DATE: March 28, 1991
CASE NO. 91-STA-3

IN THE MATTER OF

THOMAS L. RINEHART,
    COMPLAINANT,

    v.

JANCO LIMITED, INCORPORATED,
    RESPONDENT.

BEFORE: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

    On January 24, 1991, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Robert L. Hillyard issued a [Recommended] Decision and Order in this case which arises under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1988). The ALJ granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment finding the complaint untimely and ordered dismissal. In accordance with the regulations implementing the STAA, the case is now before me for review. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a) (1990). Although the regulations provide that the parties may file briefs in support of or in opposition to the ALJ's decision, 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2), no briefs have been filed before me.

    After reviewing the entire record, I find that the ALJ's factual findings are fully supported by the evidence and that his -conclusions are in accordance with applicable lay. Accordingly, I accept his ruling in this case. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c).

    The STAA and the implementing regulations provide that a complaint may be filed within 180 days after the alleged violation. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(1). The ALJ found, and it is undisputed, that the instant complaint was not filed until 264 days after the alleged unlawful discharge. While tolling of the 180-day period is justified under certain circumstances, I agree with the ALJ that there is no evidence here of any of those recognized

circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(3); Nixon v. Jupiter Chemical, Inc., Case No. 89-STA-3, Sec. Final Dec. and Order, October 10, 1990, slip op. at 4; Hicks v. Colonial Motor Freight Lines, Case No. 84-STA-20, Sec. Final Dec. and Order, December 10, 1985, slip op. at 6-8 citing School District of the City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (ad Cir. 1981). Although Complainant pleads that his untimely filing should be excused because he was not aware of his rights under the STAA until after the limitation period expired, and because he believes his complaint is "valid and legitimate," neither explanation is sufficient. Ignorance of the law is not enough to invoke equitable tolling, and I cannot disregard the limitation period simply because it bars what may be an otherwise meritorious claim. Allentown, 657 F.2d at 20-21. Since there is no genuine question of fact for hearing on this threshold issue of timeliness, the ALJ properly ruled that Respondent is entitled to summary judgment. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1978.106(a), 18.40(a)-(d) (1990).

    Accordingly, the complaint IS DENIED.

    SO ORDERED.

       LYNN MARTIN
       Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.