skip navigational linksDOL Seal - Link to DOL Home Page
Images of lawyers, judges, courthouse, gavel
September 23, 2008         DOL Home > OALJ Home > Davis-Bacon Act
USDOL/OALJ Reporter

L.T.G. Construction Co., Inc., 1991-DBA-94 (ALJ Dec. 7, 1999)


U.S. Department of LaborOffice of Administrative Law Judges
2600 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, NJ 08104

(856) 757-5312
856-757-5403 (FAX)

DOL
Seal

ARB CASE NO.: 1998-028
ALJ CASE NO.: 1991-DBA-00094
DATE: December 7, 1999

In the Matter of:

LLOYD T. GRIFFIN, JR.,
LTG CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
PHOENIX-GRIFFIN GROUP II, LTD.,
GATSBY HOUSING ASSOCIATES, INC.,
RESPONDENTS,

   v.

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
and ADMINISTRATOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
COMPLAINANTS,

   and

BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPARTMENT,
AFL-CIO
INTERVENOR.

Appearances:

Alden C. Harrington, Esquire (Boyajian, Harrington & Richardson), Providence, RI, for the Respondents

David L. Baskin, Esquire (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor), Boston, Massachusetts, for the Complainants

Terry R. Yellig, Esquire (Sherman, Dunn, Cohen, Leifer & Yellig), Washington, D.C., for the Intervenor

Before: Daniel F. Sutton
   Administrative Law Judge

DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND

I. Background

   This case is before the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a second time pursuant to a remand from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island in Griffin v. Reich, 956 F.Supp. 98 (1997). The case arises under the provisions of the Davis- Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§276a et seq.(1994), and the Related Acts, see 29 C.F.R. §5.1 (1996), and the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Parts 5, 6 and 7 (1997) in the context of a complaint by the Complainants (hereinafter referred to as "DOL") that the Respondents failed to pay prevailing wages required by the Davis-Bacon and Related Acts ("DBRA") for certain work performed on the Turnkey Housing Project in Providence, Rhode Island.


[Page 2]

   The Turnkey Housing Project itself is a byproduct of extensive litigation between a tenant advocacy organization, the Providence Housing Authority ("PHA") and the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") which grew out of PHA's decision to demolish high-rise public housing units in Providence. The advocacy group filed suit in federal district court seeking a preliminary injunction against the proposed demolition. The Court (Pettine, Senior Judge) denied the injunction but issued an order establishing a time schedule for the construction of replacement housing. Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 721 F.Supp. 1501 (D.R.I. 1989). While that litigation was pending, PHA sought proposals for the Turnkey project, and Phoenix- Griffin Group II, Ltd. ("Phoenix-Griffin") was selected in July 1989 as the developer for the first phase of the project. After the case was remanded for consideration of alternative legal bases for the replacement housing time schedule, Project B.A.S.I.C. v. O'Rourke, 907 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1991), the parties entered into a settlement stipulation which incorporated the District Court's original July 21, 1991 deadline for completion of the replacement housing units.

   The Turnkey Project was funded by HUD under the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §1437 et seq., and labor rates were subject to the DBRA. See 29 C.F.R. §5.1(a)(30). PHA entered into a contract with Phoenix-Griffin for the development of Phase I of the project which initially involved 92 housing units. CX 44.1 Phoenix-Griffin then contracted with the LTG Construction Company ("LTG") which constructed the units at a prefabrication plant located on Veazie Street in Providence. RX 50. LTG primarily used "subcontractors" to prepare the housing unit sites, erect the prefabricated units on the sites and install interior materials such as linoleum. LTG also used employees of Gatsby Housing Associates (Gatsby) to clean the units prior to their being tendered to PHA. Phoenix-Griffin, LTG and Gatsby all have a common principal, Lloyd T. Griffin, Jr.


[Page 3]

   Following an investigation by DOL's Wage and Hour Division into the wages paid in connection with the Turnkey Project, the Wage and Hour Regional Administrator directed HUD in a letter dated March 21, 1991 to withhold $500,000 from payments due Phoenix-Griffin until issues concerning back wages were resolved. CX 39. The Respondents and several subcontractors they employed on the project protested the Wage and Hour Division's determination that they had failed to pay prevailing wages as required by the DBRA on the Turnkey Project, noting that the withholding had stopped work on the projects, and they requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. ALJX 4, 5. In addition, Phoenix-Griffin filed a suit in District Court seeking to prevent the enforcement of the withholding order. The Phoenix-Griffin action was joined with the earlier case brought by the tenant advocacy organization, and Judge Pettine ordered HUD to pay Phoenix-Griffin the $500,000 that had been previously withheld and later held HUD in contempt for failing to comply. Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 768 F.Supp. 21 (D.R.I. 1991). However, the First Circuit reversed the contempt order against HUD. 947 F.2d 11 (1991). As a result, the $500,000 continued to be withheld, and the Respondents never resumed work on the Turnkey Project.

   On August 15, 1991, the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a formal hearing. ALJX 6, 7. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the alleged DBRA violations arose from the Respondents' failure to pay prevailing wages to workers at the prefabrication facility (the "Veazie Street plant") where the housing panels were manufactured, "subcontractors" of LTG who worked at the sites where the housing units were erected and individuals employed by Gatsby to clean the units. The Respondents did not dispute the Regional Administrator's allegations that prevailing wages were not paid, but they averred that the Government should be equitably estopped from holding them in violation of the DBRA because they relied on statements and guidance from HUD officials that workers at an off-site prefabrication facility, subcontractors and cleaners were exempt from prevailing wage requirements.

   On July 1, 1993, Administrative Law Judge David W. DiNardi issued a decision and order in which he determined that the Respondents had failed to pay prevailing wages required by the DBRA on the Turnkey Housing Project. Specifically, Judge DiNardi found that the Veazie Street plant and all persons who worked at the housing unit site locations, whether they were subcontractors or employees of subcontractors, were covered by the prevailing wage provisions of the DBRA. Judge DiNardi also held that cleaning work performed at the housing sites constituted "construction" work and was therefore subject to prevailing wage requirements. Finally, Judge DiNardi ordered the Respondents to pay back wages due, and, finding that the Respondents had committed aggravated and willful violations of the DBRA, he ordered that the Respondents be debarred in accordance with the provisions of 29 C.F.R. §5.12 (a) (1) and be ineligible to receive any contract or subcontract subject to any of the statutes listed in 29 C.F.R. §5.1 for a period of three years. ALJX 19. On the Respondents' petition for review, the Wage Appeals Board (WAB) affirmed Judge DiNardi's decision and order. LTG Construction Co., WAB Case No. 93-15 (December 30, 1994). ALJX 20.


[Page 4]

   The Respondents sought judicial review in District Court which remanded the case for further consideration of whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied with respect to (1) the work performed at the Veazie Street facility, (2) the work carried out by subcontractors, and (3) the cleaning work performed after the units were constructed. Griffin v. Reich, 956 F.Supp. 98, 109-110 (D.R.I. 1997). ALJX 21. The Court (Lagueux, Chief Judge) also stayed debarment of the Respondents, noting that further inquiry into the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel might influence any determination as to whether the Respondents' violations were aggravated or willful so as to warrant debarment, and it retained jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 110. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed DOL's appeal for lack of jurisdiction appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 after finding that the District Court's order of remand did not constitute a final judgement. Griffin v. Reich, No. 97-1515 (November 7, 1997). ALJX 22. On March 10, 1998, the Administrative Review Board (ARB)2 issued an order remanding the case to Judge DiNardi for reconsideration and the taking of such additional evidence deemed necessary to comply with the District Court's order. ALJX 23.

