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USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Tankersley v. Triple Crown Services, Inc., 92-STA-8 (Sec'y Feb. 1, 1995)





DATE:  February 1, 1995
CASE NO. 92-STA-0008



IN THE MATTER OF

TERRY W. TANKERSLEY,

          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

TRIPLE CROWN SERVICES, INC., AND
NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, INC.,

          RESPONDENTS.


BEFORE:  THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                     FINAL ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT
     The parties have submitted a Settlement Agreement and
Release in this case arising under the employee protection
provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
(STAA), 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (west 94).  Upon review, I grant
their request that I approve the settlement and dismiss the case
with prejudice.  29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(d)(2) (1994).  My
approval, however, is subject to the following limitations.
     The agreement purports to settle a number of matters arising
under a variety of laws, including the STAA.  See Exhibit
A at 8.  Because my authority over the agreement is defined by
and limited under the STAA, my review here is limited to
determining whether the terms of this agreement constitute a
fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of Complainant's
allegations that Respondent violated the STAA.  See
Davis v. Kimstock, Inc., Case No. 90-STA-8, Sec. Order,
Nov. 30, 1990, slip op. at 2; Aurich v. Consolidated Edison
Co., Case No. 86-CAA-2, Sec. Order, Jul. 29, 1987, slip op.
at 1-2.
     I note that Paragraph 3 of the agreement, at page 3, could
be construed as a waiver by Complainant of any causes of action 

[PAGE 2] he may have which arise in the future. Such a provision must be interpreted as limited to a waiver of Complainant's right to sue in the future on claims or causes of action arising out of facts or any set of facts occurring before the date of the agreement. See Davis, slip op. at 2; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 45 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974); Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986). Paragraph 6, pages 4-5, is a confidentiality provision. Items (A), (B), (C), (D) and (F) require Complainant to maintain the confidentiality of facts relating to the agreement itself, unless disclosure is required under compulsion of law. These items do not bind the Secretary or otherwise conflict with the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), and are approved. See Webb v. Quantum Resources, Inc., Case No. 93-ERA-42A, Sec. Order, June 29, 1994, slip op. at 2; Anderson v. Waste Management of New Mexico, Case No. 88- TSC-2, Sec. Order, Dec. 18, 1990, slip op. at 2. [1] Item (E) of Paragraph 6, however, requires confidentiality of "any other matters, however described, associated with any claim relating . . . to this agreement." The paragraph further provides that Complainant shall not criticize, belittle or ridicule Respondent or any of their affiliated companies. To the extent that these two provisions would restrict Complainant from voluntarily communicating with, and providing information to, any state or federal government agencies, they are void as against public policy and unenforceable. Brown v. Holmes & Narver, Inc., Case No. 90-ERA-26, Sec. Order, May 11, 1994, slip op. at 3-4; Murray v. Protection Technology, Case No. 92-ERA- 27, Sec. Order, May 11, 1994, slip op. at 3; Corder v. Bechtel Energy Corp., Case No. 88-ERA-9, Sec. Order, Feb. 9, 1994, slip op. at 6-8. Although the parties consider Paragraph 6 to be a material part of the agreement, the parties also agreed, in Paragraph 8, that if any part of the agreement is found unenforceable, then the validity of the remaining agreement shall not be affected. Paragraph 6, therefore, is severed from the remainder of the agreement to the extent that it would prohibit Complainant from communicating to government authorities. Brown, slip op. at 4-5; Anderson, slip op. at 3; cf. Macktal v. Secretary of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1991) (Secretary may not eliminate "material terms" of proposed settlement without consent of other two parties). As construed and limited herein, I find the terms of the agreement fair, adequate and reasonable and, therefore, approve the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release. Accordingly, this case IS DISMISSED with prejudice. SO ORDERED.
[PAGE 3] ROBERT B. REICH Secretary of Labor Washington, D.C. [ENDNOTES] [1] The terms of a settlement agreement are agency records which are subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), and the procedures in 29 C.F.R. Part 70 (1993). Unless exempt, such records must be made available for public inspection and copying. Debose v. Carolina Power & Light Co., Case No. 92-ERA-14, Sec. Order, Feb. 7, 1994, slip op. at 2-3, appeal dismissed, No. 94-1459 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995).



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