11. On or about September 18, 1986, Walter Shelton, a
quality control inspector, initially refused to sign a leak test
report during the performance of a hydrostatic test. Shelton,
who was assigned to inspect the test, was unsure whether it was
appropriate to have the pump running during the test. After
briefly discussing the matter with Complainant, Shelton raised
the issue with Doug Novin, a Bechtel quality engineer. As Novin
was explaining to Shelton that the procedure was acceptable,
Complainant interjected himself into the discussion. Despite
Novin's assurances that the procedure was proper per the code and
specifications, Complainant began shouting at Novin, insisting
that the test procedure was invalid. Complainant conceded that
he "blew up" during the "heated discussion" with Novin, and that
[Page 4]
he was shouting at Novin. (TR 600,652).
12. Following Complainant's outburst, Novin telephoned
Chester Bean, the quality control supervisor, and informed him of
the confrontation with Complainant. Novin reported that
Complainant had used "very loud and abusive language," while
witnesses interviewed by Bean stated that Novin had very
calm, even "keeping his hands in his pockets." (Cf. 12, TR
370-372). Bean reported in his memorandum dated September 18,
1986 that Complainant had threatened during the confrontation
with Novin to go to the NRC. (CX 12).
13. Early the next day, Bean consulted with James
Taylor-Brown, the quality control superintendent, regarding the
Couty-Novin incident. Taylor-Brown concluded that it was an
isolated incident requiring no drastic action to be taken,
whereupon Bean met with Complainant and advised him that such
conduct would,not be tolerated. (TR 373-374; CX 12).
14. On September 26, 1986, approximately one week following
the Couty-Novin incident, there transpired an altercation between
Rocky Hayworth, a quality control inspector, and Ed Steiner, a
Bechtel quality engineer. On that date Steiner was not
satisified with the time it took Hayworth to "scope a package",
the term used for the review of paperwork for a particular
inspection procedure. During the discussion regarding the
package, both Steiner and Hayworth began yelling, with Hayworth
at one point making the threatening remark, "I could hurt you."
(CX 1, p.3). Steiner later admitted that he, too, lost his
temper. Believing that violence between the two was impending,
Glenn Parks, a senior inspector in the quality control
department, physically placed himself between the two men and
convinced Hayworth to go outside and cool down. (CX 2 Several
days later, Steiner and Hayworth met and agreed that they both
needed to act in a more professional manner toward each other.
(CX 1, p. 4).
15. As a result of the aforementioned incident, Hayworth was
suspended for one day without pay and was advised that a
recurrence in the future of this type of incident will result in
immediate discontinuation of his services at [Arkansas Nuclear
One]." (CX 9). Steiner was suspended from work for three days
since he was in a supervisory position and was expected to
conduct himself more professionally. (TR 340).
[Page 5]
16. Due to the seriousness with which management stewed the
Hayworth-Steiner incident, and to insure that such an accident
would not recur, Sid Wilson was requested to investigate the
matter fully by interviewing the participants and witnesses. (CX
11).
17. Several weeks later, on November 11, 1986, there arose a
confrontation between Complainant and Glenn Parks, a senior
inspector in the quality control department assigned to the night
shift. As David Williams, a quality control inspector, was
completing his day shift, he informed Parks he had been unable
to sign off a weld inspection because he could not verify the
welder's stencil. Parks responded that Complainant would cover
the inspection and that Williams was free to go home. To this
suggestion Williams was agreeable. For Williams to have
completed the inspection himself would have involved Williams
using protective clothing and a respirator and having to remain
at work for an additional 1 1/2 to 2 hours. (TR 840-841;
Deposition of David Williams, pp. 11-12).