II. Proceedings on Remand

   By order issued on May 5, 1998, Judge DiNardi allowed the parties 30 days to discuss voluntary resolution and directed the parties to file a status report at the end of this period indicating whether a reconvened hearing would be necessary in the event that the parties were unable to arrive at a resolution. ALJX 25. The parties did not agree to a voluntary resolution, and on June 11, 1998, Judge DiNardi issued a notice of reconvened hearing and pre-hearing order. ALJX 27. Thereafter, the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO (the "Intervenor") filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of presenting legal argument on the applicability of estoppel. ALJX 28. Neither DOL nor the Respondents opposed this motion which Judge DiNardi granted on October 14, 1998. ALJX 29. The Respondents then moved to continue the hearing to allow for the completion of discovery directed toward the Intervenor. ALJX 32. DOL opposed the requested continuance which Judge DiNardi denied on November 6, 1998 after noting that it did not appear that the Intervenor was in possession of any information relevant to the issues to be addressed on remand and, further, that there was adequate time for completion of any discovery before the scheduled hearing date. ALJX 35, 36.

   On November 10, 1998, the Respondents moved that Judge DiNardi recuse himself from presiding over the proceedings on remand based on the Respondents' contention that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ALJX 38. On November 16, 1998, Judge DiNardi denied the Respondents' motion for recusal on both procedural and substantive grounds. However, he further ordered that the case be reassigned to me in order to remove the Respondents' challenge to his impartiality as an issue in the proceedings on remand. ALJX 41.


[Page 5]

   Pursuant to Judge DiNardi's notice of reconvened hearing, a hearing was conducted before me in Boston, Massachusetts on November 23 and 24, 1998 at which time all parties were afforded an opportunity to present evidence and argument directed to the issues to be addressed on remand. All parties appeared at the hearing represented by counsel,3 and documentary evidence was admitted as additional Administrative Law Judge exhibits ALJX 19-50 and Respondents' exhibits RX 119-123 and 126-127. At the close of the hearing, I granted the Respondents' request that the record be held open for 30 days to provide counsel with an opportunity to establish by additional evidence or stipulation the authenticity of RX 124 and 125 which had been rejected for lack or proper authentication. RTR 244- 46. I also granted the Respondents' unopposed request that the time for filing post-hearing briefs be set at 90 days from the closing of the evidentiary record. RTR 253-54.

   On January 19, 1999, the Respondents submitted additional evidence regarding the authenticity of the three HUD documents contained in RX 124, stating that although DOL was willing to stipulate to the authenticity of these documents, it continued to object to their admission on relevance grounds. The Respondents moved that RX 124 be admitted and that the question of relevancy be addressed by the parties in their briefs. ALJX 51.4 On January 27, 1999, DOL filed its objection to the admission of RX 124. ALJX 52. On January 28, 1999, I issued an order in which I provisionally admitted RX 124, noting that DOL had stipulated to the authenticity of the documents, and I deferred final ruling on admissibility until after the parties had submitted their post-hearing briefs. This order also set April 30, 1999 as the date for submission of post-hearing briefs. ALJX 53. On April 15, 1999, the Intervenor filed an unopposed motion to extend the time for filing briefs to May 21, 1999 which I granted on April 16, 1999. ALJX 54. All parties timely submitted briefs, and the record was then closed.

III. Rulings on Post-hearing Evidentiary Submissions

   RX 124 consists of three internal HUD memoranda -- (1) a June 24, 1975 memorandum from Robert Elliott, General Counsel to David M. DeWilde, Acting Assistant Secretary- Commissioner, entitled "Applicability of Prevailing Wage Requirements to Section 8 Mobile Home Projects"; (2) a June 24, 1981 memorandum for Richard S. Allen, Acting Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations from Grant E. Mitchell, Office of General Counsel, entitled "Site of Work Under Davis-Bacon (South Hill Industries, Richmond, Virginia)" with an attached DOL Memorandum #86, dated February 11, 1970, "Re: Site of the Work and Contract Performance Under the Davis-Bacon and Related Acts"; and (3) an August 14, 1981 memorandum for


[Page 6]

Richard S. Allen, Acting Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations from Grant E. Mitchell, Office of General Counsel, entitled "Applicability of Davis-Bacon Requirements to Work at Out-of-State Plant for Projects Under U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Bering Straits Regional Housing Authority Projects AK 8-14, St. Michael; AK 8-15, Unalakleet; and AK 8-16, Elim)." In objecting to the admission of these documents, DOL contends that they are irrelevant and immaterial to the issues to be addressed on remand as there is no evidence in the record that the Respondents were aware of or relied on the documents. In addition, DOL argues that there is nothing in the record to establish that the documents in question represent HUD's official policies during the relevant time frame in this matter of 1988-1991. ALJX 52, 56 at 13 n. 6. In their post-hearing brief, the Respondents contend that the HUD documents are relevant to counter DOL's argument that DOL, not HUD, is responsible for administration of the DBRA and that it was not reasonable for the Respondents to rely on any information or guidance provided by HUD. ALJX 55 at 11-14. While DOL is correct in its assertion that this record does not show that the Respondents were aware of or relied upon the particular HUD memoranda in RX 124, they are corroborative of the Respondents' position that HUD has interpreted the prevailing wage provisions of the DBRA to only apply to work performed at the project site. Since the memoranda in question would tend to support testimony offered by the Respondents at the hearing on remand regarding interpretations provided by HUD officials to the Respondents concerning the applicability of the prevailing wage provisions, I find that they are relevant. Therefore, DOL's objection is overruled, and RX 124 has been admitted. The other exhibit offered by the Respondents and rejected at the hearing for lack of authentication, RX 125, remains excluded as the Respondents have offered no further evidence or argument in support of its admission.

IV. Issues Presented on Remand

   In remanding the case for further consideration, the Court held that the Respondents are entitled to a full inquiry into, and reconsideration of, all predicate facts which can form the basis for the application of equitable estoppel in regard to three issues -- (1) the work performed at the Veazie Street plant, (2) the work carried out by subcontractors, and (3) the cleaning work performed after the units were constructed. 956 F.Supp. at 109-110. Based on the Court's instructions, this inquiry will involve consideration of whether the Respondents reasonably relied on affirmative representations by HUD and whether the Respondents, in fact, complied with HUD's policies. Id. at 109. The Court also stayed the order debarring the Respondents for three years pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §5.12 (a) (1), noting that "[f]urther inquiry concerning the doctrine of equitable estoppel may influence any determination as to whether . . . [Respondents'] violations were "aggravated or willful." Id. at 110. Therefore, an additional issue is presented as to whether, upon reconsideration of the applicability of equitable estoppel in accordance with the Court's instructions, debarment is warranted.


[Page 7]

V. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand

   After 24 days of hearings during which testimony was heard from 50 witnesses and more than 250 documents were admitted, Judge DiNardi made extensive findings of fact in his July 1, 1993 decision and order. ALJX 19. Judge DiNardi's findings were affirmed by the WAB and have, with the exceptions discussed above, been left intact by the Court. Therefore, the undisturbed findings represent the law of the case and will not be revisited herein.

    A. Applicability of Equitable Estoppel

       1. The Veazie Street Plant

   The basic facts concerning the genesis and operation of LTG's Veazie Street prefabrication plant are not in dispute. Mr. Griffin first came up with the concept of manufacturing housing panels at a separate facility for delivery to construction sites before he became involved with the Turnkey Project which he saw as an opportunity to put his prefabrication concept into practice. TR 2668-2669 (Griffin); RTR 177 (Griffin). In April of 1988, Mr. Griffin submitted Phoenix-Griffin's proposal for Phase I of the Turnkey Project. RTR 211-212 (Griffin). Labor costs were factored into the proposal which assumed that prevailing wage rates would not be required for employees working at a separate pre-fabrication facility. TR 1406, 1412, 2857 (Griffin); RTR 211-213 (Griffin). The PHA selected Phoenix-Griffin as the developer for Phase I of the Turnkey Project in July 1989, and the PHA and Phoenix-Griffin signed a final contract for the project in January 1990. ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 9-10; CX 44.5 After Phoenix-Griffin was selected as the developer of Phase I, Mr. Griffin entered into a contract on August 23, 1989 to purchase the Veazie Street property where he planned to establish the prefabrication plant, and Phoenix-Griffin contracted with LTG to construct the housing units. CX 35; RX 50.6 Shortly thereafter, construction of housing panels began at the Veazie Street plant, and panels for ten buildings had been completed by the time financing for the Turnkey Project was finalized in March of 1990. The completed panels were then transported from the Veazie Street plant to the scattered building sites around the City of Providence where the housing units were erected by subcontractors, typically small owner/operators who were hired by LTG on a per unit or per job basis. ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 10. Phoenix- Griffin had initially proposed building some of the housing units on lots adjacent to the Veazie Street facility, but this proposal was rejected by PHA and HUD in favor of other locations. RX 41, 42. As a result, Phoenix-Griffin never acquired the housing lots adjacent to the Veazie Street prefabrication plant, and no housing units were ever built on any of these lots. RTR 215-217 (Griffin). The closest site where any prefabricated panels were actually erected is approximately one-third mile away from the Veazie Street plant, and the lots for which units were proposed and later dropped for Veazie Street are situated about one quarter mile from the prefabrication plant. RX 126, 127; RTR 221-222 (Griffin).


