Because Mr. Shackleton was a very credible witness, and because most of the allegations to which he testified were corroborated, I find that his testimony contains sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible.

    It is true that respondent is prejudiced by the admission of this testimony, since it does not have the opportunity to cross examine the employees who made the allegations in question. However, whatever prejudice respondent may suffer can be alleviated by according little weight to that part of Mr. Shackleton's testimony which is not corroborated by other evidence.

    Furthermore, if employees engaged in the construction of nuclear power plants are too intimidated by the possibility of economic reprisals to report violations of federal safety standards to the NRC, then there would be virtually no incentive for their employers to observe such standards. The very real threat of an uncontrolled nuclear accident due to a poorly constructed nuclear power plant is of such magnitude that I find that the NRC's need to protect its sources in this case far outweighs respondent's need for their disclosure.

    In addition, according to its legislative history, section 5851 of the ERA was designed to:

[offer] protection to employees who believe they have been fired or discriminated against as a result of the fact that they have testified, given evidence, or brought suit under [the ERA] or the Atomic Energy Act. (1978 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 7303; emphasis added).

This purpose would hardly be served if an employee, upon giving evidence of prohibited discrimination on behalf of a fellow employee, could incurr similar discrimination as a consequence.

    For the reasons discussed above, I shall admit Mr. Shackleton's testimony, but little weight will be accorded to those allegations which are not corroborated by other evidence, and no weight shall be given to unsupported expressions of opinion concerning the motives of UNSI's management personnel.

II. Why Mackowiak was Laid Off:

    Respondent bears the burden of proving that it would have laid Mackowiak off even if he had not engaged in protected conduct. Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, 735 F.2d 1159, at 1164, citing Mt. Healthy City District v. Doyle, supra.

    The record shows that Mackowiak was layed off on January 29, 1982, in a general reduction in force which was ordered by the prime contractor on the nuclear installation, Bechtel Corporation (RT pp. 52). A total of four QCI's were layed off at that time (RT p. 52). It is undisputed that Mackowiak had more seniority than many of the QCI's who were retained, and that he was the only QCI in respondent's employ at the time of the layoff who was an American Welding Society, Certified Welding Inspector (AWSCWI) (RT pp. 62 & 148).

    Furthermore, during the same week in which Mackowiak and the other 3 QCI's were layed off, two additional QCI's were terminated for excessive absenteeism (RT pp. 148-149 & 335), and one new QCI was hired (RT p. 337). Respondent's witness Conrad Holt, the assistant Quality Assurance/Quality Control manager at UNSI during Mackowiak's employment there, could not offer an explanation as to why the two employees who had been terminated for absenteeism were not included in the general layoff, nor could he explain what would have happened if the new QCI, one Mark Thompson, had been told that a layoff was occurring and he could not be hired as promised (RT pp. 337-339)

    Mackowiak was a member of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, Local 242, which had a contract with UNSI (original bearing transcript - HT - pp. 55 & 66). The union contract had a seniority clause, which stated that:

In case of layoffs, the last Employee hired shall be the first layed off prviding the ability and efficiency of the employee is substantially equal. (Exhibit 14, p. 3; Record, Vol. I, p. 130).

However, Jerry Dennis, the Union's business manager and financial secretary, testified at the first hearing that this clause was not enforceable (HT pp. 55 & 64).

    Respondent contends that not only was this clause unenforceable (see Respondent's Post Hearing Brief, p. 3), but even if it

was enforceable, Mackowiak was layed off on January 29, 1982, because he had a bad attitude, he was abrasive, and because he could not get along with other people (RT pp. 53-54, 115, 121-122, 128, 137-138).

    In fact, Mackowiak was issued a "counseling statement" on October 22, 1981, warning him that if his attitude did not improve, he would be terminated within 30 days (RT pp. 45-46 & 48-49). Another QCI, Virginia Robbins, was also issued a counseling statement on that date, for the same reason (RT p. 47). She worked with Mackowiak on swing shift (RT p. 47). Mackowiak was not terminated at the close of the 30 day probationary period, because his attitude seemed to have improved (RT pp. 48-49). However, immediately after the probationary period, he reverted to his pre-counseling statement attitude (RT p. 50).

