create a governmental right to sue without limiting the time in which the government may exercise it. Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339. If an act creating such a right contains no limitations period, and no general statute of limitations applies, the government may seek recovery under the act at any time. Id. at 341.

   The parties suggest several potential ways in which the Government's claim can be characterized, which would lead to varying conclusions about whether a statute of limitation applies. NAES contends that the Government's claim is either one to recover an alleged debt arising "under a contract" between the parties or one to recover a "diversion of money paid under a grant program." It would follow that the case would be governed by one of the following two statutes of limitation:

(a) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later ....

(b) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first accrues: Provided, that ... an action to recover for diversion of money paid under a grant program ... may be brought within six years after the right of action accrues ....

28 U.S.C, § 2415(a)-(b). The United States contends that the action is instead statutory, arising under the JTPA: "Every recipient shall repay to the United States amounts found not to have been expended in accordance with this chapter.... No such action shall be taken except after notice and opportunity for a hearing have been given to the recipient." 29 U.S.C. § 1574(d)

(1994). Alternatively, it could be called a simple action to collect a debt. Under both of these characterizations, the United States contends that no statute of limitation applies.

   Both parties are supported by their citations. The Seventh Circuit's apposite analysis in United States Dep't of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.1982), however, controls the outcome of this case. In Old Ben, the Government filed a complaint to enforce a final administrative order of the Department of the Interior assessing civil penalties against the defendant for violation of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (1976) ("the Coal Act"). Id. at 259.

NAES's debt has already been administratively determined and the United States is asking this court only to enforce the Department of Labor's action. United States's Memorandum, at 4; 29 U.S.C. § 1578(a)(3) (setting forth the standard of review for an appeal of a final action of the Secretary of Labor by a United States Circuit Court). NAES does not challenge this characterization. Like the claim in Old Ben, the Government's claim here is analogous to a debt collection proceeding, such as one under 31 U.S.C. § 3711 as it was explained to be in the Grant Officer's April 1, 1998 letter to NAES, not to a substantive breach of contract or a diversion of funds case, and the court will construe it as such.

   This finding is consistent with the only reported case to consider whether a statute of limitation applies to the right to seek repayment of grant funds misspent under the JTPA. In Miss. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Dev. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 90 F.3d 110, 111 (5th Cir.1996), the Court considered an appeal of a decision made by the Secretary of Labor ordering reimbursement to the Government of funds provided under a JTPA grant. As one of its bases for appeal, the grantee argued that the five year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 should have barred the Government from pursuing administrative proceedings for collection. Id. at 112. The Court disagreed, explaining that "we are persuaded that the repayment action here does not involve a claim for a civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture under § 2462. It is instead an action in the nature of one to collect on a debt." Id. at 112 (citing Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 105 S.Ct. 1544, 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985). Although this characterization was made in a different context, it provides general support for this court's holding.

   Most of the cases that have applied Section 2415 to actions for repayment of allegedly misspent grant money have done so in situations where there has been no final administrative

action establishing liability. See United States v. Illinois, 144 F.Supp.2d 990 (C.D.Ill.2001) (applying Section 2415(a) in a case where the Administrative Office of United States Courts sought repayment of a Criminal Justice Act grant of federal money to the State of Illinois that was allegedly improperly spent); United States v. Flake, 783 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (applying Section 2415(a) to an action to recover allegedly misspent funds based on an alleged breach of an agreement entered into under the Housing Act of 1959); United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (same); United States v. Gray, 582 F.Supp., 1559 (N.D.Ga.1982) (Section 2415(b) applied to an action to recover funds allegedly overpaid under a Veterans Administration educational grant); United States v. Dimeo, 371 F.Supp. 95 (N.D.Ga.1974) (applying Section 2415(b) to an action to recover Social Security payments that were allegedly misused); accord United States v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 524 F.Supp. 421 (D.Neb.1981). These cases are thereby distinguishable from the instant case, in that the underlying merits had not already been determined, and therefore the claims before the district courts were properly characterized as breach of contract or diversion of money paid under a grant program as opposed to collection of a predetermined debt.