[Page 8]

   Evidence introduced at the first hearing and at the hearing on remand shows that Mr. Griffin created the Veazie Street plant with the intention of supplying prefabricated building panels for use in housing construction projects throughout the Providence area, including Phase I of the Turnkey Project, a second planned phase of the Turnkey Project as well as another scattered site housing project known as Barbara Jordan III. TR 2281 (Thornton); RTR 176-178 (Griffin). Indeed, Mr. Griffin's envisioned use of the plant extended beyond the efficient production of building components; he recruited and hired chronically unemployed or underemployed people, as well as individuals with societal problems, for training and work. TR 310 (Goodwin); TR 1931, 1937 (Kolaski); TR 2665 (Griffin). The Veazie Street plant has been also been used for other activities, such as the fabrication of cabinets, door frames and other materials for maintenance and repairs on Barbara Jordan I and II, completed housing projects now under Phoenix-Griffin's management; TR 2455-2456, 2496-2500 (Parent); TR 2642-2646, 2682 (Griffin); RTR 237 (Griffin); and the facility continued in operation as of the date of the hearing on remand. RTR 178 (Griffin). However, the only housing panels fabricated at the Veazie Street facility to date were those used in the Turnkey Project. RTR 239 (Griffin).

   The matter of whether DBRA prevailing wage rates would be required for laborers and mechanics who constructed the housing panels at the Veazie Street plant was the subject of multiple communications between Mr. Griffin and various officials of both the PHA and HUD. Mr. Griffin testified that he first raised the issue with Tom Moses, the head of Planning and Urban Development for the City of Providence, and Katie Hillam who was then the Turnkey Project coordinator for the PHA Community Development Department. RTR 181-182, 186, 223, 227. Ronald Torbik, who succeeded Ms. Hillam as the PHA's Director of Modernization and Development, testified that he also had discussions with Mr. Griffin prior to January 1990 and that he is sure that the subject of prevailing wage requirements came up. RTR 74. Mr. Griffin further testified that, prior to Phoenix-Griffin's selection as the developer for the Turnkey Project in July 1989, he met with several HUD officials in the Providence office, including Casimir Kolaski (Manager of the HUD Providence office), Louis Azar (Chief of Architecture and Engineering), Michael Diziok (Director of Housing Development), and Arthur Iacovelli (Architect), and asked whether DBRA prevailing wage rates would apply to the separate pre-fabrication facility which he proposed to establish in a building on Veazie Street in Providence. TR 2669-2770; RTR 226-229. According to Mr. Griffin, Mr. Azar looked in the HUD [Federal Labor Standards Compliance in Housing and Community Development Programs] Handbook (CX 38) and said, "Well, if you want to do this for Turnkey, you have to have more than one project that you are going to service from Veazie Street." TR 2670. Mr. Griffin responded that he intended to use the Veazie Street plant for a planned second phase of the Turnkey Project, for which he had a letter of commitment from the PHA, and for another project known as Barbara Jordan III, and Mr. Azar indicated that he would not have to pay prevailing wages as long as the plant was not specifically used for a single project. TR 2670, 2695 (Griffin). Mr. Griffin also testified that he took HUD officials Azar and Iacovelli on a visit to the Veazie Street plant in this same time frame. TR 2671-2674.


[Page 9]

   After Phoenix-Griffin's proposal for Phase I of the Turnkey Project was accepted by the PHA and HUD in July of 1989 and prior to execution of the contract, Mr. Griffin had further discussions with PHA officials concerning the application of DBRA prevailing wage rates to workers employed at the Veazie Street plant to fabricate modular housing panels to be used in the Turnkey Project. TR 1520-1522 (O'Rourke); TR 2092, 2095-2100 (Ouellette); TR 2210-2215 (Iacovelli); TR 2673-2678 (Griffin); RTR 228-230 (Griffin). According to Mr. Griffin, he was willing to accept the verbal guidance he'd previously received from PHA and HUD officials regarding the applicability of DBRA prevailing wage rates to workers at the Veazie Street prefabrication facility, but Stephen J. O'Rourke, the PHA Executive Director, decided to send a letter to HUD to get an interpretation in "black and white." TR 228 (Griffin). Mr. O'Rourke similarly testified that it was PHA's recommendation that the prior discussions with HUD officials regarding applicability of DBRA prevailing wage rates to an off-site prefabrication plant be confirmed by HUD in writing:

Let me be frank and say this is how I think I remember it. They [PHA officials Prescott and Torbik] were pretty sure it wasn't applicable but they wanted it in writing because, quite frankly, we don't always trust HUD. They say one thing and do another. And that is not to cast dispersions [sic in transcript] against people in the Providence office because they are good and very hard working people, but we have learned to get things in writing.

TR 1521. Thereafter, in Mr. Griffin's presence, a PHA attorney drafted a letter for Mr. O'Rourke's signature to Mr. Kolaski under the attention of Mr. Dziok. TR 2676 (Griffin); RTR 187-188 (Griffin). The letter, which was signed by Mr. O'Rourke and which is dated September 15, 1989, states,

    It is our understanding that Davis-Bacon Wage rates do not apply to the fabrication of building components performed off-site but that they do apply to work performed at each of the sites proposed for Project No. RI43-P001-017. In anticipation of your approval of our recently submitted Proposal, please confirm our understanding and provide a final determination of the appropriate wage scales for the work.

CX 41.7 By letter dated September 9, 1989, Mr. Dziok, issued the following response to Mr. O'Rourke's inquiry:


[Page 10]

    In response to your letter dated September 15, 1989, Davis Bacon Wage Rates do not apply to the fabrication of building components unless conducted in connection with and at the site of the project, or in a temporary plant set up elsewhere to supply the needs of the project and dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to the performance of the contract or project.

    The installation of these components upon the sites of the work is subject to prevailing wage rates.

    Should you require any further assistance on this matter, please contact Louis R. Azar at (401) 528-5380.

CX 42. Mr. Dziok's letter to Mr. O'Rourke was prepared by Louis Azar, and a copy of this letter was provided to Mr. Griffin prior to the signing of the contract for Phase I of the Turnkey Project. TR 2687 (Griffin); RTR 136 (Dziok); RTR 189 (Griffin).

