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91sc030a.htm




Date:  April 27, 1995

Case No.  91-SCA-30

In the Matter of:
                                   
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,           
                                   
          Complainant,             
                                   
     v.                                  
                                        
HOUSTON BUILDING SERVICE, INC.     

     and  
                              
JASON YOO,
                         
     Individually and Jointly,     
                                   
          Respondents.             


APPEARANCES:

Robert A. Fitz, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
Dallas, Texas
     For the Complainant

Thomas W. Moore, Esq.
Sugar Land, Texas
     For the Respondent

BEFORE:   DANIEL J. ROKETENETZ
          Administrative Law Judge


                         DECISION AND ORDER

     This proceeding arises under the McNamara-O'Hara Service 

[PAGE 2] Contract Act of 1965, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 351, et seq., (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), and the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C., § 327, et seq., and in accordance with the regulations promulgated thereunder at 29 C.F.R. Part 4. A formal hearing was held on January 12, 1993 in Austin, Texas before Judge Charles W. Campbell.[1] All parties were afforded full opportunity to present evidence. Testimony was adduced from four witnesses and various exhibits were admitted into evidence. The parties also were afforded the opportunity to file briefs. The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this decision are based upon my analysis of the entire record. Each exhibit and argument of the parties, although perhaps not specifi- cally mentioned, has been carefully reviewed and thoughtfully considered. ISSUES The following matters remain for resolution: 1. Whether Jason Yoo constitutes a "party responsible" thereby being liable, both individually and jointly with Houston Building Services, for any violations of the Act. 2. The value of the fringe benefits that the Respondents failed to pay under the pertinent contract. 3. Whether unusual circumstances exist to relieve Jason Yoo and Houston Building Services from the debarment provisions of Section 5(a) of the Act. FINDINGS OF FACT Houston Building Service, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "HBS") was incorporated under the laws of the state of Texas, and maintains its principal offices in Houston. (JX 1)[2] Respondent, Jason Yoo, is the president of HBS. (JX 1) HBS applied for and was awarded General Services Administration (GSA) Contract Number GS- 07-P-87-HT-C-0179 (hereinafter referred to as "the contract") to provide janitorial and related services for three United States Government buildings in Austin for the period from December 1, 1987 through November 30, 1988. (JX 1) HBS was awarded the contract on November 10, 1987. (JX 1) Jason Yoo signed the contract for HBS to service the three buildings for a total monthly fee of $24,391.81. (JX 1; GX 1) The contract, which was dated September 30, 1987,
[PAGE 3] included Wage Determination Number 80-288 which required certain minimum hourly wage rates and fringe benefit payments to be made to the service employees who were employed in its performance. (GX 1) The minimum hourly wage ranged from $5.43 for a Janitor to $8.07 for a non-shift Supervisor. (GX 1) In addition, section 6 of the wage determination provided the following severance allowance: Employee Completing Severance Allowance Due: One (1) year service Three (3) weeks Two (2) years service Six (6) weeks Three (3) years service Eight (8) weeks Four (4) years service Ten (10) weeks Five (5) years service Twelve (12) weeks Six (6) years service Fourteen (14) weeks Seven (7) years service Sixteen (16) weeks Eight (8) years service Eighteen (18) weeks Nine (9) years service Twenty (20) weeks Ten (10) years service Twenty-two (22) weeks Mr. Yoo has resided in the United States since his arrival from Korea in 1974. Yoo founded a cleaning service in 1980 and changed the company's name to HBS in 1982. HBS largely employs Korean immigrants. Mr. Yoo testified that he had no experience with government contracts and, consequently, hired Major Thomas as his contracting officer. Thomas represented to Yoo that he had sufficient knowledge and expertise to oversee the bidding and subsequent performance of the government service contract. Thomas also informed Yoo that he intended to replace the employees of the incumbent contractor, Housekeepers Maintenance and Supply Service (hereinafter referred to as "Housekeepers"), with his own crew of Korean laborers. (Tr. 86-90) Housekeepers employed thirty unit employees and three supervisors for the service contract which called for janitorial services in the three federal buildings. (GX 96-98) The thirty unit employees were members of Industrial, Technical and Profes- sional Employees Division of the AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as "the union"). (Tr. 20-21) J.T. Glass, the Contracting Officer's Representative, testified that HBS requested neither a copy of the seniority list nor the entry on duty (EOD) list for the Housekeep- ers' employees during the contract bidding period. Glass also testified that he would have furnished such a list upon request as it represents part of the open record. (Tr. 59) H. Ralph Smith, National Vice Chairman for the union, testified that he received a telephone request for a copy of the seniority list of Housekeepers'
