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Arizona Dept. of Economic Security v. USDOL, 94-JTP-18 (ALJ Nov. 9, 1995)

DATE: November 9, 1995

CASE NO.: 94-JTP-18

In the Matter of

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC
SECURITY,
          Complainant,

     v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
          Respondent.

        DECISION AND ORDER REVERSING IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

     This matter arises under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA),
29 U.S.C. 1501, et seq., and the regulations promulgated
thereunder at 20 C.F.R. Parts 626-638.  Complainant, Arizona Department
of Economic Security ("ADES"), seeks review of the Final Determination
of Respondent dated February 8, 1994, in which sanctions were imposed on
Complainant pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1574, and demanding the return of
$80,664[1] in misexpended funds.

                         Procedural History

     A Notice of Hearing and Order dated May 24, 1995, originally set
this matter for hearing in Phoenix, Arizona, on October 11, 1995.  By
letter dated June 13, 1995, the parties agreed to concurrently file
motions for summary judgment in this matter by July 1, 1995, and to file
a response to the opposing party's motion by July 20, 1995.  Each
party's motions and response briefs were timely received by this office.

     Pursuant to a subsequent order dated August 16, 1995, the
undersigned requested that the parties submit supplemental briefs in
support of their respective motions for summary judgment.  It was
requested that these briefs address specific issues deemed pertinent to
the undersigned's ruling in this matter.  Said briefs were timely
received by the undersigned.

     In a Decision and Order dated October 5, 1995, the undersigned
denied both motions for summary decision, finding that there was a
genuine issue as to material fact, the resolution of which was
inappropriate on summary decision.  The parties were informed that the
hearing would be conducted as scheduled on October 11, 1995.

     A telephonic prehearing conference was held between the undersigned
and counsel for both parties on October 5, 1995.  At that time, counsel
for Respondent indicated that he had no witnesses he could present at
trial.  Complainant's counsel indicated an intent to call two witnesses
 