    Respondent's witnesses testified to a variety of incidents which, respondent contends, are examples of Mackowiak's poor attitude, abrasiveness, and inability to get along with others, and which prove that he would have been terminated even if he had not engaged in protected conduct under section 5851 of the ERA.

    One of these reasons is that Mackowiak allegedly refused to work on the "as-built program." Under this program, UNSI was to sketch the completed work which had been installed within a particular time period and provide this sketch to the architect- engineer for evaluation (RT p. 37). According to Barry Sachs, the Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) Manager for UNSI, Mackowiak refused to work on this program, declaring that it was a waste of time (RT p. 37). However, Mackowiak testified that he did in fact work on this program for 2 or 3 months, and identified Exhibit C-U as a record he kept of hangars that called for inspection under this program, with his notes as to which ones needed corrections and which had been "bought off" (i.e. approved) (RT pp. 188 & 192).

    Mackowiak further testified that he called this program a waste of time because he was expected to inspect duct work that was 30 feet high without scaffolding, and he felt he could not perform a complete inspection from that distance (RT pp. 190-191). Nevertheless, he did work on the program (RT p. 191).

    Another problem which Mackowiak had with the as-built program is that, instead of being performed properly, the required procedure was being overidden via speed memos (RT p. 188). In

particular, he testified that the proper standards required that he only inspect to tolerances of plus or minus one-eighth of an inch, but he was ordered via a speed memo (Exhibit C-C, authored by Barry Sachs on August 18, 1981) to inspect to tolerances of plus or minus one-quarter of an inch (RT p. 193). This speed memo was issued after Mackowiak had received, in response to his Quality Control Request For Information (QCRFI) on July 27, 1981 (Exhibit C-V, p. 2), a speed memo from Conrad Holt (Mr. Sachs' assistant QA/QC manager), dated August 4, 1981, indicating that the one-quarter inch tolerances had been arrived at without reference to UNSI's duct standards, and as such were incorrect (Exhibit C-V, p. 1).

    Paul Narbut, an NRC investigator, also testified that Mackowiak had been concerned about the fact that the as-built program was not being performed in accordance with procedure, and that this was a valid concern (RT pp. 158 & 159).

    Furthermore, on cross examination, Mr. Sachs testified that a stop work order was issued on the as-built program (Exhibit C-D, dated September 18, 1981) because it was not being performed in accordance with the required procedure (RT pp. 71-72), thus lending credence to Mackowiak's assessment that the program was a waste of time.

    In view of this evidence, it appears not only that Mackowiak did not refuse to work on the as-built program, as alleged by Mr. Sachs, but that his criticisms of the program were valid. Hence, his purported refusal to participate in this program cannot be relied upon as a justification for his termination.

    Mr. Sachs testified that another reason for Mackowiak's termination was the fact that when he was by-passed for a promotion over other, less senior quality control inspectors, he wrote to Sachs, "demanding" that Sachs justify this decision (RT pp. 42-43). Sachs stated that the reason he by-passed Mackowiak for the promotion was his inability to work with people (RT pp. 42-43), but that he responded to Mackowiak's demand by stating that "it was a management decision, period" (RT p. 43). He could not remember hearing any further complaint from Mackowiak after this response.

    Mackowiak admitted that he wrote Sachs a QCRFI asking why, with all of his qualifications, he had not been considered for the promotion, but stated that he had never been angry about it (RT, p. 222-223), and that, after issuing the QCRFI, he never brought the matter up again (RT p. 224).

    When asked why he considered Mackowiak's inquiry concerning the promotion a justification for laying him off, Mr. Sachs responded: "That was only a small part of it. [There was] an ongoing problem with Bob in the way that he was interfacing with people and myself."

    I do not find the above to be persuasive evidence that Mackowiak's inquiry concerning his failure to be promoted formed a part in the decision to lay him off on January 29, 1982.