[PAGE 4] employees from Major Thomas of HBS on November 19, 1988 and that he subsequently mailed a copy of the list to HBS. (GX 98, p.4) Mr. Glass also testified that during a pre-start-up conference he explained the need for background checks on potential employees so that security clearances could be obtained which would allow the employees to enter the buildings to perform the contract. Glass further testified that such clearances require a minimum of 72 hours to obtain and often the clearances require additional time depending upon the location of an individual's references. (Tr. 65- 70) The HBS employees did not attempt to obtain security clearanc- es before the contract start date of December 1, 1987. (Tr. 63-64) No HBS employee obtained a security clearance to enter the buildings until December 7, 1987, and Jason Yoo did not obtain his clearance until January 19, 1988. (Tr. 66-67) HBS hired the Housekeepers' staff to clean the three buildings on December 1, 1987 and thus fulfil its contractual obligations. During December 1987, January 1988, and February 1988, HBS discharged nineteen former Housekeepers' employees without severance pay and replaced them with HBS employees after they had obtained their security clearances. (Tr. 16, GX 28-32, 39-55, 97) Norma Adams, an investigator in the Wage and Hour Division of United States Department of Labor, testified that during an investigation of HBS, she made an initial determination that 22 employees were due estimated back wages and severance pay totalling $46,757.60. (Tr. 76, GX 27) In addition, Ms. Adams testified she also discovered deficiencies in minimum wage and fringe benefit payments for HBS employees totalling $926.35. (Tr. 78-80, GX 77) Pursuant to a request from the Department of Labor, the General Services Administration withheld $14,011.50 due HBS under Contract Number GS-07-P-87-HT-C-0179. (Tr. 110, 115-16) Additionally, pursuant to another request from the Department of Labor, the United States Air Force withheld payment in the amount of $33,627.52 from funds due to HBS under contract F03602-88-C-0007 (hereinafter referred to as "Air Force contract"). The Respondents produced post-hearing records that indicate the $926.36 in minimum wage and other deficiencies had been paid by the end of contract period. I find that those deficiencies have, in fact, been corrected. I make the following factual findings concerning nineteen (19) janitor/porter/cleaner service employees discharged by HBS without severance pay: (Tr. 16, GX 28-32, 39-55, 96-97) 1. Clifton Bailey was discharged on December 11, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was August 17, 1979. He had completed
[PAGE 5] eight years of service, and worked an average of 17.26 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of his employment. 2. Tommy Lee Clark was discharged on January 4, 1988. His Entry on Duty date was December 22, 1980. He had completed seven years of service and worked an average of 24.46 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of his employment. 3. Charles A. DeShay was discharged on February 12, 1988. His Entry on Duty date was February 27, 1985. He completed two years of service and worked an average of 28.99 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of his employment. 4. Milton Henderson was discharged on February 26, 1988. His Entry on Duty date was February 1, 1986. He complet- ed two years of service and worked an average of 18.75 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of his employ- ment. 5. Grady Kennie was discharged on December 11, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was March 17, 1986. He completed one year of service and averaged 29.00 hours per week during his last 13 weeks of employment. 6. Maria Menchaca was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was July 21, 1986. She completed one year of service and averaged 13.22 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of her employment. 7. Jessie Irene Meyer was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was February 18, 1986. She completed one year of service and averaged 17.30 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of her employment. 8. Ophelia Milicia was discharged on January 4, 1988. Her Entry on Duty date was February 1, 1980. She completed seven years of service and averaged 33.69 hours per week during the last 13 weeks of her employment. 9. Rita C. Morales was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was May 16, 1982. She completed five years of service and averaged 17.27 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of her employment. 10. Helen L. North was discharged on February 26, 1988. Her Entry on Duty date was May 7, 1981. She completed six years of service and averaged 20.92 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of her employment.
