This is the third in a series of hearings that I am holding to explore the effectiveness and efficiency of government management in various aspects of national security. The first hearing considered proposed reforms to the U.S. export control system. During the second hearing, former Administration officials discussed the management of the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy at the Department of State, commonly known as the T Bureau. Today's hearing will allow us to hear from current State Department senior leaders about these same issues within the T Bureau and give them the opportunity to respond to the testimony of our previous witnesses. As I mentioned to the witnesses at our last hearing, Senator Voinovich and I recently requested the Governmental Accountability Office to examine the effect of organizational changes on the State Department, specifically on its capabilities and resources.

The major powers of the world signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Since then, four other countries have developed nuclear weapons through their efforts outside of the NPT. And now we confront the desire of terrorists to obtain similar weapons. The nuclear genie has emerged from the bottle. We must re-cork it before international security is further threatened.

Leading presidential candidates have spoken forcefully about containing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Senator McCain recently declared that his highest priority, if elected, is to reduce the danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used while strengthening all aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Senator Obama is also dedicated to bolstering the NPT and securing loose nuclear materials. Both candidates have committed themselves to fighting proliferation. However, both candidates know that policy statements are not enough. Statements need to be matched by action.

The right policies are critical, but equally important are effective and efficient institutions to support policy implementation. My goal in this hearing, along with examining possibly damaging personnel practices that occurred during the T Bureau's reorganization in 2005, is to identify possible recommendations for improving the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy.

The Department of State leads U.S. arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation efforts. The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security leads the bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation, Political-Military Affairs, and Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.

This bureaucracy has changed in two significant ways from 1999 until today. First, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which was an independent agency that led the national arms control and nonproliferation effort, was merged into the State Department bureaucracy where its multilateral and long-term focus has largely taken a back seat to the prevailing regional and bilateral interests of the Department.

The second significant change to this bureaucracy came in 2005. The bureaus singularly focused on arms control and nonproliferation were eliminated and merged into the International Security and Nonproliferation bureau.

I am concerned that this merger further weakened the State Department's capability to implement effective arms control and nonproliferation policy. I believe that steps must be taken quickly to repair damage that has been done.

The number of controversial issues from the 2005 reorganization include:

• the absence of human resources and civil service personnel from the Senior Management Panel, which had the responsibility of crafting the reorganization and reporting its recommendations to the Under Secretary;
• the significant reduction in the number of full-time equivalent personnel despite the creation of two new offices within the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau;
• the loss of an independent arms control bureau, which may have convinced other nations that America was not committed to reducing weapons of mass destruction;
• an inadequate process for selecting strong leaders with distinguished backgrounds for the bureaus; and
• concern that morale problems have discouraged well-qualified and experienced career employees in the T Bureau from remaining in the Department.

In addition to gaining a better understanding of the impact of the reorganization on the T Bureau, I also want to explore possible reforms, including:

• reestablishing an independent arms control and nonproliferation agency that is modeled on ACDA;
• creating a semi-autonomous arms control and nonproliferation agency within the State Department;
• reestablishing an arms control bureau alongside nonproliferation and verification and compliance bureaus within the T Bureau;
• elevating the role of the head of the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy to have an unobstructed and clearly-defined role in national security decisions; and
• following in the footsteps of former Secretary of State Colin Powell, finding ways to address the diplomatic and human capital readiness challenges confronting the T Bureau so that there are enough qualified arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation professionals to carry out national policies and our international obligations.

We need to work together to prevent terrorists and rogue nations from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This hearing, taken with the last hearing on this subject, is particularly important since it will help clarify the challenges ahead and provide possible solutions.