BRB No. 01-0180


WILLIE CORBITT, JR.                     )
                                        )
          Claimant-Petitioner           )
                                        )
     v.                                 )
                                        )
DELAWARE RIVER STEVEDORES,              )    DATE ISSUED:   10/16/2001
                                             10/16/01
INCORPORATED                            )
                                        )
     and                                )
                                        )
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE                )
COMPANY                                 )
                                        )
          Employer/Carrier-             )
          Respondents                   )    DECISION and ORDER

     Appeal of the Decision and Order of Ralph A. Romano, Administrative Law
     Judge, United States Department of Labor.

     Aloysius J. Staud (Fine and Staud), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
     claimant.

     John E. Kawczynski (Weber Goldstein Greenberg & Gallagher, LLP), Jersey
     City, New Jersey, for employer/carrier.

     Before: SMITH, DOLDER and McGRANERY, Administrative Appeals Judges. 

     PER CURIAM:

     Claimant appeals the Decision and Order (00-LHC-1612) of Administrative Law
Judge Ralph A. Romano rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §901
et seq. (the Act).  We must affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the administrative law judge which are rational, supported by substantial
evidence and in accordance with law. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls
Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965); 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3).
     Claimant sustained injuries to his right knee and leg when, on November 4,
1998, he fell into the hold of a ship while working for employer.[1]   Employer voluntarily paid claimant temporary
total disability compensation from November 5, 1998 through February 7, 1999,
see 33 U.S.C. §908(b), at which time claimant returned to work.  
Claimant subsequently experienced  testicular problems, ultimately diagnosed
as  hematospermia, for which he underwent a cystoscopy on June 3, 1999.  Claimant
thereafter sought temporary total disability compensation for the period of  July
19, 1999 through September 9, 1999, during which time he was allegedly unable to
work due to his testicular injury.

     In his decision, the administrative law judge found that claimant's testicular
condition is causally related to his November 4, 1998, work accident, but that
claimant failed to establish that he was incapable of performing his usual
employment duties between July 19, 1999 and September 9, 1999, as a result of any
disability arising from that condition.  Accordingly, the administrative law judge,
while awarding claimant medical benefits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §907, denied
the claim for temporary total disability compensation sought by claimant. 
Claimant's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the administrative
law judge.

     Claimant now appeals, challenging the administrative law judge's denial of his
claim for temporary total disability compensation.  Specifically, claimant avers
that the administrative law judge erred in failing to credit claimant's testimony
that his treating physician had prohibited his return to work prior to September
9, 1999.  Employer responds, urging affirmance of the administrative law judge's
decision in its entirety.

     It is well-established that claimant bears the burden of establishing the nature and extent of any disability sustained
as a result of a work-related injury. See Anderson v.  Todd Shipyards Corp., 22 BRBS 20 (1989); Trask v. 
Lockheed Shipbuilding & Constr.  Co., 17 BRBS 56 (1985).  In order to establish a prima
facie case of total disability, claimant bears the burden of establishing that
he is unable to return to his usual work. See McCabe v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 602 F.2d 59, 10 BRBS 614 (3d Cir. 1979); Harmon v. Sea-Land
Service, Inc., 31 BRBS 45 (1997); Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21
BRBS 49 (1988).  In addressing this issue, the administrative law judge may credit
a claimant's subjective complaints of pain to find that claimant has established
his prima facie case. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 19 BRBS
6 (1986),  rev'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 1194, 21 BRBS (CRT)(9th Cir.
1988); Thompson v. Northwest Enviro Services, Inc., 26 BRBS 53 (1992).

     In concluding that claimant had not established a prima facie case of
total disability, the administrative law judge declined to credit the testimony of
claimant that his treating physician advised him not to work following his June
1999 surgery.  Rather, the administrative law judge found that claimant produced
no medical evidence to establish that he sustained any period of disability as a
result of his work-related testicular condition.  

     We reject claimant's contention that the administrative law judge erred by
failing to give determinative weight to his testimony that Dr. Yorker, the
physician who performed claimant's June 1999 surgery, told him to stay out of work
until September 9, 1999.  It is well-established that the administrative law judge has
the authority to address questions of witness credibility and to weigh the
evidence.  See Calbeck v. Strachan Shipping Co., 306 F.2d 693 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); John W. McGrath Corp., v.
Hughes, 289 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1961); Perini Corp. v. Heyde, 306 F.Supp.
1321 (D.R.I. 1969); Anderson, 22 BRBS at 22.  In the instant case, the
administrative law judge rationally found that claimant's testimony was not
determinative as to the extent of his alleged disability as of July 19, 1999.  In
rendering this determination, the administrative law judge specifically found that
the record contained no medical evidence establishing any period of disability
related to claimant's testicular condition, and that in fact claimant's treating
physician, Dr. Yorker, in two reports following claimant's June 3, 1999, surgery
made no suggestion that claimant was incapable of returning to work. See
Clt. Exs. 2, 3.   As the administrative law judge's credibility determinations are
rational and within his authority as factfinder, we affirm  the administrative law
judge's determination that claimant  has failed to meet his burden of proving that
he was incapable of performing his usual employment duties with employer from July
19, 1999 through September 9, 1999. See generally Cordero v. Triple A
Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 8 BRBS 744 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 911 (1979); Donovan, 300 F.2d 741.

     Accordingly, the administrative law judge's Decision and Order is affirmed.

     SO ORDERED.    

                                                                   
                         ROY P. SMITH
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                   
                         NANCY S. DOLDER
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                   
                         REGINA C. McGRANERY
                         Administrative Appeals Judge

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Footnotes.
 1)Claimant apparently straddled a ladder while falling into the
hold.
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