   Based on my assessment of the totality of evidence in this record, I find that HUD made affirmative representations that fabrication of building components at the Veazie Street plant for the Turnkey Project would not be subject to prevailing wage requirements. These representations were initially made by officials in the HUD Providence office during meetings with Mr. Griffin prior to Phoenix-Griffin's selection in July of 1989 as the developer for Phase I of the Turnkey Project when Mr. Azar checked the HUD Handbook (CX 38) and advised Mr. Griffin that prevailing wages would not have to be paid for work performed at Veazie Street provided that the plant was not specifically dedicated to a single project. More importantly, HUD repeated this representation when Mr. Dziok sent the September 19, 1989 letter, which was drafted by Mr. Azar, specifically responding to Mr. O'Rourke's inquiry regarding the non-applicability of prevailing wage rates to the off-site fabrication of building components for the Turnkey Project. DOL and the Intervenor both argue that HUD's representations, particularly Mr. Dziok's September 9, 1989 letter, constitute nothing more than a recitation of the requirements of section 7-12 of the HUD handbook and do not amount to specific policy guidance regarding the applicability of DBRA wage rates to prefabrication of Turnkey Project housing panels at the Veazie Street plant. I disagree. This record convincingly shows that the questions regarding prevailing wage requirements raised by Mr. Griffin, and later by Mr. O'Rourke, were not "hypothetical" or otherwise posed in a vacuum of facts. Rather, Mr. Griffin credibly testified that he specifically discussed his planned use of the Veazie Street plant repeatedly with officials from both the PHA and HUD. In addition, HUD architect Arthur Iacovelli generally corroborated Mr. Griffin's testimony concerning his discussions with officials at the HUD Providence office concerning his plans to use the Veazie Street plant to prefabricate housing panels for the Turnkey Project, and he added that he had voiced his opinion to Mr. Dziok that prevailing wage requirements would not apply to the fabrication of housing panels at Veazie Street for the Turnkey Project per HUD Handbook section 7-12 because Mr. Griffin had said that he had other contracts and wasn't solely


[Page 11]

fabricating for the Turnkey Project. TR 2210- 2215. And, Judge DiNardi found the denials by Mr. Dziok and Mr. Azar at the first hearing that they had ever discussed the matter of whether prevailing wage requirements applied to prefabrication of housing panels at the Veazie Street plant with Mr. Griffin to be incredible. ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 37-38, n. 13. Moreover, the correspondence between Mr. O'Rourke and Mr. Dziok in September 1989 (CX 41, 42) both specifically referred to Phase I of the Turnkey Project for which Phoenix-Griffin had just been selected as developer. Thus, I find that a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that HUD made an affirmative representation that fabrication of building components at the Veazie Street plant for the Turnkey Project would not be subject to prevailing wage requirements because Mr. Griffin's plans for multiple uses of the plant distinguished it from a "temporary plant dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to the performance of the contract or project" as set forth in HUD Handbook section 7-12.8 This affirmative representation clearly goes well beyond silent acquiescence, negligence or the use of vague or inarticulate language; compare Dantran, Inc. v U.S. Department of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirmative misconduct requires more than simple negligence, and failure of prior Wage and Hour investigator to challenge employer's wage practice does not amount to affirmative misconduct necessary to equitably estop the government from later prosecuting employer for the wage practice);9 U.S. v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985) (vagueness or lack of artistry by government bureaucrats not affirmative misconduct); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir.1981) (reluctance to be of assistance), Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir.1979) (carelessness); and, in my view, is precisely the type of "affirmative misconduct" that Judge Lagueux had in mind when he wrote "if ever there was a case where equitable estoppel should explicitly apply against the government, this is it, provided the factual predicates are found to exist." 956 F.Supp. at 108.

   Regarding the second element of equitable estoppel, reasonable reliance, the evidence, as DOL and the Intervenor point out, does not support a finding that the Respondents relied on any affirmative representations by HUD in developing the proposal for the Turnkey Project as it is clear that Mr. Griffin planned to establish the Veazie Street plant and use it for the fabrication of housing panels to be used on the Turnkey Project before he ever received the verbal and written guidance from HUD officials that prevailing wages would not be required for work at the plant. However, the evidence does show that HUD's representations regarding prevailing wages were a determinative factor in Mr. Griffin's decisions to enter into the contract with the PHA for Phase I of the project and to continue with his plans to have the housing panels fabricated at the Veazie Street plant by disadvantaged workers who were paid less than the prevailing wage. In this regard, Mr. Griffin testified at the first hearing that, had he not received clear assurances that the housing panels for the Turnkey Project could be fabricated at Veazie Street without paying prevailing wages, he might have still gone ahead with his plans for the Veazie Street plant, but he would not have hired disadvantaged workers and, instead, would have employed fewer and better skilled workers and paid them prevailing wages. TR 2685-2686. In addition, Mr. Griffin's accountant, Bernard Poirier, testified that he had estimated the labor costs in the budgets for the Turnkey Project based on a presumption that prevailing wage


[Page 12]

rates would not apply to work done at Veazie Street. Mr. Poirier also stated that he would have recommended that Phoenix-Griffin walk away from the project had they known that prevailing wages would be required for the off-site fabricating facility because they could not have turned a profit in view of PHA's planned selling price for the housing units. TR 1411-1414. Mr. Poirier's testimony was emphatically corroborated by PHA official Ronald Torbik when he was asked about the basis of his understanding that prevailing wages were not required for fabrication of housing panels at the Veazie Street plant:

I mean, the economics of the project in my mind kind of dictated that because at $80,000 a unit with the requirements that the Housing Authority had, it was extremely difficult if not impossible, I think, to construct what we had required to do unless you were using modular housing, which the other developer was doing from a factory in Pennsylvania or some kind of if everything was built on-site, it just the economics wouldn't work. So, it was my understanding that whatever determinations were necessary, they were all worked out and it was always my understanding that the off site facility was not subject to prevailing wages.

Q. Okay. And when you say that the details were worked out, would those details include these two letters? That would be the letter of September

A. Correct.

Q. 15 and September 19?

A. Correct.

TR 2129-2130. Based on this uncontradicted testimony, I find that the Respondents relied on HUD's repeated representations that manufacture of housing panels for the Turnkey Project at the Veazie Street plant would not be subject to DBRA prevailing wage requirements in deciding to enter into the Phase I contract with the PHA and to proceed with the plan to utilize disadvantaged workers at the Veazie Street plant to fabricate modular housing panels at less than prevailing wages.

   I further find that the Respondents' reliance on HUD's assurances was entirely reasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. First, HUD's advice regarding the non- applicability of prevailing wage requirements to Veazie Street work was provided by multiple officials over an extended period of time and culminated in a formal written response, the September 19, 1989 letter from Mr. Dziok, to a direct written inquiry by PHA Executive Director O'Rourke. Second, there is absolutely no evidence in this voluminous record to support DOL's contention that Mr. Griffin should have known not to rely on HUD and should have instead directed any inquiries to the Department of Labor which has sole authority to interpret and enforce the DBRA. Rather, the assurances were


[Page 13]

provided by officials in the HUD Providence office who held themselves out as responsible for providing advice and guidance on the applicability of prevailing wage requirements, and the record establishes that it was standard practice during the relevant time period for a developer to direct prevailing wage questions to the PHA which, in turn, would refer the inquiry to the HUD Providence office. RTR 96-97 (Torbik); RTR 115-116 (Iacovelli); TR 1448-1455; ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 18. Thus, the September 19, 1989 letter instructed that any further assistance on the matter of prevailing wage requirements should be requested from HUD Providence official Louis Azar. In short, the evidence of record in this matter convincingly shows that, prior to DOL's investigation into the Turnkey Project, it was understood by PHA, HUD and developers such as Mr. Griffin that HUD was responsible for providing guidance on prevailing wage requirements. Third, PHA officials relied on and acted in accordance with HUD's assurances that prevailing wage requirements did not apply to Veazie Street work. As set forth above, Mr. Torbik testified that it was his understanding from the September 19, 1989 letter that a determination had been made that Veazie Street was exempt from prevailing wage requirements, and Philip Prescott, the PHA official responsible for conducting wage interviews with employees on the Turnkey Project to insure compliance with DBRA prevailing wage requirements, conducted no review of wages paid to Veazie Street workers in view of HUD's advice that the facility was not subject to prevailing wage requirements. ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 11. Indeed, it would seem incongruous to hold Mr. Griffin, a private party, to a higher standard of vigilance than was followed by the public officials entrusted with responsibility for monitoring DBRA compliance. These facts clearly distinguish the instant circumstances from the cases cited by DOL where estoppel was held not to be available against the government. Compare, for example, Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford, 467 U.S. 51, 61-65 (1984) (health care provider participating in the Government's Medicare program did not reasonably rely on erroneous advice concerning cost reimbursement provided by the Government's private fiscal agent when the provider knew that the agent was only a conduit and when the applicable statute, regulations and policy manual made it clear that the advice was in error); Falcone v. Pierce, 864 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1988) (developer of subsidized housing could not demonstrate reasonable reliance based on erroneous oral advice concerning use restrictions allegedly provided by a HUD loan officer and immediate supervisor since he not only had a long history of participation in the public housing program but failed to have an attorney review the loan documents which gave actual notice of the restrictions). Therefore, I conclude that the Respondents reasonably relied on HUD's assurances that DBRA prevailing wage rate would not apply to prefabrication work performed at the Veazie Street plant and that, but for these assurances, Mr. Griffin either would have abandoned the project or, at the very least, handled labor matters differently.