18. Complainant and David Williams both allege that they ran
into one another prior to Complainant's arrival at the plant for
the night shift. There is, however, a stark discrepancy in their
accounts. Williams stated several times in his deposition that
he ran into Complainant on the highway while driving home, that
he flagged Complainant down," and that the two men were stopped
"side-by-side" on the highway. (JX 2, Deposition of David
Williams, pp. 12-13, 30-31). Complainant, on the other hand,
testified that he spoke with Williams in the driveway of their
house after Williams had arrived home and before Complainant left
for work. (TR 889). It is the finding of the Court that the
fact of their meeting and discussing the inspection prior to
Complainant's arrival at work was fabricated. Instead, the
evidence indicates that the two had missed each other.
Supporting this finding is Glenn Parks' statement. According to
Parks, Williams had telephoned him when he arrived home and asked
Parks to have Complainant phone him when Complainant arrived at
work, since Williams had missed Complainant. Williams asked that
Complainant phone him so that he could "fill [Complainant] in on
the inspection." (CX 16, p. 3). The Court accepts Parks' account
as most credible.
19. Once Claimant arrived on the shift, Parks requested that
Complainant perform the inspection, at which point Complainant
became quite angry and vehemently refused to "go behind another
[Page 6]
day shift inspector" to inspect his work. Much profanity was
used by Complainant in his refusal. See CX 16, p.2. Again
Complainant was requested to perform the inspection, to which he
replied, "Hell no I'm not gonna do it." (CX 16, pp. 2-3). Parks
and Complainant then telephoned Williams, who reiterated what he
had told Parks prior to leaving the day shift. (TR 844-845; CX
16, p. 3). Complainant simply hung up his extension rather than
verbally responding to Williams' explanation, then left the
quality control trailer. Complainant returned several minutes
later, clean shaven (except for his moustache), and proceeded to
make extremely profane, disparaging remarks to Parks about
certain employees and about the Bechtel employees in general.
The following excerpt from Parks' statement, though edited, is
exemplary of Complainant's insubordination and extreme use of
profanity:
[Complainant] walked in and stated: I think
this is a bunch of Bullshit [sic] but I'll do
the dam [sic] inspection; who's the engineer,
[Parks] told [Complainant) it was Stan
Maguffee; [Complainant] stated I hate that
fagot [sic] queer M.F. why do I have to work
with that S.O.B., I don't [sic] any [obscene
expletive] use for him or that sorry-ass
Bechtel. I can't stand those low life
Bechtel scumbags. [Complainant] then said
[obscene expletive] all of you [sic] I don't
have to put up with this type Bullshit [sic]
you go to hell. (CX 16, p. 4).
20. At this juncture Parks informed a co-worker that there
was a "problem" and that he may need him to alert the security
guards. (CX 16, p. 4). Approximately forty-five minutes later
Complainant phoned Parks, stating that he would proceed with the
inspection. Complainant did complete the inspection, then
returned to the trailer and informed Parks that he believed it
was unfair to allow the day shift workers to leave and then
expect the night shift workers to perform the day shift's
inspections. At this point Complainant had calmed down. Parks
explained that it seemed nonsensical to require Williams to
remain at work for an extra two hours when the night shift was
capable of performing the inspection. (CX 16, p. 4).
21. Following the aforementioned outburst on the part of
[Page 7]
Complainant relative to Parks' request that he perform an
inspection, a disciplinary meeting was held with Chester Bean,
Glenn Parks, Complainant and James Taylor-Brown in attendance.
During this meeting Taylor-Brown instructed Complainant to 'never
conduct himself in such a manner again on this site," further
advising him that such insubordination to a supervisor would not
be tolerated. As an explanation for his actions, Complainant
stated that he was only "having a little fun" with Parks and that
he was trying to "stir the pot a little" since the night shift is
sometimes boring. According to Complainant, he had intended to
stir things up" to generate some excitement on the night shift.
See CX 16, p. 1. Complainant was explicitly advised that any
such future incidents would result in his services no longer
being needed. Complainant promised that he would "maintain a
clean act henceforth." During the formal hearing, Complainant
testified that he understood Taylor-Brown's remarks to mean that
he would be terminated from employment if any such outbursts or
incidents occurred in the future. (TR 609).