   There are cases, including some cited by NAES, that are on point but disagree with the holding reached here. For example, United States v. Am. States Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir.2001), the Government characterized its case as one to enforce the judgment of its contracting officer. The Court disagreed, reasoning that

Even though the decisions of contracting officers are not subject to challenge on the merits, they are not themselves judgments. Section 2415(a) recognizes this fact by requiring the Government to sue ‘within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.' ... this provision covers actions by the Government to enforce a final administrative decision, and thereby

suggests that such decisions are not judgments exempt from the statute of limitations. Furthermore, this lawsuit essentially is a breach of contract suit. The Government seeks damages from [the surety] because [the surety] has refused to honor its obligation under the surety agreement. Although the amount in question was determined by the contracting officer, the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual.

(citing United States v. Suntip Co., 82 F.3d 1468, 1475-76 (9th Cir.1996)). This case can be partially distinguished in that there is no indication that the decision of the contracting officer became a final action of an administrative agency. There also appear to have been issues remaining to be determined other than the amount of liability. The reasoning, however, shows a fundamental disagreement with the analysis employed here, with which this court must respectfully disagree for the reasons stated above.

   NAES also cites United States v. Chrzanowski, 358 F.Supp.2d 693 (N.D.Ill.2005) (Filip, J.), in which the Court applied Section 2415(a) to an action to collect a debt that had been determined by the Department of Defense. It appears that the parties did not dispute the applicability of Section 2415(a) in that case, however, because Judge Filip assumed its application without discussing it. Chrzanowski is therefore not strong precedent on this point.

   Because the court has characterized the Government's action as one to collect a debt, and the parties have cited no applicable statute of limitations (nor has the court found any through its own research), it follows that no statute of limitations applies to this case. The court could end its analysis here. An alternative basis for granting the Government's motion is available, however: even assuming that the six year limitations period in Section 2415 applies to this case, the Government's claim did not accrue until the Grant Officer's determination became the final action of the Department of Labor on April 22, 1998, or perhaps even later when NAES's debt became delinquent, making the United States's April 5, 2004 complaint timely.

   NAES argues that the Government's claim accrued on April 1, 1998 at the latest, when the Grant Officer of the Department of Labor issued its final determination. The United States disagrees and contends that its claim instead accrued 21 days later when the Grant Officer's decision became the final action of the Secretary of the Department of Labor under 20 C.F.R. § 636.11 (1994) due to NAES's failure to appeal the decision or to pay the debt. The court must resolve this disagreement because the United States delayed tiling its complaint until April 5, 2004, either four days after the statute of limitation had run under NAES's argument or 17 days before it had run according to the Government.

   On this point the court is again bound to apply the Seventh Circuit's Old Ben reasoning. In Old Ben, an administrative law judge issued its decision assessing penalties against the defendant on June 23, 1975. 676 F.3d at 259. Because the defendant failed to either appeal the decision or pay the fines, the decision became final 30 days later, on July 23, 1975. Id. The Government brought suit in the district court to enforce the administrative decision on July 18, 1980, thereby raising the same question in Old Ben that is raised here. In the context of the Coal Act, under which the decision was made, the Government could not bring suit until after the administrative proceedings had ended, a penalty was assessed, and the violator failed to pay the penalty. Id. at 261 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(4)). The Court said that "A statute of limitations cannot begin to run until there is a right to bring an action." Id. (citing Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 87 S.Ct. 1177, 18 L.Ed.2d 256 (1967)). After examining the Coal Act, it concluded, "Obviously an administrative agency order must exist before the Secretary can file a district court action to enforce it. Therefore, if 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to the district court proceeding the limitations period begins to run when the administrative order becomes final. The administrative law judge's order became final on July 23, 1975." Id. at 261. The Court therefore held the Government's July 18, 1980 complaint to be timely. Id.

