

The Joint Staff Officer's Guide

2000



The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
 JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
 NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511-1702



JFSC Pub 1

The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) educates staff officers and other leaders in joint operational-level planning and warfighting and instills a commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. Pub 1 is the primary curriculum publication used by the faculty at JFSC to accomplish the college's educational goals and objectives in meeting this mission. It is a compendium of jointness that offers a perspective on joint planning and execution that is not found elsewhere. It presents the "big picture" of the players, the process, and the procedures, synthesizing elements from a wide range of sources, presenting them in a systematic manner. No other single publication so completely treats the subject of "jointness."

In recent years, Pub 1 has become a more important document since joint professional military education became a shared responsibility, with Phase I taught at the Service schools and Phase II taught at JFSC. We also recognize that Pub 1 is considered the preeminent reference book for operators and planners throughout the joint and Service communities. To satisfy this broad audience we have made JFSC Pub 1 available in the Joint Electronic Library, which is accessible through desktop computers.

The content of Pub 1 is derived from many sources, official and unofficial. Because the process of joint planning is dynamic, Pub 1 also must be dynamic. This edition builds upon the previous edition with new material on the Joint Planning and Execution System, Theater Engagement Planning, and the latest Joint Doctrine Publications and terminology. To continue to keep Pub 1 useful and current, we depend on inputs from those in the field, who use Pub 1 as they plan and execute "real-world" joint operations. Therefore, we solicit not only official comments from your commands, but also unofficial comments from you, the user.

JFSC's motto "That all may labor as one" is relevant today because our military forces are engaged in a wide variety of challenging operations around the world. These challenges require military leaders who understand fully not only the complexities of joint warfare, but also the intricacies of planning and executing joint operations in a multinational force or interagency environment. Our goal is to send highly qualified graduates into the joint planning and execution community, confident that they will make an immediate and positive impact. JFSC Pub 1 is a key tool in that effort.

EDWARD L. LaFOUNTAINÉ
 Brigadier General, USAF
 Commandant


THE PURPLE SUIT

The Purple Suit concept, reflected in the color of this publication's cover, represents an important metaphor of joint and combined planning. Service members involved in joint and combined operations dissociate themselves from the inherent biases of parochial concerns to work together for the common good. The color purple symbolizes the intermingling of all the whites, blues, greens, tans, reds, gold, and silver found in Service uniforms and insignia. Purple is joint and combined: the Purple Suiter is an officer who embodies the motto on the Joint Forces Staff College Seal "That All May Labor as One."



"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."

Dwight D. Eisenhower



**Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
(1949 – 2000)**

	From	To
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA	8/16/49	8/14/53
ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN	8/15/53	8/14/57
Gen Nathan F. Twining, USAF	8/15/57	9/30/60
GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	10/01/60	9/30/62
GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	10/01/62	7/03/64
GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA	7/03/64	7/02/70
ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN	7/03/70	6/30/74
Gen George S. Brown, USAF	7/01/74	6/20/78
Gen David C. Jones, USAF	6/21/78	6/18/82
GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA	6/18/82	9/30/85
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	9/30/85	9/30/89
GEN Colin L. Powell, USA	10/01/89	9/30/93
GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA	10/25/93	9/30/97
GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA	10/01/97	

FOREWORD

JFSC Pub 1 is the primary JFSC textbook. Pub 1 brings together official procedures and adds necessary details in explaining the complex process of joint planning. It serves as a compendium of guidance from many sources, including joint publications, Service publications, technical reports, and person-to-person reports received from staff officers working in the field. To further assist the reader, Pub 1 cites authoritative sources as needed.

There are many changes in this revision of Pub 1. Procedures, terminology, and even the organization of the Joint Planning and Execution Community continue to change, so we must keep pace to remain effective staff officers and planners. It is impossible to keep the material in this publication current without information from those of you who read and use it. Please mail suggestions for improvements, changes, or corrections to

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
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REQUESTS FOR COPIES. Pub 1 is distributed to resident students of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, the JPME Phase II Senior Course, and the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School; attendees at the Joint Planning Orientation Course; the Joint Staff; the military Service headquarters; the unified commands and their Service component commands; the subordinate unified commands; and the National Defense University. Many commands and agencies have elected to attach their needs to the initial JFSC contract. The publication is available on the JFSC homepage and in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at www.dtc.mil/doctrine/jel. Other commands, agencies, schools, and individuals may purchase copies of Pub 1 through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Preface

Purpose and Perspective

The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, JFSC Pub 1, is to be a single, useful volume to help you understand joint and multinational operational planning. It provides the basic fundamental principles of both joint and multinational operations along with the complexities of the interagency. JFSC Pub 1 does not stand alone; it is a textbook to supplement the instruction of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School at the Joint Forces Staff College. Joint and service doctrine should be referred to for official guidance.

Pub 1 is a compendium of the many references used by the joint staff officer. References listed in each chapter should be consulted for the most current and accurate procedures and policies. Its organization and content were selected to offer;

- a. the big picture of the complex system of joint and multinational operational planning used by the U.S. military;
- b. an introduction to joint, multinational and interagency organizations and their command relationships;
- c. a description of the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff;
- d. references and detailed guides that give the joint staff officer a place to turn for additional material.

Pub 1 offers a view of all players in the planning community that helps you to better understand the entire process and thus, your role in it. We will outline the processes and cite references so that the serious student can go to the source for an in depth discussion of an issue.

The JFSC Perspective

Planning for joint forces is a team effort, and that team must be carefully balanced. The staff comes from the represented Services and brings not only Service doctrine but also the technical expertise from a range of functional areas within the Services. The ultimate purpose of staff officers is to make sound recommendations to a commander and then clearly communicate the commander's decision to the chain of command. This publication has been developed to help members of a joint staff work more effectively as action officers, understand the joint planning process, and interpret and prepare products of the planning process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The efforts of many fine professionals in the staff and faculty of the Joint Forces Staff College produced this 2000 year edition of JFSC Pub 1. I wish especially to commend the following individuals for their superb cooperation, and time and effort to bring this publication to print:

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All have my sincere thanks.



Stephen H. Ries, Captain, USN (Ret)
JFSC Pub 1 Editor

JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The National Defense University (NDU) was established by the Department of Defense on 16 January 1976. The four institutions of NDU, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Information Resources Management College (colocated at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.), and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia, along with the Institutes for National Strategic Studies and Higher Defense Studies, ensure excellence in professional military education and research for national security. The university was created in response to recommendations made by the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education, and is the senior joint educational institution operating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.




THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

The National War College (NWC), one major component of the National Defense University, is a unique military education institution. The National War College conducts a senior-level course of study in national security strategy to prepare selected military officers and federal officials for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities. NWC focuses on national security policy and military strategy and emphasizes a joint and interagency perspective. Reflecting this emphasis, the student body is composed of equal representation from the land, sea (including Marine and Coast Guard), and air Services, with the remaining quarter of the class drawn from the various civilian federal departments and agencies. NWC awards its graduates a Master's Degree in National Security Strategy, and provides full coverage of the joint professional military education to satisfy the requirements for Joint Specialty Officers.



INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is a major component of the National Defense University. It is the only senior Service college dedicated to the study of management of resources for national security. The ICAF mission is to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff positions by conducting post-graduate, executive-level courses of study and associated research dealing with the resource component of national power, with special emphasis on materiel acquisition, and its integration into national security strategy for peace and war. ICAF furnishes the Senior Acquisition Course for the acquisition personnel on behalf of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). ICAF awards its graduates a Master of science degree in National Resource Strategy, and provides full coverage of the joint professional military education to satisfy the requirements for Joint Specialty Officers.



INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COLLEGE

The Information Resources Management College (IRMC) is the capstone institution for Defense IRM education. As such, it offers graduate-level courses in information resources management. The college prepares senior Department of Defense officials for joint management of the information resource component of national power and its integration with, and support to, national strategy. Primary areas of concentration include business process reengineering, IRM policy, information technology, and acquisition reform.



JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) was established on 13 August 1946 as the Armed Forces Staff College, a joint educational institution operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The college is composed of three schools, the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS), Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), and the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School (JCIWS). The JCSOS and JCWS offer JPME Phase II education for Joint Specialty Officer nominees. The JCSOS and JCWS focus on joint and combined operations planning (integration of air, land, and naval forces) with emphasis on strategic deployment, joint employment, sustainment, and the synchronization of forces. The curriculum is designed to promote a spirit of cooperation and understanding that is critical to joint and combined warfighting. The JCIWS deals with facets of command and control, communications, operations, and countermeasures, and with information warfare.



The Joint Forces Staff College

History

In the 1930s few officers were qualified to engage in joint or combined operations. The demands of World War II highlighted the shortfall of not having trained officers who could easily plan for joint and combined actions by ground, sea, and air forces. To overcome this shortfall and to alleviate the friction and misunderstanding resulting from the lack of joint experience, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. ANSCOL conducted four-month courses to train officers for joint command and staff duties.

In the mid-1940s, a joint military committee prepared a directive for a new school. This directive was approved on 28 June 1946 and established the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) as the primary military institution to train officers assigned to joint and combined duty. Responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its facilities was charged to the Chief of Naval Operations. Following a temporary residence in Washington, D.C., AFSC was established in Norfolk, Virginia, on 13 August 1946 on the site of a former U.S. Naval Receiving Station. The faculty was composed of officers with joint experience in all theaters of World War II. There were 150 students in the first class, which began on 3 February 1947. The college conducted two classes of about six months' duration each year.

In a period of growth in size and prominence, classes were expanded to include civilian students from DOD agencies and officers from allied nations to further promote the joint and combined experience. With the construction of Normandy Hall in 1962, the college completed its transition from a temporary to a permanent institution, and became part of the National Defense University on 12 August 1981.

In 1978, the college assumed responsibility for teaching the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Staff and Operations Course, and the formation of two schools within the college began. The Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) accommodated the original charter of the college, while the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School (JCEWS) accepted responsibility for this additional course plus two more: the Joint Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Course in 1982 and the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Staff Officer Course in 1989. With continued revision of joint doctrine in the late 1990's, this school's focus expanded to encompass Information Warfare in 1997 and became the Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare School (JCIWS) offering courses in IW and C4I planning.

Until 1990 the JCSOS continued to graduate two classes of about six months duration each year. In July 1990, the college adjusted its program to comply with Congressional requirements for joint professional military education and began a two-level curriculum to furnish Phase II joint education for Joint Specialty Officer nominees. Intermediate-level officers completed a nine-week course and interacted with those in an associated five-week course for senior-level officers. In the summer of 1991, the 9-week intermediate program was expanded to 12 weeks, and decoupled from the 5-week senior program. In 1994, the senior program expanded from 5 to 12 weeks.

The college celebrated its 50th anniversary on August 13, 1996. On September 10, 1999, it opened a new electronic, state-of-the-art library and wargaming center in the newly constructed Okinawa Hall. In late 2000 legislative action changed the name of the college from the Armed Forces Staff College to the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC).

Mission

To educate staff officers and other leaders in joint operational-level planning and warfighting in order to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and inter-agency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.

Vision

The Joint Forces Staff College will be the center of excellence for joint, multinational, and interagency education in operational-level planning and warfighting.

Guiding Principles

1. Commitment to quality education
2. Primacy of the classroom
3. Collaboration not competition
4. Academic Freedom
5. Human Dignity
6. Personal and professional growth
7. Highest professional standards
8. Highest standards of integrity



Insignia

The red of the shield symbolizes the Army, the silver the Air Force, and the blue the Navy. The nebuly lines link the three military departments into an inseparable whole. The torch is a symbol of leadership showing the way; the book is a symbol of scholastic work; the wreath represents achievement. The scarlet circle bearing the name of the college is symbolic of a sword belt, indicating that only officer personnel attend the college.

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Joint Organization and Staff Functions

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Joint Organization and Staff Functions

100. INTRODUCTION

References: Title 10 United States Code (as amended)
DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”
DOD Directive 5158.1, “Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense”
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Action Officer Orientation Handbook
Joint Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff*
Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
Unified Command Plan (UCP)
Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 16, 1985

Numerous governmental organizations are involved in the implementation of U.S. national security policy. This chapter focuses primarily on the organizations and agencies responsible for the planning and execution of joint military operations, their organizational structures, and their command relationships.

101. BACKGROUND

a. **Civilian control of the military.** Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Constitution incorporates this principle by giving both the President and Congress the power to ensure civilian supremacy. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives the Congress the power “to declare war”, to “raise and support Armies – provide and maintain a Navy – (and) to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”

b. **Joint Organization before 1900.** As established by the Constitution, coordination between the War Department and Navy Department was effected by the President as the Commander in Chief. **Army and naval forces functioned autonomously** with the President as their only common superior. Despite Service autonomy, early American history reflects the importance of joint operations. Admiral MacDonough’s naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812; the joint teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg

Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion, poor inter-Service cooperation and lack of coordinated, joint military action had a negative impact on operations in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States required greater cooperation between the military departments.

c. **Joint history through World War I.** As a result of the unimpressive joint military operations in the Spanish-American War, in 1903; the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy created the Joint Army and Navy Board charged to address “**all matters calling for cooperation of the two Services.**” The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not direct implementation of concepts or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as “a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority.” As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of joint operations during the first World War. Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

d. **Joint History through World War II.** After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More important, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, *Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy (JAAN)*, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

102. ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. Knowledge of relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of joint staff organizations. **Figure 1-1** illustrates the principal officials and organizations that make and execute national security decisions.

a. **National Command Authorities (NCA)**

(1) Constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.




Figure 1-1

(2) The **National Command Authorities (NCA)** are the **President and Secretary of Defense** or persons acting lawfully in their stead. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. Both movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action except in self-defense.

(3) Since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the President has used his Secretary of Defense as his **principal assistant** in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. The Secretary is responsible for the effective, efficient, and economical operation of the Department of Defense, and he has statutory authority, direction, and control over the military departments.

b. **National Security Council (NSC)**. The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decision. Its membership now includes only four

statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as **statutory advisers** to the NSC. The history of the NSC and its organization are discussed in Chapter 5.

c. **Department of Defense (DOD)**

(1) The Joint Board of the Army and Navy was the first attempt to use a regularly constituted agency to coordinate the actions of the Army and the Navy. During the 1920s and 1930s, Congress made several fiscally motivated studies intended to reorganize the military. In June 1924, a joint Congressional committee recommended that a single Department of Defense be formed under one cabinet officer; no action was taken on the report. In 1932 the House considered a bill that would have permitted the President to establish a Department of National Defense and, as the President saw fit, subject to approval of Congress, transfer and consolidate functions of executive departments. The establishment of a single defense department was eventually rejected by the House. During the reorganization debates, there was strong opposition to a single defense department among the military. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy stated in May 1933: “The Joint Board is unable to recommend an organization for a Department of National Defense that would be more efficient or more economical than the present separate departmental organizations. In the opinion of the Board, amalgamation of the two Departments would be a grave error.”

(2) The evolution of a single executive department responsible for national defense was marked by caution, indecision and, from some circles, open hostility. But World War II and the new demands placed on the U.S. Armed Forces furnished the necessary impetus for unification of the military departments under a single cabinet-level secretary. World War II demonstrated that modern warfare required combined and integrated operations by land, sea, and air forces. This, in turn, required not only a unity of operational command of these forces, but also a coordinated process for achieving the most effective force mixture and structure. Anticipating the needs of a peacetime military organization, a comprehensive review by Congressional, executive, and military groups began even before the end of the war. Overwhelmingly, the studies were influenced by parochial Service interests reflecting the opinions of experienced wartime military and civilian leaders with vastly different views of the postwar era. Issues that dominated the search for a consensus included retention of air power in the Navy, maintenance of a separate Marine Corps, the form and substance of the new military department of the Air Force, and the need for military unification.

(3) The **National Security Act of 1947** was the resultant monumental legislation that reflected a compromise of diverse currents and pressures. After almost 50 years that included wartime lessons beginning with the Spanish-American War, a modern military organization had come into existence: unified action of the Services was law, the

powers of the Secretary of National Defense were identified but subject to broad interpretation, and the roles and missions of the military Services were defined by Executive Order, but would not be Congressionally stated until 1958. The act created the National Military Establishment (NME) under the leadership of a civilian secretary who was co-equal with the cabinet-level secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the new Air Force.

(4) It was quickly revealed that the new Secretary of Defense had insufficient authority to execute the responsibilities of the office. In **1949 the National Security Act was amended** to change the name of the NME to Department of Defense and recognize it as an executive department with the Secretary of Defense responsible for its general direction. The **Reorganization Act of 1958** asserted and enhanced the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the executive department and clarified the **operational chain of command** that runs from the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant forces. The **DOD Reorganization Act of 1986** further strengthened and clarified the Secretary of Defense's position in the operational chain of command.

(5) DOD functions today are outlined in DOD Directive 5100.1 and illustrated in **Figure 1-2**.

(6) The role of the **Secretary of Defense** has significantly changed since the position was established in 1947. Originally, the secretary had only general authority shared with the civilian secretaries of the military departments. Subsequent legislation incrementally strengthened the Secretary of Defense's authority. Today the Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense is composed of the following:

Functions of the Department of Defense

As prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Department of Defense maintains and employs the Armed Forces to

- support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
- ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.



Reference: DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-2

Office of the Secretary	Department of Defense field activities (7)
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
Joint Staff	Combatant commands (9)
Defense agencies (14)	

Figure 1-3 illustrates the organization that reports to the Secretary of Defense.

103. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

a. The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments to the chiefs of the Service forces. The **military departments** are separately organized, each under civilian secretaries who are responsible for, and have the authority to conduct all affairs of their respective departments, including the following:

- recruiting
- supplying
- training
- mobilizing
- administering
- construction, outfitting, and repairing equipment
- construction, maintenance, and repair of -buildings, structures, and utilities
- acquisition of real property
- organizing
- equipping
- servicing
- demobilizing
- maintaining

b. **Staff development in the individual Military Services.** Today, a number of functions common to all the Services have developed from the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, and most recently from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. **Figure 1-4** describes these common functions. The following pages discuss the evolution of military staffs within each of the Services and the specifics related to their current functions. These functions are, by law, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of the combatant commander as specified in Chapter 6, Title 10, U.S. Code. The accompanying illustrations describe some of the major functions of the individual Services as discussed in DOD Directive 5100.1. Additional information is in CM-44-89 "Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces," and CM 1584-93 "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," 10 February 1993.




Figure 1-3

c. The U.S. Army

(1) **Origin.** From its birth in 1775 until the early 1800s, young America's army staff patterned itself after the British system: control of the small Regular Army was split between the Commanding General, who was responsible for military discipline and control of field forces, and the Secretary of War, who guided administration and support with a staff bureau system. This bureau system divided authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army and lacked the mechanism to develop coordinated, long-range plans. Though suited to the efficient administration of a small peacetime force, the bureau system was incapable of coping with the demands placed on the twentieth-century Army, a situation that became clear in the Spanish-American War (1898).

COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SOME OF THE KEY FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE SECRETARIES, ARE TO

- prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war;
- maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency;
- recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands;
- prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments;
- develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations;
- assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions;
- determine force requirements to meet operational requirements of Combatant Commands;
- recommend to the JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to Combatant Commands;
- furnish logistical support for Service forces

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-4

(2) Development in the twentieth century

(a) In 1899, a civilian lawyer, Elihu Root, was appointed Secretary of War. At the time, he expanded the Army's missions to include pacification and administration of the island territories recently acquired from Spain; in addition, he responded to public criticism of the logistical and operational confusion that had plagued Army performance in the Spanish-American War. He undertook reform of the Army command and staff system patterned on the British system. In 1903 Congress passed legislation creating a modern U.S. Army General Staff. The War Department General Staff corps of 44 officers, who were relieved of all other duties, was functionally organized to prepare plans for the national defense and mobilization of troops. The legislation also replaced the

Functions of the Department of the Army

The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned.



SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY ARE TO

- organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, and for the support and conduct of special operations;
- develop airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to Army and Marine Corps;
- organize, equip, and provide Army forces for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and train such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations;
- furnish forces for the occupation of territories abroad;
- conduct the authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States.

A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-5

ranking military position, Commanding General of the Army, with a War Department Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) supervised all Army forces and the staff departments that had been responsible to the Secretary of War. It was not until 1918, though, that it was clearly resolved that the Chief of Staff was the ranking member of the Army when General Pershing, then Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, was made subordinate to the COS. The Root reforms were the beginning that gave the Army the basis for a unified command and staff system.

(b) Today the **Army Staff** is an executive component of the Department of the Army. It exists to assist the Secretary of the Army in his/her responsibilities, and includes the following:

- Chief of Staff
 - Vice Chief of Staff
 - Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, and Logistics
 - Assistant Chiefs of Staff (positions authorized by law, but not used)
- Special Staff: Chief of Engineers; Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; and Chief of Army Reserves

d. The U.S. Navy

(1) **Origin.** The Department of the Navy was established in 1798. The early department was entirely in the hands of civilian appointees, while naval officers served at sea. Growth in size and complexity of Navy business in the first quarter of the 1800s led to creation of a Board of Naval Commissioners to give professional advice to the civilian appointees on constructing, repairing, and equipping ships and superintending shipyards. It was a bilinear arrangement, since employment of forces and discipline of troops was retained by the Secretary of the Navy. By 1842 the Navy Department had shifted from a predominantly personnel service, like its Army counterpart, to a predominantly materiel service deeply involved in complex and expanding technical problems. Five individual bureaus under the Secretary of the Navy were created for yards and docks; construction, equipment, and repairs; provisions and clothing; ordnance and hydrography; and medicine and surgery. The creation of additional bureaus specifically for navigation and equipment and for recruiting (enlisted personnel matters) was the response to weaknesses of the bureau system that were discovered during the Civil War. When necessary, special boards were formed to consider specific technical problems, such as strategy, inventions, and new vessels. By the close of the nineteenth century, the size and complexity of the Service, as well as the pressing need to ensure adequate preparation for war, became too much for control by a single manager. This, compounded by the intra-Service as well as the inter-Service experiences in the Spanish-American War, furnished motivation for Congressional and administrative change in the early 1900s.

(2) **Development in the twentieth century**

(a) In 1909 a General Board of the Navy was established to serve as an advisory body to the secretary on matters of personnel, operations, materiel, and inspections. Legislation in 1915 created the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that was charged with the operation of the fleet and preparation and readiness of war plans. In the 1920s the responsibilities for operation of the fleet were assigned to the newly created

Functions of the Department of the Navy

The Department of the Navy is responsible for the preparation of the Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Navy, the Navy includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic.



SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE TO

- organize, train, equip and furnish Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to establish and maintain local superiority in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;
- organize, equip, and furnish naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, and controlled minefield operations; furnish the afloat forces for strategic sealift;
- furnish air support essential for naval operations;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including forces required for the strategic defense of the United States, under joint doctrines;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to operate sea lines of communication;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the support and conduct of special operations; and
- coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the Coast
- *Some collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to*
- interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea;
- furnish close air and naval support for land operations;
- prepare to participate in the overall air and space effort; and
- establish military government pending transfer of this responsibility.

position of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. In March 1942 the positions of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and CNO were consolidated; once again the total direction and support of the U.S. Navy operating forces were under a single person. By the 1960s the CNO as military chief had complete responsibility for operations as well as supporting logistics and administration.

(b) Today the **Office of the Chief of Naval Operations** within the Department of the Navy assists the Secretary of the Navy in executing his or her responsibilities. This office includes the following:

- Chief of Naval Operations
- Vice Chief of Naval Operations
- Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations
- Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel (N1); Policy, Strategy, and Plans (N3/5); Logistics (N4); and Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8)
- Directors: Director of Naval Intelligence (N2); Director, Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Requirements (N6); Director, Training and Doctrine (N7); Chief of Naval Reserve; Surgeon General; Chief of Chaplains; and Oceanographer of the Navy

e. The U.S. Marine Corps

(1) **Origin.** The Marine Corps staff had its origin in 1798 in the Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Marine Corps. For a time the Commandant was a one-man staff; his chief duty was recruiting Marines for service with the fleet. As the number of recruits began to increase, however, the Commandant expanded the staff to include an adjutant to assist with musters and training, a quartermaster to procure supplies, and a paymaster to pay the troops. An administrative staff of three to five officers carried the Marine Corps through the nineteenth century.

(2) **Staff growth in the twentieth century.** The emergence of the United States as a world power after the Spanish-American War greatly expanded Marine Corps employment. As additional staff officers were assigned to aid the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster, their offices became known as departments. Change first occurred outside the staff departments in what came to be called the “Immediate Office of the Commandant.” The initial step was taken in 1902, when an officer was assigned to headquarters as aide-de-camp to the Commandant. He formed the nucleus for staff expansion in the Office of the Commandant. The position of Chief of Staff was added in 1911 to assist the Commandant with matters of training, education, equipping the troops, and organization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation for expeditionary duty.

(3) Between World War I and the 1970s, the Marine Corps headquarters staff evolved into the staff that is seen today. In the early years of the twentieth century, there was the strong influence of the American Expeditionary Force and the development of the Army staff. Through World War II, the headquarters staff retained a line planning staff and functionally organized staff divisions for administrative, technical, supply, and operations functions. In the 1950s the staff was reorganized along general staff divisions, G-1 through G-4, and several technical staff divisions. The position of Chief of Staff was redefined in 1957 to assist the Commandant in his responsibilities to supervise and coordinate the headquarters staff. Even through the early 1970s, there was a composite staff arrangement with a distinction in line and staff functions. In 1973 headquarters was reorganized along functional lines with four Deputy Chiefs of Staff: Manpower, Installations and Logistics, Requirements and Programs, and Plans and Operations. These new directorates replaced the general staff sections. Marine Corps field units continued to use a combination of a functionally organized general and executive staff and a staff of technical experts.

Functions of the Marine Corps

Specific responsibilities of the Department of the Navy toward the Marine Corps include the maintenance of not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.



SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS ARE TO

- organize, train, and equip Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;
- furnish security detachments and organizations for service on naval vessels of the Navy;
- furnish security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases;
- perform other duties as the President may direct; and
- develop landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps.

(4) The **Headquarters, Marine Corps**, is in the executive part of the Department of the Navy. Its functions are to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, accomplish all military department support duties that deal with the Marine Corps, coordinate the action of Marine Corps organizations, prepare instructions for the execution of approved plans, and investigate and report efficiency of the Marine Corps in support of combatant commands. Its current organization includes the following:

- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Director Marine Corps Staff
- Deputy Commandant for Aviation; Installation and Logistics; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Plans, Policies and Operations; Programs and Resources
 - Assistant Commandant for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

f. The U.S. Air Force

(1) **Origin.** The earliest staff organization in the Air Force reflected the general staff organization in the Army in the years before World War II. Before 1935 the War Department General Staff was responsible for planning, coordinating, and controlling the Air Corps. In 1935 the General Headquarters Air Force was formed and operated under the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department. By June 1941 the Army Air Forces had a recognized Office of the Chief of the Air Force. Reorganization throughout the war years resulted in experiments with a variety of staff organizational arrangements: the Army-style general staff organization; a double-deputy staff that produced a two-prong functional general staff identified as operations and administration; and a tridirectorate staff that recognized personnel and administration, materiel and logistics, and plans and operations.

(2) **Growth since 1947.** With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Air Force was created as a separate military Service and a coequal partner in the National Military Establishment. At first, the U.S. Air Force retained the multiple directorate organization used when it was the Army Air Corps. The first Secretary of the Air Force was sworn in on 18 September 1947. The Secretary, along with the first several Chiefs of Staff, developed what was to become the foundation of today's headquarters staff. The current organization is a multiple directorate staff: the traditional personal and specialist staff subdivisions plus a coordinating staff of personnel, comptroller, operations, and materiel.

(3) Since its inception, the U.S. Air Force has been organized along functional rather than area lines. The Chief of Staff is the military head of the Air Force. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff may speak for the Chief of Staff at any time on any subject within their functional areas, according to the authority delegated by the Chief of Staff. Each

Functions of the Department of the Air Force

The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Air Force to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Air Force, the Air Force includes combat and service aviation forces.



SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE AIR FORCE ARE TO

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air—specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including forces for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare; organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for air transport for the Armed Forces;
- develop doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas;
- furnish launch and space support for the Department of Defense;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish land-based tanker forces for the in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments of aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to operate air lines of communications; and
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

Collateral functions of the Air Force include

- surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air operations,
- antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications,
- aerial minelaying operations, and
- air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-8

deputy in turn presides over a family of directorates, and each directorate is functionally oriented. In the Air Staff, decisions are made at the lowest level that has access to sufficient information and the requisite delegated authority.

(4) The **Air Staff** is an executive part of the Department of the Air Force. It serves to assist the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out his responsibilities and is organized as follows:

- Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Vice Chief of Staff
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel; Installations and Logistics; Plans and Programs; Air and Space Operations; and Director of Headquarters, Communications and Information
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- Special Staff: Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; Chief of Safety; Director of Manpower and Organization; Chief of Security Police; Director of Programs and Evaluation; Director of Test and Evaluation; Civil Engineer; Chief of Air Force Reserve; Director of Morale, Welfare, Recreation and Services; Air Force Historian

g. The U.S. Coast Guard

(1) **Origin.** The Coast Guard, the nation's oldest continuing seagoing Service, was established in 1790 as "a system of cutters" in the Treasury Department. First called the Revenue Marine and later the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard was primarily a law enforcement agency responsible for collecting customs duties from ships entering U.S. waters, enforcing embargoes, hunting pirates, and enforcing quarantines. However, by 1797 the strength of the Treasury Department's cutters had been increased to "defend the sea coast and repel any hostility to vessels and commerce"; Congressional authorization established the role of the Coast Guard in national defense.

(2) **Expansion of responsibility.** In 1915 the U.S. Lifesaving Service, an organization of local stations scattered along U.S. coasts, merged with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the U.S. Coast Guard, and with that was born its traditional image, the "lifesavers." During World War I responsibilities were added for port safety and security, commercial vessel safety, icebreaking, and marine environment protection. Joined in 1939 by the Lighthouse Service, the Service assumed responsibility for establishing and maintaining aids to navigation. In 1967 the Coast Guard became part of the newly formed Department of Transportation. A comprehensive review of wartime missions was performed in 1981 by the Navy and Coast Guard Board. In a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of Navy and Transportation, Coast Guard area commanders were assigned as commanders of the newly formed U.S. Maritime Defense

Functions of the Coast Guard

The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. It is a Service in the Department of Transportation except when operating as part of the Navy on declaration of war or when the President directs.



SOME OF THE MAJOR PEACETIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- enforce or assist in enforcement of the law with power to arrest, search, and seize persons and property suspected of violations of Federal law, including drug interdiction;
- administer laws and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
- coordinate marine environmental protection response;
- enforce port safety and security;
- enforce commercial vessel safety standards and regulations;
- regulate and control ship movement and anchorage;
- acquire, maintain, and repair short-range aids to navigation;
- establish, operate, and maintain radio navigation;
- develop, establish, maintain, and operate polar and U.S. icebreaking facilities;
- organize, equip, and furnish forces for maritime search and rescue;
- engage in oceanographic research; and
- maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized Service in the Navy.

SOME OF THE MAJOR WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- continue peacetime missions;
- plan and coordinate U.S. coastal defense for the Fleet Commanders through assignment as commanders of U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific; and
- perform naval wartime missions of inshore undersea warfare, mine countermeasures, harbor defense, ocean escort, etc., occurring in the U.S. littoral sea.

Adapted from

Titles 10 and 14 U.S. Code and

Navy and Coast Guard Board, *Review of Coast Guard Wartime Taskings*, dated 19 March 1981

Figure 1-9

Zones (MDZ). These commanders are responsible to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal defense, preparing operation plans, conducting exercises, and training reserve forces. MDZs will be activated when needed as a deterrent option to ensure port safety and the initial safety of seaborne deployments.

(3) **Organization.** The command and control structure of the Coast Guard is based on nine autonomous districts and two Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs) that report to the Atlantic and Pacific area commanders. The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Transportation in peacetime. On declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard becomes a Service within the Navy with the Commandant reporting to the Secretary of the Navy; he or she reports to the CNO for military functions concerning organization, training, and readiness of operational forces assigned to the Navy.

(4) The **Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard**, under the Commandant reports in peacetime to the Secretary of Transportation. The Commandant is assisted in the direction of policy, legislation, and administration by a functional organization headed by Chiefs of Offices:

- Chiefs of Offices: Acquisition; Chief Counsel; Civil Rights; Command, Control, and Communications; Resource Director/Comptroller; Engineering; Health Services; Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection; Navigation; Operations; Personnel; and Readiness and Reserves

104. EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

a. Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with their military advisers at the Arcadia Conference in Washington to plan a coordinated effort against the Axis powers. At that time, the two Allied leaders established the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) as the supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort. British representation for the new organization consisted of the Chiefs of Staff Committee composed of the heads of the British armed services who had been giving effective administrative coordination, tactical coordination, and strategic direction to British forces for almost 20 years. The British committee served as a “corporate” body for giving military advice to the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister. The collective responsibility of the British committee was set by the Prime Minister in 1924 and given to each new member as a directive:

In addition to the functions of the Chiefs of Staff as advisers on questions of sea, land or air . . . each of the three Chiefs of Staff will have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defense policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff in Commission.

b. But the United States in 1941 had no established agency to furnish U.S. input to a Combined Chiefs of Staff committee. Consequently, the U.S. officers whose positions and duties matched those of the British Chiefs of Staff committee formed the U.S. posi-

tion of the CCS; that group became known as the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This first Joint Chiefs of Staff worked throughout the war without legislative sanction or even formal Presidential definition, a role that President Roosevelt believed preserved the flexibility required to meet the needs of the war. The initial members of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's special military adviser, with a title of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet; and General Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air and Chief of the Army Air Corps.

c. Under President Roosevelt's leadership, this new U.S. military body steadily grew in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and giving strategic direction to the Army and Navy. In combination with the British Chiefs of Staff, it mapped and executed a broad strategic direction for both nations.

d. At the end of World War II, the continued need for a formal structure of joint command was apparent; the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff offered an effective workable example. The first legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and laid the foundation for the series of legislative and executive changes that produced today's defense organization. However, the road to a unified command organization was difficult and controversial. The vigorous debate over the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act illustrated that the controversy was alive even in more modern times. As seen in **Figure 1-10**, significant legislative changes and executive decisions have altered and refined the influence and position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1947.

105. ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

a. **Composition and Functions.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The **collective** body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in the Chairman's absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate staff of the Secretary of Defense. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the chiefs of military Services.

b. **Executive authority.** The executive authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been changed as different organizational approaches have been implemented.

(1) In World War II, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were executive agents for theater and area commanders. The original National Security Act of 1947 saw the Joint

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE JCS

LEGISLATION	PROVISIONS
1947 <i>National Security Act</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designated Secretary of National Defense to exercise general authority, direction, and control • Created the National Military Establishment • Established U.S. Air Force • Established CIA and NSC • Established JCS as permanent agency • JCS became principal military advisers to President and Secretary of Defense • Established a legal basis for unified and specified commands
1948 <i>Key West Agreement</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established JCS as executive agents for unified and specified commands • Service roles and missions defined
1949 <i>Amendment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military department Secretaries reduced from cabinet rank and removed from NSC • Renamed NME the Department of Defense • Created office of Chairman
1952 <i>Amendment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gave Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) co-equal status on JCS on Marine Corps issues
1953 <i>Plan</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Removed JCS from executive agent status, i.e., handling day-to-day communications and supervision over unified commands • Established military departments as executive agents for unified commands
1958 <i>Amendment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gave Chairman a vote • Removed military departments as executive agents • Joint Staff has no executive authority, but assists the Secretary of Defense in exercising direction over unified commands
1978 <i>Amendment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Made CMC a full member of JCS
1986 <i>Amendment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designated Chairman principal military adviser • Transferred duties of corporate JCS to Chairman • Created position of Vice Chairman • Specified chain of command to run from President to Secretary of Defense to unified and specified combatant commanders

References: National Security Act of 1947, as amended;
Reorganization of the National Security Organization,
 Report of the CNO Select Panel, dated March 1985

Figure 1-10

Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers, not as commanders of combatant commands. Nevertheless, the 1948 Key West Agreement confirmed the then-current practice under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff served as executive agents for unified commands. President Eisenhower ended this practice in his 1953 Reorganization Plan by establishing the Secretaries of the military departments instead of the Joint Chiefs as his executive agents.

(2) Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have **no executive authority to command combatant forces**. The issue of executive authority for JCS and Service secretaries was further addressed in the 1958 Reorganization Act and clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Title 10 USC 162 requires the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands or the U.S. Element, NORAD, except those forces assigned to carry out the statutory functions of a secretary of a military department, or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations. The chain of command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command.

c. **Military advice.** Today, by law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the **principal military adviser** to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. JCS members may submit to the Chairman advice on an opinion in disagreement with or in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman. However, all JCS members are also, by law, military advisers, and they may respond with advice or opinions on a particular matter when the President, NSC, or Secretary of Defense requests such advice.

d. **Immediate military staff.** DOD Directive 5100.1 assigns the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Joint Staff, as the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. This designation is not found in “Title 10, United States Code,” but the directive is a clear statement that the Secretary of Defense will turn to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for staff support on military matters.

e. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**

(1) The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 identified the CJCS as the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces. By law, CJCS is now the **principal** military adviser to the President. As appropriate, the CJCS may seek the advice of and consult with the other JCS members and combatant commanders. When CJCS presents advice, he presents the advice or opinions of other JCS members and, as he considers appropriate, the range of military advice and opinions he has received.

(2) The Goldwater-Nichols Act also transferred to CJCS the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

broad functions of CJCS are set forth in 10 USC 153 and detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1 and Joint Pub 0-2. They are summarized in **Figure 1-11**.

(3) CJCS “**functions within the chain of command by transmitting communications** to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense.” That position is now clearly stated in DOD Directive 5100.1. CJCS **does not exercise military command** over any combatant forces.

Functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is responsible for the principal functions listed below:

- **STRATEGIC DIRECTION**
assist the NCA to provide **strategic direction** of the Armed Forces
- **STRATEGIC PLANNING**
prepare **strategic plans**
prepare **joint logistic and mobility plans** to support those strategic plans
perform **net assessments** of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, and its allies as compared to potential allies
- **CONTINGENCY PLANNING**
provide for preparation and review of **contingency plans**
advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in **force capabilities**
- **REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGET**
advise on the **priorities of requirements**
advise on **program recommendations and budget proposals**
assess military requirements for **defense acquisition programs**
- **DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION**
develop doctrine for **joint employment**
formulate policies for joint training
formulate policies for coordinating **military education and training**
- **OTHER MATTERS**
 - exercise exclusive **direction of the Joint Staff**
 - as directed by the President, **attend and participate in meetings of the NSC**
 - advise and assist the NCA on **establishing combatant commands**
 - transmit **communications between the NCA and combatant commands**
 - review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
 - as the Chairman considers appropriate, consult with and seek the **advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders**
 - provide U.S. representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations

References: DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-11

f. **Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).** The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 created the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who performs such duties as the CJCS may prescribe. By law, VCJCS is the second ranking member of the armed forces. In the absence or disability of CJCS, the Vice Chairman acts as, and performs the duties of, the Chairman. Though not originally included as a member of the JCS, VCJCS was vested by Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 as a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also acts as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and a member of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

g. **Military Service chiefs.** The military Service chiefs “wear two hats.” As the chiefs of the military Services, they perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the secretaries of the military departments and are directly responsible to their Service secretaries. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they offer **advice** to the President, Secretary of Defense, and NSC. By custom, the vice chiefs of the Services are delegated authority to act for their chiefs in most matters having to do with day-to-day operation of the Services.

h. **Operations Deputies and Deputy Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** There are subsidiary bodies that are not part of the Joint Staff that assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the execution of their duties.

(1) Each Chief of Service appoints an operations deputy who works with the Director of the Joint Staff to form the subsidiary body known as the **Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** or the **OPSDEPs**. The OPSDEPs are generally the three-star chiefs of operations for the Services: Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Operations and Plans; Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Plans, Policy, and Operations; Air Force DCS for Plans and Programs; and Marine Corps DCOS for Plans, Policy, and Operations. They meet in sessions chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff to consider issues within the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to screen major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement enables the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devote their time to matters that demand their personal attention.

(2) Similarly, there is a subsidiary body known as the **Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs)**, composed of a chairman, who is the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, and a two-star flag or general officer appointed by each Service chief. The DEPOPSDEPs are currently the Service directors of plans: Army Assistant Deputy COS (ADCOS) for Operations and Plans for Joint Affairs; Navy ADCNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations; Air Force Director of Plans and Programs; and Marine Corps Director of Plans. Issues come before the DEPOPSDEPs to be either settled at their level or forwarded to the OPSDEPs.

