1 Section 5851 prohibits an employer
for discriminating
against an employee because the employee has engaged in
certain protected activity in the area of nuclear safety.
2 This case is before me pusuant
to 29 CFR § 24.6(b) for
review and issuance of a final order.
3 Complainant, who had been
employed as a quality engineer
by Respondent, alleged in her complaint discriminatory actions
by Respondent, "including discharge and other actions that
relate to compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of
employment" in recrimination for records she wrote and discussions
she had with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that dealt with
safety-related topics regarding the Zimmer Plant in Ohio.
4 As an apparent corollary of it
statutory argument,
Respondent additionally argues that the government's interest
in enforcement to assure compliance with federal nuclear safety
requirements "also precludes Nolder from terminating this
proceeding unilaterally." Respondent's Memorandum at 8. It is
not clear from this statement whether Respondent is arguing that
the governmental interest is served by disallowing a complainant
from withdrawing a complaint or whether it is in the governmental
interest to allow complainant's withdrawal only for cause. In
either case, no such requirement is stated in the Act. Nevertheless,
I note that, rather than promoting compliance with federal
nuclear safety requirements, it would be detrimental to the
governmental interest to allow dismissal only for cause if dismissal for
cause constitutes a "determination on the merits," as Respondent
contends (Respondent's Memorandum at 8). Under Respondent's
theory, since a dismissal for cause would preclude an employee
from ever bringing in any other forum another suit against
the employer based on the same cause such dismissal would
free an employer from any penalty for retaliating against
an employee for the employee's actions promoting nuclear safety.
  Dismissal for cause. (i) The administrative law
judge may, at the request of any party, or on his or
her own motion, dismiss a claim
  (A) Upon the failure of the complainant or his
or her representative to attend a hearing without good
cause;
  (B) Upon the failure of the complainant to comply
with a lawful order of the administrative law judge.
  (ii)In any case where a dismissal of a claims,
defense, or party is sought, the administrative law judge
shall issue an order to show cause why the dismissal should
not be granted and afford all parties a reasonable time to
respond to such order. After the time for response has
expired, the administrative law judge shall take such action
as is appropriate to rule on the dismissal, which may
include an order dismissing the claim, defense or party.
6 In its Reply Brief (at 3)
Respondent made the argument,
not addressed in either of its other briefs or in oral
argument, that the complaint should be dismissed for cause pursuant
to Section 24. 5 (e) (4) (i) (A), i.e. , that complainant's request
to withdraw should be considered an advance notice that she
intends not to attend the hearing. I find this argument without
basis.
7 Complainant argues that
Subsection (ii) of 20 CFR § 24.5 (e) (4)
is applicable only where a claim is dismissed pursuant to
Subsection (i) and that therefore no part of 20 CFR § 24. 5 (e) (4)
applies in this case. Respondent argues that Subsection (ii) of
20 CFR § 24. 5 (e) (4) is applicable for dismissals for cause not
covered by Subsection (i) of the regulation and that Subsection
(ii) is applicable in this case.
8Judge Lasky noted,
"Despite the fact that an order to
show cause was not issued, the parties were afforded the same
opportunity to brief and argue the merits of Complainant's
motion at the April 5 hearing that they would have been afforded
if the matter were heard upon an order to show cause," RDO at
3, n.2. If 20 CFR § 24.5(e)(4)(ii) is applicable, I agree
with Judge Lasky that its requirements were complied with.
9 If 20 CFR § 24.5(e)(4)(ii)
is not applicable, resort must
be made to the Federal Rules since 29 CFR Part 13 is silent
on the issue. If subsection (ii) is applicable, I agree with
the ALJ's reasoning and ruling that resort must be made to
the Federal Rules.
10 In each case the judge, upon
finding legal prejudice,
did not dismiss with prejudice but denied the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, requiring the plaintiff to proceed.
11 Complainant would be
prevented from bringing a new cause of
action based on the same facts under Section 5851 were the
complaint before me dismissed without prejudice. A dismissal
without prejudice does not toll a statute of limitations. See 9
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2367 at
187 (1971), and cases cited therein. The thirty days from
occurrence of a violation allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1), see also
29 C.F.R. 24.3(b), for filling a complaint has passed. Therefore,
complainant could not file a new complaint.
12 Inasmuch As the ALJ did
vacate the determination of the
Wage and Hour Division, I find it anomalous that he concluded
that the determination of the Wage and Hour Division remained
intact and legally harmed Respondent.
In requesting alternatively that vacation of the determination
be a condition for allowing dismissal without prejudice, Respondent
apparently recognized that, should the determination not be
vacated automatically, it nevertheless could be vacated by order
of the ALJ and that any prejudice to Respondent could be removed.
In its memorandum Respondent also conceded that the determination
of the Wage and Hour Division would have no "formal effect"
arguing only that it would bear a "stigma" and that it would be
"vulnerable to the Complainant's improper efforts to use such a finding
in other proceedings against the respondent." Respondent's Memo
at 8. This concession is patently inconsistent with Respondent's
assertion that the existence of the Wage and Hour determination
constitutes legal harm warranting dismissal of the complaint for
cause or with prejudice.
13 Respondent makes no
contention that the state laws on
which the state action would be tried and decided are more
beneficial to Complainant than Section 5851. Establishing,
that Respondent would be detrimentally affected by the state
laws would constitute legal prejudice. Durham, supra.
14 The other condition
Respondent requested, that the Wage
and Hour determination be vacated, is moot for the reasons
given.
15 Only if Complainant accept
the dismissal on the conditions
set by the ALJ but does not meet the conditions may the
ALJ dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Davis v. McLaughlin,
326 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 (1964).