    Another reason for which respondent allegedly chose to lay Mackowiak off was that he refused to take a liquid penetrant class (RT pp. 40 & 201-202). Apparently he had taken this class once in order to be certified to test welds using the liquid penetrant process (RT pp. 39-40). However, upon completion of the class, the certifications of all the class participants were revoked, because the instructor was not qualified to teach the class (RT pp. 40 & 74). Hence, all of the participants were asked to retake the class, and Mackowiak refused to do so. (RT pp. 39-40 & 74-76). The first time that the class was given, the participants were asked to come in on weekends, on their own time (RT p. 74). Mackowiak testified that he spent 49-50 hours of his own time on this class (RT p. 202). Although Mackowiak could still inspect welds visually without the benefit of this class, he could not do so using the liquid penetrant process (RT p. 40). Mr. Sachs testified that most of the people whose certifications were revoked were angry about it (RT pp. 75-76).

    Based on this evidence, it appears that Mackowiak had some reason to be angry about the revocation of his certification, although he perhaps was somewhat less than diplomatic in his refusal to retake the class. Since he could still perform weld inspections without the liquid penetrant certification, this incident is not, by itself, adequate justification for his layoff. However, it does show a certain abrasiveness in his attitude toward UNSI management.

    Another incident on which respondent relies in justifying Mackowiak's layoff concerns the "red-tagging" of a locked tool crib. Mackowiak testified that upon arriving to inspect the temperature of the rod oven within the crib, he found the door locked (RT pp. 175-176). He testified that he waited for one half

hour for the tool crib attendant to return so he could enter and inspect the oven (RT p. 177). When no one came, he hung a red tag on the tool crib door, marking it "rod ovens" to denote that only the oven had to be checked (RT p. 178 & 214-215). He knew that this would prevent anyone from drawing or issuing weld rod from that oven (RT pp. 177 & 214), but, he stated, he could not wait any longer because he was behind schedule and had other rod stations to check before his shift was over (RT p. 178).

    Mr. Holt, on the other hand, testified that the tool crib attendant was only gone for about 15 minutes, that the red- tagging of the tool crib prevented anyone from entering the tool crib and withdrawing tools as well as weld rod, and that it took almost 2 hours to locate Mackowiak in order to ascertain the reason for the red tag (RT pp. 115-116). On cross examination, Mr. Holt admitted that he had never spoken to the attendant involved, and had never actually seen the red tag (RT pp. 131-132). He also indicated when told to remove the tag, Mackowiak apparently did so (RT pp. 132-133).

    This incident was not the first time Mackowiak and other QCIs had had trouble gaining access to tool cribs to inspect the rod ovens (RT p. 176). Mackowiak had written a QCRFI on the subject on January 8, 1982 (See Exhibit 10; original hearing). In addition, Lorna Mackowiak (Mackowiak's wife and fellow employee) testified to an incident in which she, too, had had trouble gaining access to the rod stations (RT pp. 287-290; exhibit C-DD).

    Mackowiak also testified that some time after he placed the red tag, he was paged on a loudspeaker (RT P. 179). When he answered the page, Conrad Holt, the assistant QA/QC manager, was on the line, wanting to know why Mackowiak had placed the red tag. When Mackowiak explained why, Holt told him to remove the tag, to which he responded "Well, as long as we can settle this ... it's quite all right with me" (RT p. 180). Mackowiak explained that by "settling this" he was referring to being able to "work it out so we [could] get some keys and combinations so we [could] get in and do our surveillance" (RT p. 180). He further testified that although he and Mr. Holt never arrived at a solution to the problem, he did not have any further problems in gaining access to the rod stations (RT p. 180).

    Since Mr. Holt had no personal knowledge of the tool crib incident, other than the fact that he was the one who told Mackowiak to remove the red tag, I accept Mackowiak's version of it.

    Based on the evidence, it appears that Mackowiak may have been justified, in view of his previous problems with rod station access, in taking some action to alleviate this problem. However, his red-tagging of the tool crib, with the knowledge that this would prevent anyone from drawing or issuing weld rod, seems to have been a bit extreme. Whether or not this incident justified his layoff, however, depends on the other evidence of record.

anything wrong with the duct run (RT p. 184). Mr. Jones commented that Mackowiak had made a "good effort," and told him to replace the tags and issue a non-conformance report (C-S).

    Exhibit C-T is the non-conformance report Mackowiak issued on this problem, and includes a diagram showing the position of the allegedly incorrect angle.