[PAGE 6] 11. Benny H. Pamplin was discharged on December 11, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was October 23, 1984. He complet- ed three years of service and averaged 16.76 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of his employment. 12. Mary Ann Pesina was discharged on February 26, 1988. Her Entry on Duty date was January 21, 1980. She completed eight years of service and averaged 20.92 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of her employment. 13. Willie Belle Piper was discharged on December 11, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was December 17, 1984. He completed two years of service and averaged 18.38 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of his employment. 14. Eugene Porter was discharged on December 9, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was July 1, 1981. He did not work for the period from 1/6/85 through 10/1/87. He has completed five years of service and averaged 33.09 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of his employment. 15. Frances C. Ramirez was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was July 1, 1980. She completed seven years of service and averaged 15.66 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of her employment. 16. Onnie Lee Walker was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was November 2, 1984. She completed three years of service and averaged 16.46 hours per week for the last 13 weeks of her employment. 17. Joyce Marie Altum was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty Date was September 28, 1987. She did not complete a full year of service or 13 weeks of employment. 18. Kim Du-Triem was discharged on December 11, 1987. Her Entry on Duty date was October 1, 1987. She did not complete a full year of service or 13 weeks of employment. 19. John L. Washington was discharged on December 4, 1987. His Entry on Duty date was May 1, 1987. He did not complete a full year of service. I also find that insufficient evidence was presented to conclude that Brian Edwards, Howard Franklin, Larry Galloway, Candelario Martinez, and Booker T. Washington were discharged from
[PAGE 7] employment by HBS. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1965 was enacted "to provide much needed labor standards protection for employees of contractors and subcontractors furnishing services to or performing maintenance service for federal agencies." S.REP. NO. 978, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 948, 89TH Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965). Statutory protection was considered necessary in order to effectuate the "long standing policy of Congress that the federal government shall not be a party to the depressing of labor standards in any area of the Nation."[3] The Act provides that any contract or bid specification in excess of $2500, the principal purpose of which is to provide services to the federal government through the use of "service employees", must contain provisions requiring the contractor to pay its employees not less than minimum monetary wages and fringe benefits to be determined in accordance with the prevailing rates and fringe benefits for such service workers in the locality in which the work is to be performed. 41 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1-2). Party Responsible "The failure to perform a statutory public duty under the Service Contract Act is not only a corporate liability, but also a personal liability charged by reason of his or her corporate office while performing that duty." 29 C.F.R § 4.187(e)(2). "[I]ndividual liability attaches to the corporate official who is responsible for, and therefore causes or permits, the violation of the contract stipulations required by the Act, i.e., corporate officers who control the day-to-day operation and management policy are personally liable for underpayment because they cause or permit violations of the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 4.187(e)(3). Jason Yoo testified that as President of HBS he signed the GSA contract to clean the three federal buildings in Austin. (Tr. 104) He also testified that he intended to hire a Korean crew to clean the buildings and had no intention of retaining any of the Housekeepers' employees. (Tr. 106-107) Mr. Yoo sought and obtained a security clearance to enter the buildings in order to oversee the performance of the contract. Furthermore, Mr. Yoo testified that he did not understand the intricacies of government contracts and allowed Major Thomas to handle it for him. (Tr. 106) I find that Mr. Yoo controlled the day-to-day operations of HBS. He determined which employees would be assigned to particular jobs including, but not limited to, assigning Thomas to handle various aspects of the
