BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON,
WESLEY YOUNG, AND OTHER UNKNOWN
AGENTS OF BECHTEL AND SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA EDISON.
DECISION OF THE SECRETARY
This proceeding was commenced by Michael W. Flanagan
(Flanagan), the complainant, under the employee protection
provision of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(a) (1982).1
No employer, including a Commission licensee, an
applicant for a Commission license, or a contractor or
a subcontractor of a Commission licensee or applicant,
may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate
against any employee with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request
of the employee) --
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about
to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding
under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], or a proceeding
for the administration or enforcement of any
requirement imposed under this chapter or the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist
or participate in any manner in such a proceeding
or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in
any other action to carry out the purposes of this
chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.].
2 Recommended Decision and Order
of Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) November 19, 1981 (R.D. and O).
4 The ALJ found that Wes Young, the
building trades representative,
was not an employer and therefore not a proper party to
these proceedings and that Southern California Edison Company
played no part in Bechtel's refusal to hire Flanagan. R.D. and
O. at 7. The record supports these findings and I adopt them.
5See also Greenwald v. The City
of North Miami Beach, Case
No. 80-SSDWA-2, slip op. (Decision of the Secretary, April 14,
1980).
6 Further support for this conclusion is
found in Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Shop, 549 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977), a case
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 15 (a) (3), 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982), and Rutherford v. American Bank
of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977), a case under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (1982). In both cases, former employees were
found to be "employees", protected against discrimination by
their former employers.
7 Although Respondents have raised
other issues, this result
makes it unnecessary to address them.