    This incident does not justify Mackowiak's layoff. Even if he was mistaken in hanging the tags, and his mistake stopped all work for a time, it appears that at the very worst he was making a good faith effort to perform his duty as a QCI. Since, as the Ninth Circuit has dictated, internal reports of violations of quality control standards are protected under § 5851, the red-tagging of the duct run constitutes such protected conduct. Respondent has not alleged that Mackowiak was incompetent. To the contrary, Barry Sachs stated that Mackowiak was "very competent in inspecting welds" (RT p. 62). To cite this incident as an example of Mackowiak's negative attitude, justifying his early layoff, is an attempt to punish an employee for overzealousness. As such, a violation of § 5851 is established.

    Respondent also states that there was a great deal of unrest between the day and swing shift QCIs at UNSI. As Barry Sachs put it "they were at each other's throats," and the efficiency of both shifts was suffering (RT p. 36). He stated that swing shift QCIs were re-inspecting and rejecting work that had already been accepted by day shift (RT p. 36). He considered Mackowiak and Virginia Robbins to be the leaders of swing shift and apparently the cause of the problem (RT p. 37), although there was no problem within swing shift, and Sachs could not give a reason why the swing shift QCIs were calling the day shift's work into question (RT pp. 61-62). He also stated that when welds were called into question by swing shift, it was the day shift inspector who did the verifying (RT p. 62-63).

    Mr. Con Holt similarly testified to the problem between day and swing shifts. He stated that Mackowiak was re-inspecting work which had already been done, which was not his duty, and that he was one of the "co-leaders" of swing shift (RT p. 112). In Mr. Holt's opinion, the day shift QCIs were competent and doing proper work (RT p. 112). However, Mr. Holt admitted that he had never worked on a nuclear installation before his employment with UNSI, and that he had never been a welder (RT p. 129).

    Paul Narbut, and NRC investigator, testified that he had had a meeting with swing shift personnel, and was taken aback by the degree of agitation among them (RT pp. 156-157). They reported to him that they felt intimidated by management, because they believed that if they wrote non-conformance reports (NCRS) or reported problems, they would be in trouble (RT p. 161). Narbut felt that such a degree of agitation was indicative of real problems (RT pp. 156 & 171). Mackowiak was at this meeting, but was more reticent than some of the others (RT pp. 157 & 169).

    Narbut also testified that when he expressed his concerns about this agitation to Barry Sachs, Sachs asked him if Mackowiak was involved, to which he responded affirmatively (RT pp. 170- 171). However, according to Narbut, the problem involved more than just swing shift personnel. Some of the day shift people were also upset (RT pp. 171-172).

    Narbut further testified that his investigation of UNSI showed that some of the concerns expressed to him by Mackowiak were valid; specifically, that the as-built program was not being done to procedure, and that there were unreasonable delays in management responses to QCRFIs (requests for information) (RT pp. 158-159).

    Respondent's contention that Mackowiak was somehow responsible for the unrest between the day and swing shift QCIs at UNSI is too vague to be credited as a justification for his layoff. The only specific incident in which Mackowiak re-inspected work which was approved by the day shift involves the red-tagging of the duct run, and since I have found that that was protected activity under § 5851, that does not support respondent's position. Further, Mr. Narbut's testimony that some of Mackowiak's concerns were valid, and that Sachs, when confronted with the allegations made to Narbut, wanted to know if Mackowiak was involved, support the inference that UNSI's management looked with disfavor on employees who reported quality control violations.

    Another incident on which respondent relies is that Mackowiak allegedly had a confrontation with a welder, in which Barry Sachs had to intervene (RT pp. 31-32). However, Mr. Sachs could not remember the name of the welder, nor the substance of the confrontation (RT pp. 31 & 60). Mr. Sachs admitted that he had failed to mention this incident in his deposition (RT p. 60). There was also no mention of this incident at the first hearing.

    I find that, even if this incident occurred, respondent cannot rely on it to justify Mackowiak's layoff, since it was of so little importance to Mr. Sachs that he failed to mention it both at the first hearing and at his deposition, and since he was the one who decided that Mackowiak would be included in the reduction in force ordered by Bechtel on January 29, 1982 (RT p. 42).