[PAGE 8] government contract. Even if the responsibility for contract compliance were entirely handed to Major Thomas, as an employee of HBS, Mr. Yoo would be responsible for his actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. As a result, I find that Jason Yoo is a party responsible under the Act and is therefore liable both individually and jointly with HBS for any violations of the Act. Severance Pay The service contract included Wage determination Number 80-288, dated September 30, 1987, which required minimum hourly and fringe benefits including section 6, a severance provi- sion.[4] (GX 1) Respondents contend that they were unaware that they were required to provide severance pay to the former Housekeepers' employees upon their discharge. (Tr. 107) Nonetheless, a government contractor maintains both a duty to clarify any uncertainties in a contract concerning wage determina- tion made by the SCA, as well as a duty to consult with Department of Labor if any doubts arise about interpreting the wage determina- tion. Saavedra v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 892 (1983). The contract that Yoo signed clearly contained a wage determination with the severance allowance information. Applicable law dictates that a businessperson is presumed to assent to the terms of his contract whether he knows of them or not. Id. at 500 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 comment b, and § 157 comment b). Allowing a businessperson to avoid contractual obligations because of failure to read or understand such obligations would undermine reliance on written instruments and disadvantage blameless employees. Id. Regardless, HBS should have been aware of the seniority and severance consequences of hiring former Housekeepers' employees because Thomas requested a seniority list of those employees from the union on November 19, 1987, before the commencement of the contract on December 1, 1987. (GX 98, p.4) Respondents also contend that severance pay is not a "fringe benefit" required under the SCA, and cite Trinity Services, Inc. v. Marshall 593 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Clark v. Unified Services, Inc., 659 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1981) to support its position. The SCA prohibits a successor contractor, who furnishes substantially the same services as his predecessor, from paying any service employee under such contract "less than the wages and fringe benefits . . . to which such service employees would have been entitled if they were employed under the predeces- sor contract." 41 U.S.C. § 353(c). Severance pay is not specifically included in the SCA's provision defining "fringe benefits," however, that provision also contains the language "and other bona
[PAGE 9] fide fringe benefits not otherwise required by Federal, State, or local law to be provided by the contractor or subcontractor." 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2). Therefore, I find that severance pay falls within the Act's catch-all clause which includes "other bona fide fringe benefits." As noted above, the GSA contract clearly contained the wage determination and severance provision. Respondents contention that they are now required to provide less than the obligation they contracted for is misplaced. Additionally, the Respondents misconstrue Trinity Services and Clark. In Trinity Services, Inc. v. Marshall, the D.C. Circuit found that a collective bargaining agreement which required a successor contractor to provide severance pay to employees of predecessor contractor, who were not hired by the successor contractor, violated the governing section of the SCA. 593 F.2d at 1257. The court in Trinity specifically stated that severance pay is the proper subject a wage determi- nation and a successor employer must make severance payments to its own employees should they be laid off. Id. at 1259, n. 34. Once HBS hired the Housekeepers' employees, regardless of for what duration, they became HBS employees due severance pay upon their discharge. Thus, the Trinity holding stating that severance pay to predecessor contractor's employees violates the Act is valid only to the extent that the predecessor employees were not hired by the successor contractor. As discussed, this is clearly not the case. In Clark v. United Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the successor contractor's failure to hire all interested former employees of the predecessor contractor and to grant those employees seniority rights equal to those they previously enjoyed did not violate the SCA. 659 F.2d at 53. Clark deals only with seniority rights and does not involve severance pay, and thus is inapplicable to this case. In the case sub judice, all thirty employees and two supervisors of the predecessor contractor, Housekeepers, were hired by HBS and thereby became HBS employees. HBS never informed these employees that they were temporary workers or were somehow accepting reduced benefits or severance protection by working for HBS. N.L.R.B. v. Houston Bldg. Services, 936 F.2d 178, 1980 (5th Cir. 1991). It would be quite reasonable for the employees to assume their employment was long-term because all previous government contractors had maintained the same staff. Id. at 179-80. Also, unlike the scenario in Trinity, Respondents were only required to pay severance if they chose to hire the predecessor employees and then subsequently subjected such employees to discharge or lay-off. Furthermore, unlike the Clark situation, the
