Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. USDOL, 1998-JTP-6 (ALJ Oct. 29, 2001)
U.S. Department of
Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges John W. McCormack Post Office & Courthouse - Room 507 Post Office Square Boston, MA 02109
(617) 223-9355 (617) 223-4254 (FAX)
Issue date: 29Oct2001
CASE NO.: 1998-JTP-6
In the Matter of
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Complainant
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
This case, which arises under the Job Training Partnership Act (the JTPA), 29 U.S.C. §1501 et seq., and the implementing regulations found at 20 C.F.R. Parts 626-638, is before the Office of Administrative Law Judges of the U.S. Department of Labor on a request for hearing filed by the Complainant Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the Commonwealth) which seeks review of a final determination by the Grant Officer for the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Respondent U.S. Department of Labor (the Department) to disallow certain costs under the JTPA. Section 166 of the JTPA, 29 U.S.C. §1576, provides in relevant part that a JTPA funds recipient, upon whom a corrective action or a sanction has been imposed by the Secretary of Labor, may request a hearing before an administrative law judge. See also 20 C.F.R. §§627.800, 627.801(a).
1 Documentary evidence in the record is identified as "CX" for exhibits offered by the Complainant, "GX" for exhibits offered by the Respondent and "ALJX" for exhibits introduced by the Administrative Law Judge. References to the hearing transcript will be designated as "TR".
2 The Commonwealth filed a supplemental pre-hearing memorandum on January 15, 1999, but raised additional issues. ALJX 16.
3 As a result of a 1997 reorganization, the EOEA's responsibilities were assigned to two agencies, the Department of Economic Development (DED) and the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (DLWD). TR 38-39.
4 The ISP was subsequently renamed as the Corporation for Business, Work and Learning. M.G.L. c. 43, §165 (1997). The agency is referred to herein as "CBWL/ISP".
5 M.G.L. c. 30A, §14 provides that, except where expressly precluded by law, any person aggrieved by a final decision of a state agency in an adjudicatory proceeding may obtain judicial review of that decision where no statutory form of appeal or judicial review is provided by filing a civil action in superior court. In its opposition to the Grant Officer's motion for summary judgement, the Commonwealth stated that the Superior Court has remanded the matter to the Hearing Officer for clarification of his decision. ALJX 21. The record does not reflect the final disposition the appellate proceedings before the state superior court.
6 The correspondence from the City's attorney is not in record.
7 Section 164(e)(1) provides that a recipient shall be liable to repay funds granted under the Act upon a determination that the misexpenditure of funds was due to "willful disregard of the requirements of this Act, gross negligence, or failure to observe accepted standards of ministration." 29 U.S.C. §1574(e)(1).
9 Subsequent to the hearing on the motion for summary judgement, the Department offered a copy of a May 16, 1997 letter from Regional Administrator Semler to Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Grant Officer's Reply to Complainant's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement, Exhibit 1.
10 It appears that the audit for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1996 was conducted by Deloitte and Touche, LLP, CPAs, pursuant to OMB Circular A-128 and the Single Audit Act of 1984. GX 5b at 1. The audit report found that a total of $7,189,920 in JTPA costs had been disallowed or questioned by the Commonwealth through its monitoring of the Lynn SDA. GX 7 at 48.
11 The source of the quoted portion of the Grant Officer's concluding paragraph is unclear.
12 No audit report was submitted to the Grant Officer or offered in evidence.
13 As previously noted, no audit report was submitted to the Grant Officer or offered in evidence.
14 It is noted that the parties have devoted considerable time and energy in this proceeding to the question of whether OMB Circular A-128 or A-133 governed the annual audits required during the fiscal years in controversy. While I find it unnecessary to resolve this controversy in light of the fact that no audit, either A-128 or A-133, was conducted, it seems that both parties are partially right on this somewhat arcane point. The Single Audit Act was amended in 1996 for fiscal years beginning after June 30, 1996. Pub.L.104-156, §2 (July 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1396. Thereafter, the Part 96 Regulations were amended to change the reference from OMB Circular A-128 to OMB Circular A-133 for the annual audits required of all recipients and subrecipients of DOL funds for fiscal years beginning after June 30, 1995. 29 C.F.R. §§96.11, 96.12; 64 FR 14539 (March 25, 1999). Thus, it appears that the requisite audit for FY 1995 should have been conducted pursuant to OMB Circular A-128, while the audits for subsequent fiscal years would be subject to OMB Circular A-133.