(3) Matters come before these bodies under policies prescribed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5711.01. The Director of the Joint Staff is authorized to review and approve issues when there is no dispute between the Services, when the issue does not warrant JCS attention, when the proposed action is in conformance with CJCS policy, or when the issue has not been requested by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

106. THE JOINT STAFF

a. The National Security Act of 1947 provided for a Joint Staff not exceeding 100 officers operating under a director appointed by and responsible to the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since that act was passed numerous legislative changes have been made to the size and composition of the staff. The 1986 reorganization act removed the numerical officer limitation on the Joint Staff and placed it, and its director, under the Chairman. The act also gave the Chairman authority to select or suspend any member of the Joint Staff.


b. Today, the Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of CJCS. The Joint Staff performs duties prescribed by the Chairman and does so under procedures established by the Chairman. The staff assists CJCS with **unified strategic direction** of the combatant forces; **unified operation** of the combatant commands; and the **integration** of land, naval, and air forces. Subject to the Chairman's authority, direction, and control, the Joint Staff assists other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities.

c. Joint Admin Pub 1-1, Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff, contains detailed information on the mission and functions of the Joint Staff. The organization of the Joint Staff is illustrated in **Figure 1-12**.

107. JOINT BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES

a. **Organizations reporting to CJCS.** The diversity of offices within the Joint Staff and other organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illustrates a wide range of functions and responsibilities. Among organizations reporting to CJCS are the CJCS representatives to international negotiations, e.g., Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and activities involved with politico-military affairs and defense in the Western Hemisphere, e.g., U.S. representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, and the Military Committee of NATO. Other activities include the National Defense University, the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board, and the Joint Transportation Board. **Figure 1-13** illustrates the organizations that report to CJCS.

The Joint Staff




Reference: Joint Admin Pub 1.1, Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff

Figure 1-12

b. **Organizations reporting to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.** Several defense agencies that report to the Secretary of Defense also support CJCS. CJCS has operational responsibilities for the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and CJCS gives policy guidance and direction to other supporting organizations, including the Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Agency; the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center; and the Military Communications-Electronics Board.

Organizations Reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



Reference: Joint Admin Pub 1.1

Figure 1-13

108. COMBATANT COMMANDS

a. History

(1) The history of the current combatant command arrangement begins with the lessons learned in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. Between 1903 and 1942, the Joint Army and Navy Board sought cooperation between the Army and Navy, but accomplished little in the way of improving joint command. Decisions on joint matters in dispute between the Services went to the commander in chief. The President was the single “commander” who had a view of the entire military theater and authority over both the Army and Navy on-site commanders. Interestingly, one product of the Joint Board, an agreement on “mutual cooperation” in joint operations, was in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor were personally committed to the system of military coordination by mutual cooperation. But cooperation failed. The congressional *Report on the Pearl Harbor Attack* concluded that there was a “complete inadequacy of command by mutual cooperation” and that the conduct of operations was in a “state of joint oblivion.” Early in World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff realized that the complexity of modern warfare required a unified command structure.

(2) Following the experiences of global warfare, the Services recognized the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of U.S. forces. In 1946 an “Outline Command Plan,” the first version of the *Unified Command Plan* was approved by President Truman. Then, quite unlike today, the unified commanders reported to their executive agents on the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The executive agents have alternately been the military chiefs of Services (World War II and 1948) and the civilian secretaries of the military departments (1953-1958). Understanding exactly what role Service chiefs had in the operational direction of military forces was frequently confusing.

(3) As discussed earlier, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement “to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.” The act went on to say that it was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security,” and the President would establish unified and specified combatant commands to perform military missions. The military departments would assign forces to the combatant commands; the responsibility for their support and administration would be assigned by the Secretary of Defense to a military department. Forces not assigned would remain under the authority of the military department.

(4) Unified and specified combatant commands were first described in the NSA of 1947 and the statutory definition of the combatant commands has not changed since then.

(a) **Unified Combatant Command.** A military command which has a **broad, continuing mission** under a single commander and which is composed of forces from **two or more military departments**.

(b) **Specified Combatant Command.** A military command which has a broad, continuing mission and which is **normally** composed of forces from **one military department**. There are currently no specified commands but the option to create such a command still exists.

(c) The term **combatant command** means a unified or specified command. The commander of a combatant command is designated **commander in chief (CINC)**.

b. **Chain of command.** An objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was to **clarify the command line** to the combatant commanders and to preserve civilian control of the military. The act stated that the operational chain of command runs **from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders**. The act also stated that the President “may direct” that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders be transmitted through CJCS. In the *Unified Command Plan*, the President executed this option and directed that communications between the NCA and the combatant commander will be transmitted through CJCS. Further, by statute, the Secretary of Defense is permitted wide latitude to assign oversight responsibilities to CJCS in the Secretary’s control and coordination of the combatant commanders. This authority has been exercised in DOD Directive 5100.1 and other directives.


(1) The commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (**COCOM**) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their commands and designate the appropriate level of command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

(2) The military departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain includes all military forces within the respective Services not specifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands.

109. UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

a. The *Unified Command Plan (UCP)* is the document that sets forth basic guidance to all combatant commanders. The UCP establishes combatant command missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates geographic areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. The unified command structure generated by the UCP is flexible, and changes as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs. Title 10 USC 161 tasks CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit recommended changes to the President, through the Secretary of Defense. **Figure 1-14** illustrates the current combatant command structure.

(1) Five combatant commanders have **geographic area responsibilities**. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the *Unified Command Plan (UCP)* and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.



Reference: Adapted from Joint Admin Pub 1.1

Figure 1-14

(2) There are four combatant commanders assigned worldwide **functional responsibilities** not bounded by geography: U.S. Space Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

b. Charts of the command organization of the combatant commands and selected multinational commands are shown on the following pages. The combatant command charts show major subordinate organizations and, where applicable, indicate formal associations with multinational or bi-national commands. All CINC positions are nominative (i.e., they can be held by an officer from any Service), although most are typically affiliated with one or two Services.

110. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

a. The effective use of the nation's armed forces requires a unity of effort in the direction and operation of diverse military resources. It also requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches and non-governmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. The President, as advised by the National Security Council, is responsible for the national strategic unity of effort. The Secretary of Defense, supported by the combatant commanders, the secretaries of the military departments, the Chiefs of Staff of the Services and CJCS, are responsible to the President for the national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities.

b. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reinforced the combatant commanders' accountability to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. With this accountability came the assignment of all authority, direction, and control that Congress considered necessary to execute the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. The act defined the command authority of the combatant commander as the authority to

- **give authoritative direction to subordinate commands**, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- **prescribe the chain of command** within the command;
- **organize commands and forces** to carry out assigned missions;
- **employ forces** necessary to carry out assigned missions;
- **assign command functions** to subordinate commanders;
- coordinate and **approve administration, support, and discipline**; and
- exercise authority to **select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff**.




Figure 1-15

(1) This authority is termed “combatant command” and, subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, resides only in the combatant commander.

Combatant command (COCOM) is fully defined in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), which basically says the following:

- COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164, or as directed by the President in the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred.




Figure 1-16

- COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

- COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through component commanders.

- COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.




Figure 1-17

(2) COCOM includes **directive authority for logistics**, which supports the combatant commander's responsibility to effectively **execute operational plans, maintain effectiveness and economy** of operation, and **prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication** of facilities and overlapping functions among Service component commands. COCOM gives the supported or supporting CINC the statutory authority, whether over assigned forces or forces designated by the Secretary of Defense, to direct all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish a mission. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service component commanders.

- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commander, military departments are still responsible for logistics and administrative support of forces assigned or attached to the combatant commands.




Figure 1-18

- Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by a CINC will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy and regulations, budgetary considerations, and local conditions. Disputes are referred to the military department for consideration; failure to receive timely resolution there allows the CINC to forward the matter through CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

- During **crisis action, wartime conditions** or where **critical situations** make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of CINCs enable them to use of all facilities and supplies of all forces under their command as necessary for accomplishing their missions. Joint logistics doctrine and policy developed by CJCS establishes wartime logistics support guidance to assist CINCs in conducting operations.




Figure 1-19

- The CINCs have approval authority over Service logistics programs that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. Disputes in this area may be settled by the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.

c. **Operational control (OPCON)** is a level of command authority used frequently in the execution of joint military operations. OPCON is defined in UNAAF as follows:

- OPCON is the command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be delegated or transferred.

- OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.




Figure 1-20

- OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

- OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate joint force commanders.

d. **Tactical control (TACON)** is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in OPCON.




Figure 1-21

e. **Support** is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commands when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the NCA designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

f. **Other authorities.** Other authorities outside the command relations delineated above are described below.




Figure 1-22

(1) **Administrative control (ADCON)** is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10 USC. This is the **authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for administration and support**. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

(2) **Coordinating Authority.** Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more military departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the




Figure 1-23

authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

(3) **Direct Liaison Authorized.** **DIRLAUTH** is authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. **DIRLAUTH** is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting **DIRLAUTH** informed. **DIRLAUTH** is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.




Figure 1-24

g. **Role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The role of CJCS in the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold.

(1) As stated, **communications** between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through CJCS. With this communications responsibility come the myriad duties associated with assisting and advising the President and Secretary of Defense in the direction and control of the combatant commands.

(2) **Oversight** of the activities of combatant commands in matters dealing with the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of Defense falls to CJCS. This includes recommending changes in assignment of functions, roles, and missions to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.





Figure 1-25

(3) CJCS is **the spokesman** for the combatant commanders, including comments on the summary and analysis of requirements, programs, and budget.

h. **Assignment and Transfer of Forces.** Title 10 USC 162 requires the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands or U.S. Element NORAD except (unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense) those forces required to conduct service functions as noted in 10 USC 162.

Command Relationships: NORAD



NOTE 1: CINCNORAD is also USCINSPACE.
NOTE 2: J-1, J-2, J-4 and J-6 staff directorates are shared between NORAD and USSPACECOM. Each command has its own J-3 and J-5.




Figure 1-26

The assignment of forces is accomplished by the Secretary of Defense “**Forces for Unified Commands**” memorandum. Forces assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

(1) Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

(2) The combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over forces *assigned* or reassigned by the NCA. Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the CINC or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces *attached* by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

(4) In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” document and the *Unified Command Plan*, all forces operating within the geographic areas assigned to a combatant command will be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command, *except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense*. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic areas as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) boundaries.

i. **Combatant command structure.** Combatant commands can adopt six doctrinal organization options to organize subordinate forces: (1) subordinate unified command, (2) joint task force, (3) functional component, (4) service component, (5) single service component, or (6) specific operational forces that must, because of the situation, remain immediately responsive to the CINC. These options are not meant to be restrictive and do not in any way limit the CINCs’ authority to organize their forces as they see

fit. **Figures 1-27** and **1-28** summarize the basic organizational differences found in UNAAF between combatant commands and their subordinates.

111. JOINT STAFFS

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

a. **Introduction.** Joint force commanders are furnished staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process. The joint staff is an extension of the JFC; **its sole function is command support**, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander.

b. **Definition.** A joint staff is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one military department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

c. **Principles.** Joint Pub 0-2 outlines the principles and basic doctrine that govern the organization, activities, and performance of a joint force staff.

(1) A joint force commander (JFC) is authorized to organize the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.

(2) Members of the joint staff are responsible to the joint force commander.

(3) The joint force commander should ensure that the recommendations of any member of the staff receive consideration.

(4) Authority to act in the name of the commander must be specifically prescribed by the commander.

(5) Orders and directives to subordinate units are issued in the name of the commander and, generally, to the next subordinate command, rather than directly to elements of that subordinate command.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

	Unified Combatant Command	Subordinate Unified Command
<i>Establishing Authority</i>	President through the Secretary of Defense with advice & assistance of CJCS	Unified commander, when authorized by CJCS
<i>Mission Criteria</i>	Any combination of the following, with significant forces of two or more military departments involved: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force ● A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein ● Common utilization of limited logistic means 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conduct operations on a continuing basis per criteria of a unified command
<i>Commander's Responsibilities</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Plan and conduct military operations in response to crises, including the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion ● Maintain the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command ● Carry out assigned missions, tasks, responsibilities ● Assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions ● Communicate directly with the Chiefs of the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and subordinate elements ● Keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional or geographic area of responsibility, particularly incidents that could create national or international repercussions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Responsibilities similar to the unified commander's
<i>Forces</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Significant forces of two or more military departments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Significant assigned or attached forces of two or more Services
<i>Authority of the Commander</i>	Combatant command (command authority), i.e., <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Authoritative direction for logistics/joint training ● Prescribe chain of command; select commanders & staff ● Organize commands/forces; employ forces ● Assign command functions ● Coordinate/approve admin & support ● In the event of a major emergency in the AOR requiring the use of all available forces, may assume temporary OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR ● In an unusual situation, may exercise COCOM directly of subordinate elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Similar to unified command within the assigned area of responsibility, except authorized only operational control
<i>Notes</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Combatant command (command authority) through components, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, attaching elements of one force to another, and directly to specific operational forces ● Commander's staff: key staff positions represented by Services assigned, balanced by composition of forces & character of operations 	Exercises Operational Control through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - components - joint task forces - attaching elements of one force to another - directly to specific operational forces

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 1-27

SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS (cont'd.)

	Combatant Commander's Service Component Command	Functional Component Command	Joint Task Force
<i>Establishing Authority</i>		Combatant commander, and commanders of subunified commands and JTFs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary of Defense • Combatant commander • Subordinate unified command • Existing JTF
<i>Mission Criteria</i>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific limited objective • Does not require centralized control of logistics • Requires close integration of effort • Requires coordination of local defense of subordinate area
<i>Commander's Responsibilities</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommend proper employment of forces • Accomplish operational missions • Select units for assignment to subordinate forces • Conduct joint training • Inform CINC of proposed changes in logistics support • Under crisis action or wartime, implement CINC's logistics directives • Develop program and budget requests that comply with CINC's guidance • Inform CINC of program and budget decisions that affect planning • General functions: internal administration and discipline, training, logistics functions, intelligence • Furnish force data to support assigned missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommend proper employment of forces • Accomplish assigned operational missions • Conduct joint training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommend proper employment of assigned forces • Accomplish assigned operational missions • Jointly train assigned forces
<i>Forces</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organization, and installations under the command assigned to the unified command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Normally, but not necessarily, forces of two or more military departments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned forces of two or more military departments on a significant scale • Assigned by establishing authority
<i>Authority of the Commander</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal administration and discipline • Training of Service forces • Logistics, except as otherwise directed by the CINC • Service intelligence matters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As determined by the designating commander 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exercises OPCON over assigned & normally over attached forces
<i>Notes</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander is senior officer of Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performs operational missions of long or short duration • Commander designated by establishing authority may be Service component commander with concurrence of JFC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JTF is dissolved when purpose has been achieved • Commander may be a component commander selected with concurrence of CINC

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 1-28

(6) Authorization is generally given to communicate directly between appropriate staff officers of other commands to expedite execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands.

(7) Each staff division must coordinate its action and planning with the other staff divisions.

(8) The **staff channel** is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only.

d. **Staffing.** The establishing authority of a joint organization provides for the furnishing of necessary staff personnel. As on any staff, the number of people should be kept to the minimum and matched to the assigned task. Staff members should be detailed for sufficiently long periods to gain and use the required experience. The officers on the joint staff must be competent to advise the commander in areas concerning their respective Services.

e. **Organization.** **Figure 1-29** illustrates the broad functional subdivisions of a typical joint staff organization that are outlined in Joint Pub 0-2. The commander's staff is broadly categorized into personal staff, special staff, and general or joint staff divisions.

(1) The chief of staff (COS) is the **principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser to the JFC**. The COS coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. For internal administrative matters, the COS may be assisted by a secretary of the joint staff. In addition, some staffs have deputy chiefs of staff to assist the COS.

(2) The **personal staff group** is directly responsible to the commander. It includes any assistants needed to handle matters requiring close personal control by the commander. The commander's aide or aide-de-camp, legal advisor, public affairs adviser, inspector general, and political adviser are generally on the commander's personal staff.

(3) The **special staff group** assists the commander and the joint staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters, e.g., comptroller, facility engineering, medical, weather, quartermaster, and transportation affairs. The special staff is usually small, with experts found on the component command staffs or within the joint staff divisions.




Figure 1-29

(4) The principal functional divisions or directorates of the JFC's staff are known as the **joint staff group**. The function of the joint staff is to execute the responsibilities of the commander, e.g., developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, and overseeing all functions assigned to the commander. Depending on the staff, the staff subdivision may be headed by an assistant chief of staff or director. Joint force commanders have the authority and latitude to establish the staff organization required to fulfill the command's responsibilities.

- **Manpower and personnel division (J-1).** This division manages personnel and administration, develops personnel policies, administers military and civilian personnel within the command, and administers prisoners of war.

- **Intelligence division (J-2).** The J-2 division's function is to ensure the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area of operations and the location, activities, and capabilities of the enemy.

J-2 emphasis is on the enemy. Activities may include HUMINT and counterintelligence, target identification and selection, and electronic intelligence gathering and analysis.

- **Operations division (J-3).** The operations division assists the JFC in the direction and control of operations. Its work begins with the initial planning and extends through the integration and coordination of joint operations.

- **Logistics division (J-4).** The division develops logistics plans and coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics activities. Responsibilities may include weapons surety, civil engineering support, transportation management, etc. Because logistics support is primarily a Service responsibility, the thrust of joint logistics operations may be to coordinate Service programs and integrate them with the joint commander's concept of support. Knowledge of Service policies and doctrine is essential.

- **Plans and policy division (J-5).** This division does the long-range planning. It prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans, and the associated Commander's Estimate of the Situation. Often, the J-5 is responsible for special weapons planning. In commands without a separate J-5 division, the function is performed by the operations division.

- **Command, control, communications, and computer systems division (J-6).** This division may be found with a variety of names and designators: Command, Control, Communications Systems; Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Division; etc. It uses organizational codes such as J-6, C3, C4, C4I, C3S, etc. The functions of the division include handling command responsibilities for communications and frequency control, tactical communications planning and execution, and management and development of electronics and automatic information systems.

A more detailed description of the basic functions of the principal joint staff divisions is shown in **Figure 1-30**.

Nontraditional divisions are also found in many commands.

- **Security assistance division.** The mission of supporting military and economic aid to countries within a joint commander's area of operations is complex and vitally important to U.S. foreign policy. This function may be found in a separate division or as a part of the logistics division.

FUNCTIONS OF JOINT STAFF DIVISIONS

DIRECTORATE OR DIVISION	RESPONSIBILITIES
<i>Manpower and Personnel (J-1)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage manpower • Formulate personnel policies • Supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war
<i>Intelligence (J-2)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure availability of sound intelligence on area and enemy locations, activities, and capabilities • Direct intelligence efforts on proper enemy items of interest • Ensure adequate intelligence coverage and response • Disclose enemy capabilities and intentions
<i>Operations (J-3)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in direction and control of operations • Plan, coordinate, and integrate operations
<i>Logistics (J-4)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulate logistics plans • Coordinate and supervise supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters • Ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command
<i>Plans and Policy (J-5)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist commander in long-range or future planning • Prepare campaign and operation plans • Prepare estimates of the situation • Functions may be included in operations directorate
<i>Command, Control, Communications, and Computers or Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems (J-6)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist commander with responsibilities for communications-electronics and automated data systems • Prepare communications and data systems plans to support operational and strategic concepts • Furnish communications to exercise command in mission execution • Functions may be included in operations directorate or in the special staff
<i>Special Staff</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give technical, administrative, and tactical advice • Prepare parts of plans, estimates, and orders • Coordinate and supervise staff activities • Special staff may be included as branches of directorates
<i>Personal Staff</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible directly to the commander • Special matters over which the commander chooses to exercise close personal control • Usually includes the political adviser

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 1-30

- **Interoperability division.** The responsibility for joint planning, plans evaluation and analysis, development of joint doctrine, coordinating joint education and training, and the conduct of joint training exercises may be separate from the other divisions.

- **Force structure, resources, and assessment division.** The Reorganization Act of 1986 brought added responsibility to combatant commanders for critical involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The specialized nature of this work and the coordination required with component commands has created a need for dedicated staff support.

f. **Variations in joint staff divisions.** The commander may organize the staff as necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities. Many combatant commands have taken advantage of this flexibility. For example, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM have consolidated the security assistance function with J-4; TRANSCOM and STRATCOM have consolidated the J-3 and J-4 functions.

g. **Terminology.** Joint Pub 1-02, *The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, uses the term “general staff” to describe the divisions explained above. While there is consistency in the functional subdivisions of a staff into personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, etc., the staff designations vary between Services and with the size of organization supported. The Army and Marine Corps may use G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 to identify personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics staff divisions; the Navy may use N-1, N-2, N-3, etc.; and the Air Force uses letter designations. **Figure 1-31** illustrates just some of the possible staff designations.

h. **History.** Joint staffs are organized on the conventional staff model. The advent of extensive joint operations during World War II and the institution of the unified command structure after the war posed the question of which type of staff organization would be best suited to such commands. For a variety of reasons, the general staff organization adapted by General Pershing from the French in World War I and developed by the Army and Marine Corps evolved as the model for the U.S. joint staff. This is reasonable, because joint operations nearly always include ground forces, and a majority of the joint staff will be familiar with the concept. The term **joint staff** or conventional staff is used in lieu of **general staff** to avoid confusion with the General Staff, a unique organizational concept. The General Staff is a senior, professional military staff with command authority used in some foreign military organizations. Such an arrangement was expressly forbidden in the creation of the U.S. military establishment in 1947 and has been excluded in every legislative change since.

U.S. STAFF DESIGNATIONS

	<i>PERSONNEL</i>	<i>INTELLIGENCE</i>	<i>OPERATIONS</i>	<i>LOGISTICS</i>	<i>PLANNING</i>	<i>COMMUNICATIONS</i>
ARMY COMPONENT HQ	DCS Personnel	DCS Intelligence	DCS Operations and Plans	DCS Logistics DCS Engineer DCS Resource Management		DCS Communications- Electronics DCS Systems Automation
ARMY DIVISION HQ	ACOS Personnel (G1)	ACOS Intelligence (G2)	ACOS Operations (G3)	ACOS Logistics (G4)		
AIR FORCE COMPONENT HQ	DCS Personnel (DP)	DCS Intelligence (IN)	DCS Operations (DO)	DCS Logistics (LG)	DCS Plans (XP)	DCS Communications Systems (SC)
AIR FORCE WING	included in Support Group (SPTGP) as MSSG/MSF	included in OPG as OSS/IN	Operations Group (OPG)	Logistics Group (LG)	included in DO and LG as DOX & LGX AMC XP in ACC OG as OSS/DOX & LG as LGS/LGX	Communications Group (CG) or included in SPTGP as CS
NAVY COMPONENT HQ	ACOS Administration (N1)	ACOS Intelligence (N2)	ACOS Operations (N3)	ACOS Logistics (N4)	ACOS Plans (N5)	ACOS Communications (N6)

ABBREVIATIONS: DCS - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

ACOS - ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

References:

ARMY FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*

AIR FORCE Publication 53-21, *USAF Staff Organization Chartbook*

NAVY NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning Figure 1-30*

Figure 1-31

112. THE JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO)

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the military Services who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. "Joint matters" are defined in the law as "the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces," and this includes national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. There are no restrictions on the number of officers who may hold the joint specialty; however, sufficient numbers must be designated to meet Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) requirements. Approximately 9,000 billets are currently designated as JDAs.

b. The Secretary of Defense designates as JSOs officers who are educated in and experienced in the employment, deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives. To qualify as a JSO, an officer must complete an approved program of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and a full JDA. JSO designation boards are convened by the secretaries of the military departments to consider officers for recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for designation as JSOs. The Secretary of Defense can waive some of the JSO requirements on a case-by-case basis.

c. Both Service PME and JPME contribute essential qualities to the educational development of a JSO nominee. The military departments are responsible for designating officers as JSO nominees. Officers may be designated as JSO nominees when they have successfully completed a program of Joint Professional Military Education or have a Critical Occupational Specialty. Designation of an officer as a JSO nominee identifies the officer as a potential candidate for JSO, but does not, in itself, constitute recommendation for award of the Joint Specialty.

d. A JDA is a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. At least 800 JDAs are designated by the Secretary of Defense as critical positions. Current law requires that critical positions be filled with JSOs unless CJCS approves an exception.

e. For further information on the JSO program, see JCS Admin Pub 1.2 (*Joint Officer Management*) and the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01, 1 March 1996) (CM-344-90, 1 May 1990).

113. MULTINATIONAL COMMANDS

a. A combined command is a force under a single commander that is composed of sizable assigned or attached **elements of two or more allied nations**.

b. The organizational principles already discussed have equal validity when applied to combined commands. The concepts of command authority and the responsibilities of combatant commanders are generally applicable to combined commanders. However, since combined commands are binational or multinational, their missions and responsibilities (including command responsibilities) must be established and assigned to conform to binational or multinational agreements. Organizational questions about combined commands are often more difficult to answer than national organizational questions. The primary source of difficulty is the lack of precedent and an absence of com-

bined doctrine. Normally, a combined command operates under the terms of a treaty, alliance, or bilateral agreement between or among the nations concerned. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Combined Forces Command Korea (CFC), and Allied Command Europe (ACE) are examples of multinational commands.

c. **Nature of Multinational Command Staff Duty.** The normal types of staff problems are magnified on a combined staff. There are psychological and sociological problems created by differences in customs, religions, and standards of living. These factors point to the need for a different mental approach to combined staff duty. Just after the Allied Forces Southern Europe had been formally established in August 1951, Admiral Carney as CINCSOUTH wrote the following memorandum to his staff:

“To those of you who have only worked in the framework of your own particular Service, and thus have not been exposed to the necessary give and take of unification, much that you see will appear to be lacking in order and logic; to those of you who have not had previous experience in inter-Allied dealings, the modus operandi may appear even more obscure. Working within the framework of one’s own Service is a simple matter because the Service procedures have been long established and all of one’s colleagues speak the same language and are guided by the same indoctrination. Joint efforts, be they on the staff or in the field, invariably require mutual adjustments; these adjustments may be radical but with people of good will and good spirit the Services can truly work as a team.

When inter-Allied factors are superimposed, the effects are frequently unpredictable. Politics are politics the world over and many times we encounter difficulties and objections which are illogical from the military standpoint but which stem from political factors that are very real to the officeholders, the voters, and the taxpayers of the countries concerned. It is to be expected that we will frequently encounter problems of obscure and puzzling origin, and an awareness of the probability should help to foster the patience and flexibility necessary.”

This memorandum, written more than four decades ago, demonstrates the timelessness of certain principles relating to the human element of organizations. The advice is as good today as it was then.

114. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME)

a. Major organizational changes in the late 1800s and early 1900s laid the foundation for a modern staff system in the U.S. Armed Forces. The continuing professional education of military officers was an important element and included Service staff and war colleges. European experience had shown that, without a sound and vital school system, the staffs themselves could not function properly. The Naval War College was

established in 1884 and the Army War College in 1901. The Air War College was established in 1946.

b. World War I led to the creation of a widespread system of field staffs in the Army and a growth of staff consciousness in the other Services. Soon after the war, the U.S. military Services began to evolve the functional staff patterns that remain in use today. The Service colleges reached officers destined for Service leadership, educating them in the fundamentals of staff practice and enlarging on the body of knowledge that was to become Service doctrine.

c. By the 1920s the U.S. Armed Forces had a distinctively American staff system that had been drawn from elements of Prussian, British, and French military organizations. For example, contrary to some European practices, the United States did not adopt the concept of a permanent staff corps. Rather, officers constituting U.S. staffs are members of their own Service and are assigned to staff duty only periodically throughout their careers.

d. After World War II command and staff education for field-grade officers was further developed. While command and staff courses for company and field-grade officers in the Army (1901), Marine Corps (1920), and Navy (1923) had long been in existence, the schools now emphasized education in staff subjects and field application. Attendance at the Services' schools rose to a level not possible during the war. The Air Command and Staff College began at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1946.

e. Joint and combined schools. The school system that accompanied the early twentieth-century military reforms was reconstituted and enlarged to meet post-World War II requirements. Shortly after the war, three joint Service colleges were established: the Army Industrial College, redesignated the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in April 1946, and the National War College (NWC) in August 1946, both at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C.; and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in August 1946 in Norfolk, Virginia. All colleges were incorporated under the National Defense University (NDU), NWC and ICAF in 1976, and AFSC in August 1981. Today NDU also includes the Information Resources Management College (IRMC), the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). NDU is assigned the task of preparing selected military officers and civilian officials for command, management, and staff responsibilities. The senior colleges emphasize national security formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. Effective July 1990, the Armed Forces Staff College became the single point for completion of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II (JPME II) for prospective Joint Specialty Officer nominees. As mandated by Congress, the Service intermediate and senior schools teach the first phase of a joint track. Presently, the Joint Forces Staff College teaches the follow-on phase at the application level with a curriculum and environment specifically designed to nurture a joint perspective. For further information on

JPME, see Appendix VI, Joint Admin Pub 1.2 (*Joint Officer Management*) and JCS Memo SM-73-89, Implementation of the JCS Program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

Obligations of Joint and Combined Staff Duty



The nature of joint and combined staff duty gives rise to some obligations that should be observed. Lieutenant General D.M. Schlatter, USAF, former Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College (July 1954 to July 1957), and an experienced officer in joint and combined commands, used to advise future joint and combined staff officers as follows:

The first obligation I'm going to give you sounds like a cliché. It isn't when you really examine it. **Be objective, avoid bias and prejudice.** None of us can avoid bias and prejudice one hundred percent. We can't possibly do it, no matter how hard we try. Each of us has a varying background of knowledge, education, beliefs; and there's a certain inherent bias we can never get rid of completely; but we must keep on trying, even though we realize that we can't get rid of it entirely.

Second, **avoid emotion.** Emotion tends to clog up the thinking processes.

Third, **stick to facts whenever possible.** This is not always possible. In many cases you must rely on opinion or judgment and a vague thing called common sense. In these cases, you should listen to other competent judges. You should avoid extremes. Above all, don't express your opinion unless you know what you are talking about.

Fourth, **stick to the subject at hand.** This is a very hard thing to do in a group discussion. Sometimes, of course, it's downright dull and it suggests that old anecdote about never letting facts interfere with a good story. But if you want to reach a decision, you should stick to the subject at hand.

Fifth, **avoid personalities.** Like emotion, personalities clog up the thinking apparatus. If you can't be complimentary, at least don't say too much. You can always damn a man, you know, by faint praise. Someone has said the best treatment for a man with a chip on his shoulder is to pat him on the back until the chip falls off.

Sixth, and probably the most important obligation of a staff officer, **be honest and accurate.** There is an essential requirement for rugged honesty, particularly in combat effectiveness reporting. To shade the truth in any way in this vital subject is, to my mind, the cardinal military sin. There are two kinds of enthusiasm. A commander with enthusiasm will fire a military unit up to the point it can do more than it ever thought was possible. This is very necessary, but it is a different kind of an enthusiasm from the second kind. This second kind is usually a detriment, for it can induce unjustified optimism. You can get so enthusiastic and proud of your Service or your unit that you will brag that it can do many things it can't possibly do. Above all, here is another good place to be quiet unless you are sure of your facts. In staff work, to recommend a course of action and tell all the pros of the matter and express none of the things against it is to do yourself and your commander an injustice.

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Figure 1-32

Strategy and Resources

Chapter 2

- **Introduction** 2-2
- **Defense Department Systems** 2-4
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- **Defense Resources Management – A Joint Perspective** 2-7
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Strategy and Resources

200. INTRODUCTION. Strategic art is the essence of joint operation planning. Without mastery of strategic art, the joint operation planner cannot craft military plans that are in synergy with the strategic goals of the United States. This nonaligned or uncoordinated approach to joint operation planning will most likely result in the failure to achieve strategic objectives of any operation undertaken. But what is strategic art? Lieutenant General Richard A. Chilcoat defined it in 1996 as the skillful balancing of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (resources). While this technical definition may appear simple, history holds many examples of militaries, states, and leaders who failed because of lack of understanding and application of strategic art. Understanding how to *correctly select, successfully align, and then artfully implement ends, ways, and means* requires significant thought and study.

(a) JPME Phase I addresses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Being able to translate strategic objectives set by the NCA into operation plans that will support and achieve those objectives is one of the primary missions of the CINCs. **Figure 2-1** illustrates how the CINC must be the master of strategic art so as to give the




Figure 2-1

planners of the operational and tactical levels of war adequate guidance so that all the elements of military power are working in concert for one purpose. Today, there are those who argue that the CINC is no longer a translator of strategic objectives, since the operational and tactical levels of war have in essence become subsumed in the strategic level. **Figure 2-2** illustrates this theory. With access to information so pervasive throughout all military operations (be it on the battlefield or in the halls of the Pentagon), it is now argued that even a “tactical” action by any military member can have strategic results. It is incumbent on the joint operation planner to have considered all of the politico-military aspects of an operation, and then craft plans that enable participants at all levels of war to understand the synergy required to achieve the nation’s objectives.




Figure 2-2

(b) Strategic art requires that the joint operation planner can never again think only in terms of “military” plans, but instead in terms of “politico-military” plans. This is not to say that military planners should compromise plans that offer the best possible military solution to a problem. But it does mean that the political consequences of a military action must be well thought out. An excellent example of this mastery of the politico-military realm of strategic art is what occurred during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Because the JTF commander understood both the political and subsequent military consequences of killing large numbers of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), the commander of JUST CAUSE chose to use a combination of PSYOP and well-placed munitions to encourage surrender of the PDF. It might well have been easier to bomb their barracks and annihilate the PDF, but the politico-military results would have been disastrous (an angered populace, a void left in law enforcement). Consider the table below:

Level of Politico-Military Concern

POLITICO-military	(P-m)
POLITICO-MILITARY	(P-M)
politico-MILITARY	(p-M)
politico-military	(p-m)

A joint operation planner must be able to deftly craft plans that will succeed according to the level of politico-military concern. “P-m” signifies an environment wherein the political concerns may well override military concerns (pre-hostilities, post-hostilities, and peacetime resource acquisition). “P-M” signifies an environment wherein the military and political maneuvering is robust (lodgment, FDO). The “p-M” level indicates an environment where the military concern is paramount (decisive engagement, completely deteriorated diplomatic situation). The “p-m” level signals that other elements of national power (economic and informational elements) are paramount and that operation plans need to be crafted so as to support other efforts. The joint operation planner must master translating strategic ends into operational ways and means, while at the same time incorporating the correct balance of the politico-military level of concern. Doing so will result in the proper application of strategic art and ultimately in the continued security of the United States.

201. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMS

a. **Introduction.** At both national and departmental levels, various processes and systems have been developed to handle the complex problems of setting strategic direction, determining national military policy, requesting resources to execute that policy, and translating the funded military capability into military operations. The joint planning process is one link in a long and complex chain. This chapter describes many of the systems that joint staff officers need to understand in order to be effective in their role as joint operation planners.

b. **Background.** Before focusing on the processes or systems used by DOD for joint planning and operations, one needs to set the stage. Since the primary goal is to be able to relate the systems to the joint arena, the background of the study is a basic understanding of the joint purpose these systems serve. The purpose of joint operation planning is to use the military element of national power effectively to protect and further U.S. interests; in that endeavor, the U.S. national security strategy is the starting point for joint planning. Joint planning is a process, a systematic series of actions or procedures, used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks. The following, though not all-inclusive, lists the basic systems that affect joint planning and operations:

- National Security Council (NSC) System
- Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
- DOD Acquisition System
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
- National Communications System
- Defense Communications System
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
- C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW)
- Global Command and Control System (GCCS)

202. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

References: National Security Act of 1947, as amended
 NSDD 2, “National Security Council Structure,” dated 12
 January 1982
 PDD-2/NSC, “National Security Council Organization,” dated
 20 January 1993
 Joint Staff Manual 5715.01, *National Security Council Affairs*,
 dated 1 December 1994

a. **Function.** The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decision. Congress envisioned that the NSC would allow military and civilian government departments and agencies to work more effectively together on national security matters. The law determines the functions and scope of the NSC. Some of the functions that are salient to joint planners are to advise the President concerning the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security; to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States concerning its actual and potential military power; and to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security for the purpose of making recommendations to the President. Although the statutory functions of the NSC have remained essentially unchanged since the mid-1950s, its composition, influence, and schedule of meetings have varied considerably with each President, the personality of his key advisers, and the President’s view of the organization.

b. Organization

(1) In 1949 the NSC was placed in the Executive Office of the President. It includes only four statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence are specified as statutory advisers only. Addi-

tional members specified in PDD-2/NSC are the Secretary of the Treasury, the Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the “National Security Adviser”), the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the United States Attorney General. The National Security Adviser is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the council and the inter-agency coordination. Statutory members and advisers, and other members of the NSC specified by PDD-2/NSC, attend all meetings of the council. Other senior officials not included as members may be invited to attend meetings, depending on the topics being discussed. Subordinate elements of the NSC include the following:

(a) *The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)*, a cabinet-level senior interagency forum for consideration of national security policy issues and resolution of issues not requiring the President’s participation. CJCS, or in his absence VCJCS, attends these meetings.

(b) *The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)*, the senior subcabinet-level interagency forum for national security policy issues. The NSC/DC reviews and monitors the work of the NSC interagency coordination process (including the Interagency Working Groups (IWG)), and focuses much of its attention on policy implementation. VCJCS attends these meetings.

(c) *The NSC/DC Crisis Management (NSC/DC/CM)* group, responsible for day-to-day crisis management and crisis prevention, including contingency planning for major areas of concern. VCJCS attends these meetings.

(d) *The NSC Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWG)*, which convene regularly as determined by the Deputies Committee, and review and coordinate implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. The Assistant to the Chairman or the J-directors or their deputies attend these meetings.

(e) *The Interagency Working Groups/Subgroups (IWG Subgroups)* meet under the sponsorship of the IWG to develop background material, review working papers, and discuss and develop policy options on national security issues, including those arising from the implementation of NSC decisions. The Joint Staff division chief or action officer (AO) with functional responsibility for these issues represents CJCS at these meetings.

(2) NSC Documents. NSC documents are established to inform U.S. Government departments and agencies of presidential actions:

(a) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSC). The PDD series is used to publish presidential decisions on national security matters. All PDDs in this series are individually identified by number and signed by the President.

(b) Presidential Review Directive (PRD/NSC). This series of directives is the mechanism for directing the reviews and analysis of an assigned topic to be undertaken by the departments and agencies. All PRDs in this series are identified by number and signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Upon completion of staffing, a PRD often becomes a PDD.

203. DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT – A JOINT PERSPECTIVE

References: CJCSI 3100.01A, “Joint Strategic Planning System,” dated 1 September 1999
 CJCSI 8501.01, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,” dated 1 April 1999
 CJCSI 3137.01A, “The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process”, dated 22 January 1999
 CJCSI 3401.01B, “Chairman’s Readiness System”, dated 1 July 1999

a. Introduction

(1) The purpose of the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to produce a plan, a program, and a two-year budget for the DOD with the ultimate objective of furnishing the combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable to meet the current and future threat within fiscal constraints. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal means by which CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, discharges his legally mandated responsibility to give strategic plans and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States and to interact with the other DOD systems. The JSPS establishes the formal process for review of the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; threat evaluation; assessment of current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and proposal of military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives. See **Figure 2-3**.

(2) Taken together, the JSPS, PPBS, JWCA, CRS as well as other related systems have the combined purpose of furnishing the best possible mix of missions, forces, equipment, and support to the combatant commanders so that they may conduct day-to-day operations in support of the national strategy. For the joint operation planner to effectively discharge his or her duties, these systems must not be viewed as unrelated, nor should each part be viewed independently. These systems, and the parts they comprise, must be viewed as a system of systems. A change in any individual part or process will most likely create an impact (no matter how small or large) across the entirety of all involved systems. Any joint officer who understands the intricacies of this system of systems will be able to develop the most efficient and effective ways (courses of action), and




Figure 2-3

acquire the most appropriate means (resources) for meeting ends (objectives) that are in concert with the national strategy of the United States. Viewed in this manner (see **Figure 2-4**), the entire process is interrelated. It is important to note that the planning sequence allows continuous assessment, giving it the flexibility needed to accommodate today's rapidly changing global environment.