22. In addition to the reprimand given Complainant hiring
the aforementioned disciplinary meeting, Ed Wheat, one of the
owners of S & W Technical Services, Inc., personally counseled
Complainant on at least two occasions, warning Complainant that
he had better improve his behavior on the job. (JX 2, Deposition
of Ed Wheat, pp. 74-75).
23. Only three days following Taylor-Brown's reprimand and
warning during the disciplinary meeting, Complainant became
involved in an altercation with the health physics (HP)
supervisor, Walt Hada. Initially, Complainant requested a
respirator from the respiratory issue clerk, who informed
Complainant that he would need to shave before a respirator could
be properly issued. Because Complainant questioned her
authority, the clerk directed him to Hada, the HP supervisor.
Upon observing the stubble on Complainant's face, Hada responded
that Complainant needed not only to shave, but also to trim his
moustache which was extending down into the chin line area. (TR
942-943). Following this exchange Complainant left.
24. Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later he returned,
approached the window area of Hada's office, pointed his finger
at Hada and stated, "Why don't you come out here and we will
resolve this problem." (TR 944). Once Hada was in the hallway,
Complainant suggested they go out on the turbine deck to resolve
[Page 8]
the matter. Hada, however, refused, given Complainant's visibly
agitated and angry" state. (TR 944-945). Hada again attempted
to explain the criteria around which the decision is made to
issue respirators to persons with facial hair and reiterated his
belief that Complainant's moustache needed trimming. Complainant
disagreed with Hada and insisted that he had been issued
respirators with his moustache as it was. After repeating that
Complainant would not be issued a respirator with the current
condition of his facial hair, Hada ended the exchange by
returning to work. According to Hada, Complainant appeared quite
angry and frustrated. (TR 945-946). Witnesses to the incident
included Orville Cypret, David Moore, Gary Conley and Mark
Buckallew. Due to Complainant's inappropriate, aggressive
behavior, Hada recommended that Complainant be removed from the
site. (CX 15, p. 3).
25. According to orville Cypret, an eyewitness to the
confrontation, Complainant's behavior was unprofessional.
aggressive, belligerent and somewhat threatening. (CX 15, pp.
6-7). He further characterized the incident as a "potentially
explosive situation" which was handled very appropriately by
Hada. Crediting the descriptions of the incident by Hada and
Cypret as most credible, Complainant's account that he was
"polite to the man" is implausible. See CX 15, pp. 4-5.
26. One day subsequent to the Couty-Hada confrontation,
October 17, 1986, a telephone conference was held to discuss the
termination of Complainant, the participants including names
Taylor-Brown, Chester Bean and Ed Wheat. The parties discussed
"the recurring problem with [Complainant] concerning
inappropriate behavior with plant supervisory personnel' and
concluded that Complainant was undesirable as a quality control
inspector. (CX 14, p. 1). Bean and Taylor-Brown requested that
Wheat contact Complainant to advise him of the decision and
Wheat so agreed. That afternoon Complainant received word if the
decision from Wheat and responded with "outrage." ( 2,
Deposition of Ed Wheat, p. 76).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The basis of Complainant's claim is that in discharging him,
Respondent violated 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) which provides as follows:
[Page 9]
No employer, including a Commission licensee,
an applicant for a Commission license, or a
contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission
licensee or applicant, may discharge any
employee or otherwise discriminate against
any employee with respect to his
compensation, terms, condition, or privileges
of employment because the employee (or any
person acting pursuant to a request of the
employee)-
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced,
or is about to commence or cause to be
commenced a proceeding under this
chapter of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et
seq.], or a proceeding for the
administration or enforcement of any
requirement imposed under this chapter
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended;
(2) testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated or is about
to assist or participate in any manner
in such a proceeding or in any other
manner in such a proceeding or in any
other action to carry out the purposes
of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011
et seq.].
42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1987) (emphasis provided).