   The final criterion identified by the Court for application of equitable estoppel is whether the Respondents complied with HUD's policies. The Respondents argue that they have complied with the policies contained in the HUD Handbook and in HUD's communications because the housing panels for the Turnkey Project were manufactured at the Veazie Street plant, which is not at the site of the project, and because the Veazie Street plant was not a temporary plant set up to supply the needs of the project and dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to the performance of the project as described in Handbook section 7-12. ALJX 55 at 3-5. DOL and the Intervenor counter


[Page 14]

that the WAB and District Court have both upheld the Department of Labor's interpretation that the Veazie Street plant falls within the "site of work" as defined in the regulations implementing the DBRA; therefore, it is the law of the case that the Respondents were required to pay prevailing wages to employees engaged in fabrication of housing panels at Veazie Street. ALJX 56 at 3-15; ALJX 57 at 7-20. DOL and the Intervenor further contend that the Respondents did not comply with HUD's policy concerning off-site fabrication, as set forth in the HUD handbook, because the Veazie Street plant was used exclusively for the Turnkey Project and was clearly established as a temporary plant to serve the purposes of the project. ALJX 56 at 11; ALJX 57 at 23-24.

   DOL and the Intervenor correctly point out that the Court affirmed the WAB's holding that the language of the Housing Act concerning "the development of the project" controlled the Veazie Street issue and that work performed at the off-site facility was subject to prevailing wage requirements notwithstanding the somewhat contradictory language found in the HUD handbook. 956 F.Supp. at 105. Thus, it is unquestionably the law of this case that the prevailing wage requirements of the DBRA and implementing regulations applied to the fabrication of housing panels at the Veazie Street plant. However, as the Court instructed, the proper inquiry on remand is not whether the Respondents complied with the Department of Labor's interpretation, which they admittedly did not, but whether they "in fact, complied with HUD's policies." 956 F.Supp. at 109. HUD's policy regarding off-site work is contained in the HUD Handbook at sections 7-12 and 7-15 which respectively provide:

PRECUTTING OF PARTS AND PREFABRICATION OF ASSEMBLIES. The precutting of parts and/or the prefabrication of assemblies are not covered unless conducted in connection with and at the site of the project, or in a temporary plant set up elsewhere to supply the needs of the project and dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to the performance of the contract or project.

* * * * *

SITE OF WORK. The "site of work" is limited to the physical place where the construction called for in the contract will remain when the work on it has been completed, and to other adjacent or nearby property used by the contractor in the "site" because of proximity. Operations of a commercial supplier or materialman established in the proximity of but not on the active site of work prior to the opening of bids are not covered by the Act even if dedicated exclusively to the Federal project for a time.


[Page 15]

   It is readily apparent from the parties' statements at the hearing on remand and in their post-hearing briefs that the above- quoted provisions of the HUD Handbook are susceptible to differing interpretations in regard to such matters as whether the Veazie Street plant constituted an "adjacent or nearby property" so as to fall within the "site of work" defined by section 7-15 and whether the plant was "temporary" and "dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to performance of the contract or project" within the meaning of section 7-12. In my view, the appropriate question for determining the applicability of equitable estoppel is whether the Respondents complied with HUD's policies as communicated in the affirmative assurances relied upon by the Respondents. In this regard, this record leaves no doubt that the responsible officials in the HUD Providence office were fully aware of the pertinent facts regarding the Veazie Street plant at the time the September 19, 1989 letter was written in response to the inquiry from PHA Executive Director O'Rourke. That is, it is clear that HUD officials knew of the location of the Veazie Street plant as well as its proximity to the scattered housing sites involved in Phase I of the Turnkey Project, and they were aware of Mr. Griffin's plans to establish the plant to fabricate housing panels for Turnkey Phase I and for other housing projects in the future. With these facts in its possession, HUD provided a formal, written opinion that DBRA prevailing wage rates would not apply. Accordingly, I find that HUD's policy, as communicated to the PHA and the Respondents, was that the Respondents would not be required to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the DBRA for work performed at the Veazie Street plant for Phase I of the Turnkey project as long as the plant was not established on a temporary basis and was not dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to performance of the project. Since the uncontradicted facts show that the Respondents have continued to maintain and operate the Veazie Street plant, albeit on a reduced scale, long after termination of their work on the Turnkey Project, I also find that the plant can not under any reasonable interpretation be classified as temporary. Since there is no evidence that the Respondents moved the plant from the Veazie Street location, which HUD considered to be off-site for purposes of prevailing wage exemption, I conclude that the Respondents complied with HUD's articulated policy.10

   Based on the foregoing findings, I conclude that the Respondents have established the requisite factual predicates, as identified in the Court's opinion, for application of equitable estoppel to work performed at the Veazie Street plant.11

      2. Working Subcontractors

HUD policy regarding the applicability of prevailing wage requirements to working or self- employed subcontractors at the time relevant to the issue of equitable estoppel was set forth in section 7-3 of the HUD Handbook which states,


[Page 16]

7-3 WORKING SUBCONTRACTORS

Contractual relationships between contractors and alleged subcontractors (who perform mechanic's work) which are formed for the purpose of evading the application of prevailing wage requirements are expressly prohibited and may provide a basis for debarment. Where there is any doubt as to the bona-fide nature of a self-employed subcontractor who has no other employees, the following must be checked:

1. Does the subcontractor have-a registered trade name and is there a telephone listing under that name?
2. Does the subcontractor have a license?
3. Does the subcontractor have liability insurance or a subcontractor's bond?
4. Federal Tax Identification Number.

Any of these criteria in conjunction with a signed contract containing Hub Federal Labor Standards Provisions from each such subcontractor should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a bona-fide subcontractor. Such a subcontractor will submit payrolls indicating only that he/she is the owner, the hours worked and the classification. The phrase "self-employed owner" shall be written under the name, address, and Social Security Number (See Column 1 on the Optional Form WH-347). Nonbona-fide [sic] self employed subcontractors must be carried as employees on the payroll of the contractor who engaged him/her, and must be paid the prevailing wage rate for the classification of work performed.

CX 38 at 56.12 The subject of prevailing wages was discussed on April 6, 1990 at a pre-construction conference which was attended by PHA and HUD officials and representatives of the Turnkey Project developers including Mr. Griffin. RX 6; RTR 112. At this meeting, Arthur Iacovelli, who was representing HUD, stated that an owner- contractor working on a site is exempt from prevailing wage requirements for himself only if they met certain criteria (i.e., they had a trade name or a tax identification number). RX 6 at 3; RTR 112,126 (Iacovelli); RTR 193 (Griffin). Mr. Iacovelli testified that he gave this advice based on his understanding of HUD policy at the time. RTR 127. Mr. Griffin testified that at this meeting or at subsequent meetings HUD officials Iacovelli and Azar advised him that, if owner-contractors met certain requirements, they were exempt from Davis-Bacon coverage. RTR 193. Mr. Griffin also testified that this interpretation was consistent with his experience on prior public building projects. TR 2714; RTR 231.