(3) The following paragraphs discuss parts of these related systems. Each part is categorized under the heading of either planning, programming or budgeting. These three subcategories more easily allow the joint officer to grasp this complex system of systems. Those processes or parts under the subcategory of planning refer to documents or processes that contain strategic and operational guidance for accomplishing tasks, now and in the future. Those parts under the subcategory of programming influence the military departments, USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, and Defense agencies in the development of their programs. Finally, those processes listed under budgeting represent how DOD establishes the final estimated costs for the President's budget.

b. Planning

(1) **Joint Strategy Review (JSR)-JSPS.** The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) **assesses the strategic environment** for issues and factors that affect the national military




Figure 2-4

strategy in the near and long term. The JSR is the JSPS process for continuously gathering information and examining current, emerging, and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. Throughout the process current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives are reviewed and assessed. **The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, operation planning, and program assessment.** When significant changes in the strategic environment are identified, JSR Issue Papers are prepared. These papers are initial discussions of proposed changes to the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(a) **JSR Working Groups.** JSR working groups, consisting of representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant commands, continuously review the international and domestic environment for trends and changes that should be incorporated into long-, mid-, and near-term U.S. strategic thinking. The intent is to include officers from the Services and combatant commands in the working groups to expand participation in the strategy development process.

(b) **JSR Issue Papers.** JSR Issue Papers report, and, when appropriate, publish changes in the strategic environment significant enough to warrant senior leadership review. When a significant change in the strategic environment is identified, a JSR Issue Paper is sent to CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant commanders. Continual assessment of the strategic environment gathers information needed to determine whether revisions to other JSPS documents are needed.

(c) **JSR Annual Report.** The JSR Annual Report summarizes issues studied over the previous year and recommends any changes to the National Military Strategy as a result of those issues. The JSR Annual Report is published by 1 August annually.

(d) **Long-Range Vision Paper.** The Long-Range Vision Paper is published when needed and examines plausible future environments 14 years beyond the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) period. Its purpose is to help determine future national security needs for the long term, offering a means to study the implications of those future environments on the NMS, joint doctrine, force structure and requirements.

(e) **JSR Support Responsibilities.** The following assigned responsibilities support the Joint Strategy Review Process.

- The Director, DIA, prepares baseline intelligence assessments, strategic planning advice, and an analysis of force structure to support the JSPS as well as the development of the NMS, JPD, JSCP, CPA and other strategic planning or assessment documents. The Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and Defense agencies use these biennial threat assessments, focused on specific time periods, as a baseline for intelligence planning. The threat assessment is prepared in three parts, limited to the length necessary to summarize security interests as they relate to the NMS.

- Parts One and Two support development of strategic plans, assessments, and environments beyond the FYDP, including the long-term acquisition policy of DOD and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

- Part Three supports development of such documents as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). In consonance with the priorities listed in PDD-35, "The Enduring Challenges Document," the JSR broadly assesses regional and global issues, including military forces and capabilities; proliferation, particularly of weapons of mass destruction; science and technology; defense economics and associated industrial infrastructure; military-political-sociological conditions; regional instability; terrorism; narcotics; command, control, communications, and computers; humanitarian concerns; and foreign intelligence and security service activities and collection activities by non-government organizations. Preparers of Part Three use regularly produced intelligence reports such as the National Intelligence Estimates, and Defense Intelligence Reports and Appraisals.

- **The Joint Staff J-5 is responsible for the JSR process**, including preparing administrative guidance, and managing and organizing the JSR. The J-5 prepares the Long-Range Vision Paper, JSR Issue Papers, and the JSR Annual Report.

- The Joint Staff J-8 prepares, in collaboration with the combatant commanders, Services, and other Joint Staff directorates as appropriate, estimated force structure with alternatives that broadly support proposed changes to the NMS. These documents include appropriate strategic, nonstrategic, and defensive force structures; alternatives; and recommendations for use in the development of military plans to effectively support the NMS. Force apportionment guidance to be used in other JSPS documents (e.g., the JSCP) is included. Comparative analyses of force structure effectiveness, capabilities, and alternatives are furnished as constrained strategies and military options are assessed.

(2) **National Security Strategy (NSS)**. The NSS is signed by the President and contains strategic guidance concerning the continued security and prosperity of the United States. Its main philosophy is rooted in the belief that the United States cannot live as an isolationist (in peace or war) and that U.S. well being depends on the stability of other nations. **Thus, the U.S. NSS is a strategy of active engagement throughout the world.** U.S. engagement abroad is carried out through the four elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). Each of these elements, in and of itself, cannot be the sole answer to U.S. engagement strategy abroad. Each element must be applied in concert with and in a manner complementary to each of the other three. It is the duty of the joint officer not only to understand the intricate relationship among the elements of national power, but also to be especially well schooled in the application of the military element of national power in support of national objectives. The key to success for America’s military is not only knowing how to apply military power, but also knowing when to apply it, and most important, how the application of military power can enable achievement of national objectives.

(3) **National Military Strategy (NMS) – JSPS**. The NMS furnishes to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense the advice of CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support attainment of national security objectives. The NMS assists the Secretary of Defense in preparing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and guiding the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The NMS is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his review and then to the President. It may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance regarding NCA-directed actions. The NMS also furnishes supporting documentation to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG, and to the Services for consideration during development of the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). In 1992 the NMS was published in an unclassified format for the first time. The intent now is to publish the NMS “as needed” based on NSS changes when changes in the strategic environment dictate a need to modify the national strategy. The NMS contains

- a contextual setting, summarized from the JSR, that includes an appraisal of U.S. defense policy, as stated in the current DPG, and recommendations for change;
- an updated intelligence appraisal, extracted from the JSR, that describes the range of threats to U.S. national security;
- a description of ways to achieve U.S. national security objectives, including discussion of the threats to U.S. security interests;
- a description of the strategic landscape; and
- recommended fiscally constrained force levels, developed in collaboration with the Services and combatant commanders, that are required in order to achieve the strategic objectives with acceptable risk.

(4) **Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020)**. JV2020 provides strategic direction for the military Services in developing the proper military forces to meet the future threat. JV2020 outlines concepts such as Overseas Presence, Power Projection, Decisive Force, and Strategic Agility that guide the Service chiefs during decisions concerning the future of the military and its resources. JV2020 also provides the tenets of Dominant Maneuver, Focused Logistics, Precision Engagement, and Full Dimensional Protections as stated ends, to guide the military as it selects ways and means for the future.

(5) **Joint Planning Document (JPD) – JSPS**. The *Joint Planning Document* (JPD) supports the National Military Strategy by furnishing planning and broad programming recommendations and advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The JPD is a stand-alone document published in a series of chapters covering specific functional areas. The JPD supports the strategy and force structure for the defense planning period. It is intended to furnish insight on CJCS priorities in development of the defense program for the affected FYDP. It is prepared and submitted approximately six months in advance of the scheduled publication of the DPG. The following chapters (see table below) are typically contained in the JPD.

(6) **Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) – PBS**. The DPG issues guidance from the Secretary of Defense to the military departments for development of their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary's program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. **The DPG is the major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.** Since CJCS does not have directive authority over the Services, and most important their money, the DPG is the Secretary's authoritative guidance to the Services to ensure the incorporation of DOD-wide concerns into the POMs.

JPD Chapters

CHAPTER	TITLE	JS LEAD
1	Manpower and Personnel	J-1
2	Joint Readiness	J-3
3	Command and Control	J-6
4	Weapons of Mass Destruction	J-5
5	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	J-2
6	Information Operations	J-3
7	Interoperability	J-7
8	Strategic Mobility and Sustainability	J-4
9	Theater Engagement – Overseas Presence	J-5
10	Future Capabilities	J-8

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) takes the lead in drafting the DPG, considering the previous year's DPG, Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs), and the budget, along with the NMS. The DPG Steering Group, chaired by the Deputy USD(P), helps develop and coordinate the DPG. DPG development relies on extensive dialogue between OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the Services.

(b) As chapters of the DPG are drafted, they are circulated to the military departments and others for review and comment. The Services use the draft DPG as guidance to begin development of their programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) review the draft DPG until the final version is issued. The DRB was established as an oversight organization to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PPBS process. The DRB ensures that fiscal and other guidance are followed at all levels. This powerful group is actively involved in every step of the PPBS process. The board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, also serves as the major arbiter of fiscal issues leading to development of the DOD budget.

(7) **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) – JSPS.** The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) contains guidance to the CINCs and Service Chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. These assignments take into account the capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP directs the development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and

apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the combatant commanders. As a capabilities planning document, it represents the last phase of resource management. It apportions the resources provided by the PPBS to develop operation plans.

The JSCP constructs a coherent framework for giving capabilities-based military advice to the NCA.

(1) The JSCP is designed to be a “living document” that is reviewed as needed. As a result of such reviews, the Joint Staff J-5 initiates appropriate changes resulting from force structure modification and changes to the strategic environment, or, if there is no need to revise the JSCP, publishes a directive requiring CINC revalidation of operation plan requirements.

(2) The JSCP is the principal vehicle that assigns tasks to the combatant commanders to develop operation plans, Concept Plans with or without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), Theater Engagement Plans (TEP), and functional plans using deliberate planning procedures described in detail in Chapter 4 following. The JSCP gives strategic planning guidance and direction for plans to be developed between 12 and 18 months following its distribution. It consists of a single volume that covers planning guidance, objectives, tasks, and major force apportionment for planning. Major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period include both Active and Reserve forces under various conditions of mobilization. The JSCP supplemental guidance, published separately as 14 CJCS Instructions, furnishes planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification of tasks assigned for planning in specified functional areas:

CJCSI 3110.02	Intelligence
CJCSI 3110.03	Logistics
CJCSI 3110.04	Nuclear
CJCSI 3110.05	Psychological Ops
CJCSI 3110.06	Special Ops
CJCSI 3110.07	Chemical Warfare; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides
CJCSI 3110.08	Geospatial Information and Services
CJCSI 3110.09	Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
CJCSI 3110.10	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4 Systems)
CJCSI 3110.11	Mobility
CJCSI 3110.12	Civil Affairs
CJCSI 3110.13	Mobilization
CJCSI 3110.15	Special Technical Operations
CJCSI 3110.16	Consequence Management

c. **Programming.** In January, the President approves Fiscal Forecasts and Guidance (FFG) developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and sends it to

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services. The FFG furnishes fiscal guidance that the Services need to develop realistic programs within fiscal constraints.

(1) **Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).** The military departments and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) send POMs to the Secretary of Defense in the spring of even-numbered years. **These POMs should be in direct compliance with guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in the DPG.** These identify major issues that must be resolved during the year of submission. Supporting information for the POMs is published per the annual POM preparation instructions.

(a) The combatant commanders submit their requirements to the Services through their components during POM development. The CINCs also send their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS in the CINCs' Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). The Services are required to include special annexes that show how their POMs respond to the needs of the CINCs, in particular the CINCs' individual IPLs, and the CINCs have the opportunity to review all POMs to ensure that the Services have considered their needs.

(b) POMs are based on the strategic concepts and guidance stated in the DPG and include an assessment of the risks associated with current and proposed force and support programs. POMs express total program requirements for the years covered in the DPG. They also describe the rationale for proposed changes to the force approved by the Secretary of Defense as reflected in the Future-Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is the official database of all military establishment programs approved by the Secretary of Defense, structured as depicted in **Figure 2-5**. It is updated formally three times during the cycle shown in **Figure 2-6**.



Figure 2-5




Figure 2-6

(c) At the behest of Congress, the Secretary of Defense began submitting two-year budgets starting in FY89 with the FY89-90 budget. Congress, however, has not changed its traditional practice of working out the budget annually. To remain synchronized with Congress, DOD complies with the original annual budget timetables, but, in keeping with the spirit of the two-year budget, doesn't introduce new items in the "off-year" budget of each cycle. Instead, DOD refines the figures submitted the year before. See Figure 2-7.




Figure 2-7

(2) **Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) – JSPS.** The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) is CJCS's assessment of the composite POM. It summarizes the views of CJCS on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and support levels required to attain U.S. national security objectives. In addition, the CPA assists the Chairman in fulfilling his statutory duty to do the following:

- advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and support the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders
- submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance furnished by the Secretary, to achieve greater conformance with established priorities
- advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major manpower programs and policies of the Armed Forces conform to strategic plans

(a) The CPA assesses how well strategic guidance and the POMs submitted by the military departments, USSOCOM, and defense agencies conform to national military defense priorities and strategic guidance. When appropriate, it may contain alternative recommendations and proposals to improve conformance with strategic guidance or the CINC's priorities.

(b) CPA development is an iterative process that begins before the POMs are published and ends when critical issues are identified for inclusion in the CPA. Services, CINCs, agencies, and the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. This coordination is essential to identify and properly develop specific issues appropriate for CJCS to bring before the Secretary of Defense formally. Documents considered in CPA development include POM preparation instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs themselves, the NMS, the JPD, the JROC-JWCA, the JMRR, the CINCs' IPLs, the Combat Support Agency Responsiveness and Readiness Report, etc.

(3) **Issues – PPBS.** The OSD staff prepares a set of potential issues, i.e., alternatives to some of the programs included in the POMs. The CINCs and OMB prepare other potential issues. The Program Review Group (PRG) examines all potential issues, resolving many issues at the PRG level, and agrees on a set of issues to be considered by the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The DRB makes the final selection from the list of candidates; those selected as a formal briefing to the DRB or as issue books, sometimes called program review books, are prepared, staffed through the CINCs and Services for comment, and forwarded to the DRB for a decision. The Services formulate the issue papers, and the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs also supply inputs. Each issue paper consists of a discussion section followed by alternatives. The individual issues are combined into issue books (IB), sometimes called main

issues or program review books. Issue books are circulated to other OSD staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Services for review and comment. The DRB, the DOD's "board of directors," considers the books, with comments to facilitate the decision process.

(4) **Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs) – PPBS.** The DRB has many meetings over a two-to-three-week period to consider the Issue Books and resolve the issues. The CINCs are invited to the meetings that consider their issues. The Service Chiefs and VCJCS may attend DRB meetings. Each Issue Book is the subject of one two-to-three-hour meeting, after which the Deputy Secretary of Defense reaches a tentative decision. After all the Issue Books have been individually reviewed, a wrap-up meeting is held to evaluate the total effect of the tentative decisions on the program. Open issues are resolved and final decisions are reached and recorded in PDMs during early August.

d. **Budgeting**

(1) **Budget Estimates Submission (BES) – PPBS.** Each of the military departments and defense agencies forwards its Budget Estimates Submission (BES) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C)). The BES is traditionally due in September. It includes data for the prior year, current year, budget year, and budget year plus one (more for authorized programs) per the Budget Guidance Manual and supplementary memorandums. Budget estimates are prepared and submitted based on the approved program as well as current economic assumptions contained either in the PDMs or in detailed budget guidance issued each year. On receipt of the submission, the comptroller's program and budget office begins the joint OSD and OMB hearings to review the submission. Appropriate members of the Joint Staff and OSD staffs attend these hearings, jointly conducted by OSD and OMB representatives. The military departments make presentations concerning their submissions and respond to questions. The DRB meets when appropriate.

(2) **Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) – PPBS.** Budget submission hearings are held to obtain additional information needed to draft Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The entire budget is reviewed to ensure that the requests are properly priced, program schedules are appropriate, and estimates are consistent with the objectives of the Secretary of Defense. PBDs document approval of the estimates for inclusion in the President's Budget. These decisions evaluate, adjust, and approve all resources in the budget request. Although the responsible budget analyst has the lead in developing the PBD, other OSD staff personnel furnish appropriate recommendations and support. When each individual PBD is written, it is coordinated with OMB and the under secretaries and assistant secretaries of defense. Each PBD consists of a discussion of the area, issues, and a series of alternatives. PBDs are sent with a covering memorandum that identifies any unresolved issues to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then chooses one of the alternatives or directs a new one, and the signed PBD goes to the appropriate military department and CINCs.

(a) If a military department appeals a PBD, the appeal is processed through the same channels as was the PBD, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense makes the final decision. The military department secretaries and Service chiefs have an opportunity as near the end of the review cycle as possible to discuss with the Secretary of Defense the major budget issues that merit his personal review. During this phase of PPBS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities of the combatant commands. They present their concerns to CJCS, who discusses them with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. While the formal PPBS process has not changed, the CINCs and the Joint Staff are becoming increasingly influential in the program and budgeting choices.

(b) Since the mid-1980s, the role of the CINCs in resource management has increased significantly, as shown by **Figure 2-8**. PPBS has become much more responsive to the needs of the CINCs. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, is the only combatant commander who actually submits a budget.




Figure 2-8

(3) **Defense Budget PPBS.** If, at the end of the PPBS process, OMB or DOD feels that unresolved differences remain, the Secretary of Defense and Director, OMB, raise these issues when they meet with the President. Once the final budget decisions are made, the DOD budget becomes a part of the President's budget that is submitted to the Congress in January. Once the President signs the congressional appropriations act into law, OMB can begin apportioning funds to the federal departments. The Services execute the budget and procure new forces and capabilities, and the CINCs develop, maintain, and prepare to execute their contingency plans (See **Figure 2-9**).




Figure 2-9

f. **JSPS-Related Assessments and other Key Documents.** The following assessment list contains critical JSPS-related information.

(1) **Joint Net Assessment (JNA).** The Chairman will assess current U.S. and allied forces and will compare them with the capabilities of potential adversaries. The JNA process provides the mechanism to assess force strengths and deficiencies in the context of the U.S. ability to meet national security objectives. Strengths and deficiencies are assessed in terms of their effect on strategic plans. This informal process is conducted with the full participation of the CINCs and Services. The JNA process provides a strategic-level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.

(2) **The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) (J-3).** The CRS, depicted in **Figure 2-10**, looks at current strategy and assesses areas judged important to joint warfare. When deficiencies exist, they are looked at in more detail in concert with the uni-

fied commands and Services. Service programs are reviewed for adequacy to satisfy the current war fighting deficiency. This system reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and critical joint enablers.




Figure 2-10

(3) **The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) (J-3)**. The JMRR, the central component of the CRS, examines both current readiness and readiness to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS). It is a subjective assessment with a macro-level focus by the senior leadership of the Services and combatant commands. The JMRR contains the CJCS Service assessments of unit readiness by the Service Operations Deputies and CINC assessments of joint readiness and is briefed by the J-3. During the JMRR, the Services report unit readiness, assessing people, equipment, training, and critical enablers. The CINCs report joint readiness, assessing their ability to integrate and synchronize ready forces to execute their assigned missions. A quarterly feedback JMRR, chaired by CJCS or VCJCS, is conducted to brief the CINCs' identified deficiencies and courses of action to correct them. The solutions are developed as a collaborative effort between the Joint Staff, the Services, and unified command staffs. The focus is on near-term (within two years) operational, planning, policy, and programmatic corrections for key warfighting deficiencies.

(4) **The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) (J-8)**. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process is the CJCS vehicle for obtaining a systematic view of future joint warfighting capabilities. Assessments, sponsored by Joint Staff Directorates, are conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, federally funded research and development centers, and others as necessary. Assessments examine

key relationships and interactions between joint warfighting capabilities, and identify opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness. The continuous assessment process gives insight into issues involving requirements, readiness, and plans to recapitalize joint military capabilities. Findings are presented to CJCS, the JROC, and the CINCs. The final assessment products are used to influence programming and budget guidance and to develop joint requirement resource recommendations. The JWCA is the major source for developing the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR).

(5) **Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR) (J-8)**. The CPR contains CJCS's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for future programs. The recommendations represent the Chairman's view of programs important for creating or enhancing joint warfighting capabilities. The recommendations are intended for consideration while developing the Defense Planning Guidance. Services, unified commands, and the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. CINC inputs are solicited to make the CPR a better tool during DPG development.

(6) **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)** fulfills the statutory duty of the Secretary of Defense to furnish written policy guidance annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for contingency planning. The Secretary issues this guidance with the approval of the President after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG focuses the guidance given in the NSS and DPG, and is the principal source document for the JSCP.

204. SUMMARY OF STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

History is replete with examples of operations undertaken without understanding their strategic implications. If the North African campaign undertaken by the Germans in World War II had been given adequate resources, then Rommel's drive to the Suez might well have resulted in a significant strategic victory instead of an operational failure that had critical strategic results. In Vietnam, the United States had many operational successes but failed to achieve strategic victory. The United States' overwhelming victory during DESERT STORM is usually used as an example of appropriate application of strategic art. But even in victory, the United States has remained engaged militarily (as of this writing it has been ten years) with Iraq. The Iraqi situation is so complex that the strategic objectives of the United States have not yet been achieved. As discussed in the introduction, the joint operation planner must be well schooled in the skillful balancing of ends, ways, and means. Whether developing plans to attain resources, support the strategy of engagement, or win a conflict, the joint planner must understand and consider the implications, interactions, and workings of all of the systems previously detailed. Only by the appropriate application of strategic art will the military be able to do its part to ensure the continued security and prosperity of the United States.

Campaigning

Chapter 3

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- **Operational Art** 3-3
- **Theater Strategy** 3-24
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- **Summary of Campaign Planning** 3-59

Campaigning

References: *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
CJSCM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning
Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020)

300. INTRODUCTION. This chapter introduces the concepts of campaign planning and synchronization, focusing on key joint doctrine, command guidance, and current techniques of operational art guided by campaigning principles. The chapter offers a basic description of the concept of operational warfare, the CINC's role and responsibilities toward implementing national strategy into theater level actions, and the considerations taken into account by the joint force commander (JFC) for accomplishing actions in support of the national strategy.

The basic tool by which the combatant commander translates tactical actions into strategic results is the campaign. Campaigns represent the art of linking tactical battles and engagements in an operational design to accomplish strategic or operational objectives, which, in turn, achieve the strategic end within a given space and time. They are the CINC's vision of the sequence of operations needed to attain the strategic objectives assigned by higher authority. Campaigning orients on the adversary's centers of gravity; achieves unity of effort with all elements of power available; synchronizes the effects of land, sea, air, space and special forces; clearly defines what constitutes success; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. The campaign plan is the operational extension of a combatant commander's theater strategy. It is the element of joint operation planning that bridges deliberate planning with crisis action planning. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes (see **Figure 3-1**). If the scope of the contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifies both processes. The campaign is conducted in theaters of war and subordinate theaters of operations; they are based on strategic estimates and their resulting theater strategies. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations of all Services and agencies are integrated and unified; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. To succeed in creating an effective campaign plan, the operational commander must consider and apply a myriad of considerations in its development. The talent for taking national guidance and Service resources and creating a coherent joint plan that achieves the strategic aim is called operational art.




Figure 3-1

301. OPERATIONAL ART. Campaigning and the considerations that lead to effective campaign planning center on combatant commanders (CINCs) and their staffs. However, campaigning and the exercise of operational art are not solely the domain of the combatant commander, but are likewise exercised by designated subordinates, such as subunified commanders or commanders of joint task forces. In any discussion concerning operational art and campaigning, it should be understood that a number of levels of commanders could be involved; accordingly, the term joint force commander (JFC) will be used to refer to operational commanders who generate and/or execute campaign plans. When given a strategic or operational aim, the JFC must effectively employ military forces of all Services and coordinate any other available assets to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major engagements, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating key activities at all levels of war (**Figure 3-2**).




Figure 3-2

a. **The Heart of the Art.** When a joint force commander receives a mission from the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the unified commander that establishes a strategic aim or objective, the JFC is allocated resources through Service components with which to accomplish the mission. The “heart of the art” for the JFC is his ability to take these assets from disparate sources, and organize and direct them to effectively attain the strategic aim. The graphic representation of this challenge in **Figure 3-3** depicts the complexity of this process. The JFC is given strategic aims of the NCA based on U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and any Presidential Decision Documents (PDDs). JFC molds this guidance to conform to the National Military Strategy (NMS) and any additional inputs such as Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities (JSCP). To conduct the mission, the JFC employs forces manned, trained, and equipped by the Services. Consequently, in order to accomplish the mission, the JFC issues the necessary guidance for the employment and support of the provided forces. The degree to which the JFC effectively exercises operational art will be directly influence by the amount of friction that is generated by this process.




Figure 3-3

b. **Art or Science.** Although much of what the JFC accomplishes is based on doctrine and procedures, campaign design demands creativity of the commander and his staff. No two operational situations are the same, and each scenario will contain different factors, threats, and resource constraints. As the commander confronts the challenge of developing a coherent campaign, he performs the task much in the manner that an artist creates a painting. Just as an artist determines the scope of the landscape to be painted, the JFC determines the nature and size of his theater of operation. As an artist mentally visualizes the focal point of the painting, so does the JFC determine the enemy's centers of gravity. Like a painter, the JFC will create an operational design that best focuses on the centers of gravity and the resultant strategic aim. To do this the JFC will review and employ many principles and tenets of warfighting to determine which combination will best create the desired operational design: the campaign plan. To understand the manner in which the JFC practices this art, the following discussion will cover the points of operational art: the canvas (theater), the focal point (centers of gravity), the design (operational approach), and loading the palette (facets of operational art).

c. **The Canvas: The Theater.** The canvas upon which a JFC will “paint” his campaign plan will vary in size, type, and weight of importance. Understanding these very basic, yet key, considerations is vital for a staff supporting its commander in the development of a campaign plan. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.

(1) **Theater Size.** When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (area of responsibility, AOR).

(a) **Theater of War.** In time of war, the NCA may elect to define a theater of war across peacetime geographic boundaries or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of war. A theater of war does not necessarily encompass the entire AOR of the geographic combatant commander, and may contain more than one theater of operations. A theater of war should be associated with a strategic objective.

(b) **Theater of Operations.** The geographic combatant commander may further define one or more theaters of operations within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders and joint force commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations. Theater of operations should be associated with an operational objective.

(2) **Theater Nature.** Each theater is unique and may be viewed from a number of different perspectives. The theater may be viewed in a geographic context, by its associated predominant weather cycles, by an assessment of friendly and enemy situations, and by the degree to which its logistics infrastructure has been developed. These perspectives influence how operations in the theater are conducted. Military strategists often describe theaters as continental, maritime, or littoral, based on their dominant geographic and strategic characteristics. That view of a theater reflects the influence of geography in selecting the predominant type of military forces used, the strategic missions developed, and physical objectives pursued operationally in it. Continental theaters control land and associated air space. Maritime theaters focus on ensuring free use of seas and associated air space. A littoral theater is a combination of continental and maritime theaters, requiring balanced action between land, sea, and air forces. While each is different, they all depend on the synchronized effects of all Services for success.

(a) Continental Theater. Continental theaters emphasize protection of land vital to national security or the destruction of an opponent's means of exercising that same control. USEUCOM and USCENTCOM are examples of continental theaters where army and air forces usually predominate. Operations range from nation assistance activities to limited strike operations and major ground combat engagements with associated air and naval support.

(b) Maritime Theater. Maritime theaters furnish forward defense for the nation and ensure strategic reach of resources. USPACOM and to a large extent USJFCOM are maritime theaters. Naval forces usually predominate. Military actions in these theaters range from indirect support of political initiatives, such as port visits, to limited interventions and major naval engagements with associated support. Potential operations include actions to gain, extend, or maintain control of the seas; major operations to seize or defend land areas; and amphibious operations.

(c) Littoral Theater. Littoral theaters combine major aspects of both continental and maritime theaters and require closely synchronized action between land, sea, and air forces. Littoral theaters are not as well discussed as the previous two, but have been exercised in previous campaigns when the operational line parallels a coastline, or drives a campaign up a peninsula. General MacArthur's campaign for New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific during World War II is a classic example of a littoral theater.

(d) Theater Maturity. Another way to classify theaters is by assessing the existing infrastructure in theater. The mature theater is one able to sustain the initial phase of anticipated combat operations without significant augmentation or development of port facilities, airfields, ground transportation, communications networks, and municipal government functions. Maturity of a theater is often characterized by the presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces and significant host-nation support. Central Europe, the Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia are examples of mature theaters.

An immature theater is unable to sustain the initial phase of anticipated combat operations because of limited port facilities, limited ground transportation assets and/or roads, as well as little to no host-nation assistance. Increasingly commanders are being faced with the deployment of forces into states with no discernable government and where the limited infrastructure that existed is not functioning or has been destroyed. Examples of immature theaters are Haiti, Somalia, and much of Africa.

(3) **Theater Weight.** When numerous active theaters compete for limited resources, strategic planners consider them in relation to one another as theaters of focus, economy of force theaters, or deferred theaters. Although it would be rare for any commander to consider his theater anything but the theater of focus, it is important for both him and his staff to understand the overall strategic context and priority in which their theater competes. A theater of focus is the theater of main military effort and receives more political attention and a preponderance of the resources. Until recently, the European theater traditionally has been a theater of focus.

An economy of force theater merits a lesser level of both political significance and force allocation. An example of this dynamic was demonstrated when USSOUTHCOM, executing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua, had to compete with USEUCOM's pursuit of its campaign in the Balkans. A deferred theater receives the lowest priority for dedicated forces and resources. Strategists determine whether the risk in delaying the support to a particular theater is acceptable based on the current assessment of the threat. Increasingly, because of reduced force structure, certain elements of support to theaters are being deferred. This also becomes evident in the persistent use of dual-apportioned forces for nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

d. **The Focal Point: Centers of Gravity.** Just as a painter designs a painting to develop and support a focal point, so too does a JFC craft a campaign plan around the reduction of centers of gravity to achieve the strategic aim of the campaign. Centers of gravity are the foundation of capability, both friendly and enemy. Clausewitz identified the center of gravity as “**the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends ... the point at which all our energies should be directed.**” Centers of gravity are the characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. At the strategic level, centers of gravity might include a military force, an alliance, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. Accurate analysis of centers of gravity requires detailed knowledge and understanding of the enemy and the leaders and nation they serve.

(1) Analysis of centers of gravity, both enemy and friendly (including allies), must be a continuous process throughout a campaign. An enemy may shift the weight of its attack, thus uncovering or relying on a previously unforeseen center of gravity. In similar fashion friendly forces may develop reliance on other capabilities or forces as the campaign progresses. Enemy centers of gravity will likely be well protected, just as friendly centers of gravity should likewise be well secured. The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power to destroy or neutralize its centers of gravity. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, since it is likely that the enemy will shield and protect its center of gravity, a commander may have to initiate indirect attacks until conditions permit a successful direct attack.

(2) Because it is the natural tendency of any force to identify and protect its own centers of gravity, an opposing force must conduct an analysis further to identify **decisive points**. By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic, such as a chokepoint in a sea line of communication, a hill, a town, or an airbase. They could also include other critical elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, air and sea space, or communications capability. Many times, decisive points will be clustered or lead to a vital intersection or node. These **critical nodes**, once reduced, many times are the keys to exposing vulnerabilities in the center of gravity.

(3) At the strategic level of war, the commander of the theater of war may often see the center of gravity in complex and abstract forms, such as command and control, the will of the people, or the voice of the leadership. At the operational level of war, the JFC is likely to identify a center of gravity that is more concrete, as in a specific enemy unit, significant terrain feature, or base of capabilities. In some situations the commander may feel that he can reduce the center of gravity directly, but it is more likely that a series of engagements to reduce decisive points and critical nodes will be required, thus requiring a campaign design to coordinate the eventual reduction of the center of gravity.

e. **Operational Design.** The painter, having determined the focal point of the picture, its dimensions, and type of material on which to work, will next create the basic design in which to draw out the subject of the picture. The JFC is no different. The commander and his staff, having received strategic guidance and having assessed the nature of the theater as well as the vulnerabilities of their adversary, will next decide on the basic design of the campaign and the anticipated approach.

(1) **Operational Approach.** One of the fundamental purposes of a campaign plan is to achieve synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, and special forces. To achieve this goal the JFC and staff must understand not only Service force capabilities and limitations, but also how the Services interrelate at the theater level.

(a) **Symmetrical Relationships.** The most familiar operations and those that each Service considers its first priority are to successfully counter an adversary that opposes them in their own operating sphere or environment: ground forces versus ground forces, sea forces versus sea forces, etc. (**Figure 3-4**). This is how most Services viewed warfare before World War II and is the relationship that military officers must first master—how to win in their own element.




Figure 3-4

- Land versus land—Land Control Operations. Traditional ground combat was typified by the battles between Lee and Grant during the American Civil War or by the Allies and Central Powers in France during World War I.
- Sea versus sea—Sea Control Operations. Classic naval warfare was typified by the Battle of Jutland, the climactic naval battle in World War I that allowed the British to retain command of the sea and continue the blockade of Imperial Germany.
- Air versus air—Aerospace Control Operations. This direct relationship was well demonstrated during the early stages of the Battle of Britain.

Symmetrical relationships are the best understood, because it is in this manner that the military first masters its skills. It is the responsibility of the respective Services to ensure that their Service is master of its own environment. Failure to do so prevents execution of the Services beyond this basic relationship.

(b) Mutually Supporting Relationships. Mutually supporting relationships are close operations with one Service in support of another that require detailed coordination to help the supported Service obtain control of its respective environment from its symmetric threat (**Figure 3-5**). With the advent of full-dimensional war of World War II, these mutually supporting relationships became better understood and widely practiced.




Figure 3-5

- Air support to Land–Tactical air support. This relationship includes all manner of air support furnished to land forces requiring close integration of effects (e.g., close air support, air reconnaissance, tactical airlift, etc.).
- Air support to Sea–Aerospace maritime support. Such support includes all manner of air support to assist and protect friendly naval forces and shipping (e.g., coastal air force operations in the Mediterranean protecting Allied convoys in 1942 or aerial refueling by Air Force of naval carrier air).
- Sea support to Land–Power projection and SLOC protection. This long-standing relationship includes supporting land campaigns using naval forces (e.g., carrier close air support, naval gunfire, amphibious assaults, sustainment of land forces, etc.).
- Sea support to Air–Naval support to air forces includes SLOC operations in the sustainment of air forces and naval air augmentation to air forces. Most air ordnance for sustained air operations comes by sea.
- Land support for Air–This includes ground forces’ seizure and defense of air bases, and attacks to augment suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) (e.g., initial seizure of airfields in Operation JUST CAUSE, destruction of Egyptian air defense missile batteries by Israeli armor).
- Land support for Sea–This includes ground forces’ seizure and defense of naval bases, ports, and SLOC chokepoints (e.g., U.S. Army securing the Panama Canal during Operation JUST CAUSE).

These mutually supporting relationships have evolved extensively since World War II and have frequently been the topic of aggressive debate between Services. Mutually supporting relationships tend to highlight points of contention in command and control, boundaries and control measures, and degree and duration of support, as well as the ability to communicate. Mutually supporting relationships can significantly strengthen the joint force, but also generate increased friction that must be managed.

(c) **Asymmetrical Relationships.** Asymmetrical relationships exist when opposing forces engage each other outside their generally accepted environments (**Figure 3-6**). These operations are designed to engage the adversary in a dimension that is unexpected and thus vulnerable, because it has not anticipated protecting its force from the threat outside the expected engagement environment. Normally asymmetrical relationships are deep operations not requiring detailed coordination between Services and in which tremendous efficiency can be obtained due to the asymmetries. These operations can also be considered high risk in the event that the enemy has shielded itself properly from such an attack. Asymmetrical relationships permit the joint force commander to mass selective capabilities of his land, sea, air, and special forces, thus creating simultaneity and depth to the area of operations.




Figure 3-6

- Air versus Sea—Interdiction. This envisions friendly air forces reaching deep within the area of operations to engage enemy surface units or ports. During the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the 5th U.S. Air Force under the command of General Kenney destroyed a Japanese naval troop convoy (seven transports and four destroyers). Other examples include long-range bombers armed with antiship missiles and mines.
- Air versus Ground—Air Interdiction. Air actions disrupt or destroy the enemy's ground military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces (e.g., air strikes against the Iraqis during the Persian Gulf War, or the Kosovo bombings in support of Balkan peacekeeping missions).
- Sea versus Land—Barrier and strike operations. Naval operations can be designed to achieve sea denial and isolate enemy ground forces or destroy enemy deep targets ashore (e.g., the neutralization and bypassing of the enemy ground forces in New Guinea, Truk, and Rabaul during the Southwest Pacific campaign).
- Sea versus Air—Antiair warfare. This relationship includes the destruction of enemy air platforms from naval surface, subsurface, and air elements (e.g., carrier air or cruise missile attacks on enemy air bases, as in the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict).

- Land versus Sea—Raids by ground forces against enemy naval bases, ports, and waterways constitute actions in this relationship (e.g., the elimination of German submarine bases in France in 1944 by Allied ground action or the capture of the British naval base at Singapore via land by the Japanese in 1942). Coastal defense gun and missile batteries by some nations adjacent to SLOC chokepoints should also be considered.
- Land versus Air—These may be raids by ground forces to destroy air defense installations and ensure air base denial (e.g., the seizure of Guadalcanal by the U.S. Marines in 1942 to deny the use of the island airfield to the Japanese or the destruction of key aircraft on the ground by special forces).

The JFC must select the forces that are capable of generating the effects that will accomplish the mission. There are often forces from more than one Service that offer a given capability. For example, defensive counter-air tasks may be performed by not only U.S. Air Force F-14 or F-16 fighters, but also U.S. Navy F-14s and F-18s as well as U.S. Marine aircraft. Likewise, fire support for land warfare may be furnished by either U.S. Army or U.S. Marine artillery, or by U.S. Navy surface fires support. In addition, deep ground interdiction missions can be effectively executed by all Services. Selecting the appropriate Service with the right capability for the effects needed to accomplish the mission is a demonstration of effective operational planning.

(2) **Lines of Operation.** A second consideration in designing the elements of a campaign is to analyze the lines of operation that both friendly and enemy forces are likely to take to achieve their respective strategic missions. Lines of operation define the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy. These lines connect the force with its base of operations with its strategic objective. Normally, a campaign has a single line of operation, although multiple lines are not uncommon. Classic military theory distinguishes between exterior and interior lines of operation.

- A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point or base of operations. Interior lines generally benefit the weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than an enemy on exterior lines. Conceptually, a force is operating on interior lines if it has an operational mobility advantage over its opponent. This advantage can be achieved by the traditional means of geography, through better technology and transportation infrastructure, or by better training.

A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Campaign planning must recognize advantages and vulnerabilities of working interior and/or external lines of operation, as well as recognizing the critical lines of operation to be protected or severed. In modern war, lines of operation attain a multidimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. JFCs use lines of operation to focus the effects of combat power to have impact on the strategic objective. JFCs apply combat power throughout

the dimensions of time, space, and networks in a logical synchronized design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat the enemy centers of gravity.

(3) **Operational Reach.** Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is greatly influenced by geography surrounding and separating the opponents and is extended by locating forward forces, reserves, bases, and logistics. This in turn creates vulnerabilities that must be shielded or protected in order to sustain the reach. For any given operation there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate, a point where the operational commander has extended the force and exposed vulnerabilities that the opposing force can exploit without putting its force at risk. Thus, forward presence of troops, basing, third nation support, and full-dimensional protection become key in the successful extension of operational reach and prevent culmination.

(4) **Culminating Point.** The culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great risk. Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted available resources and is ill disposed to defend successfully.

Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistics planners' forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their concept of operations.

f. **Loading the Commander's Palette: Facets of Operational Art.** Once the artist has prepared the canvas, pictured the focal point, and designed the development of the masterpiece, he then loads the palette with the colors needed to bring the painting to life. For the JFC, the process is no different. Now that the campaign has been roughly outlined, he loads his palette with the principles and facets of operational art that will bring the campaign to life. No two commanders load their operational palette the same way, nor will they apply the principles and various considerations of warfare in the same manner. Listed below are some of the considerations with which a joint force commander will load the operational palette. They are presented in no particular order and reflect no priority. Detailed discussions of the considerations listed below can be found JP 3-0, Chapter III and Appendix A.

(1) **Principles of War.** The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of U.S. military doctrine (Figure 3-7).




Figure 3-7

- **Objective.** The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable result. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective should be avoided.

- **Offensive.** The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or retake the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

- **Mass.** The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at a place and time that will permit the force to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have

decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

- **Economy of Force.** The purpose of economy of force is to allocate the minimal essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

- **Maneuver.** The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver – or threaten delivery of – the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially to exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

- **Unity of Command.** The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort – coordination through cooperation and common interests – is an essential complement to unity of command.

- **Security.** The purpose of security is never to permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. It results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Although risk is inherent in military operations, application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

- **Surprise.** The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

- **Simplicity.** The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations because simple plans, and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable, allowing better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

(2) **Principles of Operations Other than War (OOTW) (Figure 3-8).** Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale operations usually associated with war. These operations have become increasingly frequent as major conventional threats give way to asymmetric, transnational threats. Although half of these principles are the same as the original principles of war, additional aspects need to be considered by the JFC and staff.




Figure 3-8

- **Objective.** Every military operation must be directed toward achieving a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable result. This principle of war applies also to operations other than war. A clearly defined and attainable objective—with a precise understanding of what constitutes success—is critical when the United States is involved in operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination, as well as those that could fail. JFCs must also understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.

- **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort must be sought in every operation. The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war; but, in operations other than war, this principle may be more difficult to attain. In those opera-

tions, other government agencies may often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as understood within the military. Such an arrangement may cause commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational. Because operations other than war will often be conducted at the small-unit level, it is important that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.

