however, persuades me
that the terms of settlement are acceptable with the following
qualifications.
The agreement appears to encompass the
settlement of matters arising under various laws, only one of
which is the STAA. As explained in Poulos v. Ambassador Fuel
Oil Co., Inc. , Case No. 86-CAA-1, Sec. Order, November 2,
1987, slip op. at 2, my authority over this settlement agreement
is limited to matters arising under the STAA. See also
Davis v. Kimstock. Inc. , Case No. 90-STA-8, Sec. Approval
of Settlement and Dismissal of Complaint, November 30, 1990, slip
op. at 2. Accordingly, I have limited my review of the agreement
to determining whether its terms are a fair, adequate, and
reasonable settlement of Complainant's allegations that
Respondent violated the STAA.
I also note that certain language in the
agreement could be construed as a waiver by Complainant of
causes of action he may have which arise in the future.
See Stipulation of Settlement at 2 ¶ 5. In approving
this settlement I interpret this provision as limited to a waiver
of the right to sue in the future on claims or causes of action
arising out of facts occurring before the date of the agreement.
Davis , slip op. at 3; Johnson v. Transco Products,
Inc. , Case No. 85-ERA-7, Sec. Order Approving Settlement,
August 8, 1985.
With the limitations set forth herein, I find
the terms of the agreement fair, adequate, and reasonable and,
therefore, approve the Stipulation of Settlement and General
Release.
Accordingly, the complaint in this case
against Life Style Homes, Inc. is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
LYNN MARTIN
Secretary of Labor
Washington, D.C.
[ENDNOTES]
1 The caption is
corrected to reflect the prosecuting party and the proper named
person as the Respondent in accordance with 49 U.S.C. app. §
2305(c)(2)(A) (1988) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 1978.105(b)(2),
1978.108(a) (1990).
2 I note in
response to the ALJ's comments, that it is not imperative that
the parties file the original documents. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1978.111(d)(2).