The elements of proof in a discrimination claim under
Section 5851 are clear. The employee must initially present a
prima facie case by showing that he engaged in protected conduct,
that the employer was aware of that conduct, and that employer
took some action against the employee which was more likely than
not the result of the protected activity. The burden then shifts
to the employer to proffer evidence tending to prove that there
were legitimate motives for the adverse employee action. Once
this intermediate burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
employee to show that the proffered legitimate reasons were
[Page 10]
pretextual.
In this case Complainant has established that he engaged in
activities which were protected under the Act; specifically,
Complainant threatened to "go to the NRC." See DX 12. Chester
Bean documented on September 18, 1986 that Complainant had
threatened (to Novin) that he would go to the NRC. (CX 12). This
threat on Complainant's part falls within the "is about to
commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding" phrase of the
statute. Furthermore, that such threat was documented by Bean on
September 17, 1986 makes clear that the Respondent was aware of
the threats. Also, Complainant's "internal safety and quality
control complaints" to his supervisors regarding several
inspections constitute "protected activity." See Mackowiak v.
University Nuclear Systems, Inc. , 735 F.2d 1159, 1162-1163 (9th
Cir. 1984). Such internal complaints were directed toward
supervisory personnel and were, thus, within Respondent's
knowledge.
More troublesome is a determination whether this protected
activity prompted the termination of Complainant's employment.
"The presence or absence of retaliatory motive is a legal
conclusion and is provable by circumstantial evidence even if
there is testimony to the contrary by witnesses who perceived
lack of such improper motive." Ellis Fischel State Cancer
Hospital v. Marshall , 629 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1980). If
there is adequate evidence in the record to support an inference
that the employer was motivated in part by the employee's
protected conduct, then a prima facie case is established.
Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., supra at 1162.
In support of his allegation of illegal discharge,
Complainant primarily relies on a theory of "disparate
treatment," meaning that an employee who "engaged in protected
activity was disciplined more harshly and/or according to a less
favorable process" than an employee who did not engage in a
protected activity. See Complainant's Post-Trial Brief, pp.
63-64. Specifically, Complainant points to the "far more
lenient" treatment afforded Hayworth and Steiner following their
"far more serious" confrontation as opposed to Respondent's
termination of Complainant following the Couty-Hada incident.
See Complainant's Post-Trial Brief, pp. 63-64. This argument is
not persuasive. Notwithstanding the seriousness with which the
[Page 11]
Hayworth-Steiner incident was viewed by Respondent, it was the
first example of misconduct for each of the participants.
Moreover, it was an isolated incident. It was believed that a
one day suspension for Hayworth and a three day suspension for
Steiner were reprimands appropriate to the isolated episode of
unprofessional conduct. Also, Complainant fails to take note of
the fact that Hayworth, who occupied the same quality control
inspector position with Respondent as Complainant, was advised
that a "recurrence in the future of this type of incident" would
result in his immediate termination. (CX 9).
To compare Respondent's treatment of the Hayworth-Steiner
incident to its treatment of the Couty-Hada incident is an
invalid comparison. At the time of the Couty-Hada altercation,
Complainant had already been a participant in two other
confrontational episodes involving insubordination and abusive
language, for which he had been reprimanded. Not only had
Complainant been reprimanded, he had been warned in no uncertain
terms that future incidents of his inappropriate behavior would
result in termination of his employment. (CX 16, D. 1; TR 609).
Thus, to compare the response of management to the
Hayworth-Steiner and Couty-Hada episodes is neither reasonable
nor persuasive. "Disparate treatment' has not been shown.
A valid comparison in determining "'disparate treatment"
would entail an analysis of management's response to the
Hayworth-Steiner and Couty-Novin confrontations, since the
Couty-Novin incident was Complainant's first involving misconduct
and insubordination. Upon comparison of treatment of these two
episodes, it becomes clear that Complainant was treated more
favorably than his counterpart, Rocky Hayworth. While Hayworth
was suspended for one day and warned that repeated conduct in the
future would result in his termination, Complainant received only
a verbal reprimand and was "counseled" by Taylor-Brown that such
behavior would not be tolerated. Because the Hayworth-Steiner
incident was a potentially explosive one and was quite serious,
the reprimands received by Hayworth and Steiner were harsher than
those received by Complainant and Novin. Consequently there was
no "disparate [harsher] treatment" on the part of Respondent
toward Complainant.