- **Security.** Hostile factions must never be permitted to acquire an unexpected advantage. In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to one's interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. JFCs also should be ready constantly to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

- **Restraint.** Appropriate military capability must be applied prudently. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display U.S. resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member because a single act could cause critical political consequences.

- **Perseverance.** Commanders must prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some operations other than war may be short while others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response options against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action. Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is often the requirement for success.

- **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards, as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint force operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. PSYOP can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

(3) **Facets of Operational Art.** The use of the principles of operations lays the foundation of the campaign, but the true distinctiveness of each campaign is defined through the use and style in applying the various fundamental elements of operational art to the planning process. Some of these elements have been referred to in the previous discussion on designing the campaign(**Figure 3-9**). Both those and the additional facets below should be considered when a JFC initially envisions a campaign (detailed discussion is found in JP 3-0, Chap III).




Figure 3-9

- **Synergy.** JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war. They not only attack the enemy's physical capabilities but also its morale and will. When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objectives in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. By arranging symmetrical and asymmetrical actions, JFCs take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and preserve freedom of action for future operations. The combination of these actions results in an impact on the enemy greater than if the actions were conducted individually. Furthermore, the synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities for an enemy to exploit.

- **Simultaneity and Depth.** The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of deep operations theory. The intent is to bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near-simultaneous manner that is within the decision-making cycle of the opponent. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and will to resist. Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength. In joint force operations it contributes directly to an enemy's collapse by placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. JFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite.

Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space (geographically), shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent's decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potentials before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

- **Anticipation.** Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational area, and allies and coalition members. To avoid surprise, JFCs monitor operations as they unfold and signal to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. Monitoring assures situational awareness, a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) can assist JFCs in defining likely or potential enemy COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. JFCs also anticipate the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces. Commanders and planners should carefully consider

the information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information from various dimensions should be employed in the decision-making process.

- **Balance.** Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight (operational reach).

Even as it defeats one enemy force, the joint force prepares to turn and strike another. Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. For that reason combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decision-makers. To assist in maintaining the balance of the force, JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships.

- **Leverage.** JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage, which can be achieved in a variety of ways. For example, JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. In addition, synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also gives JFCs decisive advantage. Leverage thus allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy's dilemma, and maintain the initiative. Finally, dimensional superiority, isolation of the enemy, and attack on enemy strategic centers of gravity can contribute to joint force leverage.

- **Timing and Tempo.** The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and time that best exploit friendly capabilities and inhibit the enemy. As technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements, the tempo of warfare has increased over time. JFCs may also vary the tempo of operations. For instance, during selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, by contrast, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities.

While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply them in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy's ability to react. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations, which refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that synchronizes the effects of operations, so that the maximum benefit of their contributions is exerted on the opponent at the desired time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate effects, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in a synchronized manner.

- **Forces and Functions.** Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently in order to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent. Even without that advantage, JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as C2, supply, and air defense. Such an attack is normally intended to destroy enemy balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical enemy functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will.

- **Arranging Operations.** For major operations, JFCs must determine the best arrangement, which will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state quickly with the least cost in personnel and other resources. The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations. During force projection operations, for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement the commander chooses should not foreclose future options. Thus commanders consider a variety of factors, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion.

Analysis and design of the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space. To assist in arranging operations most campaigns and their operations are commonly broken into five **phases**: prehostilities, **lodgment**, **decisive combat operations**, **follow-through**, and **transition/redeployment**. Phasing may be sequential, concurrent, or overlapping. Since logistics is crucial to phasing, joint force planners consider establishing logistics bases, opening and maintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logistics bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Key to arranging the operations of campaigns, logistics should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility. Because changes in phases at any level can represent a period of

vulnerability for the force, missions and task organizations must then also often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels, however, can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.

- **Branches and Sequels.** No plan can be projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of an operation. Commanders thus build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. The use of branches and sequels, which directly relate to the concept of phasing, can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

Branches are options built into the basic plan and may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. They add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. **Sequels** are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

- **Direct versus Indirect.** To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. But when direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. For example, if the center of gravity is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its air defense and indirect fire capability. When vulnerable, the enemy force can be attacked directly by appropriate elements of the joint force. In that way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to expose and attack enemy centers of gravity through weak or vulnerable points—seams, flanks, specific forces or military capabilities, rear areas, and even military even military morale and public opinion or support.

- **Termination.** Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable.

Often, though, wars are a result of both value and interest-based differences. The underlying causes of a particular war—such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic differences—must influence the understanding of conditions needed to terminate hostilities and resolve the conflict. JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design then give decision-makers critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. Ideally,

national and allied or coalition decision-makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces.

The joint force commander's palette is now loaded with many of the colors needed to create the campaign plan. Commanders all organize, design, and paint their campaigns differently. Some use each principle and element of operational art on their palettes while others use some colors sparingly, others more generously. Not all the considerations that may influence a campaign have been discussed in these few pages; however, many of the predominant considerations have been identified. In summary, the development of operational plans is a dynamic and creative art that varies not only due to differing situations, but also according to the uniqueness of the commanders and their planners.

302. THEATER STRATEGY. One of the first and most elementary steps in exercising operational art is the establishment of a theater strategy. The combatant commander, having received basic strategic guidance in the forms of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy as well as specific tasking from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The commander adapts that strategy to his specific theater and incorporates his concept and priority of effort to attain specific strategic objectives throughout the operational continuum, from war to preserving the peace.

Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and course of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (**JP 1-02**)

The CINCs translate national and alliance strategic tasks, objectives, and authoritative direction into theater strategy. The theater strategy incorporates each CINC's strategic estimate (theater assessment) and is expressed as strategic concepts and broad courses of action for the accomplishment of specified or implied missions. The theater strategy is the basis of wartime campaign planning within the theater.

a. **Foundations of Theater Strategy.** As previously mentioned, the theater strategy is based on the NSS, NMS, and JSCP tasking. In addition, the combatant commander must consider applicable Presidential Decision Documents (PDD), public statements of policy by the Administration and Congress, the Joint Strategic Review and other applicable assessments, theater treaty obligations, and multinational support agreements, as well as the various mission planning statements of the U.S. ambassadors within the theater. The theater strategy, although captured in a written form, is not a static document. It must be continually reviewed in relation to the ever-changing operational environment in-theater to ensure that it adequately translates national strategic aims into attainable objectives in the way the combatant commander chooses to attain them.

b. **Elements of Theater Strategy.** In very basic terms a combatant commander's theater strategy is a means of articulating how (*ways*) the CINC intends to achieve strategic objectives (*ends*) with the resources that are available in the theater (*means*). In doing so the CINC publishes a strategic vision in the commander's intent that guides all elements of the command through peace, crisis, and war. In addition, the theater strategy should contain guidance for interagency coordination, and multinational and nongovernmental organization (NGO) cooperation, as well as establish fiscal programming priorities for component forces in-theater and for security assistance initiatives (**Figure 3-10**). A list of possible considerations in developing a theater strategy follows:

- Based on a continuous theater estimate
- Publishes CINC's strategic vision and intent
- Written in terms of *Ends, Ways, and Means*
- Guides entire command throughout the operational continuum
- Protects and supports national and alliance interests
- Responds to transnational and nontraditional threats
- Provides concepts and prioritizes peacetime engagement activities
- Furnishes deterrence measures and options
- Outlines concepts for regional war and small-scale contingencies
- Considers resolution of conflict
- Serves as basis for programming and budget decisions

Elements of Theater Strategy

- **Contains CINC's Vision**
- **Gives Direction for Campaign Planning**
- **Outlines Concept for Military Ops using all elements of power (*DIME*)**
- **Includes FDO's**
- **Supports multinational interests**
- **Protects Allied Interests**
- **Defines Conflict Resolution**

Figure 3-10

- Establishes concepts for interagency cooperation and for supporting other combatant commanders
- Contains strategic direction for further theater planning

To effectively craft the theater strategy it is necessary to understand in depth the context of the theater where the strategy is to be implemented. The vehicle for assessing the theater is the theater estimate.

c. **Theater Estimate.** The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The strategic estimate is the process by which a theater commander assesses the broad strategic factors that influence the theater strategic environment, thus further determining the missions, objectives, and courses of action throughout their theaters. A continuous process, it is based on strategic direction received from the NCA that leads to the formulation of a theater strategy. Commanders and staffs at all levels use the estimate process. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part will vary depending on the level and type of operation. The framework presented below is outlined in JP 3-0, Appendix B. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to flesh out the basic framework.

(1) **Mission.** As in any decision process, defining the problem, task, or job to be done is vital. Although tasks are received from higher authorities, a command should not consider having received a mission until the commander and staff have analyzed it and has been restated, tailored, and oriented with purpose.

- **Mission Analysis.** The commander and staff must determine the higher command's purpose. They analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will be the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought. Most critical to this process is to determine specified and implied tasks. If there are multiple tasks, priority and weight of effort must be determined.

- **Mission Statement.** Once the mission has been thoroughly analyzed, the commander must articulate it in a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved. The statement must be expressed in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).

(2) **Situation and Courses of Action (COA).** Once the mission has been articulated, the various contexts within the theater in which it must be accomplished are reviewed. The contextual review sets parameters within which to frame the various COAs.

- **Situation Analysis**

- The Geo-strategic context is viewed from domestic and international perspectives reviewing pertinent information concerning the following topics:
 - political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict
 - domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints
 - international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with U.S. interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations
- Characteristics of the operational area, including the following:
 - military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather)
 - transportation
 - telecommunications
 - economics (organization, industrial base, mobilization capacity)
 - social conditions, science and technology factors affecting the operational area
- Analysis of the Enemy. The enemy situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities, is reviewed to an appropriate level of detail with the understanding that operational-level commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate. Topics typically covered in the estimate include the following:
 - Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future
 - Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known)
 - Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations
 - Possible external military support
 - Centers of gravity (strategic and operational)

Specific operational characteristics: strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors (including basing used and available), and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations)

- Friendly Situation. A review of the friendly forces should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the theater level, commanders normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and C4 estimates. In the likely event that operations may include forces from other nations, such multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partners' objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

- Limitations. Given guidance from NCA, coalition, or host-nation authorities, the operational commander may receive limitations in the form of constraints, restraints, or restrictions. Constraints limit the commander because they direct what will

be accomplished (e.g., prevent the destruction of the airfield). Restraints limit the amount of force that the commander may use, even though more force is available (e.g., the impact of all indirect fire weapons must be observed). Restrictions prohibit the use of a particular type of force and/or limit where it can be used geographically (e.g., the force will not maneuver or direct fires within the city limits of city XYZ). These limitations on the use (or threat of use) of force that are imposed may be necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

- Assumptions. Valid assumptions are vital to an effective planning process. An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge so planning can continue. It is stated as if it were a fact. Assumptions should be limited to as few as possible to keep the planning process moving forward. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue (See paragraph 409. Planning Guidance).

- Deductions. Deductions from the preceding analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

- **Courses of Action (COA) Analysis.** Based on the preceding analysis and a creative determination of how the mission can be accomplished, COAs are developed. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable (detailed discussion concerning COAs is in Chapter 4, paragraph 409, **Figure 4-28**). State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

- Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished
- In sequence or phasing of major tasks to be accomplished
- Forces required
- Logistics concept
- Deployment concept
- Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives
- Concept for maintaining a theater reserve

(3) **Analysis of Opposing COA.** Commanders must determine the probable effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA. **Caution:** Planners must not compare friendly COAs against each other at this point, but analyze them against possible enemy capabilities. The analysis must be conducted in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. The analysis of opposing courses should take into account the following considerations:

- Potential actions of subordinates two echelons down
- Conflict termination issues, thinking through own action, enemy reaction, counterreaction
- Finally, revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determination of additional requirements, if any; required modifications; advantages and disadvantages of each COA

(4) **Comparison of Own COA.** Planners then evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA by performing the following actions:

- Identifying governing factors (factors, functions, or characteristics that are not common among the COAs, e.g., speed, cost, security, flexibility, mass, etc.)
- Comparing COAs with respect to governing factors using some form of evaluative format and weighting the various governing factors as desired in some situations
- Considering other nonmilitary factors (e.g., political constraints, multinational factors, impact of media/public perception, etc.)
- Revalidating the comparison by ensuring consensus on definitions of governing factors used and verifying that each is still adequate, feasible, and acceptable

(5) **Decision.** Planners then translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, when, where, how, and why.

303. THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN. A geographic CINC, having conducted a thorough analysis of his theater and having decided how he wants to implement national strategy, translates this strategy into documents. Common practice is to publish the basic elements of a CINC's theater strategy in an unclassified version for relatively wide distribution. The manner and substance of these strategies are unique to each CINC and have varied over the years in content and frequency of publication. Because of the differing approaches of the CINCs and the increasing demand for multiuse forces in all theaters for engagement, CJCS initiated a standardized planning requirement for geographic CINCs: Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) developed by each geographic commander over a two year period.

a. **Origins of the TEP.** The TEP is primarily a strategic planning process intended to link CINC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. In short, it is the way the CINC shapes the theater. The TEP is based on planning guidance issued in the CPG Annex A and tasks assigned by JSCP, Enclosure E. In addition to the CINC-planned and -supported military operations, the TEP is an instrument used to prioritize peacetime military engagement activities. Prioritizing ensures that all efforts in the theater focus on activities that are of greatest importance without sacrificing warfighting capability.

b. **TEP Planning Process.** (See CJCSM 3113.01A.) The TEP provides guidance for the year of execution and the next seven fiscal years. It is developed into two products: the TEP Strategic Concept and the TEP with completed Activity Annexes. Although TEP planning is continuous, the development of the TEP strategic concept is on a biennial cycle, while submissions of the TEP Annexes are on an annual cycle. The TEP development process is conducted in four phases (**Figure 3-11**).

(1) **Phase I. Initiation.** The starting point for each TEP planning cycle is the JSCP, which assigns tasks to geographic CINCs to create their TEP strategic concepts for publication biennially in April (of each odd year) and TEP Activity Annexes (the completed TEP for each year) annually in October. The JSCP, JSPS documents (NSS, NMS, CPG), and Service planning documents contain strategic guidance, intelligence, and resources available for planning. The JSCP directs that CINC planners use assigned forces (from the “Forces For” document), those temporarily deployed to theater, and those that have historically been temporarily deployed into theater to support engagement activity requirements.

(2) **Phase II. Strategic Concept Development.** In the TEP Strategic Concept, CINCs identify factors affecting engagement in their assigned theaters. They develop prioritized objectives derived from the JSCP regional objectives and other national policy documents. In addition, they outline a supporting framework of peacetime military engagement activities needed to progress toward established objectives. Below are the basic steps that form the TEP Strategic Concept:

(a) **Mission Analysis.** The CINC develops objectives from prioritized regional objectives in the JSCP and guidance from other national-level guidance.

(b) **Planning Guidance.** Information in this planning guidance includes the political, military, and economic environments; threats to security and stability in the theater; opportunities within theater to be pursued; assumptions; and planning schedule. Each category of engagement activity should be included: operational, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contracts, humanitarian assistance, and other engagement activities.

(c) **Staff Planning.** Staff planning should consider all probable actions, options, and activities that could be brought to bear to meet the mission. This includes inputs and considerations from a wide range of participants, including Service component commands, Theater Special Operations Command, Defense Attaché officers, security assistance officers, military-technical advisers, and supporting CINCs.

(d) **TEP Strategic Concept.** The TEP Strategic Concept is a narrative statement of how engagement activities will be employed to support theater objectives. This narrative becomes the foundation of the TEP and includes the commander’s intent, prioritized objectives, and a general discussion of the engagement and activities and the resources/forces required to accomplish the regional objectives.




Figure 3-11

(e) TEP Strategic Concept Review. The TEP Strategic Concept is then forwarded to CJCS for review, in the format prescribed by CJCSM 3113.01A Enclosure C. The Joint Staff leads a review of the TEP Strategic Concepts from each theater and integrates them into a global family of engagement plans. That review is completed before developing detailed TEP Activity Annexes.

(3) **Phase III. Annex Development.** In this phase, the CINCs develop detailed TEP Activity Annexes for each year of the TEP covering all the areas prescribed in the TEP Strategic Concept (**Figure 3-12**). Resources to accomplish each activity are identified and, if shortfalls are known, they are also identified. Resources for each activity identified in the TEP Activity Annex should identify active and reserve forces, time and duration of force commitment, transportation requirements, and funding (where applicable). These annexes are updated annually.

(4) **Phase IV. Plan Review.** CINCs submit their completed Theater Engagement Plans electronically to the Joint Staff J-7, which has primary responsibility for conducting the review. The Joint Staff, Services, designated CINCs, and appropriate Defense agencies review the Theater Engagement Plans for adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.




Figure 3-12

304. SYNCHRONIZATION. This is defined as the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02). Synchronization ensures that all elements of the operational force are efficiently employed to maximize the sum of their effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities—synergy. It is this technique that permits the operational commander to take the initiative, get inside his adversary’s decision cycle, and defeat its forces. JFCs use campaign plans to arrange the synchronized and phased allocation of resources to subordinate commands in coordination with the use of other elements of nonmilitary power within theater to attain strategic objectives. Synchronization is the technique the JFC uses to employ forces in consonance with his sense of operational art to achieve the strategic aim.

a. **Joint Vision Operational Concepts.** Joint Visions 2010 and 2020 describe the conceptual template for how future joint force commanders will channel their forces to achieve new levels of effectiveness and attain full-spectrum dominance. This vision of innovative warfighting embodies improved intelligence and command and control available in the information age and goes on to develop four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These operational concepts, enhanced through information superiority and innovation, are the theater operating systems that must be synchronized for the JFC to dominate the battlespace of tomorrow (**Figure 3-13**).




Figure 3-13

(1) **Dominant Maneuver.** Dominant maneuver is the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint land, air, sea, amphibious, special operations, and space forces (capable of scaling and massing force—and/or the effects of fires for either combat or noncombat operations), will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility, and countermobility capabilities.

(2) **Precision Engagement.** Precision Engagement is the ability of joint forces to locate, observe, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and rearrange with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military objectives.

(3) **Focused Logistics.** Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force with the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as a part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.

(4) **Full-dimensional Protection.** Full-dimensional Protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. It is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of land, air, sea, space, and information, across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.

b. **Unified Action.** Whereas the term “joint operations” is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term “unified action” has a broader connotation. Unified action is a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of their commanders (JP 1-02). The concept of unified action (sometimes referred to as unified operations) is illustrated in **Figure 3-14** and highlights the synchronized application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power, including the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.




Figure 3-14

All JFCs are responsible for unified actions planned and conducted under the guidance and direction of senior authorities (i.e., NCA, alliance or coalition leadership, superior commander). JFCs should ensure that their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (government agencies such as the Agency for International Development (AID)). In addition, (and increasingly during operations other than war), JFCs must coordinate and synchronize, if possible, with nongovernmental organizations (such as religious relief agencies), corporations, international agencies (such as the International Red Cross), and possibly even the United Nations. Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders, especially during operations other than war. Combatant commanders typically play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions are normally present at the CINC's level). Subordinate JFCs also synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.

c. **Synchronization Matrix.** A tool often used by the JTF planners to effect coordination and cooperation in these complex contingencies is the synchronization matrix. Creating a planning tool such as a matrix allows the JFC and his staff to display many of the known activities of their operation by phases, functional area, and operating systems. There is no prescribed way to do this, for it will vary depending on the commander, the operation, and the resources available; however, an example format is at **Figure 3-15.**

Synchronization Matrix				
	Phase 1 Pre-hostilities	Phase 2 Lodgement	Phase 3 Decisive Combat	Phase 4 Redeployment
Command & Control	Res Augment Accept OPCON Assume JFACC Embark LNOs OPCON Theater	Deploy HQs Deploy HQs Deploy HQs Deploy HQs Deploy HQs	Cond Link-up Est AOA JFACC Cond Link-up	Transition Transition Transition Transition
Firepower		Prov ADA Prov Air Spt	Dest Insurg MAR Supremacy Supp FI CAS Dest Scuds	
Movement & Maneuver	Show of Force	Est FOBS Conduct Air Ops Est FOBS Chop Forces Conduct SR	Para Forc Entry Amphib Raid AI/BA/CAS Att Cp Lejeune Cond DA	Redeploy Redeploy Redeploy Redeploy
Protection		Deploy Forces Deploy Aug Forces Prov TAES Embark/Deploy Deploy Forces	Supp CA Est 2d Ech Med	Main CSAR
Intelligence	Strat Recce Theater Recon	Pre Asst Recon Track Targets Target Air Threats Cond SR	TACON SOF TACON SOF Cond SR	
Support	Est Log Base	Est Log Bases Est Log Bases Est Log Bases Est Log Bases	Prov refuel Cond IT Lift	Trans to MNF
Components: ARFOR - NAVFOR - AFFOR - MARFOR - SOF				

Figure 3-15

The value in exercising this technique lies in its highlighting critical points of coordination among components of the command, identifying shortfalls in activity by phase or function, and using this format with which to analyze potential branches and sequels in detail. Although they involve a tedious and somewhat lengthy process, synchronization matrices greatly enhance a staff's ability to identify critical nodes in the commander's operation.

305. TOOLS OF THE JFC. Campaigning is a necessary though complex process through which a commander directs his forces in a style that is uniquely his own. The numerous subtleties and nuances of operational art require that the JFC and staff use the various tools available to adequately express the commanders will. Although it is beyond the scope of this manual to discuss comprehensively all the tools available, some of the more significant tools are presented below.

a. **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent describes the desired end state of the campaign. A concise expression of the purpose of the operation, but not a summary of the concept of operations, it may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment of the enemy commander's intent. JFCs begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together with the higher headquarters' order, the JFC's intent is the initial impetus to begin the entire planning process. JFCs first express their intent vocally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance, then refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the Commander's Estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation. Helping subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned, the commander's intent provides focus for all subordinate elements. The intent statement is usually written, but could be vocal when time is short. It should be concise and clear, and should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC's order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command (**Figure 3-16**).




Figure 3-16

b. **Battlespace Geometry.** For the JFC to establish order within the battlespace, the operational area needs to be organized and labeled with a common lexicon so that all players can have a standard reference. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. Their size and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas (illustrated in **Figure 3-17**):




Figure 3-17

- **Joint Operations Area (JOA).** A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geo-graphic area. They are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

- **Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA).** A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special

operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

- **Joint Rear Area (JRA).** The JRA facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. They are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat, but may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

- **Amphibious Objective Area.** The amphibious objective area includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for conducting necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” contains further information and guidance.

- **Area of Operations.** JFCs may define areas of operations (AO) for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

- **Area of Interest (AI).** JFCs at all levels can designate AIs to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

- **Combat and Communications Zones (COMMZ) (Figure 3-18).** Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and COMMZs. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations, normally extending forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains the theater organizations, lines of communication (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. It usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a combatant commander’s AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate—connected only by thin LOCs—in very fluid, dynamic situations.




Figure 3-18

306. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS (C4) SYSTEMS. Historically, great military victories are often attributed to superior mobility, firepower, intelligence, or logistics. But superior command and control (C2) capabilities have often been what enabled commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply those capabilities at the critical time and place to win. Today improved technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, and C4 systems, and increased and increasingly sustained operation tempo, generate voluminous amounts of information. Information overload, if not managed, can adversely affect the outcome of a conflict. Properly employed, C4 systems can be the key to successful information management and military operations.

a. **Basic Doctrine**

(1) An unbroken chain of communications must extend from the NCA, through CJCS, to the combatant commanders, component commanders, and commanders of subordinate and supporting commands.

(2) CJCS, through the combatant commands, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Services, ensures that commanders at each echelon have the communications necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. The required commu-

nications capability may come from the Defense Communications System (DCS), the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), other National Communications System (NCS) operating agencies' systems, organic force communications systems, or commercial communications systems. This multiplicity of C4 systems ensures communications support during all phases of military operations.

(3) Current C4 capabilities will evolve to the Global Information Grid (GIG) – a concept and vision set forward by the DOD to achieve information superiority (IS) in the future.

b. **C4 Systems Principles.** Experience has demonstrated that the C4 planner should be brought in at the beginning of the planning process and involved throughout the planning evolution. To achieve operational objectives, C4 principles should be applied during all phases of the operation. Joint Pub 6-0 identifies principles common to Service, joint, and combined C4 activities.

c. **National Communications System (NCS).** The NCS is an interagency group that coordinates the telecommunications assets of 23 Federal departments and agencies to ensure compatibility and interoperability during emergencies without compromising day-to-day operations.

(1) The purpose of the NCS is to assist the President, National Security Council, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Office of Management and Budget to exercise their wartime and nonwartime emergency functions and their planning and oversight responsibilities, and coordinate the planning for national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Government under all circumstances.

(2) The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the NCS. The principal adviser for NCS matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I). The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), is the Manager, NCS.

d. **Defense Communications System (DCS).** The Defense Communications System (DCS) is a composite of certain DOD communications systems and networks under the management control and direction of DISA. It administers the C2 requirements of DOD and civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements. The objective is to organize the complex of DOD communications networks, equipment, control centers, and resources to furnish an effective, responsive, survivable worldwide communications system.

e. **Information Superiority (IS).** A major goal of the DOD is to achieve information superiority in support of Joint Vision (JV) 2010 and 2020. Information Superiority is defined as:

“...the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”

- Joint Vision 2010

(1) The focus of Information Superiority (IS) is providing the future Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander with an understandable, multidimensional, real-time, fused view of the battlespace to support the full range of military operations: humanitarian assistance, peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict. Information Superiority is the key enabler of the operational concepts of Precision Engagement, Dominant Maneuver, Focused Logistics, and Full Dimensional Protection.

(2) Information Superiority (IS) is not a static, pre-determined, quantifiable capability. It is intricately tied to the specific situation and is determined by the mission, environment, and current need for information.

f. The Global Information Grid (GIG)

(1) Over the past 10 years the nature of the actions involving U.S. forces has been varied and the response times have been decreasing. If the U.S. and its Allies are given time, they will place an unbeatable force in the area of conflict. Consequently, our response times are being whittled down dramatically. Also, there are more short notice JTF requirements for natural disaster response forces needing interoperability with non-DOD agencies and host nations not on our standard list of Allied or Coalition partners.

(2) The GIG is the vision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) for achieving IS. The GIG is focused on the warfighters’ needs for IS plus the critical concerns of frequency spectrum and improving the management of the information infrastructure investment along with the coevolution of DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities).

(3) The September 22, 1999, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Director, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Systems (ASD/C3I) memorandum, Global Information Grid, defines the Global Information Grid (GIG) as:

“The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services and other associated services necessary to achieve Information Superiority. It also includes National Security Systems as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The GIG supports all Department of Defense, National Security, and related Intelligence Community missions and func-

tions (strategic, operational, tactical and business), in war and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms and deployed sites). The GIG provides interfaces to coalition, allied, and non-DOD users and systems.”

(4) The GIG is not a “new start” program; it will build upon the existing Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (DII COE). The building blocks of Joint Technical Architecture, Joint Operational Architecture, Joint Systems Architecture, a shared data environment, the migration of legacy systems, and adherence to commercial standards provide the necessary structure for the GIG.

(5) The key to achieving Information Superiority lies in implementing a standards based, metric-oriented, end-to-end integrated Global Information Grid. The concept of IS may be situational but the GIG, which will implement IS, is quantifiable. Important initiatives to implement the GIG are described below.

(6) The Global Information Grid is the unifying theme that will enable the Department of Defense to develop, acquire, field, and operate the applications, communications and computing capability necessary to assure mission success in an integrated, synchronized fashion. The GIG will permit:

- battlespace awareness through a common operational picture,
- collaborative planning of dispersed, multi-functional operational teams,
- employment of massed effects rather than massed forces,
- in-flight retargeting of precision-guided munitions, and
- fused sensor-to-decision maker-to-shooter capability.

g. GIG Efforts for Achieving Information Superiority (IS)

(1) To achieve Information Superiority through the GIG, various organizational, procedural, and doctrinal changes are occurring. They are inextricably linked to the vast advancements in information technology. The goal for these changes is to enable warfighter’s concepts and efficiently support the business functions of the Department of Defense.

(2) In order to achieve this goal, the GIG must be dynamic and adaptable to changes in the operational environment, flexible and secure for adding and removing users, and support the JV2020 operational capabilities of Focused Logistics, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, and Full Dimension Protection. The GIG must provide end-to-end visibility, control, and support to manage and protect networks and the information they carry. To maintain the integral capabilities, the GIG must be scalable, resourced, and upgraded as required. Key to the warfighting environment, it must be Allied, Coalition, and non-DOD Agency friendly.

(a) Dominant Maneuver (DM) depends upon IS to enable the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish operational tasks. IS will allow our forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace through assured, real-time battlespace awareness. The GIG will ensure warfighters can coordinate widely dispersed units, receive accurate and timely feedback, and execute more precision requirements.

(b) Precision Engagement (PE) requires services and capabilities that enable forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision. Precision Engagement will allow us to shape the battlespace and enhance force protection. Information Superiority will enable high fidelity target acquisition, prioritized requirements, command and control of joint forces within the battlespace, and minimizing collateral damage.

(c) Full-Dimensional Protection (FDP) will enable the effective employment of our forces while degrading the enemy's abilities to do the same. "Full-dimensional protection will be built upon information superiority which will provide multidimensional awareness and assessment, as well as identification of all forces in the battlespace."

(d) Focused Logistics (FL) will be achieved through a fusion of technological, organizational and process innovations. Information Superiority is key to enabling the fusion to achieve FL objectives of total asset visibility, intransit visibility, right-sizing of the logistics footprint, and the merging of logistics information into the common operational picture to meet CINC and JTF Commander priorities. IS goals are providing the interoperability, collaborative planning, and information processing capabilities essential to effective Joint Force logistics.

h. **Seven Components of the GIG.** The GIG focuses on seven components to provide these capabilities: Warrior, Global Applications, Communications, Computing, Network Operations, Information Management, and Foundation.

(1) **Warrior Component**

(a) The GIG supports the sensor – decision maker- shooter – target structure critical to combat operations. During Allied Force, the entire spectrum of operations, including battle management, battlefield air interdiction, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and air campaign planning were required by NATO commanders to operate and maneuver its tanks within the adversary's decision cycle. The current C4ISR capabilities were enhanced when creative commanders on the ground developed new ways to use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and airborne forward air controllers to conduct flex targeting and filming of battle damage.

(b) Providing battlespace awareness to warfighters across the Joint force with accuracy and timeliness requires that data and information from multiple sources be collected, processed (analyzed when necessary), transported, fused, placed in appropriate contexts, and presented in ways that facilitate rapid and accurate decision making.

(2) Global Applications Component

(a) The Global Applications component covers such diverse areas as medical, weather, electronic commerce, Global Combat Support System (GCSS), DOD Intelligence Information System, Global Command and Control System (GCCS). GCSS and GCCS are two critical applications support Joint command and control and operational concepts by providing for the information needs of the warfighters.

(b) The Global Combat Support System (GCSS) will provide the logistics, accounting and finance, personnel, and medical information needed to plan, deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces key to Focused Logistics. It will provide interoperability across combat support functions, as well as between combat support and command and control. GCSS will provide the joint warfighter access to all data and applications for total asset visibility.

(c) The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is a comprehensive worldwide capability to provide information processing and dissemination end-to-end. It supports situational awareness, readiness assessments, course of action development, imagery exploitation, and planning. The development of a coherent set of Battlespace Awareness capabilities for Information Superiority will result from the continued enhancement of the GCCS Common Operational Picture. Additional information on GCCS tasks, purpose, and current and future mission applications is provided in paragraph m below.

(3) Communications Component

(a) To support the Joint Warfighter of today as well as 2010 and beyond, interoperable, assured, end-to-end networks for information and C2 transport and processing are vital. All information and data are required to be available end-to end to support whatever mission requirements exist regardless of environment. Doctrine and policy will dictate access, but the information and data will be available for push or pull.

(b) The Communications Component of the Grid extends from the post, camp, station, through the strategic networks, to the "last tactical mile." The last tactical mile extends to the Service weapons and sensor platforms. The bridge between the strategic and tactical communications networks will be the DOD Teleport. Teleports will provide deployed communications networks access to strategic networks, and the services and data that those networks have to offer, e.g. secure and nonsecure telephone, data, and video teleconferencing networks. This will allow the deployed warfighter in a Navy ship, Army division, Air Force wing, or Marine task force access to data stored on these

strategic networks, and provide a means to push information to strategic planners. As the more forward “networked sensors” need to move data and information in real-time, it makes the Communications Component more critical to operational success.

(4) **Computing Component**

(a) The GIG’s Computing Component consists of hardware, software, capabilities, and processes. It includes megacenter services, shared data warehouses for storage/access, software distribution from central locations, shared mapping services, licensing services, electronic mail delivery, web services, collaboration services to share information and ideas, common directories, and search services. These computing services will “...provide an uninterrupted distribution of information to U.S. forces, with the knowledge to use the information, while denying the enemy the ability to do the same.”

(b) The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is crafting a computing infrastructure to “...support all DOD missions, including command and control, combat support, and intelligence...”, which is evolvable, interoperable, features reuse of data, and security to support information superiority. DISA’s DII Common Operating Environment (DII COE) provides a set of integrated support services for mission area applications and the Shared data Engineering (SHADE) provides for the interoperability of functional applications at the data level among the functional areas needed to provide fused battlespace awareness. SHADE will ensure cross-functional integration of applications so data from one functional community can be used by applications belonging to another functional community.

(5) **Network Operations (NETOPS) Component.** NETOPS will provide collaborative integrated and seamless end-to-end management of networks, global applications, and services across the GIG by Unified Combatant Command commanders (CINCs), Services, and Agencies.

(a) **Network Management** will provide visibility of extent and intensity of activity, traffic load, and throughput potential. It will enable dynamic rerouting based on priority, system status and capacity. The effects of disruptions and intrusions will be minimized through allocation of traffic to unaffected available network paths. Network management, as one component of NETOPS, plays a key role in successful implementation of the GIG. Having end-to-end awareness of the networks comprising the GIG and then properly managing those networks from the strategic to the tactical level, whether fixed station or deployed, is a critical part of synchronizing our forces in peacetime or war. Interoperability between these network management systems is crucial in provide true end-to-end service to the Warfighter and DOD’s crucial business functions. Network management will provide commanders with the ability to view and manage their networks just like other resources. Commanders will be able to visualize the networks that support their on-going operations and adjust or reallocate capabilities as the situation changes.

(b) **Information Dissemination Management (IDM)** will provide improved awareness, access, and delivery of information and will provide direction for information flows based on Commander's priorities that can then be executed by network management. IDM seeks to achieve the right information, arriving at the right place, at the right time, in a useable format through the processes, services, and applications to Warfighters at all levels (Strategic, Operational, and Tactical) and other users of information. IDM will provide awareness of relevant, accurate information, automated access to newly discovered or reoccurring information, and timely, efficient delivery of that information. Key to this uninterrupted flow and making the most efficient use of the networks is providing awareness of information within a commander's Area Of Responsibility (AOR) and providing the capability to dynamically adjust the priority of information flow based on the current operational environment. IDM must work hand-in-hand with network management allowing the commander's dissemination policies to be executed while maintaining priority schemas established within specific AORs. These capabilities will become an integrated part of the Defense Integrated Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE) and will be applied to the entire GIG with a goal of making all information on the Grid available to those who are "plugged in".

(c) **Information Assurance (IA)** will provide the vital element of NETOPS that minimizes our systems and information vulnerabilities. Through a *DEFENSE IN DEPTH* approach of tactics, techniques, and procedures, IA will protect and defend the information, data, systems, and networks. Our armed forces increasingly rely on critical digital electronic information capabilities to store, process and move essential data in planning, directing, coordinating and executing operations of all types. However, many of these systems have security weaknesses that can be exploited by powerful and sophisticated deep-attack threats – events or circumstances that can cause unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, or denial of service – and increasing interoperability and network integration increase vulnerabilities. With deep, layered defenses we can eliminate vulnerabilities and deter, defeat, and recover from sustained, skillful and penetrating assaults. The integrated, network-centric nature of the GIG requires that assurance measures be applied throughout because the assurance of the entire GIG is dependent upon the assurance of all its individual elements. With one's adversaries having potentially increased visibility into our deliberation, decision-making processes, preparations, and operations, there is an increased risk of being outflanked or disrupted. In one sense the situation actually becomes more like chess, where everyone gets the same pieces and sees the same battlespace. The winner, of course, is the one who can make the best use of the pieces. A solid investment in Information Assurance and its training, doctrine, and policy are required now, in order to be prepared for the GIG environment.

(6) Information Management Component

(a) Information Management is defined as “the planning, budgeting, manipulating, controlling of information throughout its life cycle (e.g., creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, storage, and disposition.)”

(b) The Information Management component will enable the warfighter to access needed databases with appropriate permissions, anywhere in the world. It is essential for real-time decision support and knowledge management necessary to decrease response time, enable a more rapid transition from deployment to full operational capability and support flexible organizations essential to dynamic future joint operations. Information Management provides joint warfighters with the critical ability to dynamically tailor and prioritize their information requirements to support the mission and environment. This flexibility will ensure real-time, relevant information and Battlespace Awareness.

(c) Greater networking can quickly lead to information overload – we must ensure our data works for us. IM is a means of prioritizing information through electronic labeling to ensure that highly critical mission information proceeds across the networks prior to less important planning or administrative information.

(7) Foundation Component

(a) The Foundation of the GIG is solidly grounded in doctrine, policy, governance, training, engineering, resourcing, compliance, standards, architectures, and testing. These elements have been proven over time to be the strength of every successful endeavor and the downfall if they are not properly addressed.

(b) The foundation is all those “transforming” activities that must happen involving people and organizations in order to make the GIG a reality. It involves changing from the way we think today – more than individual networks and systems to being able to access information, at anytime, in any location by tapping into the Global Information Grid.

(c) The ability to provide assured awareness across the Joint force with accuracy and timeliness requires that data and information from multiple sources be collected, processed, transported, fused, placed in appropriate contexts, and presented in ways that ensure rapid and accurate understanding. It also requires that modeling and simulation (M&S) and decision support systems become integral parts of the decision making process. M&S will be critical to synchronized, integrated employment and implementation of the GIG.

i. **Network Warfare Simulation (NETWARS)**

(1) NETWARS is a modeling and simulation capability to analyze joint communications systems capacity and performance. It assures the JTF Commander and the CINC that they have the right network resources to support the fight or if these resources must be prioritized as other warfighting resources during certain phases of the operation. The NETWARS communications model is being developed to satisfy compelling needs to: (1) conduct C4 contingency planning; (2) conduct communications burden analysis of new and existing networks; (3) evaluate emerging technologies; and (4) justify joint C4 investments.

(2) NETWARS will provide results such as network and circuit utilization rates, speed of service, and message perishability with enough technical accuracy and precision to quantify the network loading delays and bottlenecks. The NETWARS model and simulation tool will help the C4 planner predict network problems and solve them during the planning phase, before they have a negative operational impact. In addition, NETWARS will justify investment strategies to help evolve the GIG.

(3) NETWARS is being developed in a modular way with each Service to facilitate and reduce the time required to perform these studies. This process will take advantage of economies of scale by sharing data and models among all Services and Agencies, provide a Joint modeling environment, and be the primary network-modeling tool for the Services in the future.

j. **Spectrum Management**

(1) Solving spectrum management issues is key to the ability to implement the real-time, assured, integrated GIG needed for successful Focused Logistics, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimension Protection focuses on. Conflicting commercial spectrum needs domestically and internationally pose serious threats to military communications access.

(2) CINCs desire assured spectrum access for the warfighter for domestic defense and international operations, without today's diverging allocation tables. We need to achieve "stable allocation tables" in order to:

- Procure/acquire future weapons systems,
- Train with current warfighting equipment capabilities, and
- Minimize modifications and thereby costs

(3) DOD faces increased "competition" for access to frequencies because the 1980s significant increases of technology and 1990s considerable commercially driven interests. The 2000s will see an expansion of the dependence on wireless requirements for civilian and military needs.

k. **Allied and Coalition Interoperability**

(1) Operations Allied Force and Noble Anvil have provided a real world laboratory for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) interoperability and its effects on the joint warfighting environment. “NATO commanders used video teleconferencing for the first time as a major instrument for exercising command and control...these commanders’ video teleconferences spanned the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command, thus greatly compressing normal command and control processes.” However, problems in communications interoperability, “...persisted throughout the campaign.”

(2) International standards, policies, doctrines, and procedures affect the critical need for C4 interoperability along with hardware and software inequities. The capabilities envisioned by the GIG will ensure applicable standards, hardware, and software compatibilities while providing the flexibility to support evolving policies, doctrines, and procedures.

