DATE:  February 27, 1995
CASE NO:  93-STA-35


IN THE MATTER OF

DWIGHT E. TOLAND,

          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

BURLINGTON MOTOR CARRIERS, INC.,

          RESPONDENT.


BEFORE:   THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                            DECISION AND ORDER

     Complainant Dwight E. Toland (Toland) alleges that
Respondent Burlington Motor Companies, Inc. (Burlington) violated
the employee protection provision of the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West
1994) when it fired him for making complaints about falsifying
logs in violation of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations.  The findings of fact in the Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ's) Recommended Decision and Order (R.D. and O.), at
3-15, are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole and therefore are conclusive.  29 C.F.R. §
1978.109(c)(3) (1993).  The ALJ's decision is affirmed, with one
correction in legal reasoning, and the case is dismissed.
                                BACKGROUND
     Burlington, a nationwide trucking company hired Toland to
drive one of their trucks.  The initial training involved a brief
course at the company headquarters, and then four to five weeks
training behind the wheel of a truck with a "driver/trainer." 
Toland was assigned two different "driver/trainers," and failed
to get along with either one.  After the fallout with the first 
[PAGE 2]
driver, the manager of the trainees, John Patrick, told Toland he
would reassign him to a different "driver/trainer."  Patrick
further told Toland that he would be fired if the second
"driver/trainer" did not work out.  Toland did not mention any
alleged DOT violations at this time.
     On September 8, 1992, after Toland had a dispute with the
second "driver/trainer," Toland was asked to return to
headquarters.  Patrick claimed that Toland was being returned to
headquarters to be fired.  On September 9, 1992 Toland spoke with
John Pinckney, Respondent's Safety Manager, and informed him that
he had been forced to falsify his logs and forgo DOT mandated
inspections.  Toland was finally terminated on September 11,
1992. 
     Toland alleges that he was fired by Respondent when he
notified them of the log falsifications and threatened to report
the violations to the DOT.  Respondent claims that Complainant
was terminated because he failed to get along with two
"driver/trainers," and the decision to terminate Toland was made
prior to the allegations protected under STAA.
                             DISCUSSION
     Under STAA section 405(a), it is unlawful to discharge an
employee because he has "filed a complaint or begun a proceeding
related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety
regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or will testify
in such a proceeding." 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a) (West 1994).  
     STAA cases first require that Complainant make a prima facie
case.  Once that is done, the burden switches to Respondent to
articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
Complainant's discharge.  If Respondent meets its burden, the
burden switches back to Complainant to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the stated grounds for discharge were 
pretextual.
     The ALJ found that Complainant set out a prima facie case,
that Respondent met its burden to articulate legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for Complainants discharge, and that
ultimately Complainant did not carry his burden of proof to show
that Respondent's stated grounds for discharge were pretextual. 
I agree with the ALJ's reasoning and adopt his decision, copy
appended, with one exception.
     The ALJ, R.D. and O. at 17, appears to require corroboration
of Complainant's allegations concerning the falsification of logs
before accepting the establishment of a prima facie case on that
point.  Corroborating evidence is not necessary to establish a
prima facie case.  In order to present a prima facie case the
Complainant need only to present evidence sufficient to prevail
if not contradicted and overcome by other evidence.  Assistant
[PAGE 3]
Sec'y and Johnny E. Brown v. Besco Steel Supply, Case No. 93-
STA-00030, Sec. Dec. and Ord., January 24, 1995, slip op. at 3. 
Therefore, Complainant's testimony that he was forced to falsify
logs by itself was sufficient to establish a prima facie case,
i.e. he would have prevailed on that point if Respondent
had not introduced evidence rebutting and overcoming that
allegation.  The ALJ held Complainant to a higher standard than
appropriate for the establishment of a prima facie case and to
that extent only, I decline to adopt his R.D. and O.
     In all other respects the factual findings and legal
analysis of the ALJ are adopted.
     Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED.

     SO ORDERED.

                              ROBERT B. REICH
                              Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.