[PAGE 10] dispute before me concerns only severance pay under the terms of the contract's wage determination and not seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Respondents additionally argue the supposed unfairness in requiring them to provide severance pay when the predecessor contractor is not required to provide severance pay under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.[5] Respondents' voluntary hiring of the predecessor employees, and its failure to consider the severance allowance in the contract's wage determination, were circumstances completely under the Respondents' control. If the predecessor contractor had duplicated the actions of HBS by hiring long-standing employees, who were later discharged and replaced, the predecessor contractor likewise would be required to provide severance pay to such employees. Conversely, if HBS had reached a collective bargaining agreement with the same terms as the predecessor contractor, HBS would not be required provide severance pay if the discharge of employees occurred because of circumstances beyond their control. Moreover, it would be quite unfair and inconsistent with the intent of the Act to award a service contract to the Respondents on the basis its lower bid and then not require the Respondents' compliance with the terms of the contract.[6] Respondents also claim that they would not have hired any Housekeepers' employees but for the problems in acquiring security clearances for its own employees, i.e., a circum- stance beyond their control. The problems concerning the acquisi- tion of security clearances was not beyond Respondents' control. Knowledge of the responsibilities required by the contract is the duty of the Respondents. Testimony from Mr. Glass indicated that no HBS employee made any attempt to obtain a security clearance until December 1, 1987, the day the contract commenced. (Tr. 63-64) Glass also testified that the security clearance requirement was discussed in a pre-start-up conference with HBS. Respondents make reference to the fact that Mr. Glass told them a security clearance normally could be obtained in 72 hours. This fact is of little consequence as none of Respondents' employees even attempted to obtain such clearances until the date of the commencement of the contract. Respondents also make reference to the fact that no clearance was obtained by any HBS employees until December 7, 1987 and Mr. Yoo's clearance was not obtained until January 19, 1988, well beyond the estimate of 72 hours relayed by Mr. Glass. Even if Mr. Glass had somehow misrepresented the requirements to the Respondents, reliance on advice from contracting agency officials is not a defense to liability under the SCA. 29 C.F.R. § 4.187(e)(5). Finally, common sense mandates that HBS must have realized that security clearances for employees who are Korean immigrants
[PAGE 11] might require some additional time to obtain.[7] Respondents also contend in their brief that if they had realized the severance pay requirements for the Housekeepers' employees, they would have chosen to delay start-up and suffer the requisite GSA penalties, which would have been less than the severance pay. This contention is irrelevant. The Government is not required to determine the reasoning behind a contractor's business decisions. As a first-time government contractor, it is entirely possible that the Respondents did not want to make a negative first impression by delaying start-up, or found the cost of the severance pay was minimal when assessed against the overall award of the contract ($292,737.92). As a result of the foregoing, I conclude that the Respondents, Houston Building Services and Jason Yoo, are individually and jointly liable for $19,061.71 in severance pay under the terms of the wage provision in the GSA contract to the following employees in the following amounts:[8] Name and Reg.Rate Avg. Hrs. Severance Amount Classification Of Pay per week Allow- ance Due 1. Clifton Bailey $5.43/hr. 17.26 hrs 18 weeks ,686.99 Janitor 2. Tommy Lee Clark $5.43/hr. 24.46 hrs 16 weeks $2,125.12 Janitor 3. Charles Deshay $5.43/hr. 28.99 hrs 6 weeks $ 944.49 Janitor 4. Milton Henderson $5.43/hr. 18.75 hrs 6 weeks $ 610.88 Janitor 5. Grady Kennie $5.43/hr. 29.00 hrs 3 weeks $ 472.41 Janitor 6. Maria Menchaca $5.43/hr. 13.22 hrs 3 weeks $ 215.35 Janitor 7. Jessie Meyer $5.43/hr. 17.30 hrs 3 weeks $ 281.82 Janitor 8. Ophelia Milicia $5.43/hr. 33.69 hrs 16 weeks $2,926.99 Janitor 9. Rita Morales $5.43/hr. 17.27 hrs 12 weeks ,125.31