   Old Ben's analysis was recognized and applied in 1998 when Judge Plunkett decided United States v. Serfilco, 1998 WL 641367 (N.D.Ill. Sept.11, 1998). There, the Government sued to enforce penalties that had been levied against defendants under the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420, by an administrative law judge. Id. at *1. Defendants appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the Under Secretary for Export Administration, who affirmed the findings of liability and ordered the defendants to pay their

fines by July 10, 1996. Id. The parties agreed that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied. Citing Old Ben, the Court found that the Export Administration Act, like the Coal Act, conditioned an enforcement action on the completion of administrative proceedings and the violator's refusal to pay the penalties assessed. Id. at *3. "Because the government could not have filed this suit to enforce the [administrative law judge's] order before July 10, 1996-the date by which all defendants had been ordered, and had failed, to pay the penalties-the enforcement claim did not accrue until that date." Id.

   Chrzanowski extended this analysis to Section 2415(a). There, the Army initiated administrative disenrollment proceedings against the defendant, seeking repayment of her scholarship funds due to her withdrawal from school. 358 F.Supp.2d at 694. The Government explained that "any duty to repay the United States ... arises only after a disenrollment proceeding." Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2005(g)(1)). The Court noted that "the government's right of action does not accrue when a scholarship recipient breaches the scholarship.... Rather, the right of action accrues on the date when the damages to be paid to the government are due." Id. at 696. The Court held that the claim accrued when the Government established a debt, demanded payment, and the defendant failed to reply. Id. at 696.

   In this case, administrative action was also mandatory. Under the regulations that applied to the JTPA, "the Grant Officer shall make an initial determination of the matter in controversy including the allowability of questioned costs or activities." 20 C.F.R. § 636.8 (1994) (emphasis added). After the initial determination is completed and the parties are given an opportunity for settlement, the regulations mandate that "the Grant officer shall provide each party with a final written determination...." Id. (emphasis added). The parties have not cited language as specific

as was found in the Coal Act in Old Ben and the Export Administration Act under Serfilco providing that the Government may bring a civil lawsuit only after the defendant has failed to pay the assessed debt, and the court has not found any in its own review. Considering the nature of the Government's claim as one to enforce an administrative decision, however, logic leads to the same conclusion as was reached in those cases because the Government cannot sue to enforce an administrative decision that does not yet exist because it is not final. The court can not find that such a claim accrues before the Government can file a complaint. Requiring the Government to file an early complaint for statute of limitation purposes would frustrate the administrative scheme as well as the dockets of the district courts. United States v. Int'l Assn. of Firefighters, 716 F.Supp. 656, 660 (D.D.C.1989).

   The contrary view is taken in American States, 252 F.3d at 1272-74; United States v. D.H. Dave, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 424, 427-28 (D.Md.1976); and United States v. Gen. Elecs., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 801 (D.N.J.1983) (adopting the reasoning of D.H. Dave ), where the Courts found that a cause of action accrued under Section 2415(a) at some time before administrative proceedings were final. In the most relevant case, D.H. Dave, the Court found that although administrative proceedings were mandatory under a clause of the contract between the Government and the defendant, the Government's breach of contract claim accrued before the required proceedings were finished. 424 F. Supp, at 428. The Court reasoned that Crown Coat's holding that claims "accrue" when administrative actions are final does not apply to Section 2415(a) because the Supreme Court implied in Crown Coat that there was a difference between

We agree with appellant that Congress could not have intended the one-year period in Section 2415 to be superfluous. Thus we hold that the ‘applicable administrative proceedings' in section 2415 refers not to the intermediary's audit, but to the proceedings of the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, which hears appeals by providers from final decisions of fiscal intermediaries. Since no appeal was taken by the provider in this case, no "applicable administrative proceeding" occurred and we have no occasion to apply the one year limitation provision. There will be other cases, however, in which the provider will appeal to the Board, and the Board might not decide the case until more than six years after the completion of the audit. In such a case, the one year provision would have an obvious purpose.

Id. at 805-806 (internal citations omitted).