Mr. AKAKA.  Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the U.S. arms control and nonproliferation bureaucracy and its impact on our national security.                        

     Recently, I chaired two hearings of the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee concerning the national security bureaucracy for arms control and nonproliferation.  I examined several options for improving our ability to control proliferation.  They included:  reestablishing an independent arms control and nonproliferation agency, creating a semi-autonomous arms control and nonproliferation agency within the State Department, and reestablishing an arms control bureau in the State Department.  Other issues discussed were elevating the role of the head of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaucracy and ensuring that there are enough qualified arms control and nonproliferation experts to protect our national security and meet our international obligations.

     Witnesses for both hearings had decades of experience in managing our nation's arms control and nonproliferation issues.  Ambassador Thomas Graham and Ambassador Norman Wulf, along with Dr. Andrew Semmel, who recently retired as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, provided perspective about the changes to this bureaucracy over the past decade and the need for reform.  Mr. President, I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert into the record, following my remarks, a report submitted by Ambassador Wulf which represents consensus findings of a number of experts and former U.S. officials experienced in this field.

     The second hearing featured Ms. Patricia McNerney, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and Ms. Linda Taglialatela, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources.  They gave greater insight into the controversial, and damaging, arms control and nonproliferation bureaucracy reorganization at the State Department in 2005 and the ongoing human capital changes the bureaus involved continue to face today.  The State Department's use of short-term, band-aid fixes to cover a loss of qualified civil servants and a lack of commitment by senior leaders to address the Department's cultural tensions, primarily between regional and functional issues, troubled me since these problems affect both human capital and organizational capacity to confront the evolving threat of weapons of mass destruction. 

     In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy entered office, the United States faced a perceived missile gap against its foe, the Soviet Union.  The Kennedy Administration, confronting the critical challenges of the day, advocated a new government "agency of peace" which would work toward "ultimate world disarmament."  This agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), helped craft and implement the policy decisions that would reduce the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threat to Americans through multiple, lasting, and verifiable treaties.  The world was at a nuclear tipping point, where a small change could make a significant difference.  The Kennedy Administration challenged the conventional wisdom that argued for only an increase in nuclear weapons.  It instead focused on controlling and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons by creating the small, but agile, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that gradually began to increase international security.

     The world appears to be at another nuclear tipping point.  Today international security does not hinge on an arms race between two mighty superpowers.  Rather, international security is increasingly threatened by the wide proliferation of nuclear programs, material, and knowledge.  Countries such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have either achieved a nuclear weapons program or have aspirations to create one.  Others soon may follow.   Along with these headline-grabbing nuclear proliferation concerns, many countries are seeking nuclear power and assured access to uranium to satisfy their growing energy demands.  The peaceful application of civilian nuclear programs heightens the risk of diversion or the proliferation of plutonium and enriched uranium.  Both presidential candidates have expressed their commitment to addressing proliferation and working with other nations to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict.

     The next Administration must confront this tipping point head-on and solve the problem of our troubled arms control and nonproliferation bureaucracy.  Along with its organizational structure, fundamental human capital issues must be resolved.  They include: addressing what is considered by some a cumbersome hiring process; recruiting, developing, and retaining a diverse and highly-qualified workforce; involving key stakeholders during organizational changes; and making it desirable for Foreign Service Officers to serve in the fields of arms control and nonproliferation.

     We need to consider the gravity of this issue now.  I urge my colleagues to advocate an arms control and nonproliferation workforce and organization that will support effectively the policies of the next Administration and prepare us for the nuclear threats developing throughout the world.

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