1. **Coevolution**

(1) Doctrine, policy, and organizations will need to coevolve to take full advantage of the enhanced capabilities provided by the GIG. Coevolution of the elements of the GIG’s Foundation Component will provide increased connectivity and interoperability. With the GIG capabilities and JV2010 operational capabilities, warfighters and their staffs are likely to coevolve innovative ways of fighting yet in vented or observed.

(2) As networks, applications, software, systems, and transmission mediums become more interoperable and assured, they provide the warfighter as well as the business process owners of the DOD an opportunity to take full advantage of capabilities at all levels to visualize their current situation. They can then use this fused data to plan their specific mission, within the context of the global situation. Increased battlespace visualization will provide the joint warfighter with real-time and simulated information into the impact of mission planning on overall resources available allowing optimization based on operational constraints.

m. **The Global Command and Control System (GCCS).** GCCS became the Joint Command and Control System of Record on 30 August 1996.

(1) **GCCS Tasks.** GCCS provides the Warfighter (joint task force, functional service components, and supporting CINCs) to the NCA information technology (IT)-enabled C2 capabilities incorporating core elements of mission-essential tasks enabling the commanders to better respond to unexpected conditions. GCCS provides these capabilities supporting a wide range of military operations from the strategic national level down to the service component level and throughout the spectrum of possible operations. GCCS supports decision-making processes in environments that may or may not provide

all necessary information. In addition, the information exchange environment provided by GCCS must also make it easy for the JFC to request and assimilate relevant information about support to the joint force plans and operations. While it is the responsibility of the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) to provide support information, GCCS must accommodate integration and presentation of that information to the commander. GCCS must meet the readiness support requirements of the Services; provide a real-time collaborative environment with decision support tools greatly reducing the decision cycle, and must provide the joint Warfighter a modern, open systems architecture, scaleable in both size and capability to meet the spectrum of the Warfighter's needs (See **Figure 3-19**).




Figure 3-19

(2) **GCCS Purpose.** The purpose of the GCCS is to provide a system the National Command Authorities (NCA) and subordinate elements can use in the generation and application of national military power. The system must be highly flexible, be able to collect, process, disseminate and protect information, and support the C2 decision-making process. The process of C2 is comprised of those methodologies enabling the JFC to gain and maintain dominant advantages of timing and tempo over opposing forces or adversaries. These methodologies fall into three broad areas: planning, preparation, and execution. The C2 methodologies in operation in each of these areas are fueled by

information. Information is an essential fundamental element of C2. However, control of information and the synthesis of information usable to the commander and staff are the most severe challenges to effective C2.

(3) GCCS Defined

(a) GCCS is the Information Technology/Information Technology Management (IT/ITM) based system, policies, and procedures supporting the exercise of joint C2 from the NCA to the service component level. C2 is defined as: “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.” (*Joint Publication (JP) 1-02*).

(b) GCCS is used over the spectrum of command from the NCA to the service component level. Of special note, GCCS gives the joint force commander (JFC) the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 enables joint force commanders to form an understanding of the situation, decide what action is required, transmit instructions to subordinate commanders, and get feedback on the results of the action in relation to the JFC’s desired outcome (intent). This C2 cycle begins at the moment the JFC is ordered to execute a mission, and functions until the JFC is ordered to cease operations and stand down. The JFC uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions influencing friendly and enemy forces to the JFC’s advantage. GCCS provides information to integrate joint force components, allowing them to function rapidly and effectively across vast distances. In short, the joint force must have information to operate. This information should be relevant, essential, timely, and processed in a form that warriors quickly understand and can use. GCCS is the JFC’s principal information technology/ information technology management (IT/ITM) tool used to collect, transport, process, and disseminate this information supporting the spectrum of operations.

(c) GCCS provides a continuous flow of data to provide real time battlespace information anywhere and anytime. GCCS has the capability to provide both information pull on demand and information push. While remaining within the mandates of the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), GCCS should not be limited in definition in terms of infrastructure or hardware. Within GCCS are a suite of core C2 capabilities providing planning, execution, collaboration, and monitoring tools for the mission-essential tasks of force generation, force employment, force protection, intelligence, and situational awareness. These are essential capabilities required by the combatant commanders and their subordinate JFCs to accomplish their mission. In support of these major mission-essential tasks are a set of office automation tools, collaboration tools, modeling and simulation tools, shared data bases, and assessment tools.




Figure 3-19

(4) GCCS Current Mission Applications

(a) **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)** is the integrated command and control system used to plan and execute joint military operations. It is a combination of joint policies, procedures, personnel, training and a reporting structure supported by automated data processing on GCCS. The capabilities of the JOPES mission applications support translation of the National Command Authority's policy decisions into planning and execution of joint military operations. JOPES applications include:

- Requirements Development and Analysis (RDA) creates, analyzes and edits Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).
- Scheduling and Movement (S&M) handles command and control information on deployment activity and status. It functions as a vehicle for the scheduling and tracking movement of TPFDD requirements.
- Logistics Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) assists logistics planners in determining sustained movement requirements during deliberate and crisis action planning.

- Non Unit Personnel Generator (NPG) functions are to assist in determining quantities of replacement and filler personnel.
- Systems Support functions as the JOPES core database management subsystem for functional managers.

(b) **JOPES Editing Tool (JET)**: JET provides the capability to create, add, modify, delete, and generate deployment-related information contained in an Operation Plan (OPLAN) Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). Although JET is focused on time-sensitive or Crisis Action Planning (CAP), it is also an excellent tool for the deliberate planner. JET has two segments, JOPES Editing Tool (JET) and JET DB Server (JETSrv). JET provides the user with a rapid, user friendly approach to developing and maintaining JOPES TPFDD. JET achieves its speed from code modularity, streamlined screen navigation and the use of a low overhead software language. The user friendly aspects are derived from close coordination in development with the JOPES user community. Specifically, functionality is driven by the JS/J3CSOD designated single point of contact at FORSCOM. JET will support “remote users” over low baud rate dial-up phone lines using STU IIIs. JET is expected to replace the JOPES Requirements Development & Analysis (RDA) application. JET development is planned in a series of “Builds”. The initial focus is routine single edit functions expanding to more complicated tasks such as mass edits, force module processing, and OPLAN merges in later builds. JETSrv is the database server segment for the JET application. It creates the Oracle objects (including the JET_USER role) necessary for the operation of JET. It also provides scripts which are used to add/remove users as JET users.

(c) **Rapid Query Tool (RQT)**: The Rapid Query Tool (RQT) is a prototype. It consists of one segment, the RQT Client. No RQT specific database segment is required. It is intended to perform all the critical functions of legacy JOPES Ad Hoc Query (AHQ), but at a much higher speed. It is a rapid Operation Plan (OPLAN) query tool. It uses a new approach that provides a fast, flexible, and complete solution to a user’s OPLAN query needs. RQT provides a wide range of user-defined data representation and format options for viewing and printing OPLAN data. RQT creates a “snapshot” of OPLAN data through rapid retrieval using parallel processing. This snapshot is saved on the Client workstation and is used when generating reports. This approach allows report tailoring “on the fly” and greatly reduces the number of times the GCCS Oracle database is accessed. RQT provides the user with a comprehensive JOPES data retrieval, analysis, and output tool. The primary goal in the development of RQT is providing the JOPES user community with a total OPLAN data analysis tool with the absolute maximum performance. Speed does not come without the application of processing power. RQT does this by taking advantage the database server’s capability to manage multiple processors and processes. RQT creates multiple processes to extract data, thus eliminating the time-consuming bottleneck of multiple ORACLE table joins. After the data is retrieved it is then merged into a single “snapshot” for analysis. The multiple processes are prioritized and managed by the database server operating system in consideration of server demands to perform other tasks. It is to the user’s advantage that the operating system puts as much computing power as available to accomplish the retrievals and

merge the data. This is done quickly and efficiently as opposed to long term, slow processes that tend to bog the system down.

(d) **COMPASS**: COMPASS is a set of Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software services. COMPASS provides a non-intrusive middleware approach that facilitates Collaborative Planning, Modeling & Simulation (CPM&S) access as well as Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) to the Joint-Combined Arms environment. COMPASS allows planners using disparate mission planning systems to move between local planning, collaborative planning, analysis, and simulation-based rehearsal modes. COMPASS capabilities include a client-server architecture with session management (SMGT) tools, a shared overlay manager (SOM), a composite route preview (CRP) capability, COTS DCP tools, GOTS DCP server tools, and the ability to observe external M&S products on host C4I and mission planning systems.

(e) **MAT**: MAT is a medical planner's tool that provides a requirements generator (MAT-RG) and a course of action analysis (MAT-COAA) module. Previously, two separate models performed these functions. MAT combines these two functions into a single environment and provides interfaces between them and to other data sources and automated tools.

(f) **Global Reconnaissance Information System (GRIS)**: GRIS supports the planning and scheduling of monthly sensitive reconnaissance operations (SRO) theater requests. The Joint Staff staffs these requests through the office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and State Department for National Security Council approval. Incoming RECON 1/2/3/4 formatted messages are received by an automated message handling system, validated, and passed to the GRIS application for automated processing and database update. GRIS generates all RECON messages and also monitors the monthly execution of theater commands exercising operational control (OPCON) over airborne reconnaissance assets.

(g) **Evacuation System (EVAC)**: EVAC collects and displays information about U.S. citizens located outside the United States as collected by U.S. State Department embassies and consulates. It accesses the database server via TELNET operation from a GCCS compatible client.

(h) **Global Status of Resources and Training (GSORTS)**: GSORTS provides information on status of units with respect to personnel, equipment and training. Query and display capabilities include: categories of units (ships, fighter aircraft, ground forces, etc.); specific types of units (frigates, armor battalions, F-15's, etc.); and by specific unit (displays detailed status information).

(i) **Global Status of Resources and Training (Enhanced) GSORTS (E)**: GSORTS is made up of two segments: RASINP and RASSRV. RASINP client in-

terface will provide the GCCS user a means for on-line registration and entry of unit readiness data into the Global Status Resources and Training System, Sorts database.

(j) **Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS):** JDISS applications provide the intelligence window to access national, theater, and tactical intelligence sources through the joint architecture for intelligence. It provides connectivity and interoperability with intelligence systems required to support forces during peacetime, crisis, and war. JDISS includes INTELINK at the Secret classification level (INTELINK-S). It is an intelligence dissemination service which enhances the sharing of intelligence information electronically over the SIPRNET. INTELINK provides intelligence dissemination using networked information discovery, retrieval, and browsing services. Its point and click technology makes intelligence products widely available to both users and producers of intelligence.

(k) **Common Operational Picture (COP):** The DII-COE COP provides an integrated tactical display of TADIL, Intel, and sensor data while providing a common geospatial processing & visualization to all C4I & C2 programs.

(l) **Global Transportation Network (GTN)** is an operational prototype that furnishes the automated command and control support needed for USTRANSCOM to carry out its mission of global transportation management for DOD. GTN also supports USTRANSCOM in accomplishing its task to integrate deployment-related ADP systems and to furnish centralized traffic management in peace and war.

- GTN accesses current transportation information from diverse sources, integrates that information, and gives it to users in a useful form. Information is integrated into a central database to cross-reference supply, cargo, forces, passenger, and patient requirements and movements with airlift, air refueling, aeromedical, and sealift schedules and movement. Success will be directly related to the quality of the data, response time to a query, number of users able to access the database at one time, and ability to keep the database operational under all conditions.

- DESERT SHIELD/STORM highlighted the need for integrated transportation information. One of the key problems experienced was inaccurate movement requirements. JOPES gave a general forecast of requirements to schedule lift against, but some units took more or less equipment than the JOPES database held for them, or they weren't ready to embark lift assets at times indicated in the JOPES database. This sometimes resulted in scheduling the wrong lift assets for the wrong loads at the wrong times. Another problem was lack of in-transit visibility; once passengers and cargo were loaded on a lift asset, they could not be tracked until accounted for at the receiving end. The customers in the field did not know where critical items were in the pipeline, so duplicate and triplicate requisitions were sometimes submitted, and lift that could have been used more efficiently for something else was used to move the extra items. Containers remained in ports because nobody knew what they contained or where to send them. In-transit visibility, a primary benefit of GTN, solves or ameliorates such deficiencies.

• GTN gives users the ability to do the following things, as depicted in **Figure 3 -20**:

- locate items in transit
- forecast port workload
- assess unit deployment status
- determine onward movement requirements
- confirm requisition movement
- determine container and pallet contents
- obtain current aircraft and ship schedules




Figure 3-20

(m) **Scheduling and Movement (S&M)** is the focus within JOPES for command and control information on deployment activity and status. It functions as a vehicle to report and track movement of TPFDD requirements. S&M allows the user to review, update, schedule, and create manifests of both Transportation Component Command (TCC) carrier and organic movement data, before and during deployment. It offers the capability to review and analyze an extensive variety of source requirements. The Global Transportation Network (GTN) supplies TCC air carrier information. Multiple reports concerning transportation analysis are available. Major new functions in S&M include the following:

- maintaining both allocation (planned) and manifested (actual) movement data
- permitting “shuttles” through same geographic location
- furnishing carrier support for more than one OPLAN

(n) **Air Tasking Order (ATO)** offers the capability to view and print selected parts of air tasking orders. A query function allows the user to tailor requested information contained in a specific order for viewing. The query function also supports display of color-coded ground tracks for selected parts of the order. ATO interfaces with the Contingency Tactical Air Planning System (CTAPS).

(o) **Fuel Resource Accounting System (FRAS)** gives fuel planners an automated capability for determining the supportability of a deliberate or crisis action plan and for generating the time-phased bulk petroleum required to support an OPLAN. FRAS facilitates the review of the fuel requirements of a proposed, new, or revised OPLAN and assesses the adequacy of available resources to support crisis action planning. Two or more OPLANs can be combined into a single OPLAN for analysis. The requirements generated can be varied through the use of intensity tables and consumption data extracted from the Logistics Factors File (LFF) or with Service-supplied data. Principal users are the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, and Defense Fuel Supply Center.

(5) **GCCS Future Mission Applications**

(a) **IDM**: IDM is an integrating segment for the Information Dissemination Management (IDM) collection of tools and services. IDM tools and services assist in the identification and characterization of appropriate information and in its retrieval and delivery to appropriate users while accommodating heterogeneous communications networks with intermittent availability. The IDM segment assists an administrator in configuring previously installed segments to provide integrated IDM tools and services and facilitates subsequent administration of the tools and services. The segment also enhances the functionality of services provided by the other segments and provides a level of integration between other segments in order to improve IDM tools and services.

(b) **NetMeeting**: The Microsoft NetMeeting segment provides real-time conferencing along with several additional features such as communication with both audio and video, collaboration on Windows-based applications, exchange of graphics using an electronic whiteboard, file transfers and a text-based chart program. This segment is a partial segment that verifies that the Microsoft NetMeeting software has been installed on the PC.

(c) **Joint Forces Requirements Generator (JFRG) II**: Joint Forces Requirements Generator (JFRG) II is a PC application to support remote and forward deployed users in generating Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). JFRG provides a unit-level deployable, microcomputer-based deployment planning tool for the Joint community. JFRG accelerates the development, sourcing, analysis, and refinement of plans and deployment databases resulting in executable JOPES TPFDD. It will provide a bridge between JOPES and the TCAIMS II system, and reduce response time by more efficiently creating and refining plans that can be accomplished directly in JOPES. JFRG prepares timely initial estimates through the use of standard reference data and analysis tools. It facilitates identification of accurate unit data down to the unit personnel

and Level 4 cargo detail. It consolidates joint and service-specific reference information and codes from numerous sources. JFRG can produce JOPES executable TPFDDs; it can produce a JOPES transaction file for modifications to an existing OPLAN database; and can download existing JOPES plans.

(d) **Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (I3)**: I3 is a tool that overlays Defense Intelligence Agency data, Order of Battle, targets, on imagery using Joint Mapping Tool Kit (JMTK). The GCCS Integrated Intelligence and Imagery will enhance GCCS with the ability to access military intelligence imagery assets. I3 provides necessary intelligence features to the Warfighter. It consists of approximately 49 segments which comprise several key databases and activities.

(e) **GRIS Web Interface (GRISWI)**: The GRIS Web Interface (GRISWI) is a Joint Mission Application Software (JMAS) segment. It is used by the Joint Reconnaissance Centers (JRCs) at designated Unified Command sites. GRISWI provides automated support in planning, scheduling, reporting, and monitoring reconnaissance activities under the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) program. GRISWI maintains a near real-time status of all SRO missions and provides immediate on-line retrieval of mission, track, and message data. To accomplish this, GRISWI provides automated real-time capture and processing of Reconnaissance Information Processing System (RIPS) format messages, and maintains a mission and track database containing schedule and resultant information. GRISWI generates and releases outgoing SRO messages to the Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN) and provides on-line query and report capabilities detailing message, mission status, and scheduling information. It is used to maintain current Track Dictionary data and to generate the master copy of each new dictionary or set of change pages. GRISWI has external interfaces with the GCCS Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), and the Joint Mapping Toolkit (JMTK).

307. SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING. This chapter on campaigning describes the concept of the campaign plan, which is the basic tool for the commander to use in linking tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives. This linkage of tactical engagements cannot be mere coincidence because it is possible for the commander to win all the battles but still lose the war. To effectively create this linkage, the joint force commander uses all the aspects of operational art to focus the capabilities of his forces on the accomplishment of tactical actions that will lead to operational and ultimately strategic success. For the linkage of tactical actions to the strategic aim to be effective, the commander analyzes his adversary, orient on the enemy's vulnerabilities and centers of gravity, determine to what end he has been tasked to fight, and aggressively carry out his plan. The process of initiating military action is viewed as an attempt to rob the initiative from the enemy, while linking tactical actions to strategic ends must be viewed continually with the end state in mind.

a. **Operational Thinking.** The main purpose of exercising the numerous aspects of operational art is to keep the enemy off balance and to “get inside its decision cycle.” The creation of leverage, striking with surprise and strength in simultaneous manner throughout the depth of the battlespace, in all functional environments, forces the enemy to become reactive, thus placing the initiative in the hands of the friendly commander. Armed with the product of strategic art (i.e., end state) the JFC exercises his talent to possess the product of the process of operational art (i.e., initiative). The result is the attainment of operational and subsequently strategic objectives.

b. **Commanders’ Queries.** The art of campaigning and the implementation of operational art are detailed and complex. Not only is the commander confronted with a myriad of principles, concepts, and elements with which to frame his operation, but concurrently he will be bombarded with all forms of data and demands for his time and for decisions. In the midst of the “fog and friction” of war it is imperative that the commander and his staff keep focused on five basic questions for operational success:

- **What am I being asked to do? (Mission)**
- **What forces will I need to do it? (Force Planning)**
- **How will I get the forces there? (Transportation Planning)**
- **What will it take to sustain them? (Support Planning)**
- **How will I know I am successful? (End State)**

“Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious. Those who discern when to use many or few troops are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious. Those whose generals are able and are not constrained by their governments are victorious.”

- Sun Tzu

Deliberate Planning

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Deliberate Planning

References: Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*
CJCSM 3122.02A, *Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution*
CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (w/Change 1), Planning Formats and Guidance*
CJCSM 3122.04A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance (classified)*

400. INTRODUCTION

a. Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*), defines the joint operation planning process as follows:

“A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission.”

The particular procedures used in joint planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, planners use a process called peacetime or deliberate planning. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of military forces, the planner uses crisis action planning (CAP) procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis action planning:

- receive and analyze the task to be accomplished
- review the enemy situation and begin to collect necessary intelligence
- develop and compare courses of action
- select a course of action (COA)
- develop and get approval for the selected COA
- prepare a plan
- then document the plan

b. The next section of this chapter introduces the entire process of joint operation planning to give an overview of the planning problem. The remaining sections describe deliberate planning procedures. Deliberate planning is discussed from the receipt of the assigned task to the development of a detailed transportation schedule of personnel, materiel, and resupply into the theater of military operations. The chapter also describes the procedures for maintaining the accuracy of plan data. The phases and steps of the planning process are presented as sequential and orderly, though in actual practice procedures may vary considerably. Some of the steps may overlap, some may be undertaken simultaneously, and some are iterative.

401. THE PROCESS OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

a. Five manuals guide combatant command planning. CJCSM 3113.01A guides the development of the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) while the four other manuals comprise the JCS-published Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) that guides the overall process of joint operation planning. These manuals are depicted in Figure 4-1.




Figure 4-1

b. The staff of a combatant command must consider many factors in its planning in order to select the best means of performing a military mission. Understandably, this means that the planning process will be complex; out of necessity the process must be orderly and thorough. The joint operation planning process must be flexible, as well. In peacetime, the deliberate planning process requires 18 to 24 months to completely prepare and fully coordinate/review a plan; on the other hand, a crisis may demand a product in just a few hours or days.

c. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Although two different planning methods are described in the manuals, there is a high degree of similarity between them. Both methods are depicted graphically in **Figure 4-2**.




Figure 4-2

(1) PEACETIME or DELIBERATE PLANNING is the process used when time permits the total participation of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) (Figure 4-3). Development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders, agencies, and Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle. To develop a large plan, JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements are expected to reduce the time required.




Figure 4-3

(2) **TIME-SENSITIVE** or **CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP)** is conducted in response to a crisis where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response is being considered by the National Command Authorities (NCA). While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and develop rapidly. Thus, in CAP, the time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days. The overall process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and NCA requirements. CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COAs), and communication of reports and recommendations from combatant commanders up to the NCA and decisions from the NCA down to the combatant commanders.

(3) Both deliberate and crisis action planning are conducted within JOPES. Procedures for deliberate planning are described in CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume I) while CAP is described in CJCSM 3122.02A. The detailed administrative and format

requirements for documenting the annexes, appendixes, etc. of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and functional plans, the products of deliberate planning, are described in CJCSM 3122.03A JOPES Volume II, and CJCSM 3122.04A. The purpose of JOPES is to bring both deliberate and crisis action planning into a single system architecture, thereby reducing the time required to do either, making the refined results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and allowing the more effective management of any plan during execution.

d. The view of resources is another method of describing joint operation planning.

(1) Requirements planning focuses on the combatant commander's analysis of the enemy threat and assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome that threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources.

(2) On the other hand, capabilities planning attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. Planning is conducted with the available level of forces, equipment, and supplies or those expected to be available during the planning cycle.

(3) Military solutions may be constrained; a course of action may be limited by available resources or political and diplomatic considerations. Continuing an established trend, the JPEC is moving ever more toward capabilities planning in the post-cold-war era of less explicitly defined and more diverse threats. The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is an examination of threats to the national security, an evaluation of defense strategy, and the determination of the force structure required to meet the threats to U.S. interests (See **Figure 4-4**).

(4) The shift from the cold-war focus on global plans to a regional focus for deliberate planning has increased the flexibility in apportionment of available combat forces. Anticipation of multiple regional contingencies within the framework of adaptive planning allows effective apportionment of some combat forces to more than one CINC for contingency planning, depending on national priorities and the sequence in which regional contingencies develop. Apportioning supplies is more difficult, but progress continues toward developing capabilities in JOPES to create contingency plans that account for anticipated sustainment availability.

e. Still another way to define planning focuses on command perspective.

(1) Strategic, global planning is done primarily at the JCS/NCA level. Decision-makers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of U.S. military forces.

(2) In regional planning, combatant commanders focus on their specific geographic regions as defined in the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP).




Figure 4-4

(3) Functional planning is conducted by combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM, and their component commanders. Their view of the planning problem is not limited by geography.

(4) The perspective of the combatant command greatly influences both the choice of course of action and the resources made available for planning. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, functional planning is subordinate to each supported CINC's concept for the particular theater of operations in order to support that concept.

e. Finally, joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose.

(1) Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander's theater of operations and defines the framework within which plans fit. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes, thereby giving a common purpose and objective to a series of plans (see **Figure 4-5**).




Figure 4-5

- Designing campaigns represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. Theater campaigns are conducted in theaters of war and subordinate campaigns in theaters of operations; they are based on the Commander's Estimate and theater strategic estimate and resulting theater strategies. "Campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces." (Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*)

- Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts by developing theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict, but the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises (Joint Pub 5-0). To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation (campaign) planning doctrine:

- Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus
- Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat
- Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity
- Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and post-hostilities/redeployment), including the commander's intent for each phase

(2) A successful contingency plan involves a wide spectrum of operations. Each element within the spectrum requires special consideration:

- mobilization planning details the activation of Reserve forces as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel to bring all or part of the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency;
- deployment planning encompasses all activities involved in moving forces and materiel from origin or home station to destination, including intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, and movement through staging areas and holding areas;
- employment planning describes the theater use of combat forces; and
- sustainment planning involves the logistics support of combat forces.

(3) This guide outlines the entire environment of joint operations and focuses on deployment, with emphasis on the strategic mobility problem. Deployment planning has been the focus of real-world planning efforts in the past and remains so. As JOPES evolves, new ADP applications will be integrated to make possible much more refined mobilization, employment, and sustainment planning.

402. DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. To draw from the many categories we have identified, this chapter describes the planning procedures for

- developing a plan of military action in a hostile environment
- prepared by a CINC with a regional perspective
- by a staff in peacetime conditions when combat action is not imminent
- using currently available U.S. capabilities measured in armed forces, transportation, and supplies and
- emphasizing the strategic deployment of those forces, equipment, and supplies based on the CINC's concept of operations.

b. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning process to build a contingency plan for military action. The plan is based on predicted conditions that will be countered with resources available during the planning cycle. The product is called an operation plan that can be either an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, depending on the level of detail that is included. Regardless of the type of plan developed, there are several characteristics common to all plans as shown in **Figure 4-6**.




Figure 4-6

c. Automated Data Processing (ADP) support is essential to the process of creating and maintaining a plan's database of forces and resources. A plan's database will include

- the many available types of combat and support units, described in terms of numbers of passengers and weight and volume of cargo,
- the calculation of the vast quantities of specific sustaining supplies needed in each of the various phases of the operation,
- and the simulated deployment of troops and support from their starting locations to test the feasibility of the plan's concept of operations.

403. SUMMARY OF THE PLANNING CYCLE

a. The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. Operation plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect they are continuously maintained and updated.

b. **Task assignment.** The CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Strategic planning was discussed in Chapter 3; the contingency planning responsibility of CJCS is performed through the commanders in chief of combatant commands (CINCs). The task-assigning directive performs several functions: it apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document, i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation. **Figures 4-7 through 4-10** show an overview of each of the four types of plans that can be developed by a combatant command.

c. **Developing the concept.** In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINC's Strategic Concept. The CINC's Strategic Concept is submitted to the CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development.

d. **Developing the detailed plan.** Subordinate commanders use the CINC's concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates' recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take

Operation Plan (OPLAN)

When prepared:

- when situations are sufficiently critical to national security that detailed prior planning is required
- when the situation would tax total resources made available for planning

All annexes are required

Figure 4-7

Concept Plan (CONPLAN) *[with or without TPFDD]*

When prepared:

- for a contingency not sufficiently critical to national security to require detailed prior planning
- when probability of occurrence in JSCP time frame is low
- when planning flexibility is desired

Requires Annexes:

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| A. Task Org | J. Command Relationships |
| B. Intelligence | K. C4I |
| C. Operations | V. Interagency Coordination |
| D. Logistics | Z. Distribution |

Figure 4-8

Functional Plan (FUNCPLAN)

When prepared:

- when operations are anticipated that involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or nonhostile environment
- for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, intratheater logistics communications, continuity of operations)
- for “functional peacetime operations,” such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and counterdrug or peacekeeping operations

Requires Annexes:

- | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| A. Task Org | J. Command Relationships |
| B. Intelligence | K. C4I |
| C. Operations | V. Interagency Coordination |
| D. Logistics | Z. Distribution |

Figure 4-9

Theater Engagement Plan

- **Engagement:** All military activities involving other nations intended to shape the regional security environment in peacetime
- Published annually, covers current year plus 7 following (8 years total)
- **Possible engagement activities:** operational activities, military contacts, combined exercises/training/education,
- security/humanitarian assistance
- **Seven TEPs:** JFCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, Russia, Mexico

Figure 4-10

part in the planned operation, and the sustainment to meet requirements is identified as much as possible. USTRANSCOM, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. **Figure 4-11** illustrates the overall process of this phase:

- determine the forces and cargo required to be moved
- describe them in logistical terms (numbers of personnel, volume, and weight)
- simulate the move using the capabilities of apportioned lift resources
- and, finally, confirm that the OPLAN is transportation feasible




Figure 4-11

This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

e. **Review of the plan.** The review process is more than a single phase in deliberate planning. The Joint Staff has reviewed and approved the CINC's Strategic Concept before detailed plan development. Now the completed plan goes to CJCS for review and approval. If all is in order, the plan will be approved (effective for execution, when directed). **Figure 4-12** illustrates the review sequence.





Figure 4-12

f. **Preparation of the supporting plans.** The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

404. BASIS FOR MILITARY PLANNING

a. The process of planning a joint operation produces a contingency plan for military action. It begins with a national strategy stated by the President, supported with the funding of resources by Congress, and is defined by the task assignments published by CJCS. The systems that support the translation of national interests into contingency plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

b. Players in the planning process are illustrated in **Figure 4-3** (repeated below for clarity during a discussion of the JPEC). They include the NCA, their advisers, supporting executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. Examples of those organizations are



listed in the definition and include those shown on the lower part of **Figure 4-3**, i.e., CJCS, supported commanders, etc.

(1) Civilian leadership tops the pyramid in **Figure 4-3**. The ultimate decision on national policy, detailed development of resource levels, and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces is given by the President and Secretary of Defense, referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA are supported by the executive departments, e.g., Departments of Defense and State, and organizations within the Office of the President, such as the National Security Council. The illustration also includes combat support agencies, e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. All these executive-level organizations have a role to play in the preliminary direction of contingency operations and approval of the final plans.

(2) CJCS and the Joint Staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products and approve the final version of peacetime plans. The supported command, i.e., the combatant command, and its subordinates are the commands principally responsible for developing the deliberate plan and, ultimately, executing it. The Services and

their logistics agencies play key support roles within the community. By law, it is the responsibility of the Services to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, and maintain forces for the combatant commands. The U.S. Transportation Command is shown separately as a supporting player in the JPEC because of its strategic mobility responsibilities and its critical role in assisting the CINCs to develop transportationally feasible plans. The last entry on the figure is titled “Supporting Commands”; it represents all the commands and agencies that supply resources to the supported command.

c. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) details an established, orderly way of translating the contingency planning task assignments into an Operation Plan or Functional Plan in deliberate planning, or an operation order in crisis action planning. JOPES is directed by DOD to be used as the process for joint planning. JOPES is comprehensive enough to thoroughly prepare a concept of military operations and automated enough to handle the enormous quantities of data involved in military operation planning. The modern computer tools it employs afford reasonable assurance that the plan will work as expected on execution or can be modified during execution to adapt to changing circumstances. The overall system is complex and is best understood through examination of both the process and procedures that make it up.

(1) The process is a particular method of planning for joint operations that involves a number of steps or operations. It is the planning activity from receipt of the task to the preparation of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders. The joint planning process for both deliberate and crisis action planning is described in the references identified at the beginning of this chapter and paragraph 401.a (3).

(2) The procedures are the individual, often interrelated, steps, actions, or methods performed to produce the plan. Each level of command responsible for writing plans may have developed its own procedures to expand or augment JOPES direction. These procedures may vary in certain respects from command to command, so newly assigned staff officers need to adjust to the specifics of their own organizations.

(3) Staff officers should keep the difference between process – the method of planning – and procedures – the steps required to use the process – clearly in mind as they become immersed in joint planning. An abundance of detailed procedures accompanies the actual planning process, yet most of the published guidance seems very general. This publication tries to amplify JOPES guidance.

d. Service Planning Systems

(1) The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the efficiency of the Services and their preparedness for military operations. Given strategic guidance in CJCS documents and program and budget guidance sent through department channels, the military Service chiefs have developed a series of documents that support, direct, and guide component commanders.

(2) The following are some of the documents detailing Service-unique planning systems that have specific application in the development of joint plans:

U.S. Army Publications

FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*

FM 100-5, *Operations*

FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*

U.S. Navy Publications

NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)

U.S. Air Force Publications

AF Manual 10-401 *Operation Planning and Concept Development*

USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)

U.S. Marine Corps Publications

FMFM 2-1, *Intelligence*

FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*

Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)

U.S. Coast Guard Publications

USCG Capabilities Manual (CG CAPMAN)

USCG Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CGLSMP)

(3) The component commanders receive direction and guidance from both the operational chain of command and a Service or functional support chain of command; they are the common link between the two chains. The component commanders support the operational needs of the CINCs to the extent that they are supported through their Service and functional chains of command. The components negotiate the proper balance between requirements planning and capabilities planning.

e. **Adaptive Planning.** Adaptive planning is a concept for joint operation planning in the context of the post-cold-war world. It is the framework within which the deliberate planning process produces operation plans useful to high-level decision-makers if crises develop. It recognizes that with the more diversified threats to U.S. interests since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, fixed assumptions for warning times and political decisions (force movements, reserve callup, mobilization, etc.) used in deliberate planning will likely be less accurate if the contingency that planners anticipate actually occurs. In short, without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place. Adaptive planning also recognizes that key decision-makers are more likely to exploit available response time to deter further crisis development if a menu of response options, gauged to a range of crisis conditions, is available for them to implement rather than an all-or-nothing choice. The

“all” would likely be too much and the “nothing” not enough to deter escalation of a crisis early in its development. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires the CINCs to use adaptive planning principles to develop a menu of options along the spectrum from “all” to “nothing” in their operation plans for regional contingencies, including flexible deterrent options, deploy-decisive-force options, and counterattack options. JSCP force apportionment facilitates development of this range of options by apportioning some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning. This policy is often referred to as “multi-apportionment.” In anticipation of the need to respond to multiple, sequentially developing regional contingencies, the JSCP also furnishes planning guidance that prioritizes and deconflicts planned employment of forces that are apportioned to more than one CINC.

(1) **Regional focus.** Regional contingencies are the focus of U.S. conventional planning. Anticipated regional contingencies for which deliberate planning is conducted are classified as either Major Theater Wars (MTWs) or Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs). An MTW is a regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interests in a region that warrants the deployment of significant forces (i.e., greater than division-wing combinations). An SSC is a regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than in an MTW. SSC missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum. Through the JSCP, combatant commanders are assigned tasks of developing Operation Plans or Functional Plans for specific MTWs and SSCs anticipated as future possibilities in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).

(2) **Range of options.** The adaptive planning concept calls for development of a range of options during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. Where the crisis builds slowly enough to allow it, appropriate responses made in a timely fashion can deter further escalation or even defuse the situation to avoid or limit conflict. Where such options fail to deter or there is not time enough to execute them, a stronger response may be required to protect vital U.S. interests. The eventuality of attack without prior warning must also be considered. **Figure 4-13** amplifies the options discussed.

(a) **Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).** FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. They are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to avoid the response dilemma of too much, too soon or too little, too late. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with diplomatic, economic, and informational options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all elements of national power. This concept is illustrated in **Figure 4-14**.

(b) All regional operation plans have FDOs, and CINCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and informational options as they develop their plans. Examples of FDOs from all four elements of national power are listed in **Figures 4-15** through **4-18**. In general, plans for FDOs use Active Component, in-place forces of approximately brigade, squadron, or battle group size, intratheater lift assets, and predominantly Active Component support forces.




Figure 4-13

(c) **Deploy decisive force.** If decision-makers elect not to make a response to crisis indications, or an adversary is not deterred by FDOs that are executed, CINCs must plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrence perspective) to respond to unambiguous warning. Unambiguous warning occurs when the President decides, based on intelligence he receives, that a hostile government has decided to initiate hostilities. Deploy-decisive-force options involve early deployment of sufficient supportable combat forces, possibly including some Reserve forces, to the crisis region to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to quickly end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Deploy-decisive-force options are the focus of deliberate planning. They are the options for which detailed force and resource planning is conducted and for which transportation-feasible TPFDDs are developed for OPLANs/CONPLANs. Though crises for which deploy-decisive-force options are appropriate may still be deterrable, planners assume that deterrence will fail and that conflict will erupt.

(d) **Counterattack.** Crises could begin, of course, with no-warning attacks against U.S. forces or vital interests, or without prior deterrent moves having been made. U.S. force deployments would not begin until after conflict had been initiated. CINCs include concepts for a counterattack option in MTW operation plans for deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces to achieve U.S. objectives.




Figure 4-14

(3) **Force apportionment and multiple contingencies.** Adaptive planning, centered on regional contingencies is a framework for deliberate planning using force levels reduced from those needed to meet a global threat. Apportionment of some forces from these reduced force levels to more than one CINC for planning is required to generate decisive force in some regional contingencies. In addition, U.S. military strategy requires maintaining the capability to respond to two concurrent, sequentially developing regional contingencies. The purpose of this requirement is to deter potential adversaries from deciding that U.S. commitment of decisive force to one contingency might present a window of opportunity to successfully attack U.S. interests elsewhere. Adaptive planning minimizes conflict between the need to apportion some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning, and the need to plan responses to two concurrent contingencies. While different CINCs may plan the employment of some of the same forces for each of the two concurrent contingencies, those forces obviously cannot be simultaneously employed in both. The JSCP gives planning guidance that prioritizes apportioned forces into four cases for all MTWs. MTWs are the most demanding operation planning scenarios, and the CONPLANS developed to respond to them would therefore be most dependent on forces apportioned to more than one CINC. Even though the forces in all four cases are available to the CINCs for development of CONPLANS, forces in some of

Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Option

- Heighten public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict
 - Gain popular support
 - Promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements
 - Take measures to increase public support
 - Maintain an open dialogue with the press
 - Take steps to gain and maintain the confidence of the public
 - Gain Congressional support
- Heighten Informational Efforts
 - quickly
 - honestly
 - within the security restraints imposed by the crisis
 - Keep selected issues as lead stories
 - Protect friendly C4I assets
 - Impose sanctions on C4I technology transfers
 - Interrupt satellite loan link transmissions

Figure 4-15

the cases may not be available at execution of a response to one of two sequential, concurrent contingencies. The four cases are related to the range of options previously discussed.

(a) **Case 1 Forces (FDOs)**. Case 1 forces are primarily in-place and augmentation forces from the Active Component appropriate for an array of FDOs the CINC might develop for use during a period of ambiguous warning. Augmentation forces are rapidly deployable and relatively small, as previously described. The augmentation force may contain subunits of a larger force from Case 2.

(b) **Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy-Decisive-Force)**. Built on Case 1 forces, the Case 2 forces include Active and that portion of the Reserve forces needed to move and sustain a major force deployment from CONUS. They give the CINC a significant level of force that would be used in the early stages of a Deploy-Decisive-Force option.

(c) **Case 3 Forces (Deploy-Decisive-Force)**. Built on Case 1 and Case 2 forces, the Case 3 forces are apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy initially may not have completed preparation for war. They include Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and partial mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces available to the CINC during CONPLAN development.

(d) **Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force)**. The Case 4 forces build on Case 1, 2, and 3 forces and comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required and made available under partial mobilization. Case 4 forces are phased into the

Examples of Military Flexible Deterrent Options

- Employ ready in-place units
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase strategic reconnaissance
- Increase collection efforts
- Initiate or increase show-of-force actions
- Employ electronic measures
- Conduct aircraft flyovers
- Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
- Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area
- Pre-stage or deploy contingency ready brigades
- Pre-stage airlift
- Pre-stage airlift support assets
- Institute provisions of existing host-nation agreements
- Emplace logistics infrastructure where possible
- Impose restrictions on military personnel retirements, separations, and leaves; establish curfews
- Open pre-positioned storage facilities
- Deploy SAG/MAG to the region
- Deploy CVBG to the region
- Move MEB to the region
- Raise units' deployment status
- Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation
- Increase mobile training teams
- Deploy tactical fighter squadrons
- Move forward-deployed ARG/MEU(SOC) to the region
- Activate procedures to begin reserve callup
- Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area
- Deploy AWACS to the region
- Move MPS/AWR to the region
- Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
- Open and secure sea and air lines of communication
- Pre-stage sealift and airlift reception assets to air and seaports of embarkation
- Increase informational efforts
 - PSYOP
 - Measures directed at the military forces of the opponent
 - Mission awareness

Figure 4-16

CONPLAN to support the concept with the decisive force needed to quickly end a regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

(e) **Concurrent Contingencies.** The purpose of dividing MTW force apportionment into the four cases is to deconflict planned employment of forces apportioned to more than one CINC for planning in anticipation of concurrent contingencies. If an MTW is the first of two sequentially developing contingencies, not all of its Case 4 forces, even though phased into the CONPLAN, may be available at execution, as those units could be allocated to a second contingency. In the case of the second of two sequentially developing contingencies where significant forces have been committed to the first, in-place Case 1 forces may be the only forces available for planning an initial response. Other later deploying (Case 4) forces are apportioned for the purpose of counter-offensive operations should deterrence fail. CINCs receive tasks in the JSCP to produce plans that outline how they will deal with such eventualities. It must be remembered that

Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Promote democratic elections
- Reduce national embassy personnel
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- Alter existing meetings, programs or schedules
- Take actions to win support of allies and friends
- Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem
- Use the UN or other international institutions
- Work within an existing coalition or alliance (seek to avoid unilateral actions whenever possible)
- Increase cultural group pressure
- Restrict activities of diplomats
- Show international resolve
- Clearly identify the steps to a peaceful resolution
- Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel
- Pursue measures to increase regional support
- Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
- Initiate actions to start the development of a coalition of nations
 - Heighten informational efforts directed at:
 - the international community
 - the people within the nation
 - the allies of the opponent
 - the coalition formed to overcome the crisis

Figure 4-17

Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze monetary assets in the U.S.
- Seize real property in the U.S.
- Enact trade sanctions
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Sponsor trade sanctions/embargo actions in UN and/or other international organizations
- Reduce security assistance program
- Embargo goods and services
- Cancel U.S.-funded programs
- Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
- Heighten international efforts directed at:
 - financial institutions, questioning the soundness of continuing actions with the opponent's businesses
 - reducing or eliminating corporate transactions

Figure 4-18

these force apportionment parameters are set forth in the JSCP to furnish the guidance necessary to conduct coordinated contingency planning. The NCA will determine priorities between actual concurrent contingencies and the actual major forces deployed to respond to them at execution.

405. PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING. The five formal phases of the deliberate planning process begin when a commander receives a task assignment and end when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. However, from the supported commander's perspective, deliberate planning never stops. Regular updating of plan information is required to ensure that plans are as accurate as possible. Maintenance of large plans may require planners to continually update elements of information. The products of deliberate planning are Operation Plans and Functional Plans. Operation plans are either OPLANs or CONPLANs. The process is the same for development of both, but CONPLANs are less fully developed (only requiring, as a minimum, annexes A through D, J, K, V and Z), especially in the area of detailed resource planning, and generally will not contain a TPFDD. Functional Plans, like CONPLANs, require annexes A through D, J, K, V and Z. Operation plans are developed using all phases of the deliberate planning process. Approved plans remain in effect and must be maintained until canceled or superseded by another plan. **Figure 4-19** shows the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process.




Figure 4-19

- a. In the **initiation phase** planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.
- b. Several things happen during the **concept development phase**. The combatant commander derives the mission from the assigned task, issues planning guidance to his staff and subordinate commands, and collects and analyzes information on the enemy. From this, the staff proposes and analyzes tentative courses of action (COAs), the combatant commander selects the best COA, and the staff develops that COA into a complete concept of operations. The concept of operations, documented as the CINC's Strategic Concept, is forwarded to CJCS for review. By authority of CJCS, the Joint Staff reviews the CINC's Strategic Concept and, when approved, it becomes the concept of operations for the plan.
- c. In the **plan development phase** the combatant commander's staff, the staffs of subordinate and supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC develop the operation plan to the level of detail and in the format required by CJCSM 3122.03A (JOPES Volume II). If the CINC considers it necessary, a CONPLAN or Functional Plan can be developed in more detail than JOPES requires. For all OPLANs and some designated CONPLANs, a detailed transportation-feasible flow of resources into the theater is developed to support the concept of operations. Forces are selected and time-phased, support requirements are determined and time-phased, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information required for the plan, i.e., the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file using JOPES ADP. This phase ends when the fully documented plan, including TPFDD when required, is forwarded to CJCS for final review and approval.
- d. The **plan review phase** is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. The CINC submits all elements of the now fully developed plan to the JPEC for review and CJCS approval.
- e. In the **supporting plans phase**, each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the CINC's plan prepares a supporting plan. The subordinate and supporting commanders submit these plans to the supported commander for review and approval. The planning process continues through development of supporting employment and deployment plans that further ready the CINC's plan for implementation.
- f. The planning cycle for the deliberate planning process is defined by the principal task-assigning document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The approved operation plans prepared as directed by the JSCP are considered effective until superseded. CJCS publishes the schedule for document submission dates, dates for the TPFDD refinement conferences held late in the plan development phase, and dates for the

TPFDD maintenance conferences. The CINCs play a key role in establishing the administrative schedules as well as recommending to CJCS whether current operation plans remain valid, need updating, or should be canceled.

g. The following sections contain an overview of the actions that are conducted by supported and supporting commands during the deliberate planning process. For a detailed discussion of the actions to be completed by each staff section within a combatant command, refer to CJCSM 3500.05, JTF HQ MTG.

INITIATION PHASE

406. INITIATION PHASE OF DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. Background

(1) Military action is not the only possible response to situations that threaten U.S. national interests. All elements of national power – the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements – are considered in the formulation of national policy. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider diplomatic, economic, and informational options. In fact, CINCs must explicitly relate military Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to FDOs under the other elements of national power as they develop their operation plans according to adaptive planning principles. Several examples of deterrent options are listed in **Figures 4-15** through **4-18**.

(2) The President and his advisers (**Figure 4-4**) develop the nation's strategic direction. The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates and prepares the national strategy. While one administration published this strategy as a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD); the exact title of the President's national strategy document may vary from one administration to another. After the national strategy is published, CJCS translates the worldwide military strategy into specific planning requirements.

b. Task-assigning documents

(1) CJCS outlines the nation's military strategy in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the combatant commanders (**Figure 4-20**).

(a) The JSCP assigns the CINCs the tasks of preparing operation plans in complete format (OPLANs), in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs), or as Functional Plans. Formats for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are described in detail in CJCSM 3122.03A (JOPES Volume II). Briefly, the CONPLAN does

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

- Assigns planning tasks
- Identifies planning requirement (OPLAN, CONPLAN, FUNCPLAN, TEP)
- Apportions major combat forces
- Apportions strategic lift (air and sea)
- Provides additional guidance

Figure 4-20

not require the detailed identification of units and preparation of movement schedules found in the OPLAN and its accompanying TPFDD file. At present, CONPLANS are required to have at least annexes A through D, J, K, V, and Z. The Functional Plan summarizes the CINC's concept in even broader terms than the CONPLAN, is normally associated with peacetime operations, and, like the CONPLAN, is required to have at least annexes A through D, J, K, V, and Z (Figure 4-21).

Operation Plan Annexes

A	<u>Task Organization</u>	L	Environmental Considerations
B	<u>Intelligence</u>	M	Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S)
C	<u>Operations</u>	N	Space Operations
D	<u>Logistics</u>	P	Host-Nation Support
E	Personnel	Q	Medical Services
F	Public Affairs	R	Reports
G	Civil Affairs	S	Special Technical Operations
H	Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations	T	Consequence Management
J	<u>Command Relationship</u>	V	<u>Interagency Coordination</u>
K	Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C4)	X	Execution Checklist
		Z	<u>Distribution</u>

CONPLAN and Functional Plans require annexes: A, B, C, D, J, K, V, and Z

Figure 4-21

(b) The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the CINC to use to develop each operation plan. These are called apportioned resources, and may include any limited, critical asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies, or strategic and theater transportation units. The JSCP generally apportioned “major combat forces,” a term that covers combat, not support, units and, generally, units the size of Army brigades or larger, Air Force squadrons, Navy carrier battle groups and surface action groups, and Marine Corps Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). It is important to recognize that these apportioned resources may differ significantly from the forces that may ultimately be furnished, or allocated, when an operation is actually executed.

(c) The JSCP establishes priorities for OPLANs and CONPLANs that compete for limited resources.

(2) The *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) gives basic guidance to the combatant commander on general responsibilities and identifies geographic and functional areas of responsibility (AORs) (**Figure 4-22**).




Figure 4-22

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the classified UCP as required and update it periodically. It is a task-assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the authority the Secretary of Defense grants through memorandum or DOD directive. The President approves the UCP.

(b) In broad terms, the UCP directs the combatant commanders to be prepared to

- evacuate noncombatants,
- execute disaster recovery operations, and
- conduct “normal operations” within the assigned geographic or functional AOR.

The broad category “normal operations” includes responsibilities for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF) and Joint Administrative Publication 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff*.

(c) The UCP, then, is a general task-assigning document that covers many contingencies for which the CINC has to prepare.

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), is also a task-assigning document. The unclassified CJCS guidance in UNAAF defines the exercise of authority by the combatant commander (**Figure 4-23**).

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) Joint Pub 0-2

- **Contains doctrine and policy governing unified direction of forces**
- **Discusses the chain of command**
- **Discusses the relationships between combatant commands and the military departments**
- **Covers command relationships**
- **States policy for establishing joint commands**

Figure 4-23

(a) UNAAF discusses the principles and doctrines governing joint activities of the Armed Forces:

- restatement of the statutory guidelines and departmental directives that govern the functions of the entire Department of Defense
- functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments
- principles governing the unified direction and the joint activities of the Armed Forces

- responsibility and authority of the combatant commander
- functions and responsibilities of joint staff divisions
- the command authority over forces and implications for the transfer of

authority

(b) By broad definition, the UNAAF initiates deliberate planning by assigning the combatant commander the task of “planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion.” Continuing operation of the command and basic self-defense of the command are missions developed from that broad task assignment.

(4) On occasion, CJCS may direct preparation of additional plans not included in the current JSCP. Such a task assignment may come in the form of a message or other directive. The new task will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP.

(5) The CINC’s planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The CINC may prepare plans considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities described in the UCP and UNAAF, but not specifically assigned. The CINC may also determine that a need exists to prepare plans to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP. If the CINC expects to assign tasks to forces not currently under his combatant command, the CJCS must approve.

(6) The number of operation plans prepared by a CINC using deliberate planning procedures differs from one command to another.

c. **Products.** In the deliberate planning process, the CINC is directed in the initiation phase to produce operation plans in either complete (OPLAN) format or abbreviated concept (CONPLAN) format, or to produce a Functional Plan.

(1) An OPLAN (**Figure 4-7**) is a complete description of the CINC’s concept of operations and demands much time and effort to produce. It identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and includes a movement schedule of the resources into the theater of operations. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the theater-wide support required in the subordinate commander’s supporting plan. OPLANs describe deployment and employment of forces and resources and include a TPFDD. The detailed planning essential in OPLAN development is normally required when the military response to a hostile situation.

- is sufficiently critical to U.S. national security to justify the detail involved,
- contributes to deterring enemy aggression by showing U.S. readiness through planning, or
- would tax total U.S. capability in forces, supplies, or transportation.

(2) The JSCP can direct the development of a CONPLAN (**Figure 4-8**) with or without a TPFDD, although in most situations the task does not require preparation of a detailed flow of resources. Though the same process is followed for producing CONPLANS as is used for OPLANS, the level of detail produced in the plan development phase of CONPLANS is abbreviated. Normally, detailed support requirements are not calculated, nor are strategic movements simulated. CONPLANS do not generally include the detail typically found in OPLAN annexes, but require annexes A through D, J, K, V, and Z (and a TPFDD if CJCS or the CINC so directs). CONPLANS are normally prepared when

- the contingency is not sufficiently critical to national security to require detailed prior planning,
- the situation would not place unacceptable demands on U.S. resources,
- the probability of occurrence during the JSCP planning cycle is low, or
- planning flexibility is desired.

(3) A Functional Plan (**Figure 4-9**) is used to respond to the requirements of the JSCP, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported commander, Joint Staff, Service, or combat support agencies. Development of Functional Plans follows the same process used for OPLANS and CONPLANS throughout the concept development phase of deliberate planning. They normally are plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as the following:

- disaster relief
- nation assistance
- logistics
- communications
- surveillance
- protection of U.S. citizens
- nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation
- continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks

d. **JPEC coordination.** The Services also have input during the initiation of planning. Since CJCS apportions only major combat forces, the Services must give the CINC information about other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces that are available for planning. They also inform the combatant commander on Service doctrine, guidance, and priorities.

e. **Review of previous operations.** Planners should access the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) databases early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution gained from actual operation and exercise

experiences. A regular review of such information during the planning process can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful, innovative ideas.

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE

407. INTRODUCTION

a. After the CINC has received the task assignment, the staff analyzes the mission and develops tentative courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. The concept development phase can be seen as an orderly series of six steps (Figure 4-24). The first five take the joint staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINC's Strategic Concept. In the sixth step CJCS reviews the CINC's Strategic Concept. With CJCS approval, the CINC's Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. Although the steps are diagrammed and discussed individually, in actual practice they may not be conducted separately or in the simple sequence listed. The dividing line between steps is sometimes hard to see, since steps are often repeated, combined, or done concurrently. Staff work done in one step (or later revisions to the products of an earlier step) affects staff work being done in others.




Figure 4-24

b. Once it has developed the CINC's Strategic Concept, the staff forwards it to CJCS for concept review. When approved, the CINC's Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan, and the plan is approved for further development. This review process is the same for all OPLANs and CJCS-designated CONPLANs. Functional Plans are reviewed, and eventually approved, by the combatant commander developing the plans.

408. STEP 1 – MISSION ANALYSIS

a. In the JSCP, the Chairman tasks CINCs to develop operation plans, concept plans, and functional plans to meet threats to U.S. national interests. However, the extent of any CINC's planning effort is not limited solely to tasks listed in the JSCPs. Each CINC also has broad responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2 and may prepare whatever plans are deemed necessary to discharge those responsibilities. To begin developing the concept of operations, the combatant commander reviews the task assigned to the command in the JSCP regional task list or the task listed in one of the other directives. The CINC then reviews what resources are available for use in developing the plan, analyzes the enemy and the environmental conditions that affect the task, and reviews the guidelines that have been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other planning directive. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the assigned task. In the language of deliberate planning, the CINC and his joint staff review the overall operation, determine specified and implied tasks, and develop a concise mission statement that contains the tasks that are essential for the successful accomplishment of the assigned .

b. The term tasks is not defined in Joint Pub 1-02 but a transition from the assigned task to the CINC's mission statement must be made.

(1) Both Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, define a mission as "the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action." However, neither the DOD Dictionary nor UNAAF defines the term "task."

(2) Tasks are defined in Service documents. AR 310-25, the *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, defines tasks as "the specific Army, Navy, and Air tasks which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from . . . the overall strategic concept."

c. For the purposes of deliberate planning, a clear distinction must be made between a task and a mission.

(1) JFSC defines a task as a job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.

(2) Using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, then, the subordinate's mission is derived from the task assigned by a higher authority and includes the reason for that task.

(3) This distinction between mission and task is consistent with joint planning documents. The task assigned by higher authority and its contribution to the mission of that higher-echelon commander serve as the basis for developing the subordinate's mission.

d. Tasks can be further classified as:

- **Assigned** – the regional tasks issued in the JSCP or tasks issued in other directives (JP 5-0, page III-3) (e.g., “Develop a concept plan for the defense of nation XYZ”)
- **Specified** – tasks that are stated in planning directives or orders (e.g., “Concept plans must incorporate provisions for unilateral U.S. action as well as operations as part of a coalition of nations to achieve a common goal”)
- **Implied** – actions or activities not specifically stated in the task stated but must be accomplished in order to successfully complete the mission (e.g., to defend nation XYZ implies the need for the U.S. to deploy forces and other resources to that nation)
- **Essential** – those required to achieve the conditions that define success for the assigned task

e. The product of Step 1 is a mission statement that is developed from the essential tasks (specified and/or implied) resulting from the analysis of the assigned task. The exact identification of an “essential” tasks is a very subjective evaluation. For mission analysis an extract of the Webster dictionary probably conveys the central thought when it indicates that; “essential implies belonging to the very nature of a thing and therefore being incapable of removal without destroying the thing itself or its character.” Therefore the essential tasks should identify actions around which the successful outcome of the planning task (and mission) absolutely depends. The mission statement developed during this step becomes the central focus of actions for the rest of the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process. It is included in the CINC's planning guidance, each concept of operations that will be developed, Staff Estimates, Commander's Estimate, CINC's Strategic Concept, and the completed operation plan.

(1) The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished by the command (what) and the purpose to be achieved (why) (JP-3-0, page B-1). The five elements of the mission statement are **who**, **what**, **when**, **where**, and **why**. Normally, **how** an operation will be conducted is described in the concept of operation and, as greater detail is added, in the execution paragraph of the plan. Multiple tasks that are included in the mission statement are normally listed in the sequence in which they are to be accomplished. Routine, non-essential tasks and tasks that are part of the inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement.

(2) A good overview of the initial step in concept development is contained in CJCSM 3500.05; Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG). Although this manual is specifically written for the JTF, it outlines a twelve-step process that can be used to guide individuals conducting operational mission analysis in deliberate planning. The process described in the MTG is an iterative process and describes the depth of work that must be accomplished to conduct a good mission analysis. This includes but is not limited to:

(a) Considering the forces that have been apportioned for planning, their capabilities and limitations as well as those of the enemy, Centers of Gravity, Decisive Points, the terrain, geographic features that support and/or restrain friendly and enemy actions, and weather

(b) Incorporating controlling factors levied by others that will influence the military operation, such as diplomatic understandings, economic conditions, host-nation issues, translating political objectives into Military End State, etc.

409. STEP 2 – PLANNING GUIDANCE

End State and Planning

Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring that it supports achieving national objectives are the CRITICAL FIRST STEPS in the estimate and planning process

Figure 4-25

a. This step has two objectives: first, to give enough initial planning guidance to the supported CINC's staff for work to begin on COAs and, second, to communicate planning guidance to the subordinate commanders through a written planning directive or a planning conference. At this point, the most critical first steps in estimate and planning process are defining, for all of the participants, the end state and ensuring that it supports national objectives. Defining the end state early in the process is essential to ensure that all the planning participants are working towards a common goal. Ensuring that the end state supports the stated or published national goals is critical to making certain that the planned operation is being conducted in the best interests of the U.S.

b. **Initial guidance.** The following paragraphs describe the information that a supported commander may give a staff to understand the assigned task, derived mission statement, and restrictions or other considerations that will affect their planning.

(1) **Mission.** The mission statement was developed in Step 1 from the CINC's analysis of the task.

(2) **Assumptions**

(a) The DOD Dictionary defines an assumption as

“**A supposition** on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, **necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation** and make a decision on the course of action” (emphasis added)

(b) An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge so planning can continue. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders normally treat the assumptions of the higher-echelon commander as facts and do not plan for the possibility that they are not valid. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

(c) Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. When dealing with an assumption, a “branch” to the main plan would be developed to account for the possibility that an assumption is subsequently proven to be incorrect. A branch plan is not simply an annex to the evolving plan. A branch plan is, in essence, a completely separate plan with a starting point that coincides with the time/location within the main plan when the assumption would be determined to be false. Because of this influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. **A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.**

(d) Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can assume the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential to the success of their own plan, but cannot assume the success of their own operation.

(e) As a rule, planners should use a worst-case scenario. The planner should plan that the enemy will use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Planners should never assume away an enemy capability.

(f) Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

(g) As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others may be replaced with facts or new information gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain and assumptions must be made to complete the planning.

(3) **NBC Defense and Nuclear Planning.** Planning for nuclear and chemical warfare is especially sensitive. The commander issues guidance as early in the planning process as possible. A highly specialized staff does the planning for these capabilities.

(4) **Political considerations**

(a) Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. Political factors can have a significant effect on the prosecution of a military operation. Unfortunately, in peacetime planning they are extremely difficult to predict. Political considerations may have to be treated as assumptions.

(b) Most unified combatant commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Adviser (POLAD) as a member of their personal staffs. The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements, etc.

(5) **Tentative courses of action**

(a) The CINC gives the staff his preliminary thinking on possible military actions early in the planning process to focus their actions. These preliminary or tentative COAs are activities initially seen to be open to the military commander that will lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Normally, these tentative COAs are not fully analyzed for feasibility and seldom contain all elements of a refined COA.

(b) Tentative COAs may include only what military action is to be accomplished, that is, amphibious or airborne assault, naval blockade, etc., and where the military action could take place. The refined COA contains who, what, when, where, and how.

Phasing Tasks in COAs

- **Sequences tasks logically**
- **Arranges orderly flow of events**
- **Simplifies planning tasks**
- **Identifies critical/escalatory events**
- **Assists in phasing of forces**
- **Illustrates organizational command relationships**
- **Assists in plan development**

“The primary benefit of phasing is that it **assists commanders in achieving major objectives**, which cannot be attained all at once, **by planning manageable subordinate operations** to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible.”

JP 3-0

Figure 4-26

(6) **Planning schedule**

(a) The commander usually issues a planning schedule with his initial guidance, although this practice varies from command to command.

(b) Normally drawn up by the chief of staff, the planning schedule sets milestones or deadline dates for completing staff estimates, submitting data from subordinate and supporting commands, and completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

(7) **Initial staff briefings**

(a) Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and others are vital to the staff early in the planning process. They help the J-5 staff formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the CINC.

(b) In most cases, the appropriate staff directorates prepare and present these initial briefings.

c. **Commander's Intent (Figure 4-27)**




Figure 4-27

The commanders' intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment of the enemy commander's intent. The commander's intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. The commander refines his intent as he considers staff estimates and the Commander's Estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The commander's intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders. Thus, the commander's intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.

d. **Planning directive.** The CINC normally communicates initial guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commander's intent and is "reading from the same sheet of music."

(1) Generally, the head of the plans and policy directorate, J-5, coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CINC's initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff briefings; this information becomes the written planning directive issued by the CINC. The contents of a planning directive are not officially prescribed in deliberate planning procedures, but generally include the information discussed in paragraph b. preceding. A suggested format is in Appendix A to Enclosure S of CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume I).

(2) The CINC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CINC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial

Tests for Course of Action

SUITABLE. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives and does it comply with the supported commander's guidance?

FEASIBLE. Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

ACCEPTABLE. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position? Is the action consistent with the law of war and militarily/politically supportable?

DISTINGUISHABLE. Each COA must be significantly different from the others. Plans will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved/test publications in the Joint Publication System. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine when preparing plans facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of planned operations. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not the case. The Commander's Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COAs preempts the CINC's decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander's Estimate.

COMPLETE. When the COAs have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer

- **Who** (what forces) will execute it?
- **What** type of action is contemplated?
- **When** it is to begin (i.e., M, C, T, or D-Day time provided for major actions for every force in the OPLAN)?
- **Where** it will take place?
- **How** it will be accomplished? There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed.

The refined COAs are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is taken not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the "how."

JP 5-00.2

Figure 4-28

reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. The supported commander's staff normally prepares and distributes minutes of the conference. The record of these proceedings can also serve as the basis for a planning directive.

(3) It is absolutely vital to the success of the planning process that all members of the JPEC be kept informed. The ultimate success of the supported commander's mission will depend on the support and cooperation of each subordinate and supporting commander. A large measure of that success results from a clear understanding of the commander's intent. Of course, each new plan spawns supporting plans; early CINC guidance allows supporting commanders to begin concurrent planning to develop those supporting plans.

410. STEP 3 – STAFF ESTIMATES

a. **Introduction.** Staff estimates are the foundation for the CINC's selection of a course of action. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

(1) Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of a plan. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

(2) Most combatant commanders, however, demand the thorough, well-coordinated plan that necessitates a complex staff estimate step. Although written staff estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and coordinated and fully documented.

b. The CINC's entire staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. The J-5 normally coordinates the overall process of long-range planning, prepares the initial planning guidance, and coordinates the staff estimates.

c. As illustrated in **Figure 4-29**, most major joint staff divisions, J-1, J-2, J-4, and J-6, prepare staff estimates. In addition, input may be solicited from the supporting commands, component commands, and the CINC's special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information and, with the J-3, proposes and revises tentative COAs. The J-3 might also complete a staff estimate to compare COAs for supportability and recommend a preferred COA to the J-5. In the later stages of staff analysis, the J-5 begins to focus on selecting information from the staff estimates to assist the CINC in preparing the Commander's Estimate.

d. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CINC the best possible information to select a COA.




Figure 4-29

(1) Each joint staff division

- reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective,
- examines the factors for which it is the responsible staff,
- analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective,
- compares each COA based on its staff functional analysis, and
- concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can best be supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

(2) Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands; this coordination is essential, since they bring details of force support and employment not viewed at the theater level.

(3) The form and, possibly, the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined courses of action.

e. The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the Commander's Estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the Commander's Estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

(1) The principal elements of the staff estimate normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of friendly COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective—they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimate on intelligence concentrates on the enemy: enemy situation, enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of enemy capabilities includes analysis of the various courses of action available to the enemy according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2's conclusion will indicate the enemy's most likely course of action.

(2) Guidance on the format for staff estimates is found in Appendixes B through F to Enclosure S of CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume 1. Combatant commanders may direct that additional details be included in their particular staff estimates.

f. Often the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.

(1) During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates step, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include as many of the following as applicable:

- what military operations are considered
- where they will be performed
- who will conduct the operation
- when the operation is planned to occur
- in general terms, how the operation will be conducted

(2) These refined COAs are developed by an iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original, tentative list. The staff continually estimates and reestimates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are

frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can best be supported.

411. STEP 4 – COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

a. **Definition.** Joint Pub 1-02 defines the Commander’s Estimate (of the Situation) as “a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.” In deliberate planning, it is the document that clearly states the CINC’s decision and summarizes the CINC’s rationale for that decision. The Commander’s Estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the CINC to the staff and subordinate commanders. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

b. Generally, after receiving direction from the CINC and drawing from information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the Commander’s Estimate. It is prepared for the CINC to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the Commander’s Estimate is a planning document used by the command. Appendix F to Enclosure S of CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume 1) furnishes a format for the Commander’s Estimate. **Figure 4-30** shows the basic subdivision of information; the five main paragraph headings outline steps to basic problem solving. A more detailed guide to preparing a Commander’s Estimate is contained in **Figure 4-31**, “A Primer on the Commander’s Estimate.”




Figure 4-30

A Primer on the Commander's Estimate

The Commander's Estimate is an essential tool in deliberate and crisis action planning. Using the staff work of the preceding steps, it documents the decision process used by the combatant commander (CINC) in choosing his course of action (COA). It becomes the foundation of the CINC's concept of operations and all future planning. The document is more than a collection of information from prior staff work; it is the statement of the CINC's decision process to select a COA. Often prepared by the J-5 for the CINC's signature, it is a definitive statement of the direction of subsequent deliberate planning.

A Commander's Estimate is used in both deliberate and crisis-action planning. Its format in deliberate planning is set forth in Appendix F to Enclosure S of CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I. The estimate consists of five paragraphs.

PARAGRAPH 1—MISSION. The mission statement that was developed in the mission analysis step, written during planning guidance, and refined during the staff estimate step is restated in Paragraph 1. This mission statement will be used throughout the operation plan.

PARAGRAPH 2—THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION. This information is limited to the significant factors that influence the CINC's choice of COA. Separate subparagraphs describe enemy capabilities and list friendly COAs to be considered.

● **CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.** Under each of the selected headings in the format are facts that are known about the situation. If facts are not available, necessary assumptions are stated. Two categories of topics are discussed.

(1) **Characteristics of the area of operations.** This information is furnished by J-2. The topics suggested in Appendix F to Enclosure S of CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I. Illustrate information that may be influential in selecting a COA. The list is neither mandatory nor exhaustive.

(2) **Relative combat power.** This is not simply a list of the numbers of combat troops and weapons. The planner also assesses the competence and characteristics of the forces, their composition, location, disposition, and information that measures combat effectiveness.

● **ENEMY CAPABILITIES.** Enemy capabilities are defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as "those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission...." The planner discusses not only the adversary's general capabilities to attack, defend, delay, reinforce, and/or withdraw, but also more specific capabilities, if pertinent. Information for this paragraph can be taken from the intelligence staff estimate, including the probabilities of the enemy's exercising the capabilities, and the vulnerabilities that might result from those actions. It is important to make a statement of joint enemy capabilities, since the CINC will be opposed by the combined strength of ground, air, and naval forces.

● **OWN COURSES OF ACTION.** The friendly COAs that survived the staff estimate step are listed. In practice, the length and complexity of the staff estimate process dictate that the number of refined COAs has probably been reduced to two or three. These refined COAs all pass the tests described in **Figure 6-15**.

PARAGRAPH 3—ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. The purpose of Paragraph 3 is to evaluate each proposed friendly course of action as though opposed by each enemy capability. This series of wargaming exercises illustrates that the commander considered the most significant and influential confrontations.

The comprehensive analysis that is documented in Paragraph 3 is sometimes difficult for new planners to begin. First, planners organize their thoughts: consider enemy capability #1 against friendly COA #1, e.g., consider the enemy's capability to defend against our amphibious assault. How will the terrain affect the matchup? What effect will the lines of communication have? What is the relative combat power of forces?

How will this confrontation affect further operations? Comprehensive planning at this point does not restrict the flow of ideas under consideration. The process of selection comes later. No reasonable possibility should be overlooked.

Figure 4-31

A Primer on the Commander's Estimate (cont'd.)

The planner will note that certain features begin to appear dominant as the wargaming and analysis continue. Some of these factors will clearly favor friendly forces and others will favor the enemy. These dominant considerations are known as governing factors. They are used by the J-5 and the CINC to focus the evaluation of friendly COAs.

The total enemy capabilities may be numerous, yet the decision-maker must focus on a small, manageable number to permit comprehensive analysis. Two methods have been developed to reduce the number of enemy capabilities under consideration without compromising the value of the wargaming exercise.

- **GROUPING.** While Service component forces operate in distinct environments, they mutually support one another and generally center on a major ground, air, or sea objective. It may be possible to focus staff analysis on an identifiable, pivotal operation, e.g., the initial battle to secure the beachhead in an amphibious operation. The planner may concentrate on the broad enemy capability most relevant and "group" all others in its support. For example, against our amphibious operation, group enemy air and naval capabilities as support and concentrate on analyzing enemy ground defense, the more significant issue, in opposition to our assault; or against our mission of sea control, recognize and group the supporting enemy capabilities in air and ground arenas to permit our in-depth study of the enemy's pivotal naval capability. Obviously, extreme care must be exercised to avoid overlooking any significant enemy capability or misreading the contribution of other capabilities.

- **SELECTION.** This technique further reduces the workload by selecting for analysis only those enemy capabilities that uniquely affect the outcome of a particular friendly COA. Comparatively, there is little to gain by considering the enemy's capabilities that similarly affect all friendly COAs. For example, the enemy's air defense capability may affect the friendly air superiority mission regardless of which ground-based COA is used. If that is the case, that particular enemy

capability is not likely to govern the commander's choice. Although an enemy capability may be unquestionably critical to our success, it may not contribute to the decision-maker's choice of one COA over another.

- When further reduction in the number of enemy capabilities is needed, the planner analyzes enemy capabilities in the expected order of adoption identified in the intelligence estimate. The planner may elect to restrict analysis to only the most likely enemy capabilities. This selection process must be used very carefully. Enemy commanders, too, understand that surprise is important! A critical enemy capability must not be overlooked or arbitrarily excluded from consideration merely for the convenience of the planner.

PARAGRAPH 4—COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COA'S. This paragraph weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA in light of the governing factors, e.g., relative combat power, logistics support, terrain, mobility, etc. It is a narrative description of the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as seen by the CINC. In preparation, it may be useful for planners to summarize their analysis. In reality, the actual comparison may be a mental process that lacks documentation or a computer simulation weighing sensitivity of the COA to enemy capabilities. In this paragraph the CINC describes his method for comparing each COA measured in factors he considers important to the success of the operation. Normally, the supporting tools used in the analysis are not included in the final document. A clear picture is given of the results of the analysis that led to the decision on the best/recommended COA. The final part of paragraph 4 is a statement that concludes, "Course of action # ____ is favored because"

PARAGRAPH 5—DECISION. In practice, the J-5 may prepare, coordinate, and submit to the CINC a recommended COA, but the final product, when signed by the CINC, gives the rationale used in the decision process. The document need not be the compelling argument as to the choice of a particular COA; it is, however, a statement of the CINC's decision for use by planners in understanding the rationale that went into the choice of the COA.

Figure 4-31

412. STEP 5 – CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

a. **Introduction.** The CINC’s Strategic Concept is the proposed concept of operations for the plan (**Figure 4-32**), an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commander’s Estimate prepared in Step 4. It is a narrative statement of how the CINC expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two purposes:

(1) It clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces.

(2) It identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

Concept of Operations

“A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept.”

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Figure 4-32

b. **Format.** The CINC’s Strategic Concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CINC’s overall view of how the operation will be conducted, or concept of operations. The particular format for submission of the CINC’s Strategic Concept is prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03A (Enclosure C – Basic Plan/CINC’s Strategic Concept). The elements of information that clearly convey the CINC’s concept of operations include the following.

- the plan
- (1) Situation
 - probable preconditions for implementation of the plan
 - deterrent options included in the plan
 - enemy forces
 - general tasks of friendly forces
 - expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence
 - the plan
 - assumptions, including level of mobilization
 - legal considerations
 - (2) Mission
 - (3) Execution
 - who will be employed
 - where forces will be employed
 - when forces are to be phased into theater
 - general description of how forces are to be employed
 - conventional, nuclear, and other supporting operations
 - deception
 - necessary deployment of forces
 - tasks of each subordinate and supporting command
 - required supporting plans
 - (4) Administration and Logistics
 - transportation during deployment and employment
 - concept of logistics support
 - stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks, consumption
 - mutual allies' support requirements and inter-Service support
 - levels
 - (5) Command and Control
 - command relationships
 - command and control requirements
 - succession to command

c. **Concept Development Conference.** The CINC may call a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties. Such a conference might be convened if additional work is required from subordinate and supporting commanders, which may be the situation either when the original task is to prepare an OPLAN or a CONPLAN with TPFDD and substantial subordinate commander involvement is required in the next

phase (plan development), or when considerable effort will be required to prepare supporting plans. The conference would be convened to ensure that adequate direction is given to subordinates. Subordinate and supporting commanders base further planning on guidelines in the CINC's Strategic Concept.

d. **The transmittal of the concept.** The commander must ensure that his concept is accurately described both to members of the planning community, so they can continue planning in support of the operations, and to CJCS for review and approval.

413. STEP 6 – CJCS CONCEPT REVIEW. Once the CINC's Strategic Concept is prepared, it is forwarded to CJCS for review and approval. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans, whether they are new plans or existing plans for which the concept has changed. Reviews should be completed within 60 days of referral; however, the Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if necessary. With CJCS approval, the CINC's Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. It will be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan and described in detail in Annex C of the OPLAN/CONPLAN/FUNCPLAN.

a. **Initiation of review.** The Joint Staff conducts the review for CJCS. When the Joint Staff receives the CINC's Strategic Concept, it determines whether the concept is in the proper format, conforms with JSCP guidance, is consistent with joint doctrine, and is therefore ready for review. If not, the submitting headquarters is notified by memorandum or message.

b. **Review responsibilities.** The Joint Staff, Services, and designated defense agencies (National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and defense agencies are submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conducting reviews. The Services submit comments to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

c. **Review criteria (Figure 4-33).** The purpose of the concept review is to

(1) determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned,

(2) assess the validity of the assumptions,

(3) evaluate compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine, and

(4) evaluate acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability.

Concept Review Criteria

- **Adequacy: Scope and concept of operations sufficient to accomplish tasks**
- **Validity of assumptions**
- **Acceptability: militarily and politically supportable**
- **Compliance with CJCS tasks assigned and CJCS planning guidance**
- **Consistency of concept of operations with joint doctrine**

Figure 4-33

d. **Review comments.** Comments back to the CINC concerning his concept are classified as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative.

(1) **Execution-critical** comments describe major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples of such deficiencies include such things as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

(2) **Substantive** comments pertain to less critical deficiencies such as deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(3) **Administrative** comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

e. **Review results.** Results of the review are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the concept is either

- (1) approved for further plan development or
- (2) disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission.

f. **Post-review actions.** The supported commander incorporates changes required by CJCS as follows:

(1) A formal change incorporating all execution-critical comments is submitted to CJCS within 30 days of receipt of the review results.

(2) Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety in the plan review phase of the deliberate planning process.

414. SUMMARY OF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

a. The deliberate planning process has progressed from receipt of the task assignment to development of the CINC's concept of how the assigned task will be accomplished. The CINC has documented the plan in sufficient detail for the reviewing authority, CJCS, to understand fully the overall military concept of operations. Moreover, the transmittal of the concept gives continuing guidance to subordinates as they begin more detailed planning. The procedures in concept development are not rigid. Through each step, the planners identify and analyze factors that could adversely affect the accomplishment of the CINC's mission. This discovery and problem-solving process continues even while they are preparing the CINC's Strategic Concept; they may adjust or revise the concept at any time. Shortages in types, quantities, or timing of forces or resources (called shortfalls) are among the most critical factors. The identification and resolution of shortfalls continue throughout the entire planning process.

b. Joint Planning and Execution Community coordination. The planning procedures during the concept development phase are conducted primarily by the CINC and the CINC's staff. The component commanders, joint task force commanders, and subordinate unified commanders have been involved. Outside the CINC's theater, supporting commanders, such as USTRANSCOM and other combatant commanders, and defense agencies, have attended coordination meetings, received the supported CINC's guidance, and given valuable insight during development of the concept.

c. The development of the CINC's concept of operations has been described as the most difficult phase of deliberate planning, because of the many subjective determinations that must be made. Now begins the detailed development of the flow of resources and the determination of whether that operation is possible with the apportioned forces and transportation. This next phase, plan development, is undoubtedly the most time-consuming phase.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

415. INTRODUCTION

a. **Overview.** At the close of concept development, the CINC sends his Strategic Concept to CJCS for review and approval. Once approved, it becomes the concept of operations for plan development and subsequent phases of the deliberate planning process. In the plan development phase, the staff expands and formally documents the concept of operations in the appropriate operation plan format. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans. (**Figure 4-34**)




Figure 4-34

b. CONPLANS and Functional Plans are not as fully developed as OPLANS. CONPLANS do not require the level of detailed planning in support, sustainment, or transportation that OPLANS do. Unless the supported commander requires it, annexes and appendices are not required to be as fully developed as in an OPLAN, and, generally, TPFDD development is not required. Therefore, CONPLANS present a less complicated plan development problem than OPLANS. Because OPLAN development requires all the procedures for the plan development phase to be accomplished and CONPLAN development does not, subsequent discussion of the plan development phase will focus on planning procedures for OPLANS.

c. During the initial steps of this phase, the spotlight moves to the subordinate commanders; generally, in unified combatant commands, these are the component commanders. Planners on the staffs of the component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document (the JSCP) and included in the CINC's concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service headquarters, other supporting commands, and combat support agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidates each component's forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, CINC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model; reasonable assurances can then be given by the CINC that the operation is transportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the plan's hypothetical (notional) units with actual units and those supply entries that can be replaced. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated, and USTRANSCOM develops movement tables. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. Two phases follow plan development in the deliberate planning process. The first presents the OPLAN package to CJCS for final review and approval, and the second sees subordinate and supporting commanders developing necessary supporting plans.

f. For clarity, the plan development phase will be described in eight sequential steps shown in **Figure 4-34**. In reality, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the course of action refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. The sheer magnitude of the problem is enormous; tens of thousands of separate combat and support units and materiel shipments make up large OPLANs. Computer support within JOPES makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

g. **ADP support.** The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the area of operations. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides ADP support to operation plan development. JOPES is accessed by planners and throughout the JPEC through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Planners use specialized application programs in JOPES and interface with other application programs through JOPES, to create a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) computer file. The TPFDD is created by entering and relating data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC and generated by JOPES and JOPES-related applications. The discussion of plan development in this volume will first cover the eight steps previously mentioned, followed by a section covering the ADP support available in JOPES to help accomplish the steps.

h. **TPFDD LOI.** The supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI) at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The purpose of the LOI is to give the CINC's component commanders and supporting commands and agencies specific guidance on how the plan is to be developed. The supported commander's staff coordinates with affected commands such as USTRANSCOM and its components before publication to ensure that the guidance given in the LOI is current. The LOI must furnish specific guidance concerning these items:

- priority of air movement for major units
- apportionment of airlift capability between Service components and resupply
- standard time windows for resupply defined by earliest arrival date (EAD) and latest arrival date (LAD)
 - resupply and nonunit personnel replacement planning factors
 - retrograde, chemical, and nuclear TPFDD procedures
 - attrition planning factors
 - standard ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs) for forces, and channels for resupply
 - administrative management of identifiers used within JOPES application software to identify, manipulate, and track force, cargo, and personnel requirements (e.g., unit line numbers (ULNs), cargo increment numbers (CINs), personnel increment numbers (PINs), and force record numbers (FRNs))
 - the CINC's required delivery dates (RDDs) and TPFDD points of contact for the supported and supporting CINCs' staffs

416. STEP 1 – FORCE PLANNING

a. **Introduction.** The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CINC's concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine. It consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work.