[Page 17]

   The Respondents do not dispute the fact that prevailing wages were not paid to several owner-contractors who worked on the Turnkey Project's scattered housing sites. In their closing argument, the Respondents concede that they are ultimately financially responsible for subcontractors' failure to pay prevailing wages, and they state that they "contest only the claims of the owner/operators [Bogacz and Orange] and have established compliance with HUD policy on this issue." ALJX 55 at 7. Contrary to this claim, I have concluded from my review of the record that the Respondents have not established that they complied with HUD's policy on subcontractors. The facts relating to the Respondents' use of subcontractors was extensively developed at the original hearing before Judge DiNardi who made the following findings:

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Turnkey Housing Project, somehow and/or for whatever reason, was seriously underbid, that when all of the figures for each section of the unit were factored into the total cost of each unit attempts were made to lower the construction cost of each unit by taking advantage of the "loopholes" in the contract relating to the use of independent contractors, subcontractors, owner-operators, an off-site fabrication facility and the use of another firm to clean the unit just prior to occupancy. Thus, the scenario was set and the web was spun to require submission of invoices by the subcontractors and laborers on the firm's letterhead, that certified payrolls should be submitted based upon the agreed upon contract price for the specific work performed, payrolls which did not reflect the actual number of hours worked by each worker at the housing site.

Thus, I find and conclude that Lloyd T. Griffin, Jr., PGG, LTG and GHA have engaged in a pattern of activity to evade the DBRA by various schemes, that LTG failed to pay its own employees, such as Paul Sullivan and Frank Henderson, for hours worked laying linoleum, that LTG failed to pay employees the prevailing wage rates for hours worked on the project at the housing sites, that LTG used its own Veazie Street employees to lay linoleum at the unit and treated these workers as "independent contractors," thus failing to pay them the prevailing wage for such work, that LTG, taking advantage of a "loophole" intended for bona fide off-site fabrication facilities, failed to pay the prevailing wage for work done at Veazie Street, failed to keep accurate certified payrolls and encouraged falsification of payroll records, that LTG failed to pay the workers of an affiliated corporation, GHA, the prevailing wage for cleaning work done at the housing sites, that LTG, through Connie Sullivan and R. Scott Stone, Jr., entered into a scheme under which Stone employees were paid less than the prevailing wage and that Lloyd T. Griffin, Jr., knowingly and personally participated in the plan to treat Veazie Street employees as subcontractors and in coercing Frank Henderson and Hensul, Inc., d/b/a


[Page 18]

H & S Construction Company (H & S) to accept less payment than required by the prevailing wage for finished linoleum and framing work, that LTG agreed to put the employees of H & S on LTG's payroll as employees, that Paul Sullivan, the other partner of H & S, was encouraged by Connie Sullivan to submit false certified payroll records but Paul Sullivan refused to do so and that LTG, through Connie Sullivan, approved, if not actually suggested in the summer of 1990, a subterfuge whereby Frank Henderson and Paul Sullivan and constituted one "partnership" and the rest of the workers of H & S (as many as four) constituted another "partnership."

ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 48-49 (quotations and emphasis in original). Judge DiNardi's findings were affirmed by the WAB and, while criticized, were not vacated by the Court.13 In addition, no evidence has been offered in the proceedings on remand which is inconsistent with Judge DiNardi's findings regarding the Respondents' conduct with respect to subcontractors. Based on the finding that the Respondents knowingly participated in a scheme involving the use of subcontractors for the expressed purpose of avoiding the prevailing wage provisions of the DBRA, I conclude that the Respondents can not establish compliance with HUD's policies. Rather, by engaging in such a scheme, the Respondents directly violated HUD policy, specifically the prohibition in Handbook section 7-3 against "[c]ontractual relationships between contractors and alleged subcontractors (who perform mechanic's work) which are formed for the purpose of evading the application of prevailing wage requirements . . . ." Having failed to demonstrate compliance with HUD's policies, equitable estoppel has no application with respect to the subcontractor issue. 956 F.Supp. at 109. Moreover, even assuming that the Respondents could establish that they complied with HUD's policies, they can not establish the element of reliance since there is no evidence that HUD made any assurances regarding the use of subcontractors that the Respondents relied upon prior to the signing the contract with PHA for Phase I of the Turnkey project. Accordingly, I conclude that equitable estoppel is not available to the Respondents with regard to the subcontractor issue.

       3. Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages to Cleaners

   With regard to the payment of prevailing wages for cleaning work, section 7-4 of the HUD Handbook states,

Cleaning performed during construction is subject to prevailing wage provisions. In the absence of a specific wage rate for the cleaning classification, or if DOL disapproves a conformance request, the cleaners must be paid the predetermined wage rate for laborers. Cleaning performed after the completion of construction in order to prepare the premises for occupancy which is not being done under the construction contract is not subject to the prevailing wage requirements.


[Page 19]

   It is undisputed that the technical specifications of the Turnkey Project contract required the developer to complete the following prior to occupancy:

A. Employ experienced workmen or professional cleaners, for final cleaning.

B. In preparation for substantial completion or occupancy, conduct final inspection of sight-exposed interior and exterior surfaces and of concealed spaces.

C. Remove grease, dust, dirt, stains, labels, fingerprints and other foreign materials, from sight-exposed interior and exterior finished surfaces; polish surfaces so designated to shine finish.

D. All glass shall be thoroughly cleaned inside and out, washed and polished, with all stickers, marks, labels and stains carefully cleaned up.

E. Repair, patch and touch up marred surfaces to specified finish, to match adjacent surfaces.

F. Broom clean paved surfaces, rake clean other surfaces of grounds

G. Remove snow and ice from access to building.

H. Replace hood and fan filters if units were operated during construction.

1. Clean ducts, blowers, and hoods, if exhaust units were operated without filters during construction.

J. After date designated on Certificate of Substantial Completion as Owner Acceptance of Project, cleaning will be responsibility of owner except for Punch List Requirements.

CX 95 (Section 3.2, "FINAL CLEANING"); TR 259-263 (Prescott). At the hearing on remand, Mr. Griffin testified that he had discussed the applicability of prevailing wage rates to cleaners with HUD Providence officials Iacovelli, Azar and Dziok in connection with a prior public housing project, Barbara Jordan II. According to Mr. Griffin, the advice provided by these HUD officials was that prevailing wages would not have to be paid to cleaners who were brought in by a property management firm after closing to clean windows, bathtubs and other things unrelated to construction. Pursuant to this advice, Mr. Griffin testified that Gatsby, his property management firm, hired employees at less than prevailing wages to perform pre-occupancy cleaning after the completion of construction and after tradesmen, who were paid prevailing wages, had completed their cleaning work including correction of "punch list" items. RTR 195-197. Mr. Griffin's testimony regarding this advice received from the HUD Providence officials was not contradicted, and PHA official Torbik testified at the first hearing that his understanding of industry practice regarding the payment of prevailing wages to cleaners was substantially the same as the advice Mr. Griffin reportedly received from HUD. TR 2278-2279.


[Page 20]

   The Respondents contend that they reasonably relied on the assurances provided by HUD Providence officials on past projects in not paying prevailing wages to the employees hired by Gatsby to perform pre-occupancy cleaning on the Turnkey Project. ALJX 55 at 7-9. DOL and the Intervenor respond that the Respondents should not be allowed to invoke equitable estoppel on this issue because they failed to comply with HUD policy, as articulated in Handbook section 7-4, which required payment of prevailing wage rates to the individuals who performed cleaning work because pre-occupancy cleaning was specifically mandated under the terms of the Turnkey Project contract. ALJX 56 at 3-5; ALJX 57 at 24-25.

   If, as Mr. Griffin's testimony suggests, a clear distinction existed between construction-related cleaning by tradesmen and a second, post-construction cleaning by Gatsby employees, an argument might successfully be made that the Respondents relied on the oral assurances provided by HUD Providence representatives and that they complied with HUD's policies as explained by these agency representatives. But, the record in this case shows rather convincingly that no such distinction was made. In this regard, I will quote at length from the testimony of Kemphis Bason who was employed by Gatsby to do cleaning work on both the Barbara Jordan and Turnkey Projects:

Q. And if you recall, during the period you worked for Gatsby Associates was there any time at which you did cleaning work at sites other than the Barbara Jordan complex?