[PAGE 12] Janitor 10. Helen North $5.43/hr. 20.92 hrs 14 weeks ,590.34 Janitor 11. Benny Pamplin $5.43/hr. 16.76 hrs 8 weeks $ 728.05 Janitor 12. Mary Ann Pesina $5.43/hr. 20.92 hrs 18 weeks $2,044.72 Janitor 13. Willie Piper $5.43/hr. 18.38 hrs 6 weeks $ 598.82 Janitor 14. Eugene Porter $5.43/hr. 23.09 hrs 12 weeks ,504.54 Janitor 15. Frances Ramirez $5.43/hr. 15.66 hrs 16 weeks ,360.54 Janitor 16. Onnie Walker $5.43/hr. 19.46 hrs 8 weeks $ 845.34 Janitor Debarment Congress has promulgated that any person found to have violated the minimum wage and fringe benefit requirements of the Act shall be placed on a list of contractors and subcontractors ineligible to receive government contracts for the provision of services. The violator shall be retained on the ineligible list for three years and will be relieved of the debarment only upon a showing that an "unusual circumstance" exists that dictates against debarment. 41 U.S.C. § 354. Congress amended the Act in 1972 to add the "unusual circumstances" standard to relieve violators from debarment, but clearly expressed their intent that it should only be used to provide relief where debarment "would have been wholly disproportionate to the offense." See 29 C.F.R. § 4.188(b)(2). The factors that must be weighed in determining whether "unusual circumstances" exist were set forth by the Secretary in Washington Moving and Storage Co., No. SCA-168 (August 12, 1973) and In re Quality Maintenance Co., 21 WH cases 1094, 1100-1101 (December 28, 1973), [decision of the Assistant Secre- tary]. The following factors have been approved by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Federal Food Service, Inc. v. Donovan, 658 F.2d 830, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (summarized):
[PAGE 13] 1. whether a history of past violations of the Act exists; 2. the nature, extent and seriousness of the past or present violations; 3. whether the violations were willful, or the circumstances show there was culpable neglect to ascertain whether certain practices were in compliance, or culpable disregard of whether they were or not, or other culpable conduct; 4. whether the Respondent's liability turned on bona fide legal issues of doubtful certainty; 5. whether the Respondent has demonstrated good faith, cooperation in the resolution of issues and a desire and intention to comply with the requirements of the Act; 6. the promptness with which the employees were paid the sums due; and, 7. evidence of repeated violations. Application of these factors to the circumstances of this case favor a recommendation that unusual circumstances do not exist to relieve the Respondents from the ineligible list. The first factor is not relevant to this case as this matter involves the first federal contract secured by the Respondents. (Tr. 89) Considering the second factor, I find this case presents a serious violation of the Act, as the Act's intent is to protect service employees from precisely the kind of action as was taken by the Respondents. Concerning the third factor, Respondents contend that the severance violation was the result of its own ignorance of the severance provisions in the contract. However, the facts indicate that Respondents knew, or reasonably should have known, of the severance requirement. The severance allowance is clearly spelled out in the wage determination portion of the contract. Mr. Glass testified that even though the "entry on duty" (EOD) list stating the seniority and security clearances of all predecessor employees was available to the respondents in the period when they were bidding on the contract, they never requested such a list. (Tr. 59) In addition, HBS requested a seniority list of the predecessor employees from the union prior to the start-up date. (GX 98, p.4) This evidence indicates that the Respondents knew, or should have known, that the predecessor employees were entitled to certain benefits as union members and long-standing employees. The fourth factor declares that an unusual circumstance exists
[PAGE 14] if liability turns on a bona fide question of law. However, the Respondents' defenses lack merit and its use of supporting case law is misconstrued. (See analysis above). Factor five considers the Respondents efforts to bring their actions into compliance with the Act. The evidence indicates that the Respon- dents were untruthful about its intentions to discharge the predecessor employees, and sought to force such employees to become "temporary" independent contractors to avoid the severance requirements. See N.L.R.B. v. Houston Bldg. Services, Inc., Supra. The sixth factor concerns the promptness with which the employees were paid the sums due them. The Respondents did eventually pay $926.36 in minimum wage and overtime violations at the end of the contract period. However, $19,061.71 of severance pay compensation had not been paid prior to the hearing. Factor seven regards evidence of repeated violations of the Act. The Respondents' compliance history under the Service Contract Act is limited to the aforementioned Austin buildings, as well as a subsequent contract with the U. S. Air Force in Little Rock, Arkansas. The only evidence of the nature and extent of the Air Force compliance proceeding is Mr. Yoo's testimony that it involved a minor record keeping problem. Thus, due