    Respondent also alleged that one of its reasons for laying off Mackowiak was that he had refused to assist in training other QCIs on the inspection of "skewed-T fillet welds," which were difficult welds to inspect (RT pp. 41-42 & 118-119). Mackowiak's assistance was requested because of his qualification as a certified welding inspector under the AWS (the American Welding Society) (RT p. 119).

    Mackowiak testified that he was asked by Mr. Holt to assist one person in the inspection of skewed-T fillet welds, that he asked Mr. Holt if this was a request or an order, and upon learning that it was merely a request, he felt that he had the option to refuse (RT p. 203). Mr. Holt also testified that he had "asked" Mackowiak for assistance (RT p. 119). Mackowiak testified further that when this request was made, his probationary period following the confidential counseling statement had just expired, and he had just learned that he was not to be fired as a result of it (202- 203). Mackowiak apparently refused Mr. Holt's request because he felt wronged by the counseling statement (Rt pp. 221-222), and because he felt that being an instructor was not his province (RT pp. 218-219).

    While Mackowiak's response to this request could have been more diplomatic, the record supports his assertion that he did not refuse a management order. Hence, I cannot find that this refusal constitutes a reasonable basis on which to justify laying him off. The last of respondent's reasons for laying off Mackowiak is that he issued too many QCRFIS, or quality control requests for information, and that only about 10 percent of them were valid (RT pp. 45 & 120). However, Mr. Sachs indicated that this document was designed to facilitate communication between the QCIs and QA management, so that "where there was a gray area or if the QC personnel had questions, they could put them on that document" (RT p. 79). He also testified that the QC inspectors were not discouraged from using this document (RT pp. 79-80).

    Furthermore, Mr. Narbut testified that his investigation had revealed that management's untimely and inaccurate responses to

these QCRFIs was a valid concern which Mackowiak had brought to his attention (RT p. 158).

    Since the QCRFIs were merely requests for information, rather than assertions of fact, I find it illogical to classify them as valid or invalid. It would appear that if Mackowiak, or any QCI, was unsure of his duties, or what procedure to follow, then it would be incumbent on him to make such a request of management, rather than performing his job incorrectly. Hence, I cannot find any validity in this final reason for Mackowiak's early layoff.

    In summary, only two of the incidents cited by respondent, the red-tagging of the tool crib and the refusal to teach another QCI about T-fillet welds, show that he had an abrasive, or uncooperative attitude. However, I do not find these two incidents to be sufficient justification for his early layoff. Furthermore, the other incidents cited, particularly the as-built program and the red-tagging of the duct run, show that Mackowiak was layed off, in large part, for engaging in protected activity under § 5851.

    As the Ninth Circuit has dictated, "the employer bears the risk that 'the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated.'" Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., supra, at page 1164 (citation omitted). Hence, I find that Mackowiak is entitled to damages for his early layoff by UNSI.

III. Damages:

    Evidence of additional damages which Mackowiak had incurred since the first hearing on this case was submitted at the remand hearing. In addition, respondent presented evidence demonstrating that it had terminated its activities at the nuclear power plant in Richland, Washington.

    Respondent contends that since the Ninth Circuit's order of remand was confined to the determination of whether or not Mackowiak would have been terminated in absence of his protected activity, evidence of additional damages is outside the scope of the remand hearing, and should not be considered (Respondent's post-hearing brief, p. 19).

    Complainant argues that respondent should not be able to benefit from its improper motive in terminating Mackowiak by having its liability limited to only those damages which were incurred as of

the first hearing (Complainant's memorandum of legal authorities, pp. 1-5). In the alternative, Complainant argues that if evidence of additional damages is not admitted, then respondent's evidence concerning the termination of its activities at the nuclear power plant also should not be considered (Memo of legal authorities, p. 5).

    The Ninth Circuit did not consider the question of what damages were appropriate in its order of remand.

    In support of his position, complainant cites In the Matter of Ferrell-Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., and Andrew Burinskas, B 1692, No. 134, a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case, in which an employer had unlawfully terminated an employee for unionism. The case was originally decided in favor of the employer, but upon remand from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the NLRB reversed itself and found for the employee.

    In that case, the NLRB found that the employee was entitled to full back pay and reinstatement, and that absent any mitigating factors, the tolling of back pay from the date of the first hearing only served "to benefit the wrongdoer at the expense of the wronged." Supra, at 1694.