In summary, it has been determined that Complaint has
demonstrated no evidence, circumstantial or other, which would
support even an inference that the Respondent was motivated in
[Page 12]
part by Complaint's protected conduct when it discharged
Complainant.3 Having failed to prove a
prima facie case,
Complainant has not shown a violation of Section 5881 of the
Energy Reorganization Act. It is significant to note however,
that the same result would be reached if Complainant had
established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Had
such occurred, the burden would then have shifted to Respondent
to proffer evidence of legitimate motives for the adverse
employee action. In the instant case, the record is replete with
evidence of valid, legitimate reasons for Complainant's
discharge.
It is certainly true that a quality control inspector such
as Complainant is protected from discrimination based upon
"competent and aggressive inspection work." Mackowiak v.
University Nuclear Systems, Inc., supra at 1163. However,
abusive, obscene language coupled with defiant and hostile
conduct justifies an employee's discharge. Dunham v. Brock , 794
F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1986). Numerous instances of such
profane language and belligerent behavior have been documented.
See Findings of Fact, supra at pp. 3-7. The Couty-Novin,
Couty-Parks and Couty-Hada confrontations are sufficiently
documented and have been discussed in this decision. Though only
one example has been cited herein, there are other instances in
which complainant addressed plant supervisory personnel with
obscene language. See CX 16, pp. 2-4; CX 12; Findings of Fact,
paragraph 6.
In a retaliatory discharge case, the aggrieved employee may
prevail only if he would not have been discharged but for his
participation in the statutorily protected activity. If there is
substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the discharge
would have occurred despite the alleged protected activity, the
employee may not prevail. See Durham v. Brock, supra at 1040.
The evidence of record in the case at bar overwhelmingly supports
the conclusion that Complaint would have been discharged
regardless of his having engaged in protected activity.
Beginning in September of 1986, Complainant embarked upon a
series of confrontations with plant supervisors, the first of
which was with Novin. See Findings of Fact, paragraphs 11-13.
Complainant took it upon himself to become involved in a
discussion which pertained to Shelton's inspection rather than
his own. Furthermore, Complainant acted in an unprofessional and
[Page 13]
inappropriate manner using "loud and abusive" language, while
Novin remained very calm, (CX 12) Despite a counseling session
and warning that such conduct would simply not be tolerated,
Complainant again lost control of his temper during the
subsequent altercation with Parks. During this incident
Complainant became very hostile, repeatedly refused to perform
the inspection, and used an extensive series of "obscene
expletives" before finally performing the inspection. Using his
own jargon, Complainant surely went beyond his pretextual goal of
"generating excitement" during what was ordinarily a boring
evening shift. See CX 16. This confrontation resulted in the
disciplinary meeting during which Complainant was explicity
warned that any such future incidents would result in his
immediate termination. Approximately one week later, however,
Complainant became enraged at Hada, the HP supervisor, for
validly refusing to issue him a respirator. That Hada
recommended Complainant's security badge be pulled, which would
in effect preclude his access to the RCA and his ability to
perform future inspections, supports the finding that
COmplainant's conduct during the incident led Hada to believe his
presence was of a threatening nature. Likewise, the eyewitness
account of Orville Cypret indicates that Complainant's
aggressive," "belligerent" behavior intimated a "somewhat
threatening" and potentially explosive situation." (CX 15, p.6).
Without doubt, there is ample documentation of Complainant's
repeated hostile, inappropriate, belligerent behavior which
included numerous instances of profane, crude and abusive
language. Additionally, Complainant had been counseled following
the initial Couty-Novin incident that such outbursts in the
future would not be tolerated, and following the Couty-Parks
confrontation that he would immediately be terminated if another
such incident occurred. The Respondent has propounded valid,
genuine reasons for Complainant's discharge - reasons with which
this Court can not disagree. As evidenced by his numerous
confrontations, obstinate behavior and extensive use of profane
language, Complainant overstepped the "defensible bounds of
conduct," thus resulting in his legal termination from
employment. See Durham v. Brock , supra at 1041.