A. Yes.

Q. And what sites were those, sir?

A. 293 Prairie Avenue, 1197 Glenham, Street, 9 and 11 St. James Street, 330 Salisbury Street, 18 Salisbury and 17 Salisbury, 440 Chalkstone, 444 Chalkstone and 448 Chalkstone.

Q. And who assigned you to do cleaning work at those sites?

A. Well, my foreman at the time was Lionel Coleman.


[Page 21]

Q. What did he say to you?

A. He told us that we had to go out there and clean the sites.

Q. Do you know what kind of sites they were?

A. Scattered housing sites.

Q. Do you know who the developer of those sites was?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was it?

A. Mr. Griffin.

Q. How do you know that?

A. Because he was always there.

Q. And at those sites, what did you personally do?

A. Major cleaning, from the top to the bottom. I cleaned the windows, the floors, the cellar, the cabinets, everything.

Q. When you say everything, what else?

A. The outside, laid the grass.

Q. If you recall, did you install appliances?


[Page 22]

A. We moved appliances inside of the houses, but we never installed them. At least, I never did.

Q. What other type of cleaning did you do inside the houses?

A. Baseboards. Where they had -- He hired a contractor to lay the tiles. The glue was oozing up from around the tiles. We had to get on our hands and knees with paint thinner and clean the glue up off of the floor. The windows were a mess from where they did the stucco on the ceiling. We had to scrape the windows and clean the windows.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. We also had to clean the baseboards, the bathrooms.

Q. What did you do in the bathrooms?

A. Where they had done the work in the bathroom from the stucco, we had to clean the tubs thoroughly, the toilets thoroughly. Make it livable, in other words.

Q. Do you know why you were assigned to do this work?

A. It was my job, I guess.

Q. And approximately how many hours a day did you work at these sites?

A. Eight, easy.

Q. Per day.

A. Maybe more. Yes.

Q. And when you worked at these sites, what was your rate of pay per hour?


[Page 2]3

A. Five dollars an hour.

Q. And did you record your time on any time cards?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. And were these Phoenix-Griffin time cards, L.T.G. time cards, Gatsby time cards?

A. They were Gatsby time cards.

Q. And did you -- When you receive -- I take it, you received a pay check every week

A. Yes.

Q. -- or every two weeks? It was every week?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. And were those on Gatsby pay checks?

A. Yes.

TR 292-294. Mr. Bason's description of the cleaning work performed by Gatsby employees is far more detailed and consequently more credible than Mr. Griffin's vague testimony about construction- related and post-construction, pre-occupancy cleaning. Accordingly, I find that a preponderance of the credible evidence of record establishes that the individuals employed by Gatsby at less than prevailing wage rates performed cleaning work such as removing stucco from windows, toilets and bathtubs and cleaning tile adhesive from floors and baseboards which is not only clearly covered by the technical specifications of the Turnkey Project contract but which can not reasonably be classified as separate and distinguishable from construction-related cleaning that Mr. Griffin claims was done by tradesmen at prevailing wage rates. Indeed, Mr. Bason's testimony shows that the Gatsby employees performed some functions (e.g., laying grass and moving appliances into the housing units) which appear to be more appropriately considered construction activities than cleaning. Rather than adhering to the distinction made by HUD officials between construction-related and post-construction


[Page 24]

final cleaning, I find that the Respondents substantially merged cleaning on the Turnkey Project into a single undertaking which was accomplished by Gatsby employees who were not paid at prevailing wage rates. It is axiomatic that a party invoking an equitable defense must do so with "clean hands." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M.M. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). See also Akbarin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 669 F.2d 839, 844 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that a "petitioner's unclean hands ... may preclude him from asserting estoppel against the Government"). In my view, the Respondents' failure to scrupulously follow the guidance orally provided by HUD officials concerning cleaning and prevailing wage rates precludes their recourse to the doctrine of equitable estoppel with respect to this issue.

    B. Debarment

   The regulations implementing the DBRA provide that when any contractor or subcontractor is found to be in "aggravated or willful" violation of the labor standards provisions of any of the DBRA , the "contractor or subcontractor or any firm, corporation, partnership, or association in which such contractor or subcontractor has a substantial interest shall be ineligible for a period not to exceed three years . . . to receive any contracts or subcontracts subject to any of the statutes listed in [29 C.F.R.] §5.1." 29 C.F.R. §5.12(a)(1). A violation of a prevailing wage statute does not per se amount to an "aggravated or willful" violation. Rather, the evidence must establish a level of culpability beyond mere negligence. See Framlau Corp., WAB Case No. 70-05 (April 19, 1971), slip op. at 4-5; Structural Concepts, Inc., WAB Case No. 95-02 (November 30, 1995), slip op. at 3-4. A "reckless disregard" of the requirements of the law is sufficient to meet the "aggravated or willful" standard. See In re Wayne J. Griffin Electric, Inc., WAB Case No. 93-05, slip op. at 5 (October 29, 1993), quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988); and there is no de minimis doctrine applicable to avoid debarment where a violation is deemed aggravated or willful. Miller Insulation Co., Inc., WAB Case No. 91-38 (December 30, 1992), slip op. at 10-11 (violations consisting of failure to pay overtime, accompanied by patent efforts to conceal those violations by falsifying certified payrolls, were no less willful or deliberate because they involved three employees and one contract).

   As discussed earlier in this decision, Judge DiNardi found that the Respondents engaged in a pattern of activity to evade the DBRA by various schemes. In addition to the failure to pay prevailing wage rates to the employees who worked at the Veazie Street plant, Judge DiNardi found that the Respondents' various schemes included: failing to pay its own employees, such as Paul Sullivan and Frank Henderson, for hours worked laying linoleum; failing to pay employees the prevailing wage rates for hours worked on the project at the housing sites; using LTG's Veazie Street employees to lay linoleum, treating these workers as "independent contractors" and failing to pay them the prevailing wage for such work; failing to keep accurate certified payrolls and encouraging falsification of payroll records; failing to pay the workers hired by Gatsby, an affiliated corporation, the prevailing wage for cleaning work done at the housing sites; LTG's conduct through Connie Sullivan


[Page 25]

and R. Scott Stone, Jr., in entering into a scheme under which Stone's employees were paid less than the prevailing wage; Lloyd T. Griffin, Jr.'s knowing and personal participation in a plan to treat Veazie Street employees as subcontractors and in coercing Frank Henderson and Hensul, Inc., d/b/a H & S Construction Company (H & S) to accept less payment than required by the prevailing wage for finished linoleum and framing work; LTG's agreement put the employees of H & S on LTG's payroll as employees; LTG's actions through its agent, Connie Sullivan, in encouraging Paul Sullivan, the other partner of H & S Construction Company, was to submit false certified payroll records (which Paul Sullivan refused to do); and LTG's conduct, through Connie Sullivan, in approving, if not actually suggesting in the summer of 1990, a subterfuge whereby Frank Henderson and Paul Sullivan constituted one "partnership" and the rest of the workers of H & S Construction Company (as many as four) constituted another "partnership." ALJX 19, DiNardi Decision and Order at 48-49. Judge DiNardi concluded that the Respondents' violations of the DBRA were aggravated or willful and warranted debarment, and the WAB affirmed. While I have concluded, pursuant to the Court's instructions on remand, that DOL is equitably estopped from prosecuting the Respondents for the violations arising out of the failure to pay prevailing wage rates to Veazie Street plant workers involved in the prefabrication of housing panels, the doctrine does not shield Respondents from the consequences of their other violations of the DBRA which formed the predominant bases for the debarment order. Accordingly, I conclude that debarment for three years remains an appropriate sanction for the Respondents' aggravated and willful violations of the DBRA as originally found by Judge DiNardi.

VI. Conclusion

   For the foregoing reasons, DOL is equitably estopped from prosecuting the Respondents for violations of the DBRA arising out of their failure to pay prevailing wage rates to employees at the Veazie Street plant who were involved in the prefabrication of housing panels for Phase I of the Turnkey Housing Project. Equitable estoppel is not available to the Respondents with respect to the issues arising out of their conduct and wage practices with respect to subcontractors and cleaners, and debarment for a period of three years is warranted in view of the prior findings of aggravated or willful violations of the DBRA which were not vacated by the Court's decision in Griffin v. Reich, 956 F.Supp. 98 (1997) or otherwise affected by the determinations herein on remand respecting the applicability of equitable estoppel.