    I find that complainant's position has merit. Section 5851 of the ERA dictates that, when a violation has occurred:

the Secretary [of Labor] shall order the person who committed the violation to (i) take affirmative action to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the complainant to his former position together with compensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the Secretary may order such person to provide compensatory damages to the complainant ... 95851(b)(2)(B). (emphasis added).

It would defeat the purpose of the ERA if back pay and other damages were limited to those which had been incurred by the end of the first hearing. In addition, the legislative history of section 5851 indicates that it is "substantially identical to provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act," both of which acts were patterned after the National Labor Management Act. 1978 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 7303. Hence, it makes sense to employ the rationale expressed in an NLRB case such as Ferrell-Hicks, supra, in deciding this issue.

    Respondent's witness Conrad Holt testified that the installation work on the nuclear power plant terminated as of May 1, 1982 and that all Level II QCI's were layed off as of May 13, 1982 (RT p. 333). He also stated that Mackowiak was a Level II QCI in rod surveillance at the time of his layoff, and no rod surveillance was done after May 1, 1982 (RT p. 333). Although some QCI's were retained after May 13, 1982, they were senior QCI'S, unlike Mackowiak (RT p. 334). Hence, respondent argues that if a finding of discrimination is made, Mackowiak is not entitled to back pay beyond May 13, 1982 (Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief, pp. 21-24).

    Complainant argues that in absence of discrimination, Mackowiak would not have been layed off until January 28, 1983, based strictly on seniority (Memo of Legal Authorities, pp. 9-11). Complainant also argues that respondent bears the burden of proving when a layoff would have occurred for business reasons, citing Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1968). (Memo of Legal Authorities, p. 9).

petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review of the Secretary's assessment of his allowable costs and attorney's fees. The Sixth Circuit held that he was not entitled to his attorney fees before it, because:

... the award of ... attorneys' fees allowable under section 5851 is specifically limited to encompass those incurred "for, or in connection with, the bringing of the complaint upon which the (Secretary's) order was issued." Before this court DeFord did not incur any attorneys' fees or other costs for litigation of claims arising from the complaint upon which the Secretary's order was issued. That complaint was lodged against [the employer]. Rather, DeFord incurred attorneys' fees ... before this court in pursuit of a distinguishable cause--complaints against the Secretary arising out of dissatisfaction with his order. DeFord, at 233.

In dicta, the court in DeFord also said that an award by the Secretary of attorneys' fees incurred before the court would "appear" to be outside the scope of his authority, as a jurisdictional matter. DeFord, at 232.

    Section 5851 states that:

at the request of the complainant, the Secretary shall assess against the person against who in the order in issued ... all costs and expenses (including attorneys' ... fees) reasonably incurred ... by the complainant for, or in connection with, the bringing of the complaint .... 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) [emphasis added].

Unlike DeFord, Mackowiak's appeal before the Ninth Circuit arose in connection with his complaint under 95851, not under a separate, but related action. Since the plain language of § 5851 states that the Secretary shall award all attorneys fees in connection with the complaint, logic dictates that this should include Mackowiak's fees before the Ninth Circuit. Hence, I decline to follow the dicta in DeFord, supra, indicating that an award by the Secretary of fees before a court appears to be outside the scope of his authority.

    I find that the fees and costs requested by claimant's counsel in this case are reasonable. Hence, the total amount requested, $20,803.55, is allowed.

    1. Respondent is ordered to pay complainant back pay in the amount of $774.25 per week ($154.85 per day times 5 days per week) from January 29, 1982 through May 17, 1982, less ,587.21 for the 82 hours complainant worked in March, 1982, or damages in the total sum of $9,871.60.

    2. Respondent is also ordered to pay complainant compensatory damages in the amount of $804.38.

    3. Respondent is also ordered to pay complainant $402.00 to reimburse him for the expense of his airline ticket to Spokane, Washington to attend the July 26, 1982 hearing.

    4. Respondent is ordered to pay complainant's attorney $20,803.55 as an attorney fee and costs.

       EDWARD C. BURCH
       Administrative Law Judge

Dated: 25 JUL 1986
San Francisco, California

ECB:csw