With regard to Complainant's allegation of blacklisting, the
Court finds that such allegation is not sustained by the evidence
of record. Focusing on the information communicated from
Respondent's officials to Louisiana Power and Light (LP&L), there
[Page 14]
is evidence of only one such communication. See RX 64. LP&L had
telephoned Respondent in an attempt to verify Complainant's
employment during the periods from July 1986 through November
1986 and from August 1973 through May 1974. Respondent was able
to verify Complainant's employment during the first period, but
not the second, since Complainant had been employed during the
second period by "X-Ray Eng." and assigned to Arkansas Nuclear
One. (RX 54, p.4).
Complainant's inability to achieve certification is
attributable to the inability of LP&L officials to verify
completion of the high school degree requirements rather than any
information communicated by Respondent to LP&L officials. As
stated by Mr. Gerret, who served as Quality Assurance Manager for
LP&L through March of 1987, LP&L personnel were unable to verify
that Complainant was a high school graduate or had received an
equivalency diploma (TR 768-769), one of the requirements for
certification as a Level II receipt inspector. Mr. Gerret's
testimony comes as no surprise, since counsel for Complainant
encountered the very same difficulty. (RX 72). Complainant's
assertion that it would have been easier for LP&L to simply
request the documentation directly from him is not well-founded.
Such a request was made of Complainant, but production of the
diploma or GED scores was not possible since Complainant had
misplaced the originals. See TR 827-828; RX 72. Accordingly,
the record in the instant case is devoid of evidence supporting a
claim of blacklisting. Complainant was denied certification by
LP&L for a legitimate reason.4
In conclusion, Complainant has failed to prove his claim of
illegal discharge or of blacklisting on the part of Respondent.
There having been no violation of Section 5851 of the Act,
Complainant's claim should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is hereby recommended that the complaint of
Complainant, Richard Couty, be DISMISSED.
Entered this 16th day of November, 1987, at Metairie,
Louisiana.
JAMES W. KERR, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
JWK:CC:dqc
d/29
[ENDNOTES]
1 The following abbreviations will be
used throughout this decision when citing the evidence of record: Complainant's
Exhibit - CX, Respondent's Exhibit - RX, Joint Exhibit - JX,
Transcript of the hearing - TR, and Court Exhibit - Court Exh.
2 Findings of fact numbered one
through ten comprise the
parties' stipulated facts. See JX 1.
3 Complainant has further argued
that Respondent's contention
that Complainant's discharge was premised upon "repeated abusive
language, bad mouthing Bechtel, and insubordination to Parks and
Hada" is not supportable since "neither Hada nor Parks claimed to
be nor was [Complainant's] supervisor." See Complainant's
Post-Trial Brief, p. 62. This argument is without merit. The
primary reason for Complainant's discharge was "The recurring
problem...concerning inappropriate behavior with plant
supervisory personnel ." (CX 14, p. 1)(emphasis provided).
Clearly, Parks and Hada qualified as "plant supervisory
personnel," given Parks' status as the senior quality control
inspector in the quality control department and Hada's status as
the HP supervisor of the health physics department. TR 836-837,
929-930).
4 Whether Complainant's
convictions for three counts of
"harassing communications" and three counts of "terroristic
threatening" played a role in the denial of Complainant's
certification is not known. See RX 51-53. The actions which led
to such convictions did not constitute protected activity.
Similarly, Complainant had been terminated by other employers
prior to his termination by Respondent, though he was unwilling
to so admit. (TR 619-620, 621, 627-628). It is entirely possible
that this knowledge was gained by LP&L during its process of
verifying employment, thereby casting doubt on Complainant's work
place behavior.