VII. Order

   Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is hereby ordered that Judge DiNardi's July 1, 1993 order is modified insofar as the Administrator shall not obtain from HUD any funds from the amounts withheld for the payment of back wages due employees for their work at the Veazie Street plant in the prefabrication of housing panels for Phase I of the Turnkey Housing Project. Any funds withheld from the Respondents remaining after compliance with Judge DiNardi's order as modified herein shall be promptly released to the Respondents.

      Daniel F. Sutton
      Administrative Law Judge

Camden, New Jersey

[ENDNOTES]

1 The documentary evidence in the record is identified as "CX" for exhibits offered by DOL, "RX" for exhibits offered by the Respondents, and "ALJX for exhibits offered by the administrative law judge. References to the transcript of the original hearing conducted in this matter will be designated as "TR" while references to the transcript of the hearing held on remand will continue to be designated as "RTR".

2 In April 1996, the Secretary of Labor established the Administrative Review Board to succeed the former Board of Service Contract Appeals, Wage Appeals Board and Office of Administrative Appeals. 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (May 3, 1996).

3 An appearance at the remand hearing was also made by a HUD attorney in view of the fact that HUD employees had been subpoenaed by the Respondents to testify. RTR 10-11.

4 Post-hearing submissions and orders have been identified as the following Administrative Law Judge exhibits: ALJX 51 - the Respondents' January 19, 1999 letter re: RX 124; ALJX 52 - DOL's objection to the admission of RX 124; ALJX 53 - order issued on January 28, 1999; ALJX 54 - the Intervenor's unopposed motion for extension of time in which to file post-hearing memorandum; ALJX 55 - the Respondents' post-hearing brief; ALJX 56 - DOL's post-hearing brief; and ALJX 57 - the Intervenor's post-hearing brief.

5 Although Phoenix-Griffin's proposal was accepted in July of 1989, there was an extended period of adjustments and modifications in design, sites and scope of work in response to community concerns. TR 2308-2311 (Torbik); RTR 226 (Griffin); RX 56.

6 Mr. Griffin never completed the purchase of the Veazie Street property, but he has continued to rent and utilize the building where he set up the prefabrication plant. RTR 236-237 (Griffin).

7 Project No. RI43-P001-017 is the designation assigned to Phase I of the Turnkey Project for which Phoenix-Griffin had been selected as developer. RTR 106-107 (Torbik).

8 As noted by Judge Lagueux, Judge Pettine found in Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 768 F.Supp. 21, 25 (D. RI. 1991) that Phoenix Griffin had "relied upon HUD's assurance (through the PHA) that the wage law did not apply to the Veazie Street site." 956 F.Supp. at 109, n 9.

9 The Court in Dantran additionally observed that "if a statute or regulation clearly limns a party's legal obligations, the party cannot justifiably rely for estoppel purposes on a government agent's representations that the law provides to the contrary." Id. at 67. In the instant case, the law and regulations, as discussed later in this decision, did not clearly require the payment of prevailing wage rates to employees involved in the prefabrication of housing panels at the Veazie Street plant. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the Respondents could rely for estoppel purposes on the affirmative representations that prevailing wage rates were not required.

10 It is noted that the evidence of record supports of a finding that, in part due to events outside of the Respondents' control such as the cancellation or delay of other housing projects and HUD's withholding of funds which deprived the Respondents of capital that might have enabled utilization of the plant for commercial ventures, the predominant use of the Veazie Street plant to date has been the manufacture of housing panels for Phase I of the Turnkey Project. However, even if it were determined that the facts show that the plant was "dedicated" on a near exclusive basis to Phase I of the Turnkey Project, I would nonetheless conclude that the Respondents complied with HUD's policy because the plain language of Handbook section 7-12 requires that a prefabrication plant be both temporary and dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, to the project to fall out of the prevailing wage exemption. As discussed above, the facts demonstrate that the Veazie Street plant is not temporary.

11 Note is taken of the Intervenor's argument that allowing the Respondents to invoke equitable estoppel to prevent DOL from recovering back wages owed to the individuals who worked on the Turnkey Project will frustrate the public interest embodied in the DBRA of protecting local wage standards for the benefit of construction workers. ALJX 57 at 33-34, citing Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771 (1980), United States v. Binghampton Construction Co., 347 U.S. 171, 178 (1954) and Walsh v. Schlect, 429 U.S. 401, 411 (1977). Accepted at face value, the Intervenor's argument would mean that equitable estoppel would never be available to a party involved in litigation with the Government over a prevailing wage dispute. However, an absolute bar to the invocation of equitable estoppel against the Government was clearly rejected by the Court, and the instructions to be followed on remand leave no room for weighing the public interest as an additional criterion to be satisfied by the Respondents. Rather, the Court held that "equitable estoppel should apply in this case if plaintiffs relied on HUD's written and/or oral representations and plaintiffs were in compliance with HUD's policies and representations concerning the applicability of Davis-Bacon requirements." 956 F.Supp. at 109.

12 The apparent exemption from prevailing wage requirements of working subcontractors in section 7-3 of the HUD Handbook is contradicted the Department of Labor's DBRA implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R §5.2(o) which are appended to the HUD Handbook. CX 38 at 73-87. Section 5.2(o) of the regulations states,

Every person performing the duties of a laborer or mechanic in the construction, prosecution, completion, or repair of a public building or public work financed in whole or in part by loans, grants, or guarantees from the United States is "employed" regardless of any contractual relationship alleged to exist between the contractor and such person.

The conflict between section 7-3 of the Handbook and 29 C.F.R. §5.2(o) was brought to light during the Department of Labor's DBRA compliance investigation of the Turnkey Project when HUD Regional Labor Relations Director William Bieryla referred an inquiry from the PHA to the Regional Solicitor for the Department of Labor. In response to this inquiry, the Regional Solicitor, Albert H. Ross, advised Mr. Bieryla in a letter dated September 30, 1992 that the HUD Handbook incorrectly implies that an individual meeting the section 7-3 indicia is a bona fide subcontractor and exempt from the DBRA. CX 99. Interestingly, PHA and HUD officials have expressed serious doubts, if not outright disagreement, regarding the correctness of this position despite the Department of Labor's primacy in interpreting and enforcing the DBRA. TR 2145-2148, 2153- 2156 (Torbik); RTR 153 (Bieryla).

13 The Court found that "the reliance issue was inadequately considered, and the finding was not based on articulated substantial evidence", and it made the following general observation concerning Judge DiNardi's finding that the Respondents did not rely on HUD's assurances: "However, the ALJ never explains why it is 'obvious,' that the project was underbid nor does he refute evidence in the record explaining that Griffin would not have participated in the project or would have handled labor matters differently if HUD's advice had been different." Three issues with respect to which plaintiffs assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel as separate matters involving different factual foundations. 956 F.Supp. at 108-109 (quotations in original). The Court did not, however, find any fault with Judge DiNardi's conclusion that the Respondents had engaged in an unlawful scheme respecting the use of subcontractors in an attempt to evade the requirements of the DBRA, and it is noted that the evidence in the record, which I have previously discussed, that "Griffin would not have participated in the project or would have handled labor matters differently if HUD's advice had been different" related to HUD's assurances concerning the Veazie Street plant and not to the use of subcontractors. As the Court pointed out, the "three issues with respect to which . . . [Respondents] assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel . . . [are] separate matters involving different factual foundations." 956 F.Supp. at 109. Accordingly, the Respondents can not use the factual foundation of reliance that they have established with respect to one issue (the Veazie Street plant) as a springboard to establish reliance with respect to another issue (here, the use of subcontractors) for which there is no factual foundation of either reliance on or compliance with HUD's policies.



Phone Numbers