to the limited extent of the Respondents' government contracts, factor seven is basically inapplicable and will not be weighed against the Respondents. In summary, after weighing all relevant factors, I find that the totality of the evidence presents no unusual circumstances that warrant relieving the Respondents from the ineligible list. The evidence indicates that the Respondents were negligent in acquiring security clearances and used the predecessor employees to cover their contractual obligations. As the HBS employees gained clearances, the predecessor employees were discharged without severance pay in clear violation of the wage determination. Allowing the Respondents to obtain the contract by under-bidding all other contractors and then not holding the Respondents liable for their failure to comply with the terms of that contract and provide severance benefits to employees would be contrary to the stated purpose of the Act. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The United States Air Force shall forward to the United States Department of Labor $5,050.21 from the amount of $33,627.52 which it has withheld from Houston Building Services, Inc. under Contract Number F03602-88-C-007 and shall forward the balance of $28,577.31
[PAGE 15] to Houston Building Service, Inc. 2. The United States Department of Labor shall distribute the amount of $19,061.71 (consisting of $5,050.21 from the Air Force contract added to the $14,011.50 previously withheld by GSA) to the sixteen (16) service employees named in this Decision and Order in the individual amounts specified therein less deductions for social security and applicable taxes. 3. Jason Yoo and Houston Building Services, Inc. be placed on the list of ineligible bidders for service contracts by an agency of the United States and that both remain on such list for three years pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 354. __________________________ DANIEL J. ROKETENETZ Administrative Law Judge NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Within 40 days after the date of this decision, any party aggrieved thereby who desires review thereof may file a petition for review of the decision with supporting reasons. Such petition shall be submitted in writing to the Board of Service Contract Appeals pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Part 8, with a copy thereof to the Chief Administrative Law Judge. The petition shall refer to the specific findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order at issue. A petition concerning the decision on the ineligibility list shall also state the unusual circumstances which warrant relief from the ineligible list. The Board of Service Contract Appeals may be served at: Board of Service Contract Appeals, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 6507, Washington, DC 20210. [ENDNOTES] [1] Judge Campbell's retirement, prior to issuing a Decision in this matter, has rendered him unavailable to this agency within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). The matter has been transferred, without objection, to the undersigned Administrative Law Judge. [2] In this decision, "GX" refers to Government Exhibits, "RX" refers to the Respondent's Exhibits, "ALJX" refers to the Administrative Law Judge's Exhibits, "JX" refers to the joint exhibit of the parties, and "Tr." to the Transcript of the hearing. [3] Statement of Congressman O'Hara, co-author of the Act, 111 CONG. REC 24337 (1965). [4] The severance allowance contained a schedule relating the employees completion of years of service to the number of weeks of severance allowance due, and this notation, "A week of sever- ance allowance shall be computed on the basis of an employee's regular straight hourly rate of pay at the time of lay-off times the average number of hours worked per week for the employee's last thirteen (13) weeks of employment." [5] Section C, Article XXII of the CBA provides that a sever- ance allowance will not be paid if the layoff is a result of "circumstances beyond the control of the Company." Such circum- stances would include the awarding of the contract to another company by the GSA. [6] The highest bid was $46,650 from Sylvan Service Corpora- tion, and the low bid was from HBS at $24, 394.81. Housekeepers bid was $29,999. (Deposition of Katie L. Pope, GSA contracting officer). [7] A number of the HBS employees could not obtain security clearances, which resulted in the continued employment of eleven former Housekeepers employees. See N.L.R.B. v. Houston Bldg. Service, Inc., 936 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1991). [8] The violation is based on the average hours worked in the by the employee in his or her last 13 weeks of employment on the contract at the base rate of $5.43 per hour. The original determination offered at the hearing by the Department of Labor was based on an estimated number of hours per week, and at a base rate of $7.55 per week, which incorrectly included pension, holiday, vacation and sick leave payments.



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