plaintiff wrote on September 13, 1990, stating that he was able to compile the evidence and witness list for one hearing at a time. Plaintiff wrote again on September 21, 1990, requesting that the cases be separated and that one be selected for hearing. The Plaintiff has never filed a response to the pretrial order.

    Twenty-nine CFR section 18.6 provides in pertinent part:

(d) (2) If a party ... fails to comply with... any other order of the administrative law judge, the administrative law judge, for the purpose of permitting resolution of the relevant issues and disposition of the proceeding without unnecessary delay despite such failure, may take such action in regard thereto as is just, including but not limited to the following:

(v) Rule that ... a decision of the proceeding be rendered against the non-complying party.

    Twenty-nine CFR section 18.29 provides that the administrative law judge shall have all powers necessary to the conduct of fair and impartial hearings, including:

(6) take any action authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act;

(8) where applicable, take any appropriate action authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts issued from time to time and amended pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072; and

(9) do all other things necessary to enable him or her to discharge the duties of the office.

    A trial judge is allowed considerable discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. Tinkoff v. Jarecki, 208 F.2d 861 (1953, CA7 Ill); Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 694 F. 2d 497 (7th Cir. 1983). These rules reflect a court's inherent authority to control its own docket by way of dismissal of actions in order to manage the orderly and expeditious disposition of all cases. An Order of Dismissal sua sponte under Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., may be entered by the adjudication officer. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed. 2d 734 (1962).

    It is clear that the district court does have the power under Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal. Carter v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 636 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1980). The sanction of dismissal is appropriate only if the attorney's dilatory actions amounted to failure to prosecute and no alternative sanction would protect the integrity of pretrial procedures. J. F. Edwards Const. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). As the Seventh Circuit has stated, "the key is a failure to prosecute, whether styled as a failure to appear at a pre-trial conference

failure to file a pre-trial statement, failure to prepare for conference, or failure to comply with the pre-trial order." Id. at 1323.

    In the instant case, the Plaintiff is representing himself, and any failure to comply with pretrial orders are directly attributable to and due solely to the neglect of the Plaintiff. A review of the facts in this case show that the Plaintiff consistently failed to comply with Orders of this court. Initially, delays were granted at Plaintiff's request due to his health problems. Proceedings were continued and/or stayed pending improvement of the Plaintiff's health. For these delays the Plaintiff was not penalized. However, even during this period the Plaintiff demonstrated a reluctance, if not outright refusal, to comply with the court's Orders. The Plaintiff failed to comply with an Order directing him to file a medical report giving his prognosis and an estimate as to when he would be able to proceed with hearing. The Administrative Law Judge then personally wrote to the doctor to get the necessary information.

    The Plaintiff, during the telephone conference of June 8, 1990, advised that he was able to proceed with the hearings on his complaints. A date for the hearing was agreed upon with all parties present. A date was also discussed and agreed upon for the prehearing submissions. Shortly thereafter, on June 12, 1990, a Notice of Hearing and Prehearing Order was issued. Since that time, the Plaintiff has failed and refused to comply with any Orders of this court.

    A telephone conference was conducted on July 31, 1990. The purpose of the conference was to discuss and schedule hearings on the cases scheduled to commence on August 13, 1990. The determination on which cases, if any, were to be consolidated for hearing was to be made after the parties had filed their pretrial submission containing the witness list and list of issues. The Defendant TVA stated in its pretrial submission and in telephone conferences that the issues were intertwined and the different cases would require the same witnesses. TVA estimated that all five cases could be heard in one to one and one-half days. The Plaintiff did not file a pretrial submission. In fact, the Plaintiff admitted during telephone conference that he had made no attempt to comply with the pretrial order. He said that he made no attempt to gather the information necessary for compliance until the week of July 23rd and even then gave no indication

of what, if any, effort he had made for compliance. The scheduled hearings were canceled and Plaintiff was given an extension until September 14, 1990, for filing his pretrial submission. To date, the Plaintiff has filed no response to the pretrial order.

    Plaintiff states that he is unable to handle five cases at one time. He feels the stress of working these five cases is too much for him. He submitted a letter from Dr. Robert K. Berglund, dated July 11, 1990 in which Dr. Berglund states:

Mr. Douglas Billings is now eight months post-bypass grafting, but still has occasional chest discomfort during periods of emotional upset and heavy exertion for which he remains on medical treatment. He would benefit from having his trials staged in single events rather than all five at the same time, since it is unlikely that he would be able to handle the stress level ....

    Depending on the list of witnesses and issues which were to be submitted by the Plaintiff in his pretrial submission, one or more of the cases may have been heard separately. However, the Plaintiff refused to file any response to the pretrial order and, in effect, has written that he has no intention of complying with the pretrial order. He wrote that he intends to comply with Dr. Berglund' s recommendation. Dr. Berglund had no knowledge that all cases could possibly be heard in one to one and one-half days as estimated by the Defendant.

    The facts show that the complaint was filed on January 11, 1989. A hearing notice was issued on April 26, 1989, and the hearing later continued at the request of the Plaintiff until his health improved. On June 8, 1990, the Plaintiff advised that his health had improved to the point that he could proceed with formal hearings on his cases. At that time, the cases were severed but were scheduled for hearing at the same time pending filing of the prehearing submissions by the parties. The Plaintiff was advised that a decision on which cases, if any, to consolidate for hearing would be made after review of the issues and witnesses as listed by the parties in their pretrial submissions. He was made aware of this on at least six occasions, twice orally, during telephone conferences of June 8, 1990 and July 31, 1990 and four times in writing, by memorandum of

telephone conferences dated June 12, 1990 and August 2, 1990 and by Orders dated June 12, 1990 and August 9, 1990. Plaintiff waited until shortly before the scheduled trial date before advising the court that he was unprepared to go forward. This was not in response to a written notice but in response to a telephone conference initiated by the Administrative Law Judge. It is to be noted that all of the numerous telephone conferences conducted during these proceedings were initiated by the Administrative Law Judge and were held with the Plaintiff, attorney for the Defendant and this Administrative Law Judge. Plaintiff was advised by notices issued with orders dated February 3, 1989, June 12, 1990, and August 9, 1990, that failure to comply could result in dismissal of his complaint. The Plaintiff has still made no attempt to comply with the Pretrial Order. I find that the action or inaction on the part of the Plaintiff evidences an unqualified indifference to several court commitments which were continually changed at the request of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff's contumacious conduct warrants dismissal of the complaint for want of prosecution pursuant to Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brazil v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., 27 FR Serv2d 228, Unpublished No. 77-2231 (7th Cir. 1978), Reh den Nov 13, 1978.

    It is, therefore,

    ORDERED that the complaint of Douglas E. Billings is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

       ROBERT L. HILLYARD
       Administrative Law Judge