(1) The original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive, identifies major combat forces. Tasks assigned in the UCP and UNAAF generally use in-place forces already under the combatant command of the CINC. Forces apportioned for use in making operation plans will be those projected to be available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. CJCS approval is required when CINC-initiated plans cannot be supported with apportioned resources. The CINC's strategic concept must clearly identify the principal combat forces required by the proposed concept of operations.

(2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops (**Figure 4-35**). Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. Therefore, each component command develops its own total force list composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces (C, CS, CSS) using Service planning documents: *Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System*

(AMOPES) in four volumes, *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan* (NCMP) and fleet planning guidance, *Marine Capabilities Plan* (MCP), and the *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan* (WMP) in five volumes. Essential combat and support forces that are available for planning may also be listed in the applicable JSCP supplemental instructions.




Figure 4-35

(3) Apportioned major combat forces normally are described in relatively large fighting units, such as Army division and brigade, Navy carrier battle group and surface action group, Marine expeditionary force and brigade, and Air Force wing and squadron. While the apportioned forces may be in large units, the final product for each component's total force list will include detail down to unit level (i.e., battalions, companies, squadrons, detachments, sections, teams, etc.). Certain terms describing the movement of forces are essential to understanding this step of the planning problem and later discussions of the JOPES ADP applications that planners access to build the TPFDD.

b. **Movement terms.** Forces move from their home location to a specified destination in the theater. This movement involves planning by several echelons of command, possible stops at several en route intermediate locations, and a schedule constrained by a variety of operational requirements. These essential items of information are first considered and identified during the force planning step. **Figure 4-36** illustrates the flow of resources.




Figure 4-36

(1) Key locations routinely used in deliberate planning include the following:

(a) The actual calculation of dates and the determination of locations used in deliberate planning begin with the destination (DEST), the geographic location where the force is to be employed. It is the terminal geographic location for the movement of forces in the TPFDD. To reach the DEST may require strategic and theater transportation controlled by the CINC as well as theater transportation controlled by subordinate and supporting commanders. Arrival at the DEST is not to be equated to coming into direct contact with an opposing force; rather, arrival at the DEST only satisfies the concept of operations envisioned by the CINC and subordinate commander. For example, the DEST for an Army brigade may be a transshipment point or an assembly area many miles from direct contact with the enemy.

(b) The port of debarkation (POD) is the airport (APOD) or seaport (SPOD) within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation requirement for forces is completed, generally a large airport or seaport. It may or may not be the ultimate destination. For example, troops landing at an airfield in country Blue, the POD, may have to be transported many kilometers to their planned defensive position on the country Blue-country Red border (DEST). In some cases, the POD and DEST are the

same place, e.g., an airfield in Germany may be the POD and the final destination for an Air Force squadron. The port of support (POS) is the geographic location within the objective area where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sealift ammo; sealift POL; and sealift supplies and resupply. This is expected to be a distribution point; intratheater transportation from this geographic point may be required.

(c) The port of embarkation (POE) is the point where strategic air or sea transportation begins. Generally, it is the location in CONUS where strategic shipments begin. For Reserve units, the POE probably will not coincide with the home location (HOME) or mobilization station. The origin (ORIGIN) is the beginning point for a deployment move. For Active Navy and Air Force forces the ORIGIN and the POE will probably be the same, while for Active Army and Marine Corps forces the ORIGIN and POE will probably not be the same geographic location. For instance, Fort Bragg is the ORIGIN and Pope AFB is the POE for the 82d Airborne Division. Transportation to the POE is the planning responsibility of the providing commander or Service, with either organic transportation or transportation arranged by a supporting commander, such as USTRANSCOM's component, the Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(d) Several additional locations within the theater may also influence deployment; an intermediate location (ILOC) is a stopping point in the deployment movement that may be used for strategic staging, changing mode of transport, necessary cargo handling, training, or marrying forces and equipment that are being transported by split shipment. The ILOC can occur between ORIGIN and POE, between POE and POD, or between POD and DEST. A marshalling area is the location where troops are matched with pre-positioned war stocks of equipment and supplies, such as the Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) located in Europe (Benelux and Italy), Kuwait, Qatar and South Korea. These pre-positioned stocks may also be afloat as part of the Army's AWR-3 configuration or with one of three U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioned Squadrons (MPSRONS or more commonly known as MPSs). Another ILOC may be a strategic staging location for holding forces not yet directly committed to the theater's military operation. Finally, the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) is the location where units assemble before tactical employment.

(e) These locations all play important roles in the deployment of forces and supplies. Since the arrival at the DEST is the key to successful participation in the CINC's concept, readying forces and supplies at the ORIGIN or POE, scheduling intermediate stops, and scheduling theater transportation from POD to DEST influence the planning and timing of the movement.

(2) Timing is crucial. Times are important because they offer a method to track the movement of resources and measure attainment of the CINC's schedule for involvement of the forces and required arrival of supplies. In addition, the assignment of dates

allows JOPES application software to compare simulated movement with the CINC's desired movement schedule to determine whether the concept is transportationally feasible.

(a) The force must arrive, unload, and move to its destination by the required delivery date (RDD) if it is to fulfill the tasks envisioned by the plan's concept of operations. It is not enough just to get a unit to its destination; it must arrive on or before the RDD. Arriving too early may create an unnecessary logistics support problem; too late may mean that the forces cannot affect the outcome of the operation. Another date, the CINC's required date (CRD), has been introduced in response to the administrative shifting of the RDD that sometimes takes place during plan development to resolve simulated shortfalls. The CRD is the plan's original RDD, and is listed in the TPFDD to give visibility to RDDs that do shift and to show the impact of later arrival. It is intended that CRDs not be changed without CINC approval, as such changes can significantly alter the concept of operations. CRDs are important at plan execution because they become the mark for unit deployments when planners receive their actual allocation of strategic lift assets.

(b) For the strategic move, planners begin with the RDD to determine some important interim dates. Deployment planners are interested in having units arrive at the POD between an earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). The EAD is the earliest a planner can allow the first element of personnel or equipment to offload from strategic lift at the POD; the LAD is the latest date for the last element to arrive at the POD and complete offloading in time to arrive at the DEST by the RDD. ***The unloading of the last unit at the POD is termed "closing the force."*** Similarly, the unloading of the last element of a deploying unit (e.g., the last company in a brigade) is known as "unit closure." Whatever transportation time may be required to move between the POD and DEST is the difference between LAD and RDD.

(c) At the other end of the route, the mobilization and intra-CONUS planners (the Services, force-providing organizations, and the supporting transportation commands) are primarily concerned with preparing and scheduling the forces at the HOME, mobilization site, and ORIGIN. The ready-to-load date (RLD) is the earliest date a unit is available at the ORIGIN for onward transportation to the POE. The available-to-load date (ALD) is the earliest time that the unit can begin loading at the POE. An earliest date of completion (EDC) of loading is the scheduled time that all loading is completed at the POE. The earliest departure date (EDD) is the earliest date after the ALD that the shipment is ready to depart from the POE. Theoretically, these dates would be calculated backward from the RDD after considering marshalling and assembly times, theater and strategic deployment transportation times, etc. In fact, there is seldom any slack early in the planning period; the RLD and ALD are generally the minimum time required to prepare the units and materiel and transport them to the POE. Delays here may adversely affect arrival time at DEST.

(d) In practice, planners calculate the arrival window at the POD by determining the time to complete each link in tactical, intratheater transportation. Beginning with the RDD (or CRD) set by the CINC, deployment planners determine the time it will take to get from the POD to the DEST – time both to match with split-shipped or prepositioned equipment and to perform necessary assembly. Since most units cannot fully arrive on one day, there is an EAD-LAD window from the earliest arrival of the units and/or equipment at the POD and the latest departure from the POD to the DEST that will still satisfy the RDD. In theory, subtracting the time to perform strategic lift between POE and POD from those dates would result in the deadline required to complete assembly at the HOME/ORIGIN/POE for onward shipment. In practice, planners realize that at execution, competing demands will be made to mobilize, prepare for movement, and transport forces, equipment, and supplies. An RLD-ALD window is generally determined for the embarkation end of strategic transportation, and compromises begin to ease the impact on the final delivery date at the DEST. The possible loss of visibility of the original RDD that can result from these compromises led to the introduction of an inviolate CRD.

(3) Planners must have a clear understanding of force planning.

(a) It is easy to visualize a complicated movement of Reserve units. They may require movement from their home location (HOME) to their mobilization site and, possibly, onward to an Active Component base (ORIGIN) for training and marrying with equipment. Further movement may be required to the POE, where strategic transports will be met. These can become transportation planning problems even before troops and equipment leave CONUS. Such movement requirements are not limited to the Reserve Component. Active-duty units may also require intra-CONUS transportation from ORIGIN to POE. This enormous field of planning is basically the responsibility of the Services and is executed through the USTRANSCOM component, MTMC. This is called mobilization planning. It can significantly affect strategic lift and, ultimately, the arrival of combat units under the CINC's concept, and is therefore important to supported commanders. ADP applications for mobility planning are envisioned within JOPES to furnish planning tools that facilitate this crucial transportation link.

(b) Strategic deployment planning is the central focus of deliberate planning. It involves the strategic transportation of forces from POE to POD and of supplies and replacement personnel from POE to POS. Planning is done for transportation by sea-lift and airlift assets that are apportioned to the CINC for planning. This lift is furnished by a supporting commander when the OPLAN is implemented.

(c) Within the theater, transportation may be required from a POD to the DEST. Transportation may be done in several ways, but of primary interest to the CINC is the requirement for limited theater airlift, a resource that may also be apportioned in the JSCP or limited by Service capabilities. This onward movement from POD to DEST

is termed theater deployment planning and may be significant to the CINC if requirements for use of theater lift assets exceed the CINC's theater capabilities or if the simulated intratheater movement is not scheduled to meet the RDD. Arrival of the force at the right place and time (factors that are determined by an employment scheme and the concept of operations) is the ultimate objective of the deployment.

(d) Employment planning is another area vital to the successful execution of the CINC's concept of operations. It involves the actual use of personnel and materiel in the theater of operations. Detailed planning for employment is normally the responsibility of the subordinate commanders, such as component commanders or a joint task force commander.

(e) Overarching the mobilization, deployment, and employment planning processes is the Services' responsibility to sustain their forces. Though such sustainment planning is not completely supportable within the current capabilities of JOPES, improvements to JOPES ADP will include applications with much more capability to support it. Sustainment involves the resupply of materiel and replacement of personnel lost in the operation.

(f) The traditional focus of deliberate planning has been on strategic deployment. Improvements in ADP hardware, application software, and planning procedures continue to expand the view and control of the CINC in deliberate planning. Requirements for JOPES ADP to deal with the full planning spectrum from initial generation of force lists in mobilization through monitoring of employment and sustainment have been identified. The scope of JOPES is discussed in Chapter 5.

c. **Building the force list.** Given the mission and the concept of operations to accomplish it, the component planner reviews the forces apportioned for planning and included in the CINC's concept of operations, confirms the appropriateness of those forces, and determines the applicable CS and CSS forces from Service planning documents. The component force lists are developed with the full involvement of the supported commander. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and assurance that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINC's staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. It analyzes the consolidated force list to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces. Planners may build a force list in different ways.

d. Planners can create a force list unit by unit, starting with the apportioned combat forces and adding all necessary CS and CSS forces identified in doctrinal publications. This is a time-consuming effort, since OPLANs can contain several thousand separately identifiable units, or force requirements, and scores of data elements for each entry are

needed to plan the movement adequately. An alternative method uses force modules. These are groupings of C, CS, and CSS forces, as well as a calculated amount of sustainment. Using either method manually would take an extremely long time. Fortunately, JOPES ADP support greatly aids in building the force lists for a plan, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

(1) Understandably, each Active and Reserve unit in the U.S. Armed Forces today differs from the others. Even seemingly similar units within a Service may have different unit performance characteristics, various physical sizes of personnel and equipment assets, and even different unit readiness and combat capability. It is impossible to distinguish each unit separately at this stage of force planning, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, a standard model is used during the force planning at the combatant commands, one that generally represents each different category of unit in each Service. Each model is a generic (notional), or type, unit – one that is representative of an operational capability. Nearly 8,500 type units are on file representing units ranging in size from a two-person Air Force personnel team unit to a 15,000+-member Army division. Type units are used to build a force list line by line.

(a) To build a force list line by line requires the following unit descriptive information about the forces to be listed:

- approximate physical characteristics listed in number of personnel and weight and volume of equipment and accompanying supplies
- approximate movement characteristics in terms of self-deploying aircraft and operators, size of palletable materiel, and its ability to fit on current-inventory tactical and strategic lift platforms
- special characteristics of supplies, such as whether they are hazardous, explosive, etc., so special handling can be arranged
- unique operational characteristics that may aid in shipping less than the entire unit

(b) The unit movement information, such as ORIGIN, POE, ILOC, POD, and DEST, is needed.

(c) In addition, suggested times are introduced for RLD at the ORIGIN, ALD at the POE, and EAD and LAD at the POD. These times are determined from the expected transportation modes using apportioned strategic and tactical lift assets, planners' professional assessments of necessary loading and unloading times, marshalling and assembly times, final transport time to the DEST, and the RDD set by the CINC.

(d) In fact, when the necessary routing information is included, there are 96 separate identifiers that peacetime planners find useful in describing the movement and physical characteristics of an individual unit. Almost 75 percent of these must be entered individually.

(e) Mixing the CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine with the combat forces further complicates the process. Their movement into the theater is phased to meet operational requirements of the fighting force as well as operational constraints levied by transportation.

(2) A more efficient way to build force lists is through the use of force modules. Force modules are planning and execution tools used within JOPES to link major combat units with supporting units and a minimum of 1 day's sustaining logistics supplies. (Despite the definition in JP 1-02, many attempts were made to develop force modules with 30 days of sustainment, but too many variables were encountered [e.g., level of combat, categories of enemy targets, level of damage desired to targets, desert or arctic environment, etc.] to produce acceptable results. Current JOPES ADP applications are mitigating this shortfall by allowing near-real-time planning within which all organizations involved in a unit's move can share data and determine actual support requirements.) Movement for the entire package is phased to support the concept of operations. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force and satisfies the long-standing need to link support requirements with each major combat force in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and permits the monitoring of execution. Many force and support requirements can be added to a plan's database with a three-character force module identifier (FMI). There are three types of force modules:

(a) The first type is the Service force module. Service force modules are built by each Service headquarters to represent the generic (notional) structure of major combat units. Each Service force module contains the combat forces, combat support (CS) forces, and combat service support (CSS) forces required to support the combat. Service force modules are designed to be basic building blocks to aid the planner in quickly creating force lists in both deliberate and crisis action planning. A basic library of Service force modules is maintained by the Services in the JOPES database.

(b) The second type of force module is the OPLAN-dependent force module. Like Service force modules, OPLAN-dependent force modules group combat, CS, and CSS elements (and may include sustainment resources), but they are developed by CINCs to meet the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. They may begin as Service force modules that are then tailored to fit the requirements of the OPLAN in development, or the CINC or components may create them to fulfill a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules respond to recognized theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host-nation support contributions, expected intensity and nature of conflict, etc. OPLAN-dependent force modules are extremely useful to planners. Maintained as components of approved OPLAN TPFDDs, they reside in the JOPES deployment database and are accessible to planners for use in building TPFDDs for other plans. Because they have been tailored to specific anticipated scenarios and conditions, they are more directly applicable to similar scenarios in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

(c) The third type of force module is the force tracking force module. This force module is OPLAN-dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force tracking force modules consist of major combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

(d) Administratively, force modules are extremely convenient for identifying and monitoring groupings of forces. They are valuable because they facilitate block manipulation of data associated with each module, display large amounts of aggregated information about the forces and cargo included in an OPLAN, and facilitate tracking of forces planned for use in various options within an OPLAN, such as the options required by adaptive planning. Both the current JSCP and JOPES procedures require use of force modules in deliberate planning.

(e) Expanding on the utility of force modules is the concept of force module packages (FMPs). These are groups of force modules oriented on specific functional capabilities (e.g., air superiority, close air support, or reconnaissance). They can facilitate even more rapid TPFDD building in deliberate planning plan development or in crisis action planning.

417. STEP 2 – SUPPORT PLANNING

a. **Overview.** The purpose of support planning is to identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces identified in Step 1, and phase their movement into the theater to support the concept of operations. Support planning determines the quantities of supply by broad category and converts them into weights and volumes that can be compared to lift capability. Thus, they become calculations of phased movements that become deployment movement requirements. The intent is not to identify the detailed levels of particular supplies, but to identify and phase into the theater the gross quantities of needed sustainment. These quantities are based on the number and types of C, CS, and CSS units to be employed in the operation. Support planning is completed when all significant supply, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the supported commander, and then entered into the TPFDD file for the plan.

(1) Sustainment capability is a function of U.S. logistics capability, inter-Service and interallied support, Service guidance, theater guidance, and the resulting time-phasing. Appropriate combat support agencies and the General Services Administration (GSA) give the Services planning information concerning the origin and availability of non-Service-controlled materiel.

(2) The actual support calculation uses consumption rates developed and maintained by the Services under their responsibility to supply, equip, and maintain their forces assigned to combatant commanders. This calculation is generally made by the component commanders, who refer to Service and USSOCOM planning guidelines and

doctrine. It is also possible for the supported commander to perform the calculations using component-supplied force lists and planning factors.

(3) Support requirements include supplies, equipment, materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces, as well as civil engineering, medical, and EPW materiel, and equipment and supplies to support the civil affairs effort.

(4) During the support-planning step, planners are primarily concerned with how much strategic lift will be needed to move the support requirements. Thus, the gross estimates of supplies and replacement personnel do little more than initially determine the amount of space and number of passenger seats needed. Before the operation plan is complete, and definitely before it can be implemented, logistics and personnel planners attempt to define the requirements in more detail.

b. **Guidance from the CINC.** The initial concept of support was developed during the concept development phase. Early in the planning the CINC gives guidance to the subordinate and supporting commands that defines the length of the operation, strategic lift availability, supply buildup policies, and anticipated supply shortages. The supported commander also gives guidance on transportation priorities, available common- and cross-servicing agreements between subordinate and supporting commands, personnel attrition factors, ports of support, etc.

c. **Calculations.** The computation of sustainment uses Service planning factors, or consumption rates, and the number of forces, or consumers, to be supported. The product of these factors becomes a total supply requirement, as illustrated in **Figure 4-37**. This total must be expressed as gross movement requirements in barrels of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); short tons or measurement tons of equipment and materiel identified by broad supply class or subclass; and numbers of personnel. These calculations are generally made by the component commanders.

(1) The actual calculations are usually done using planning factors from the Services. These planning factors can be applied to numbers of people, numbers of equipment types, or numbers of recurring type units, for instance, rations: 6.8 lbs per person per day; spare parts: 25 filters per 10-18 tractors per month operating in a dusty environment; or munitions: number of high-explosive rounds per day fired by 155mm batteries in heavy rate of fire.

(2) Performed manually, the calculations for the many force records in a typical TPFDD would be overwhelming. Consumption rates vary with the class and subclass of supply, theater or area within the theater of operation, intensity of combat for different Services and time periods, etc. JOPES ADP is a great help in performing these calculations and adding the supplies to the TPFDD. Supplies are phased into the theater in increments to avoid overloading logistics support facilities and transportation. It is important to note that the key to successful support planning is the prudent choice of planning factors.




Figure 4-37

d. **Definitions.** Numerous terms are fundamental to an understanding of support planning and the JOPES ADP that supports it. Support requirements for deploying forces are divided into two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment, and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. The relationships of the supply categories are shown in **Figure 4-38**.

(1) Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit's organic equipment, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies specified by the CINC.

(a) The basic load is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand within a unit. This is the materiel that makes the unit capable of engaging the enemy immediately on arrival at the DEST. The Service determines this quantity, and it is included in the Service-generated description of each type unit, indistinguishable without reference to Service documents. Some units carry no basic load, others may deploy with 1, 3, 5, 15, 30, or 60 days of supply. When a planner selects a type unit and enters it into the OPLAN TPFDD, the unit-related supplies already included in the type unit description are added automatically to the TPFDD as well. The planner must know the days of supply and the expected supply consumption that are considered basic load and already included in the type unit description.




Figure 4-38

(b) To maintain effective contact with the enemy may require considerably more than the basic load. When a unit deploys, it is normally required to arrive with enough supplies to perform its mission without being resupplied for a stated period ranging from one to five days. The CINC defines in the concept of operations the length of time that the unit must be self-sustaining. Additional accompanying supplies extend the period supported by the basic load. The amount of additional accompanying supplies that must be added to the basic load quantities varies from unit to unit; it depends on the unit's mission and doctrine. The quantity of additional accompanying supplies must be calculated and added to the OPLAN TPFDD for arrival with the unit. These supplies are unit specific and are readily identifiable for the specific unit.

(2) Non-unit-related supplies and equipment include all support requirements that are not in the Service-generated type unit descriptions or augmented by accompanying supplies. These supplies are not identified for a specific unit, thus the designation non-unit-related. It is useful to further divide the broad category of non-unit-related supplies into subcategories.

(a) Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) are a forward-deployed part of the nation's total war reserve stocks. Because strategic transportation assets are limited, especially in the early days of a deployment, pre-positioning supplies eliminates some of the competition for strategic lift. Pre-positioning is an essential sustainment asset that further bridges the time between when a unit begins to operate in the theater and when continuous resupply is established. The Army's AWR-3 Program, the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, and the Army and Air Force Afloat Pre-positioning Ships (APS) program in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian and Pacific Oceans are examples of afloat pre-positioned war materials that substantially reduce the near-term strategic lift requirement for unit equipment allowance, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies.

(b) Sustaining supplies are needed by forces to support them from the time their accompanying supplies and the afloat pre-positioning force (APF) (if available) run out until the continuous resupply pipeline opens. This is especially true if forces have deployed over long distances. The continuous resupply pipeline largely depends on sealift. Sealift could take days or weeks to begin making regular deliveries, because of the loading and unloading time at the ports, and the sailing time between them. Sustaining supplies, therefore, are normally delivered by airlift.

(c) Resupply includes all the materiel needed to sustain the forces and is the supplies necessary to replenish the consumed supplies. Quantities to supply all in-place and deploying units in the theater are computed. Resupply will be a continuous requirement as long as forces remain in an area of operations.

(d) Supply buildup includes all supplies above the consumption rate that can be delivered into the area of operations and stockpiled. The stockpile then acts as a buffer in the supply system that can continue to sustain the forces should the supply pipeline be temporarily interrupted. Supply buildup policy is defined in the concept of support in the CINC's Strategic Concept. For example, the policy may specify that a 15-day supply buildup of all supply classes be in place at the end of 30 days.

(e) Replacement personnel are categorized as a non-unit-related requirement that is designed to keep all units daily at 100 percent combat effectiveness. The requirement for replacement personnel is computed using Service attrition factors at various rates for noncombat losses and intensities of combat. Replacements are time-phased into replacement centers within the objective area at regular intervals. On the other hand, filler personnel are individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit to its authorized strength.

(3) The ADP support for deliberate planning generates the strategic deployment of supply requirements to a port of support (POS), which is to supplies essentially what a POD is to forces – the terminus of strategic movement. The POS is also significant because some supplies, POL and ammunition for instance, require special facilities or cannot be offloaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity. From each

POS, supplies will be made available to designated units. Component planners designate ports of support (air cargo, general sea cargo, POL, and munitions) for every location where forces will be operating. From the POS the responsibility for onward transport may fall to each component commander or to a designated component command within a specified area, depending on how the CINC sets up intratheater supply through his directive authority.

(4) The terms “classes” and “subclasses” of supply have been used. The hundreds of thousands of items in the federal supply system are categorized in one of ten broad classes. **Figure 4-39** lists these classes. It further indicates the magnitude of the planning problem that results from the calculation, even in general terms, of the supplies required to first prepare an armed force for an operation and then continue to sustain it. Deployment planning focuses on very broad categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40 subclasses. For instance, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, refrigerated rations, nonrefrigerated rations, combat rations, and water.

418. STEP 3 – NBC DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR PLANNING

a. Nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) defense planning

(1) Enemy use of NBC weapons has the potential to significantly affect U.S. operations. The enemy’s capability presents major defensive problems and requires in-depth study and detailed planning.

(2) The component commands submit their NBC defense requirements to the supported command. Service component commanders’ plans for operations in an NBC environment are consolidated into a single joint stand-alone TPFDD file, separate from the OPLAN TPFDD. Guidance for NBC defense operations is found in Appendix 2 to Annex C in CJCSM 3122.03A. Planning considerations include enemy NBC capabilities; friendly NBC defensive capabilities; participation of allies in NBC defense operations; related assumptions; shipment, intratheater receipt, pre-positioning, issue, and accountability of NBC defense equipment; subordinate tasks; and procedures and responsibilities for furnishing NBC defensive logistics support to allied forces, if applicable.

b. Nuclear planning

(1) **Introduction.** The possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world presents the joint planner with new problems. Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be introduced in combat; planners must assess the impact that would have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: either nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be

Classes and Subclasses of Supply

	Symbols		Subclasses
CLASS I Subsistence			A - NONPERISHABLE C - COMBAT RATIONS R - REFRIGERATED S - NONREFRIGERATED W - WATER
CLASS II Clothing, individual equip, tools, admin supplies			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL E - GENERAL SUPPLIES F - CLOTHING G - ELECTRONICS M - WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES
CLASS III Petroleum, oils, lubricants			A - POL FOR AIRCRAFT W - POL FOR SURFACE VEHICLES P - PACKAGED POL
CLASS IV Construction materials			A - CONSTRUCTION B - BARRIER
CLASS V Ammunition			A - AIR DELIVERY W - GROUND
CLASS VI Personal demand items		 	A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL D - ADMIN VEHICLES G - ELECTRONICS K - TACTICAL VEHICLES L - MISSILES M - WEAPONS N - SPECIAL WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES
CLASS VII Major end items: racks, pylons tracked vehicles, etc.			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL D - ADMIN VEHICLES G - ELECTRONICS K - TACTICAL VEHICLES L - MISSILES M - WEAPONS N - SPECIAL WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES
CLASS VIII Medical materials			A - MEDICAL MATERIAL B - BLOOD/FLUIDS
CLASS IX Repair parts			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL D - ADMIN VEHICLES G - ELECTRONICS K - TACTICAL VEHICLES L - MISSILES M - WEAPONS N - SPECIAL WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES
CLASS X Material for nonmilitary programs		 	

Figure 4-39

quickly employed by friendly forces if the need arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation of both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINC's lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the unified or combined command level is usually based on political policies. It stems from national-level considerations, but is influenced by the military mission. Nuclear planning is conducted by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in coordination with U.S. combatant commanders and certain allied commanders.

(2) Guidance for documenting the planning for nuclear operations is found in CJCSI 3110.04 (Supplemental Instruction to the JSCP). There are many areas to consider, including nuclear initiation, assumptions, enemy nuclear capabilities and defense options, friendly nuclear assigned support tasks, concept of nuclear operations, weapon allocations, targeting, limitations, and reconnaissance operations to support nuclear operations.

419. STEP 4 – TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

a. Overview of transportation planning (Figure 4-40)




Figure 4-40

(1) The supported commander does transportation planning. This step and two others outline the procedures to solve the complex strategic movement problem. The task is to simulate the strategic movement of requirements generated by component planners during the force planning and support planning steps using organic lift and the apportioned common-user strategic transportation resources. The goal in transportation planning is to produce a feasible strategic transportation movement in support of the CINC's plan, a very difficult and complex thing to do. It is an iterative process: if the simulation of movement indicates that the forces and nonunit supplies cannot be moved in time, planners identify the problems, evaluate their impact on the overall plan, incorporate solutions, and, if necessary, simulate the strategic move again. **Figure 4-40** illustrates the relationships between the three steps: transportation planning, shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis.

(2) As **Figure 4-36** (The Flow of Resources) illustrates, the strategic movement is only part of a complex logistics problem: units must travel from home or ORIGIN to POE, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on time to the POE, combat force loading must be done according to the type of offloading expected (amphibious assault, airdrop, administrative, etc.), and there are always competing demands for lift resources and support facilities. Transportation feasibility should not be confused with overall plan feasibility. Strategic transportation (**Figure 4-41**) is only one element in the picture of overall plan feasibility; transportation from ORIGIN to POE, and POD to DEST, must be available as well as the actual capability to furnish the nonunit supply requirements calculated in the support planning step.

<i>Strategic Mobility Options</i>	
<u>AIRLIFT</u>	<u>SEALIFT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very fast • Very flexible • Limited capacity • Most expensive • Airfield-dependent • Requires special unloading equipment (CRAF/KC-10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slow to very slow • Some flexibility • Huge capacity (1 ship=130 C-5s) • Least expensive • Seaport-dependent • Requires special offloading equipment (civilian ships)

Figure 4-41

b. Before the iterative transportation planning process can begin, all force and non-unit records must be entered into the TPFDD. Each entry equates to a movement requirement; if not all the requirements are known, their movement cannot be simulated to determine feasibility and make adjustments as required.

(1) Component commanders have already considered the competing demands for limited strategic transportation; limitations of the support capabilities at intermediate locations along the route; limitations of the personnel processing, materiel handling, and materiel storage capabilities at the POE and POD; capabilities of theater transportation between POD and DEST; and required transport time between POD and DEST, etc. In concept development, component planners determined key logistical elements, such as the size of forces, equipment, and nonunit supplies; probable ORIGIN, POE, POD, POS, marshalling and assembly requirements, and DEST; the expected timing to reach each stop along the way, etc. Phasing of movement was planned, and the CINC may have already issued guidelines to divide apportioned lift resources among the components.

(2) At this point in deployment planning, a completed movement plan considers competition for limited lift assets, mobility support facilities, and priorities of the CINC to support the concept of operations. USTRANSCOM reviews the TPFDD file with CINC-assigned PODs and identifies preferred POEs.

(3) The Service component planners designate as many actual units as they can to replace the generic (notional) type units in the force list, taking into account the CINC-assigned POD and USTRANSCOM's preferred POE, and identify any support problems to the supported commander. This process of assigning actual units to force requirements is known as sourcing.

(a) Army sourcing of CONUS-based forces begins in force selection by USJFCOM's Army component, the Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(b) Air Force sourcing of CONUS-based forces begins in force selection by USJFCOM's Air Force component, the Air Combat Command (ACC). The Air Force distributes its apportioned force list to major commands and separate operating agencies to source combat and support units; the War Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, the Air Force planning document, identifies real-world forces available for deployment, employment, and redeployment in support of listed plans.

(c) At this stage in planning, the Navy sources only a few requirements. The OPLAN is a planning document covering the period specified by the JSCP, while specific Navy resources that would be used in the plan are highly mobile. For example, a carrier battle group that is in Norfolk today may be in the Indian Ocean a month later. Generally, the Navy will complete sourcing only during crisis action planning, when operation plans are converted to OPORDs.

(d) Sourced requirements in the TPFDD file contain the same kinds of detailed data for actual real-world units that they previously contained for the generic (notional) type units.

(4) The TPFDD is modeled using the Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST); (**Figure 4-42**) that is, the strategic deployment of all transportation requirements, forces and supplies, is simulated reflecting the deployment portion of the plan's concept of operation.




Figure 4-42

(5) The LAD at the POD or POS, as applicable, was established for each requirement when TPFDD record entries were completed. The movement simulation software in JFAST calculates a Feasible Available to Load Date (FALD) for each requirement at its POE, if the resource being moved requires land movement furnished by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). JFAST also computes an arrival/unloading date at the POD or POS, given the factors that influence the movement of forces and nonunit supplies, and the data in the TPFDD. The transportation feasibility of the OPLAN is determined by comparing the arrival/unloading dates reflected by JFAST to the LAD for TPFDD, checking to see that there is sufficient port throughput capability, and looking to see if there is sufficient common-user airlift and sealift capacity to move the force and its support. If the JFAST calculated dates meet the LAD requirements in the TPFDD, the plan can be judged to be grossly transportation-feasible.

(6) When it is determined that the expected arrival of forces and supplies at the DEST does not conform to CINC requirements, a shortfall is said to exist. The shortfall may be attributed to any single cause or combinations of many causes, but the shortfalls discussed here are transportation shortfalls. The realization that a shortfall exists may come from a detailed computer simulation, manual calculations by skilled logisticians, or a “best guess” by an experienced operation planner. The earlier a shortfall is discovered, the earlier planners can explore solutions to eliminate/mitigate the shortfall or make necessary changes to the plan.

420. RETROGRADE, NEO, AND MEDEVAC PLANNING

a. **Introduction.** Although not included as a distinct step in plan development, the requirement to transport personnel and materiel from the theater of operations requires close coordination. The movement of equipment requiring repair, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and medical evacuation out of the combat theater are also concerns of the logistics planner. Recent experience with transportation simulation has demonstrated that the transportation requirements for these categories are far more of a problem than originally anticipated. The expectation of “more than enough airplanes to haul stuff back to the States” is no longer accepted without considerable planning efforts to support that contention. To consolidate medical evacuation, NEO, and other retrograde requirements, a separate retrograde TPFDD is usually created.

b. The Department of State (DOS) is primarily responsible for NEO and determines whether and when NEO operations are executed. The combatant commands are responsible for furnishing support and conducting NEO operations. DOD Directive 5100.51, “Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad,” gives guidance on protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. Regional combatant commanders also prepare a NEO FUNCPLAN to support potential NEO requirements within their AOR. When the DOS requests DOD support to execute a NEO, the supported commander develops an OPORD with time-phased NEO requirements developed in coordination with DOS or its designated representative (normally the affected country’s U.S. Ambassador) and USCINTRANS. If a retrograde TPFDD is developed for an OPLAN, the anticipated NEO requirements may be added to the other identified requirements.

(1) The joint planner preparing NEO plans works in coordination with the Department of State and the embassy in the country concerned. Biennially, the Department of State submits to the Department of Defense an estimate of the number of Americans in each country, their status, and transportation requirements at each alert condition. Each embassy also maintains an “F-77” form that contains a current estimate of U.S. citizens in that country. Each embassy also maintains plans for notifying Americans of potential danger or possible evacuation from the country. This alert system is graduated from warning to imminent unrest/hostile action.

(2) The DOS has a crisis response organization to monitor and advise on NEO. The operations center keeps 24-hour watch on world conditions; the staff includes a military representative. The regional bureaus and country desks monitor specific activities within their geographic areas of responsibility. An interagency task force working group, called the Washington Liaison Group, may be established to plan and conduct operations during heightened alert conditions. Within the affected country's U.S. embassy, the country team, composed of the ambassador and selected staff members, is the focal point for combatant command coordination of NEO planning.

(3) A Department of State request for assistance generally does not come until an alert condition of imminent unrest/hostile actions exists or host-nation and civil channels are not available to conduct NEO.

421. STEP 5 – SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION

a. Shortfall identification, like transportation planning, does not occur at only one point in deliberate planning. The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, should resolve them by early coordination and conference with component commanders and supporting commanders. This step focuses on identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls highlighted by the deployment simulation conducted during transportation planning.

b. Shortfalls are identified in a variety of ways; the computer-simulated movement performed in transportation planning, however, identifies the simulated late arrival of forces and nonunit records. Reports generated during the computer simulation also identify reasons for the late arrivals: shortage of lift resources, overloaded mobility support facilities, excessive requirements for intratheater lift, etc.

(1) Planners make reasonable corrections or adjustments to the movement requirements. For example, analysis might show that shortfalls are caused by inadequate materiel-handling capacity. Planners could initiate a solution by rescheduling shipments when the POE is not operating at full capacity or identifying an alternate POE for some TPFDD movement requirements. They should restrict adjustments to those that will not affect the CINC's concept of operations or concept of support.

(2) Planners identify unresolved shortfalls for corrective action by higher-level decision-makers, or those that must be resolved with other commanders by compromise or mutual agreement. The CINC alone approves changes that affect the concept of operations or the concept of support.

c. In conjunction with subordinate and supporting commanders, planners may use any one or a combination of the following alternatives to resolve transportation shortfalls:

- change priority of force or nonunit cargo records
- adjust POEs, PODs, routing, and timing
- change mode or source of strategic lift
- adjust pre-positioned forces or resources
- enhance facility capabilities with new construction or upgrading
- seek additional assets
- conclude contractual agreements or inter-Service support agreements
- arrange for host-nation support
- as a last resort, redefine the concept of operations

d. Situations may occur when the identified shortfall simply cannot be resolved (inadequate forces or transportation apportioned in the JSCP or furnished by the Services to accomplish the assigned task) and no alternative within the CINC's authority would result in a satisfactory solution.

(1) In such a situation, the shortfall and other critical limiting factors and their impact on mission accomplishment, the associated risk of not resolving the shortfall, the threat level that apportioned resources can meet, and any recommended change in the task assignment are submitted to CJCS for resolution.

(2) However, plan development based on apportioned resources continues; OPLAN completion is not delayed pending resolution of shortfalls or limiting factors. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will assess the impact of shortfalls and limiting factors and list the tasks that cannot be accomplished. Planners submit a separate TPFDD identifying shortfall force and nonunit cargo records.

(3) When planners identify a problem that adversely affects the OPLAN, they act immediately either to correct it or to coordinate its resolution. Problems get more difficult to handle the longer they go unresolved. If numerous shortfalls are left for resolution until this step in planning, the work required to resolve them becomes complicated and frustrating.

e. The CINC usually calls a plan development conference to review initial closure profiles and to assess the feasibility of closure to meet the OPLAN's concept of operations. Here planners consider shortfalls unresolved by the planning staffs, explore solutions, and assess resulting risks. All subordinate and supporting commands attend the conference at the invitation of the supported commander. This should not be the first time the planning staffs of supporting commanders have coordinated on the development of the plan. However, it may be the first time that they make hard decisions and compromises to resolve crucial, previously unresolvable shortfalls.

422. STEP 6 – TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

a. Transportation planning has been going on long before the planner reaches this step in plan development. Hasty analyses that manually simulated the transportation movement were performed as early as the staff estimate step in the concept development phase; repeatedly, shortfalls have been identified and resolved without fanfare. In the transportation planning and shortfall identification steps, planners collected and added information to the computer database, identified shortfalls, and implemented the formal process for handling the unresolved shortfalls.

b. Strategic transportation is formally analyzed in Step 6. After the computer simulation and, possibly, several iterations of the transportation steps, the result is the conclusion by the CINC that the OPLAN is grossly transportation-feasible and ready for TPFDD refinement. There is no finite definition for “grossly transportation-feasible.” Computer modeling of the TPFDD can demonstrate whether or not the CINC appears to have sufficient strategic lift resources apportioned to handle the planned flow of forces and their sustainment. This conclusion must be reached before the CINC can forward the OPLAN to the supporting commands, agencies, and USTRANSCOM for TPFDD refinement.

423. STEP 7 – TPFDD REFINEMENT (Figure 4-43)

TPFDD Refinement Conferences

- **Forces Conference: Services source and tailor major combat forces for the plan then determine the CS/CSS forces required to support those combat forces.**
- **Logistics Conference: Participants identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces selected during force planning.**
- **Transportation Conference: Participants simulate the strategic movement of the forces and supplies to determine if the plan is still transportationally feasible and complies with the CINC approved concept of operations.**

Figure 4-43

a. For OPLAN development, the TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps or phases that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support other elements of the plan development phase: force plan-

ning, support planning, transportation planning, and shortfall identification. These plan development steps are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics, and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate plan. Database size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The TPFDD file for regional plans is normally refined using two refinement conferences, combined Forces and Logistics Conference, and a Transportation Conference. TPFDD files for MTW OPLANs may be refined at three separate conferences (Forces, Logistics, and Transportation Conferences) as are TPFDD files for global plans. Refinement conferences may be combined or omitted as required to achieve the most efficient refinement of either a single OPLAN or a family of OPLANs developed for a common planning task. For regional plans, that decision is made by the supported commander in consultation with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. For global planning, the decision will be made by the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands. The supported commander conducts conferences for regional plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff conducts conferences for global plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the combatant commanders.

(1) **Forces refinement.** This initial phase of TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, the Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINTRANS normally hosts forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance; to assess the adequacy of CS and CSS force planning; and to resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM furnishes sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

(a) Before any forces refinement conference, supported commanders update force lists against the latest TUCHA file, which contains the type unit information accessed by JOPES application software. The Services update the TUCHA file quarterly to reflect current force structure and data.

(b) Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment are furnished to the supported commander by the appropriate component command before any forces refinement conference.

(c) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the Logistics Factors File and Civil Engineering Support Planning File reflect current data. These files are OPLAN-specific and interface with other JOPES applications to generate TPFDD requirements.

(d) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the latest quarterly update of the Service Force Module Library has been completed.