[Page 2] on Complainant's behalf. Ultimately, the parties agreed to stipulate to the facts that these two witnesses would testify to. The parties also agreed to submit the contracts executed under the JTPA, along with face sheets identifying the relevant portions thereof. A deadline of October 20, 1995, was set for the submission of these documents. It was further agreed that the undersigned's decision in this matter would be made upon the record, including these supplemental documents. The stipulation of the parties, as well as the sworn affidavits of James Salmon and Ronald Sterrett, Complainant's two witnesses, were received on October 16, 1995. The contracts and both parties' face sheets were received on October 20, 1995. Issues Presented Based upon the telephonic prehearing conference and the record presented, it appears that the following issues require resolution: 1. Whether or not the "misexpenditure of funds was due to willful disregard of the requirements of this chapter [the JTPA], gross negligence, or failure to observe accepted standards of administration" (quoting 29 U.S.C. 1574(e)(1)); 2. Whether or not the fraudulent actions of the two employees are or are not attributable to WEDCO, the other subrecipients, and/or the recipients; and 3. Whether repayment of misexpended funds through the performance of in-kind services was appropriate. EVIDENCE The evidence considered by the undersigned is contained in the record presented by Respondent, as well as the documents provided subsequent to agreements reached at the prehearing conference. The undersigned will summarize this evidence herein.[2] Record Evidence The State of Arizona entered into an agreement, including several modifications thereof, with the Respondent under the Job Training Partnership Act ("JTPA"). This agreement allowed the State of Arizona to disburse JTPA funds to the City of Phoenix Service Delivery Area through Respondent (RB p.1). Such funds were then disbursed by Respondent to a company by the name of Western Economic Development Corporation ("WEDCO") (CB p.2; See generally R. pp.107-272). Subsequently, it was determined that two employees of WEDCO had submitted $80,664 in fraudulent claims for on-the-job training
[Page 3] reimbursements (RB p.2 and fn.2). An investigation was instigated resulting in a criminal indictment against these two employees (RB p.2). One has since pled guilty to the crimes charged, while the whereabouts of the second employee remain unknown (RB pp.2-3). On February 8, 1994, a Final Determination Letter was issued requesting cash reimbursement of the amounts fraudulently disbursed (R. pp.9-11). Respondent's Regional Administrator of the Employment and Training Administration, based upon a Guidance Letter issued by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, refused the in-kind services performed by WEDCO in repayment of this amount (R. p.69; R. pp.82-83). Complainant timely requested an administrative hearing in this matter pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  1576 (R. p.4). Complainant's Evidence Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, Complainant's two witnesses would have testified at trial in accordance with their affidavits. The evidence contained therein is also summarized. AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES SALMON James Salmon is the President of WEDCO, whose affidavit indicates that he first became aware of the fraud perpetrated by two WEDCO employees on July 26, 1991. He indicates that he informed the City of Phoenix of this fraud on July 29, 1991, and that no other employees of WEDCO had knowledge of or were involved with the fraud committed by the two employees. AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD STERRETT Ronald Sterrett is the detective with the City of Phoenix Police Department who originally investigated the allegations of fraud in this case. He indicates in his affidavit that the two indicted employees were the only ones whom he could determine were involved with the fraudulent contracts. He further swears that WEDCO's management denied any knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by the two employees, and that no employee of the City of Phoenix or Complainant was involved in the fraud. DISCUSSION The Applicable Burdens The availability of an administrative hearing to review a sanction imposed by the Secretary is granted under the JTPA at 29 U.S.C.  1576(a). Such hearings are governed by the regulations contained at 29 C.F.R. Part 627, Subpart H. Pursuant to these regulations: [t]he Grant Officer shall have the burden of production to support her or his decision. To this end, the Grant Officer shall prepare and file an administrative file in support of the decision which shall be made part of the record. Thereafter, the party or parties seeking to overturn the Grant Officer's decision shall have the burden of persuasion. 29 C.F.R.  627.802(e). In this case, the Respondent would have the initial burden of production, which once established, would then shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to Complainant.[3] Respondent's Initial Burden As discussed, Respondent has the initial burden of production, in that it must support the Grant Officer's Final Determination. In order to satisfy its initial burden, Respondent must present evidence "sufficient to enable a reasonable person to draw from it the inference sought to be established." State of Maine v. U.S. Department of Labor, 669 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing McCormick, Evidence 789-790 (2d ed. 1972)). In other words, the Respondent must initially establish a prima facie case. Only then will the burden of persuasion shift to Complainant. The JTPA provides for the recovery of funds when it has been determined that such funds have been misexpended. In particular, the JTPA provides in pertinent part: (1) Each recipient shall be liable to repay such amounts, from funds other than funds received under this chapter, upon a determination that the misexpenditure of funds was due to willful disregard of the requirements of this chapter, gross negligence, or failure to observe accepted standards of administration. No such finding shall be made except after notice and opportunity for a fair hearing. 29 U.S.C.A. §1574(e)(1). Respondent has adequately established, and Respondent does not dispute, that there was a "misexpenditure of funds" in this case. However, the Grant Officer never made a specific finding that this misexpenditure was due to "willful disregard of the requirements of [the JTPA]," "gross negligence," or "failure to observe accepted standards of administration." Rather, the Grant Officer simply found: [t]he actions of the Superior Court have already resolved the issue of allowability of the costs in question by conviction of the individuals involved. Because the Court [sic] found the defendants guilty of the fraudulent schemes and willful concealment, the disallowed costs must be remitted to the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration in
