Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to see such distinguished witnesses appearing before the Committee today, and I share your interest and concern on this issue. I applaud your efforts to bring more attention to our policies and programs aimed at deterring nuclear terrorism.

I have long been concerned with the threat of nuclear terrorism. In 2001, as the Chairman of the International Security Subcommittee, one issue that I focused on, and held several hearings on, was the protection of radioactive sources that could be used in so-called dirty bombs. A 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that I requested, entitled Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources (GAO-03-804), disclosed that the United States did not reliably keep track of or account for radioactive sources. According to the report, a quarter to half a million of Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) radiological sources are estimated to exist in the United States and approximately 24,000 new sources are annually added. These sources, in use throughout the United States and often not well secured, have the potential to become the base material for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), the formal name for a dirty bomb. As a result of the hearings and GAO report, Senator Bingaman and I introduced The Low Level Radioactive Waste Act to promote the safe and secure disposal of low-level radioactive waste. I am pleased to say that some of our proposals were included in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. 

Internationally, the problem of securing both low level radioactive sources and highly enriched uranium is compounded by its growing availability. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) reported 252 incidents of theft or loss of nuclear and other radioactive materials in 2006, accounting for 20 percent of the reported incidents since the database was created in 1995. It is difficult to say if the problem is growing or if improved reporting is making it more noticeable. In any case, the numbers represent a significant problem and one which, as our witnesses today observe, has caught the attention of terrorists.

I am convinced there are two lines of defense against possible nuclear terrorism threats. First, we must continue to secure radiological sources, even low-level ones, within our own country. After all, why should a terrorist go to the trouble of bringing radioactive material in when he can find it here? But the second front is the most difficult and, in the long-term, provides the greatest threat. This is the risk of unsecured nuclear and radiological sources abroad.

Our witnesses today cite a number of initiatives to improve security of foreign sources of nuclear radioactive material, including the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Now is the time, I believe, to take a fresh look at how we can enhance the capabilities of our current domestic programs and international efforts to secure, monitor, and control nuclear material.

We are on the verge of a major expansion in the number of nuclear power plants. By 2030, there may be as much as a 60 percent increase in the number of operating nuclear reactors. In addition to answering the demand for more energy, nuclear technology will find greater use throughout the world in food safety and medical applications. This will also create a much larger nuclear waste issue. For instance, the volume of spent reactor fuel is expected to double between now and 2020.

The growing use of nuclear applications and nuclear power production increases the risk that radiological sources or nuclear weapons end up in the hands of terrorists. To contain this danger, we need to examine ways that agencies, such as the IAEA, can be strengthened to meet the proliferation concerns generated by increased use of nuclear material. Two areas offer immediate opportunities to improve nuclear security but only if the IAEA's budget is expanded to meet this larger role: increasing nuclear and radiological accountability and expanding verification activities.

Accounting for and tracking nuclear and radiological materials is the cornerstone for greater security. One possibility is to create a comprehensive international database of nuclear and radiological sources. The IAEA could require that new materials be put on this list as they are created, and tracked as they are transported to their end user, and finally moved into safe disposal. Although this program would be voluntary, would require considerable additional funding, and would be challenging to implement, it would set the international community on a path to greater security that will become even more crucial in the future.

To prevent the theft, loss, or diversion of highly radioactive material, a more robust verification regime is required. To match the projected increase of nuclear reactors, the IAEA will need more inspectors armed with uniform inspection standards and with better technical tools. For example, the IAEA has negotiated comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and additional protocols (AP) designed to ensure that nuclear programs are used only for peaceful purposes. However, thirty states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have not implemented CSAs and approximately 100 states have not adopted the APs. This points to the difficulty in monitoring potential nuclear diversions. But even where the IAEA does have access agreements, it will need advanced technical tools to keep up with the increasing sophistication of nuclear design and efforts to hide secret nuclear weapons programs.

A critical barrier to making these reforms is the IAEA's zero real growth budget. An unintended consequence of this United Nations-wide budget requirement is the prevention of critical investment in the IAEA's human capital, infrastructure, and equipment. The United States needs to take the lead in addressing these issues if we are going to be successful in preventing what we all believe is the inevitable consequence of not confronting in a comprehensive strategy the domestic and international threat of nuclear terrorism.

I would again like to thank the Chairman for arranging this hearing and helping the public understand the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.

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