U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
Commerce Plaza
603 Pilot House Drive, Suite 300
Newport News, VA 23606
Date: December 8, 1998
Case No.: 1988-ERA-33
In the Matter of:
CASEY RUUD,
Claimant,
v.
WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY,
Employer.
Appearances:
Robert A. Jones, Esq.
For Complainant
Stuart R. Dunwoody, Esq.
Robert A. Dutton, Esq.
For Respondent
Before: FLETCHER E. CAMPBELL, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND
This matter is before me on remand by the Administrative Review Board
("ARB" or "the Board"). In February of 1988, Complainant, Casey Ruud,
[Page 2]
filed a complaint against Respondent, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), under the employee
protection (whistleblower) provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), as amended,
42 U.S.C. 5851 (1994), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 2622 (1994), the Clean
Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7622 (1994), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. 6971
(1994), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. 9610, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i)(1994) and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1367 (1994).
The parties reached a settlement agreement in 1988, and the then-presiding administrative law judge dismissed the case. However, Secretary Reich voided the
dismissal in 1994 because the former administrative law judge had not reviewed the settlement to
determine whether the terms were fair, adequate and reasonable. Secretary Reich remanded the case
for hearing, and in 1995 the case was referred to me. A hearing was held in Richland, Washington
in August of 1995. On March 15, 1996, I issued a recommended decision and order (RD&O)
recommending that the parties' settlement agreement be approved and, in the alternative, finding
violations of the employee protection provisions of CAA and CERCLA.
The ARB, in its decision and order of remand dated November 10,
1997 ("ARB Remand"), adopted my findings of coverage under CAA and CERCLA and
also found coverage under SDWA, which allows exemplary damages, the amount of which is to be
decided on remand (ARB Remand at 11). The Board also rejected the proposed settlement
agreement. The Board found that, while there was no coercion or fraud in the inducement, the
settlement should be rejected on the grounds that (1) the agreement was breached by Respondent's
interference with Claimant's subsequent employment at the Savannah River Site; and alternatively
(2) the parties did not agree on a material term of settlement, namely the personnel file provision
(ARB Remand at 16-8).
Having rejected the proposed settlement, the Board adopted my
alternative findings of liability at the Hanford reservation for the period 1986-88 and found an
additional adverse action in Respondent's premising of settlement negotiations on an unlawful
"gag" provision, which violated public policy (Id. at 19-20). Further, the ARB
found that the retaliation at the Savannah River facility constituted continued retaliation because of
protected activity at the Hanford reservation and that the record fully supported my finding that the
corporate connection between Respondent and Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC)
is close enough to attribute the actions of one corporation to the other for purposes of whistleblower
protection (Id. at 20, 23). However, "out of an abundance of caution," the
Board remanded the case ". . . to give WHC an additional opportunity to defend against the
evidence of violation at Savannah River" (Id. at 25). I was further directed to revisit
the issue of appropriate relief based on my ultimate findings and to avoid duplicative recovery
(Id. at 26). 1[Page 3]
1 The Board's concern was about any recovery
that might duplicate Claimant's recovery in a South Carolina state court action settlement. Ruud et al v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., case no. 94-CP-02-486 (South Carolina Ct. of Common Pleas, 1996).
2 The Board gave an alternative ground
for rejecting the settlement that bears a more tenuous connection to the violation at the Savannah River Site (ARB
Remand at 18). This further bolsters my interpretation of the Board's remand as not including a re-evaluation of the
settlement agreement's validity.
3 The Court in Bestfoods did not
apply the corporation law of any particular state but apparently some kind of general state corporation law. I have no
doubt that, on this record, Complainant has not met the Bestfoods test. Should the Board decide that
Bestfoods is pertinent to this case, the record would need to be reopened to receive evidence on the corporate
connection in light of Bestfoods.
4 The Board did not specifically instruct me
to make any further findings on remand concerning damages for emotional distress.
5 Recourse to medical treatment is important
for two reasons: 1) Doctors' reports confirm the existence of symptoms of the distress and 2) they allow an evaluation
of the intensity and seriousness of the distress.