[Page 4] accordance with Section 164.(e)(1). . . (R. p.11). This finding in no way establishes or supports the finding that WEDCO or Complainant willfully disregarded the requirements of the JTPA, committed gross negligence, or failed to observe the accepted standards of administration. The mere fact that two WEDCO employees were convicted of fraud does not, in and of itself, establish that WEDCO was guilty of one of the three prerequisites to a repayment of misexpended funds. Respondent acknowledges this lack of finding in the Grant Officer's Determination, arguing: . . . [w]hile not specifically stating that all of the factors in § 1574(e)(1) were violated, the Final Determination, when read as a whole, reflects the Grant Officer's finding that the misexpenditure of funds was due to . . . WEDCO's willful disregard of the requirements of the JTPA, gross negligence, and failure to observe accepted standards of administration. It is the DOL's position that WEDCO, if it had observed accepted standards of administration, would have discovered the fraud which its employees committed long before the City of Phoenix Service Delivery Area (Phoenix SDA) reported the issue to DOL's Office of Inspector General. It is also DOL's position that, because the fraud was not discovered under the facts of this case, WEDCO is guilty of willfully disregarding the requirements of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and gross negligence. (Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 2-3). It is one thing to allege such violations. But these mere allegations are not sufficient to meet even the relatively easy to establish burden of production. Without some evidence to support these allegations, it is impossible for the undersigned to "draw from it the inference to be established." Respondent, in agreeing to have the case decided on the record, has failed to produce any evidence to support its allegations of willful disregard, gross negligence, and/or failure to observe accepted standards of administration. In particular, it has presented no evidence which would lead the undersigned to infer that WEDCO or Complainant knew or should have known of the fraud committed by the two employees. Nor has any evidence been presented to show that had accepted standards of administration been followed by WEDCO or Complainant, the fraud would have been discovered earlier. Lastly, Respondent has presented no authority or facts for the proposition that
[Page 5] the fraudulent acts of the two employees is attributable to the corporate entity, WEDCO. Based upon the foregoing, it is evident that Respondent has failed to carry its initial burden of production. Therefore, the burden never shifted to Complainant to persuade the undersigned that the return of the misexpended funds was not warranted under Section 1574(e)(1) of the Act. Because Respondent has failed to establish a prima facie case in support of the Grant Officer's Final Determination, the sanction imposed therein must be reversed. Arguably, Respondent has presented a prima facie case warranting the repayment of misexpended funds under Section 1574(d) of the JTPA. Establishment of a prima facie case under this section is much easier in that it does not require proof of willful disregard, gross negligence, or failure to follow accepted standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1574(d). But for whatever reason, the Grant Officer did not base his determination on this section and therefore, this issue is not properly before the undersigned. Additional Issue As discussed above, an issue as to the appropriateness of repayment through in-kind services was also presented in this matter. It is apparent that Respondent rejected such services performed by WEDCO in substitution of monetary payment of the sanctions imposed. This rejection was based upon written guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Labor indicating that cash payment is the only acceptable form of repayment in cases of misexpenditures caused by fraud. However, as the undersigned has found that no repayment of any kind is warranted, the issue as to the form of such repayment need not be addressed in this decision. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Grant Officer's Final Determination Letter dated February 8, 1994, imposing sanctions upon Complainant in the amount of $80,664.00, be reversed. Entered this 9TH day of November, 1995, at Long Beach, California. SAMUEL J. SMITH Administrative Law Judge [ENDNOTES] [1] According to Respondent, Complainant has since provided documentation indicating that real amount in question is $77,016 (RB p.2, fn.2). [2] The following abbreviations will be used: R. = The record submitted in this matter CB = Complainant's brief in support of motion for summary judgment dated June 30, 1995 RB = Respondent's brief in support of motion for summary judgment dated June 30, 1995 [3] This regulation is contradictory to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., which is applicable to hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. Section 7(c) of the APA states that the "proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). The United States Supreme Court has recently interpreted this provision as placing the burden of persuasion on the proponent of the rule or order. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994). As the proponent of the Grant Officer's order, the APA would place the burden of persuasion on Respondent. However, in light of the findings below, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to address this apparent conflict between the JTPA regulations and the APA statutory requirement.



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