(e) Forces TPFDD files are sourced by sourcing agencies at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) before any forces refinement conference. Joint Staff J-3, as functional database manager, monitors and facilitates the transfer of data, as required.

(2) **Logistics refinement.** This second phase of TPFDD refinement is primarily conducted by the Service logistics sourcing agencies, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and CINC components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINCTRANS normally hosts logistics refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistics refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistics requirements per JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources furnished by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering support planning.

(a) The logistics community begins refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced and adequate force list TPFDD furnished by the supported commander.

(b) Before logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved develop and/or source facilities and materiel support requirements.

(c) Before the start of the logistics phase, Services and supported commanders ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and used throughout the logistics refinement process.

(d) During logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved resolve problems regarding non-unit-related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical evacuee, and resupply records, including shortfalls.

(e) Before a logistics refinement conference, USCINCTRANS assesses initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and the Joint Staff, and gives the results to the conference participants. At the conclusion of the logistics refinement conference, USCINCTRANS reassesses transportation feasibility for the supported commander to ensure that the TPFDD is ready for transportation component command flow.

(3) **Transportation refinement.** Transportation refinement is conducted by USCINCTRANS in coordination with the supported CINC, Joint Staff, Services, and other CINCs. USCINCTRANS normally hosts transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure that they are transportation-feasible and are consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

(a) Transportation refinement begins with the supported commander giving a sourced TPFDD file to USCINCTRANS for transportation flow.

(b) During the transportation conference, participants resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate combined transportation requirements and shortfalls. Movement tables are furnished and the supported commander determines whether the closure profile is consistent with his concept of operations.

b. USTRANSCOM assesses the gross transportation feasibility of the OPLAN when force and logistics TPFDD refinement is completed. If a plan is determined to be grossly transportation-feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff in coordination with the supported commander may consider the OPLAN “effective for planning.” This concept recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution before submitting the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation as effective for planning is predicated on the fact that the CINC’s Strategic Concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the check for gross transportation feasibility indicated the plan was transportation-feasible.

c. The supported commander, in coordination with the Joint Staff and USCINCTRANS, publishes refinement guidance in the TPFDD LOI prepared at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning.

(1) To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JOPES database, TPFDD data is intensively managed and updated. This is done to ensure database accuracy to facilitate rapid conversion to an OPOD in crisis action planning. This intensive management includes replacing sourced units that are changed or deactivated, updating the TUCHA and other standard reference files, and updating force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structure.

(2) Normally, representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, the Joint Staff, Services, defense agencies, and components attend refinement conferences.

(3) Completed TPFDD files are normally made available to refinement participants through USCINCTRANS no less than 30 days before refinement conferences. Medical working files, personnel working files, planning factors files, ports of support files, unit consumption factors files, and control files will be submitted with the TPFDD file.

(4) The supported commander certifies that the TPFDD file is ready for refinement.

424. STEP 8 – PLAN DOCUMENTATION

a. **Definition.** Plan documentation is the final step in the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The objective is to document the OPLAN in JOPES format for submission to CJCS for final review and distribution to the JPEC. The fully documented plan, including its refined TPFDD, is an operation plan in complete format.

(1) The OPLAN includes a summary, a basic plan, a series of detailed annexes, and other administrative documents describing the CINC's concept in great detail. The basic plan describes the situation, mission, plan of execution, and administration and logistics concepts, and identifies the CINC's plan for command and control.

(2) The annexes provide the details of the OPLAN: commands supporting the plan (task organization), intelligence, operations, logistics, personnel, and a multitude of other vital subjects. The annexes further expand the OPLAN's information by a long list of appendixes that contain an even more detailed statement of the CINC's concept for specific elements of the plan. CJCSM 3122.04 contains guidance for preparing many of the classified annexes and appendixes.

(3) Information gathered by the planning staff during the entire deliberate planning process is used for plan documentation. The actual writing of individual elements of the plan need not wait until this step; it begins when there is enough information for each particular topic. The CINC's Strategic Concept, prepared during the concept development phase, normally serves as the substantial beginning for OPLAN documentation. Information on new or expanded details that were not included in the CINC's Strategic Concept are now collected and included in the final OPLAN document.

(4) CJCSM 3122.03A (JOPES Volume II) contains administrative guidance and formats for the OPLAN. **Figure 4-44** shows the major elements of an OPLAN and a list of annexes.

(5) The documentation of the OPLAN reflects the latest changes to the TPFDD resulting from the refinement process. Planners often make changes that are absolutely necessary to close the force. While the CINC or other appropriate members of the staff approved them, it is possible that these changes have altered the original concept of operations. The documentation step is the final opportunity to meld the computer description of the operation, manifested in the TPFDD, with its written description.




Figure 4-44

b. The documentation step includes not only preparing the written package but also producing the TPFDD updated by the refinement process. Supporting commands and agencies that receive the plan can review the database on-line via GCCS. If the plan is sent to an organization that does not have access to the necessary JOPES ADP capabilities, selected information can be extracted from the TPFDD and included in the written plan. The Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) is just such a printed computer product that displays extracts of specific data from the TPFDD file. The TPFDL may be included as Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN.

PLAN REVIEW PHASE

425. PLAN REVIEW PHASE

References: CJCSM 3122.01
CJCSM 3141.01A, “Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans.”

a. **Introduction.** In this phase, the Joint Staff performs or coordinates a final review of operation plans submitted by the combatant CINCs. It is a formal review of an entire operation plan. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to develop their plans in support of the CINC’s concept. The supporting commanders don’t wait until the plan is approved before beginning to develop their supporting plans; they have been involved in doing this while the CINC has been building the plan.

b. **Sources of plans for review.** CJCS has statutory responsibility for reviewing contingency plans. By this authority, the Joint Staff reviews plans from the following sources:

- Operation plans submitted by the CINCs in response to JSCP requirements and other CJCS directives, including:
 - new operation plans
 - existing plans, as changed
 - existing plans recommended for cancellation
 - existing plans recommended for continuation
- Combined military plans and planning studies in coordination with comparable authorities of the other nations
 - Military plans of international treaty organizations. These plans are reviewed by the Chairman when:
 - The U.S. military representative to an international treaty organization requests guidance or comments from the Chairman on a plan
 - A Major NATO Command (MNC), or other NATO command authorized by a MNC, forwards a plan to the nations concerned for national comment
 - Other operation plans designated by the Chairman or specifically requested by the Chief of a Service or CINC

c. **Types of review.** The Joint Staff and JPEC conduct two types of reviews as reflected in **Figure 4-12** (repeated here for clarity).




Figure 4-12

(1) **Concept review** is the final step in the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's Strategic Concept is reviewed for adequacy, feasibility, validity of assumptions, compliance with CJCS guidance, consistency with joint doctrine, and acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability. CJCS concept review is discussed in detail in paragraph 413 of this publication and in Enclosure D to CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume 1.

(2) **Final plan review** is conducted during the **Plan Review Phase** of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to all operation plans. It is a formal review of the entire plan, including TPFDD, updated medical working file, and appropriate civil engineering support planning files, if applicable. When an operation plan is approved, it is effective for execution when directed.

d. **Review criteria (Figure 4-45)**. Approval of the operation plan during final review depends on whether it satisfies the CJCS task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of apportioned resources. This is summarized as adequacy and feasibility. In addition, operation plans are reviewed for consistency with joint doctrine and acceptability.

Plan Review Criteria

- **Adequate: Scope and concept of operations sufficient to accomplish tasks**
- **Feasible: Task can be accomplished with apportioned forces and resources**
- **Acceptable: militarily and politically supportable (Results are worth the cost of the operation)**
- **Concept of operation is consistent with joint doctrine (CJCS Plan Review Guide provides more specific guidance)**

Figure 4-45

(1) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the JSCP tasking. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine.

(2) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether the plans exceed the apportioned resources.

(3) The review for acceptability ensures that plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criterion of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. In addition, using this criteria, the plans are reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War.

(4) Operation plans incorporate appropriate joint doctrine as stated in approved and final draft or test publications contained in the Joint Doctrine Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans streamlines adaptation of operation plans to specific crises in crisis action planning and facilitates execution of operations during all phases and operations for crisis resolution.

e. **CJCS action.** Operation plans submitted to CJCS for review are referred to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, which conducts and coordinates the final plan review. Other Joint Staff directorates, the Services, and defense agencies are consulted as required.

(1) **Review comments** are categorized as follows:

(a) **Execution-critical** comments are major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

(b) **Substantive** comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance, JOPES formatting, and/or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(c) **Administrative** comments are comments offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

(2) Reviews are processed under the provisions of CJCSI 5711.01 and CJCSM 3141.01A. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(3) Review results are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is given one of the following dispositions:

(a) Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

f. **Post-review actions**

(1) Within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander sends a message to the Chairman stating his intentions concerning incorporation of execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items will be submitted to CJCS with 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change or by the next CJCS review. A formal change incorporating substantive comments must be submitted within 180 days of initial CJCS approval of an OPLAN/CONPLAN. Subsequent submissions of formal changes are made at CINC discretion and/or Chairman direction. A supported commander with substantial justification to request resolution of review comments should forward his recommendations in a memorandum to the Joint Staff proponent for the deliberate planning process, the Director, J-7.

(2) Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander sends a message to the component commands notifying them of

(a) operation plan approval status;

(b) operation plans replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and

(c) component commands' responsibilities to notify supporting commands and agencies of operation plan effectiveness and taskings.

(3) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported command's operation plan review notification message, component commanders send a message to all supporting commands and Service agencies that are assigned tasks within the plan, relaying operation plan status and effectiveness.

(4) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff reviews it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review is determined case by case.

(5) Supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies are normally reviewed and approved by the supported commander. Supported commanders advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

(6) See CJCSM 3122.01, Enclosure D for review procedures for Combined Plans, Canada-U.S. Combined Plans, and NATO Plans.

SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE

426. SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE

a. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the preparation and submission of supporting plans. These plans focus on what is needed to complete mobilization, deployment, and employment tasks outlined in the CINC's plan. Paragraph 3 of the operation plan and paragraph 3 of the Plan Summary clearly document the task assignments. As required by the CINC's task assignment, component commanders, joint task force commanders, supporting commanders, or other agencies develop supporting plans. As shown in **Figure 4-46**, many of these commanders in turn assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. As an extreme example, a local unit-recall roster ordering an individual Service member to report for duty in case of a contingency can be considered a supporting plan.




Figure 4-46

b. Enclosure A of CJCSM 3122.03A, contains specific instructions for assigning discrete plan identification numbers (PIDs) to every operation plan entered into the JOPES system. Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. In some cases, however, a command is required to perform essentially the same actions to support two or more supported commander's plans. In these situations, the supporting commander may prepare a single, omnibus plan rather than multiple supporting plans that restate identical material. The supporting plan summary lists the plans it supports, and the supporting plan PID is assigned without regard to the PIDs of the plans it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the plan is converted into an OPORD and executed. In many cases, however, the politico-military situation cannot be clearly predicted, so detailed employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it.

d. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, are submitted by the supporting command or agency within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless the supported commander so directs. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander reviews and approves supporting plans. CJCS may be asked to resolve issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff, on behalf of CJCS, can review any supporting plan.

JOPES ADP SUPPORT FOR PLANNING

427. INTRODUCTION. (See Appendix B, *ADP Support for Planning and Execution*, for additional information on automated data processing [ADP] support software, models and joint deployment information systems integration.)

a. The JOPES deliberate planning process would be unacceptably slow, unresponsive, and inflexible without the support of JOPES ADP. In the deliberate planning process, planners develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and prepare supporting plans using JOPES ADP. It is also used in crisis action planning to tailor and refine existing operation plans to produce executable OPORDs, or rapidly develop wholly new COAs and work them into executable OPORDs, in response to contingencies as they arise. In deliberate planning, JOPES ADP helps primarily in the plan development phase by facilitating collaborative planning by all involved staff agencies to build and flow the force list, calculate and flow nonunit cargo and personnel required to sustain that force, complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support, and test for gross transportation feasibility. The product of this process is the TPFDD, a transportation-feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to execute and support the CINC's concept of operations, phased into the area of operations at the places and times required by the CINC's concept. The TPFDD can be thought of as an expression of the CINC's concept of operations through the scheduled deployment of the forces and sustainment required to execute the plan. Throughout the planning process, planners have access to several applications programs, first to initialize the TPFDD (create the database), then to add forces, then support, then transportation planning data. During this process the TPFDD grows. Once the TPFDD is built, JOPES ADP helps refine it before and during the refinement conferences. JOPES ADP supports plan review, the development of supporting plans, and TPFDD maintenance to keep the database current (**Figure 4-47**).

b. During crisis action planning (CAP), the objective TPFDD standard is 72-hours from notification and receipt by the supported commander to validation of the TPFDD, in level 4 detail, for the first seven days of the deployment flow (see CJCSI 3020.01). In order to achieve this objective both JOPES systemic and ADP support processes will need to evolve. It will be necessary to change the deployment process from one that is deliberate and sequential into one that is collaborative and concurrent yet provides the

Purpose and Objective of TPFDD Maintenance

- **Incorporate required changes to TPFDD files**
- **Keep OPLAN TPFDD deployment up-to-date for current JSCP period**
- **Support smooth transition to next JSCP planning period**
- **Expedite execution planning in crisis**

Figure 4-47

supported commander the controls necessary to develop a valid, feasible TPFDD that reflects the requirements of the CINC's concept of operations. While focused on the development of executable TPFDDs during CAP, the development of a single-source data system for unit deployments, virtual collaborative planning and management systems, and collaborative, interoperable joint deployment decision support tools will all have an impact on how deliberate planning is accomplished. While the means to accomplish deployment tasks will evolve greatly over the next few years, planners, logisticians and commanders must be remembered these improvements are tool to be used in developing a valid plan, not systems that will reduce or eliminate the need for effective conceptual planning by users.

428. JOPES FILES. (See Appendix B for a list of JOPES ADP Standard Reference Files, Standard Reference files, and Plan-Unique Files.) The JOPES application programs accessed by the planner while building the TPFDD draw information from numerous data files. Standard reference files contain basic, relatively imperishable data required to build any TPFDD. Planning and execution files and support files also furnish data for manipulation by JOPES application programs. The user generates many of these through JOPES application programs. Most standard reference files are plan-independent; that is, the data they contain is not plan-specific, but is valid for generating any plan. Files such as the TUCHA, GEOFILE, and CHSTR are plan-independent. Plan-unique files contain data valid only for a specific plan. Most plan-unique files are created by JOPES applications while building the TPFDD and information is drawn from them by various JOPES applications to generate plan-specific TPFDD data.

429. JOPES/GCCS ADP FOR FORCE PLANNING

a. Unit movement characteristics

(1) Information on movement characteristics of a type (notional) unit is contained in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA). The acronym “TUCHA” comes from the previous name of the file, Type Unit Characteristics File. The TUCHA describes the capabilities of each type unit in narrative form and defines the unit in terms of total personnel; numbers requiring transportation; categories of cargo in the unit; weight of equipment and accompanying supplies; volume of equipment categorized as bulk, outsize, oversize, or non-air-transportable; and numbers and dimensions of individual units of equipment. The Services maintain the file and update it quarterly.

(2) Unit type codes (UTCs) are used to access data in the TUCHA. These are five-element alphanumeric codes that identify units of common functional characteristics. Service planning documents and automated files list units and show the number of each type available for planning.

(3) The unit identified by UTC in the TUCHA is a type, or “notional” (generic), unit. It is a representative unit with the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all the actual (real-world) units that it represents. It is, therefore, an average, generic approximation of what real-world units of that type should be. It is, for example, *an* infantry battalion as opposed to, say, *the* 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry; or *a* CVN as opposed to, say, *the* USS *Nimitz*; or *an* F-15 fighter squadron as opposed to, say, *the* 1st Fighter Squadron.

b. **Timing of movements.** Before development of each force requirement is finished, the key dates for required movement must be determined and entered for each force record. Beginning with the CINC’s RDD or CRD, the supported commander and subordinate planners calculate the EAD-LAD window at the POD or POS in addition to the EADs and LADs at intermediate locations. Soon, more detailed planning is required, and the Service, supporting commander, and defense agency planners develop the RLDs and ALDs at the ORIGINS and POEs. Determination of these dates is not automated—the responsible planner must enter them.

c. Unique force record descriptions

(1) After the force list has been finished and assembled, each separate force record, or line entry, in it is assigned a plan-unique alphanumeric code called a force requirement number (FRN). When an FRN has been assigned to a unit in a plan, it generally is not changed in the course of the plan. The FRN is useful because it allows the planner to track a unit that may change sequence position in the TPFDD as the TPFDD is worked and refined. FRNs are two, three, four, or five alphanumeric characters that identify a single force requirement.

(2) Two additional characters, called fragmentation and insert codes, may be added to the FRN in positions 6 and 7. These two additional characters identify a force entry that requires more than one iteration of the FRN to satisfy the force requirement, such as three individual brigades to satisfy the requirement for a division, etc. The resulting identifier becomes the unit line number (ULN).

(3) JOPES and the JSCP both require that force planning be done using force modules, described in paragraph 416 of this chapter. Generally, force modules are groupings of combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, with or without appropriate non-unit-related personnel and supplies. The elements of force modules are linked together or uniquely identified so that they can be tracked, extracted, or adjusted as an entity in the planning and execution databases. Force modules offer an efficient way to do force planning and build forces rapidly in the TPFDD. Each individual ULN is identified as being associated with one or more force modules. A three-character alphanumeric identifier called a force module identifier (FMID) identifies each force module in a plan.

(4) To differentiate between CINC OPLAN TPFDD files and force modules in the JOPES database, the first characters of ULNs and FMIDs are assigned in JOPES Volume I. Whenever possible, the force module identifiers for a given TPFDD should be identical to the parent ULN for major combat forces.

d. The preceding descriptors are needed to explain force movements either in narrative form or computer jargon. The JOPES ADP programs use these terms to describe the CINC's concept of operations in the TPFDD. Three basic application programs assist the planner in the force build step, the JOPES Editing Tool (JET) system, the TPFDD Editor of the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST), and the Joint Force Requirements Generator-II (JFRG-II). [See Appendix B for a discussion of the TPFDD Editor and JFRG-II]

e. The JOPES Editing Tool (JET) system provides the JPEC with a rapid, user-friendly tool for creating, updating and maintaining TPFDDs. JET assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data. A unique advantage of JET over prior force building tools is that TPFDD changes made in JET are networked to all copies of that TPFDD on GCCS. The data developed in JET will be used later to determine the plan's gross feasibility of transportation. The codes and nomenclature of application programs are often confusing. Some JOPES abbreviations and acronyms will be introduced as necessary information in the force-planning step. ADP support is introduced here because it includes the manual procedures and the rational process for assembling the force list.

(1) **Purpose.** JET allows planners to create, analyze and edit Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). JET supports force deployment during execution, and logistics planners and operators in deliberate and crisis action planning. JET offers the capability for creating and modifying force and nonunit requirements associated with

OPLANs. It allows manipulation of TPFDD data and creates graphical displays to ease editing and compare transportation capabilities. It allows planners to analyze the force records; select, delete, or modify type units or force modules and modify the information defining movements and narrative descriptions; split the movement of a force record into air and sea shipment; and perform a variety of other operational and administrative functions.

(3) **Files.** JET draws information from numerous databases, including the following:

- TUCHA - descriptions and characteristics of major equipment or cargo categories listed in the major equipment file (MEF)
- GEOFILE - standard worldwide geographic locations
- CHSTR - characteristics of transportation resources
- Permanent databases used for reference, including standard distance files (SDF) and characteristics of airports (APORTS) and seaports (PORTS); transportation assets (ASSETS)
- TUDET - dimensions of equipment found in the type unit equipment detail file

The planner creates the TPFDD using these and other Standard Reference Files (SRFs) to describe in detail the CINC's concept of operations. The planner may also call for standard or ad hoc printed formats for use in analysis and to satisfy administrative requirements of the OPLAN. Access to and within JET is controlled by the Information Resource Manager (IRM) application in GCCS.

f. A much quicker way to identify and add large numbers of units to a plan uses Service/joint force modules and previously created OPLAN-dependent force modules. The Force Module Edit (FMEdit) function of JOPES ADP allows planners to review and modify groups of TPFDD records using force module identifiers.

(1) **Purpose.** Force modules (FMs) already exist that include complete combat packages made up of Combat, CS, and CSS forces in addition to some nonunit cargo and personnel. By gaining access to this library, the planner may build a new TPFDD or modify an existing TPFDD quickly and effectively. JET also allows the planner to go into an existing TPFDD and group force entries into a new or existing FM. A very valuable secondary function of JET is that large groupings of force entries can be identified for ease of monitoring during plan execution or for use in executing deterrent options.

(2) **Foundation.** The force modeling function of JET allows the planner to seek FMs that are either already built and maintained by the Services or (with the proper permissions) built by a CINC during prior OPLAN creation. A supported command's existing OPLANs are especially useful because they have already been sourced and incorporate numerous planning factors and operating parameters that are unique to their areas

of responsibility. Significant combinations of these forces and supplies have already been identified by a unique force module identifier in existing OPLANs for use in subsequent deliberate and crisis action planning. As a result of that work, the CINC can now display and retrieve vast quantities of force module information.

(3) **Flexibility.** The force modeling function of JET includes the following:

- Maintenance defines new force modules, modifies and deletes existing modules, and allows the planner to audit the files by Cargo Increment Number (CIN), Personnel Increment Number (PIN), and ULN.
- Display of FM title, description, and selected indexes
- Print functions for a variety of reports
- Data retrieval permits the planner to include records in or exclude them from the TPFDD/Summary Reference File (SRF).
- Display of the quantity of associated cargo and personnel in each FM by totals for force and separate totals for air and sea transport and source of lift
- Build function permits the planner to create an OPLAN TPFDD by loading an FM library entry into a plan that already includes a plan identifier, classification, and starting FRN/CIN/PIN. Selected FMs can then be quickly added to the new file.

g. **Application.** Component planners use JOPES ADP force-building applications to compile a total component force list. Given the mission, the component planner reviews the type combat forces apportioned in the task-assigning document and called for in the CINC's concept of operations, and determines applicable CS and CSS units from Service planning documents. The plan is built by selecting individual units by UTC or by selecting entire force modules; however, all force requirements are included in force modules.

(1) The merged collection of the components' force lists becomes the CINC's consolidated force list. The database is called the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file (TPFDD); numerous working papers can be printed that selectively display elements from the data file.

(2) The SRF is created in the database along with the TPFDD. It includes administrative information on the plan identification number, date of the concept of operations, and number of records; force and nonunit record summaries describing numbers of unit and force records, fragmented forces, and aggregated cargo shipments; movement data for nonstandard units not included in the TUCHA; and descriptions of the planning factors and simulated environments used in the ADP support process.

(3) The increased capabilities of GCCS to facilitate meaningful collaborative planning are permitting the component planners to use actual (real-world) forces to build their force lists. This obviously solves many problems early in planning by permitting actual data to be used in place of representative sizes, locations, etc. Some Services list

actual units in Service planning documents; others, like the Navy, are unable to identify specific units very far in advance because of their mobility. Eventually, the type (notional) units will have to be replaced with more accurate information before the completion of plan development. In the case of the Navy, the geographic locations of both combat and support forces change drastically month to month, and most units are self-deploying. Type units are used for most Navy force requirements throughout the deliberate planning process.

(4) **Supported commander's role.** The supported commander participates fully in development of the component force lists. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. The supported commander has been involved in the concept development and, now, in the details of force planning. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and confidence that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINC's staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. This consolidated list is analyzed to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces from origin to destination, such as mode and source of transportation, POD, EAD-LAD, priority of off-load at POD, DEST, and RDD.

430. JOPES ADP FOR SUPPORT PLANNING

a. The Logistics Sustainability and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) is the baseline GCCS ADP tool currently used in support planning (**Figure 4-48**). This application program calculates the gross non-unit-related equipment and supplies to support the OPLAN. These calculations determine the nonunit movement requirements by using numbers of personnel, number and types of UTCs, Service planning factors, and user-supplied CINC planning guidance from the CINC's Strategic Concept and TPFDD LOI. These gross determinations for supplies are translated into weights and volumes and added to the TPFDD as movement requirements.

(1) **Purpose.** LOGSAFE allows the planner to

- use data from a reference file to create an OPLAN-dependent ports of support file (POSF) categorized by Service, supply destination, air and sea transport, and munitions and POL;
- use data from a JOPES ADP reference file to create Planning Factor Files (PFFs) and UTC Consumption Factor Files (UCFFs) based on Service-developed logistics factors; and
- calculate the nonunit movement requirements.

The planner can also selectively aggregate the data to reduce the number of nonunit cargo records using the EAD-LAD window at each POS and, thus, best phase the movement requirement for sustainment cargoes to support the concept of operations while most efficiently using available lift, and port and materiel handling or transport facilities.




Figure 4-48

(2) **Foundation.** Planning parameters for the calculations are chosen from two sources: the UCFF uses resupply consumption factors for unit type codes (UTCs) and the PFF includes a wide variety of planning factors that are used throughout the LOGSAFE process. Daily consumption rates for 43 subclasses of supply are computed by either pounds or gallons per UTC, or pounds or gallons per person per day. Fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and major end items are equipment-related supplies and are computed as a function of numbers of force records, for example, number of UTCs that describe 155mm artillery batteries. Other items of supply, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies, are better suited for planning factors listed in units of pounds per person per day. The Logistics Factors File (LFF), a JOPES standard reference file, is the foundation for the UCFF and PFF. The LFF uses Service-developed consumption rates for UTCs, and origins for resupply. The LFF initializes the PFF, which the user can then update and modify with factors to describe more accurately the situation in the theater.

(3) **Flexibility.** The planner has great flexibility in using planning factors in LOGSAFE. The planner can modify the following parameters:

- size of the EAD-LAD window (USTRANSCOM prefers a minimum of 5 days for air moves and 10 days for sea moves)
- beginning day of strategic resupply by sea
- period of time for resupply by air of specified supply subclasses
- up to 10 origins for each supply class

- buildup increments by supply class
- rate of consumption by supply subclass modified by theater multiplier
- average travel time from POD to DEST in each of up to 26 objective area countries
- safety level of supplies in number of days to be maintained in-country
- conversion of up to 35 subclasses of supply from weight to volume
- identification of up to 15 fuel types for each fuel resupply category
- percentage of attrition of supplies to combat loss for 4 time periods and 20 subclasses of supply
- specification of 5 combat intensity levels over 4 time periods

(4) **Information required.** To execute LOGSAFE, users need a minimum of information: the period of planning for the OPLAN, the increments in which resupply will be delivered, the supply class/subclass consumption factors for each UTC in the plan, the weight-to-volume multipliers for converting short tons to measurement tons, specification of the objective area for determining theater-specific multipliers, and the combat intensity rate for periods of planning.

(5) **Files.** LOGSAFE uses information from various standard reference files available to all users: TUCHA, GEOFILE, and LFF. It uses and adds to the unique, OPLAN-dependent files prepared in the force development step: TPFDD and SRFs. LOGSAFE creates unique files for use in its calculations: temporary working data files, POSF, UCFE, and PFF.




Figure 4-49

b. In addition to calculating supplies, the CINC must analyze civil engineering support requirements of planned contingency operations. The resulting analysis is not precise, but is a tool the planner uses to analyze actual facility asset data, anticipate new facility requirements, project war damage, recognize actual and projected civil engineering forces, determine required civil engineering materials, and acknowledge available support from the host nation. The formal document, called a Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP), includes analysis of facility support requirements and any other sustainment

engineering requirements associated with execution of the OPLAN. The GCCS software package that generates facility requirements data which is analyzed to determine the adequacy of engineering support for an OPLAN is the Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). A JEPES user can produce reports and graphics to reflect generated engineering requirements, existing assets, and engineering resources. JEPES extracts pertinent TPFDD records, computes facility requirements, and determines if adequate facilities exist to support deployed forces. The reports can be used to identify facility deficiencies and shortfalls in engineering capability, information that is used by components for detailed planning. Normally, responsible component commanders are given the task of coordinating the CESP for their specific construction management areas. These area CESP are then consolidated by the CINC into a single theater-wide CESP for the operation plan.

(1) **Purpose.** The modules used in the ADP support package offer the capability to maintain unit and facility information in the existing files. They also are used to analyze troop and facility requirements data from the TPFDD; determine facility requirements based on forces employed, unit mission, and war damage; schedule existing engineering manpower; and prepare the necessary reports and tabs to identify facility and construction requirements and develop scheduling information.

(2) **Foundation.** JEPES uses the TUCHA to develop the master list of essential mission facilities for each separate UTC in the force list. The TPFDD file is used to build the TROOP file for determining units that have initial facility requirements; and numerous planning factor files are developed and maintained by the Services to define the support required.

(3) **Flexibility.** The planner uses JEPES to determine expected facility requirements that must be met with new construction and war damage repair. The planner can alter the following parameters: number of personnel, aircraft, and vehicles supported; amount of host-nation assets that can be used by friendly forces; anticipated amount of war damage to existing facilities; priority of construction effort; conversion of engineering troop strength to engineering capability; decreased engineering unit efficiency during early operations; attrition of personnel, equipment, and construction products as a result of enemy action; required completion date for new construction; and circuitous routing of supplies from POS to DEST.

(4) **Files.** JEPES uses both Service-maintained files for basic planning guidance and the OPLAN-dependent TPFDD files to determine specific facility requirements. The Services define and set priorities for the facilities required for each UTC, the capabilities of engineering units, planning factors to convert personnel loading at a base to specific facility requirements, and the acceptability of existing facilities to meet contingency operations. JEPES application functions include the following:

- LOGSAFE system data preparation support
- JEPES database file import/export utilities
- Database maintenance
- Requirements generation and analysis
- Reports and queries

c. **Medical Analysis Tool (MAT)** is a baseline GCCS application that supports both deliberate and crisis planning. The process considers the population at risk, length of stay in hospital facilities, and Service-developed frequency data for injury and death. The result is a planning tool to determine patient load, requirements for patient evacuations, and both Service and component medical planning requirements.

(1) **Purpose.** The system uses an interactive mode to create working files and modify planning factors, and to perform calculations and print reports. The reports include theater-wide analysis and component planning details, such as number of several categories of physicians, operating room requirements, and whole blood and intravenous fluid requirements, and planning factors for use in the nonunit resupply calculation procedures. The products of MAT are used in the medical annex to the OPLAN, input to the personnel and sustainment models, identification of possible medical planning deficiencies in the OPLAN, and analysis of the impact of COAs on medical requirements.

(2) **Foundation.** Planners develop the population at risk (PAR) from the TPFDD file. Through automated interface with the TPFDD, MAT assists the medical planner in quantifying the impact of a proposed OPLAN COA on the medical system using data from the existing TPFDD, the Medical Reference database, PAR files, and the Medical Planning File. It gives medical planners a tool to perform gross medical feasibility and supportability assessments using scenarios that focus on particular OPLANs, series of OPLANs, or specific geographic areas that consider varying enemy threats, tempos of operations, climates, and frequency of patient distribution. The medical database estimates numbers of personnel who are wounded in action, killed in action, administratively lost, and dead of wounds, and evacuation rates and length of stay conforming to evacuation policies.

(3) **Flexibility.** MAT resource forecasts include the following:

- Health service support requirements across the battlefield
- Planning parameters for developing medical force structure
- Projections of medical evacuation airlift requirements
- Planning parameters for processing patients at varying levels of conflict
- Planning parameters for consumption rates
- Flow patterns for medical supplies

The result is a calculation of medical requirements that reflects a forecast of the theater medical resource requirements based on the warfighting scenario and supports time-phased medical sustainability analysis by generating estimates of time-phased casualties by type, medical evacuees, and returns to duty.

(4) **Files.** A temporary medical working file (MWF) is created from reference files and planner-modified planning factors. The resulting detailed planning reports are for use by theater and Service planners:

- medical planning factors
- personnel loading
- requirements for physicians, hospital beds, operating rooms, blood and fluid supplies (JOPES supply subclass VIII-B), and all other medical supplies (JOPES supply subclass VIII-A)
- graphic comparisons of capabilities and requirements for beds and evacuation

d. The Movements Requirements Generator (MRG) was the original model used to compute requirements of supply and replacement personnel. However, the MRG did not consider the availability of supplies from Service and Defense Logistics Agency inventories. Moreover, the MRG aggregated supplies into only one of ten classes by POE-POS channel. The Logistics Capability Estimator (LCE) was developed to more accurately calculate resupply. However, the LCE never achieved the required level of performance. LOGSAFE was developed to replace the MRG and the LCE. Part of the GCCS' initial operational capability, it can rapidly generate nonunit sustainment records; identify, quantify, and integrate time-phased CINC-critical items; compare requirements with available assets; identify shortfalls and chart sustainability; identify substitute items to overcome sustainment shortfalls and relate these items to the employment of forces; and support determination of the overall logistics feasibility of COAs.

e. **Summary.** The GCCS applications for support planning are essential to determining feasibility of the CINC's concept of operations. It is now possible to calculate more accurately medical requirements for physicians, supplies, and facilities with MAT; civil engineering support requirements for construction of facilities and war damage repair using the JEPES; and, with LOGSAFE, supply requirements. Not all calculations of sustainment are automatically added to the OPLAN TPFDD; planners must run some of these programs separately, and add their calculations manually. Further, work remains to be done in automating the calculation of requirements in support of civil affairs and enemy POW programs. Nevertheless, the rapid development of resupply calculations has greatly improved the planner's ability to develop a feasible plan and to appraise the supportability of tentative COAs.

**The fighting dog is wagged by
the LOGISTICS tail.**

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Figure 4-50

431. JOPES ADP FOR TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

a. **Introduction.** The purpose of the three steps of transportation planning is to determine the gross strategic transportation feasibility of the CINC's OPLAN. The CINC compares each subordinate commander's transportation requirements and the total apportioned strategic transportation capabilities. A GCCS application program called the **Joint Feasibility Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST)** simulates strategic movement. Planners at the supported command run a computer simulation of air, land, and sea movements of the forces and their support requirements from ORIGIN to POE to POD. JFAST uses the transportation assets identified in the JSCP for the OPLAN to "move" the forces and supplies. JFAST incorporates all the factors that influence the movement of force and nonunit requirements and calculates computer-simulated feasible dates to arrive and be unloaded at the POD. The feasibility of the OPLAN is determined when the modeled dates are compared with the CINC's latest arrival dates (LADs). The simulated deployment movement of a requirement that results in an arrival on or before the LAD is considered by the CINC to be grossly transportation feasible. Numerous conditions, including lift capacity and port capability, are attached to this transportation simulation, since neither all transportation assets, OPLAN force records, nor resupplies may have been sourced. Therefore, even when simulated results indicate arrival earlier than LAD, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the OPLAN will close. All that can be said is that the plan is grossly feasible when considering strategic transportation.

b. **Purpose.** JFAST uses planner-specified parameters to determine whether the movement of personnel, equipment and supplies can be accomplished within the time-frame established by the CINC.

c. **Foundation.** Information about the movement of forces and supplies has been created in the OPLAN-dependent computer files: the TPFDD, files created by the GCCS/JOPES ADP application programs, such as JET, and the miscellany of support programs and modules such as LOGSAFE, MAT and JEPES. The resulting file lists force and nonunit records by individual identifiers (i.e., ULN, CIN, and PIN) that include the amounts to be moved, the timing, and the channel of flow for the planned movement.

(1) The planner must evaluate the TPFDD to analyze information such as Origin-POE and POE-POD channel data, port throughput capability, airlift and sealift capacity, numbers of personnel, tons of materiel, and barrels of POL.

(2) The planner may create new files or modify standard files, including transportation assets, characteristics of transportation, and ports and airfields identified from the TPFDD to meet the constraints of the particular operational concept. Transportation assets are selected that match the apportioned forces from the JSCP or task-assigning document, the asset characteristics are defined, and the attrition rates are introduced.

(3) JFAST models the transportation flow based on the identified parameters; the results are displayed in graphic or tabular reports. Strategic movement simulations are calculated using the ALD at the port of embarkation, travel time, and EAD at the port of debarkation. There are three simulations, LAND, SEA, and AIR.

(4) JFAST produces reports that identify the computed estimated feasible available to load (FALD) date at POE (if the LAND model is run), the departure date from the POE, and arrival and unloading dates at the POD. Standard reports display information needed by the planner to analyze the movements.

(5) JFAST draws from the OPLAN TPFDD, summary reference file, and standard reference files, such as ASSETS, GEOFILE, CHSTR, PORTS, APORTS, TUCHA, and a ship availability file.

(6) Reports produced by JFAST include the following:

- POE/POD facility daily workload
- strategic lift requirements
- intratheater daily lift requirement, i.e., POD-DEST channel
- daily aircraft and ship use
- summaries of force and nonunit records delivered
- summary of planning factors

(7) JFAST is especially useful to planners not just because of its speed of analysis, but because it can graphically displays the results of that analysis. This greatly enhances the planner's ability to assess the feasibility of the plan and identify transportation shortfalls. The user can modify lift allocation and port throughput capability within JFAST to aid in shortfall resolution. In the current models of JFAST, if resolution of a shortfall requires altering the phasing of resources, the TPFDD may be adjusted using the TPFDD Editor within JFAST. After all adjustments have been completed, JFAST can then export the plan's B8 file back into the GCCS system for use by other JOPES/GCCS systems and planners. This is a tremendous advantage over earlier models of JFAST where data had to be modified outside of JFAST and then brought back into JFAST for further transportation analysis.

(8) Another especially useful feature of the TPFDD Editor is its ability to rapidly phase representative real-world forces (with CS, CSS, and sustainment) for initial COA transportation analysis. The combat forces in the GCCS/JFAST classified (as opposed to training) database are real-world forces. The model generates appropriate CS and CSS, according to Service doctrine, for the combat forces selected by the planner, and also generates sustainment. The Sustainment Generator uses planning factors generally consistent with Service doctrine and allows the planner to modify some or all of the sustainment planning factors. Although currently not as accurate as a formal TPFDD development using JET, the editor allows the planner to rapidly create, in effect, a list of movement requirements and analyze it for transportation feasibility in JFAST. This feature is particularly valuable for exploring COA feasibility early in the deliberate planning process (before full TPFDDs are developed) and in Crisis Action Planning when the time for planning is constrained. The editor now also permits a planner to make changes to an actual TPFDD under analysis and export the resulting changes back into other JOPES applications via the B8 file.

432. JOPES ADP SUPPORT SUMMARY. JOPES ADP, which resides on the Global Command and Control System, is used in the deliberate planning process by the JPEC to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and to prepare supporting plans. JOPES ADP is used primarily in the plan development phase by the components to build the force list, calculate the flow of nonunit cargo and personnel, and complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support. Through this process the TPFDD grows. When the components complete this work, the CINC's staff merges the TPFDDs and tests gross transportation feasibility. ADP is used to refine the database before and during refinement conferences. In the plan review phase JOPES ADP supports the review process, and, in the supporting plans phase, supporting commands may use JOPES ADP to analyze the supported command's TPFDD. Finally, during maintenance of the TPFDD, JOPES ADP is used to make necessary updates.

433. TPFDD MAINTENANCE. TPFDD maintenance is a process designed to keep a contingency plan as up to date as possible. When a plan is published at the conclusion of the deliberate planning process, it is considered to be adequate and feasible in light of apportioned resources. However, it is based on intelligence information as it existed during the plan's development, and real-world conditions may have changed overnight and invalidated many of the plan's key assumptions or conditions. When the concept requires major revision, the entire deliberate planning process may have to be repeated. Plans are reviewed periodically to make such determinations. However, even when the basic concept remains valid, the data contained in TPFDD files become outdated for many reasons. The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to systematically and effectively incorporate changes to TPFDD files to maintain as up to date as possible the database of phased forces, materiel, and sustainment that makes up the CINC's concept. TPFDD maintenance focuses largely on the changes to deployment data that have occurred since

refinement. Its aim is to reduce the amount of change required to adapt the TPFDD for response to an emergent contingency. Although the supported commander is ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in keeping the TPFDD current.

a. Periodic TPFDD maintenance is scheduled by the Director, J-7, and normally hosted by the plan's owning CINC (supported by USTRANSCOM). The periodic maintenance is normally a relatively routine administrative job. JOPES ADP is used for TPFDD maintenance, and supported CINCs ensure that changes are loaded at scheduled intervals designated by the Joint Staff. Changes in sourcing, unit equipment, location, or state of unit readiness affect the plan, since they may change the amount of materiel to be deployed or the POE where it will be loaded. As the force structure changes, alternate units may have to be designated and substituted to satisfy the force record requirement of the TPFDD. The sources of information used to keep the deployment database current are as varied as the information itself. All members of the JPEC are responsible for keeping the JOPES database current, and regular reporting procedures have been established in Joint Pub 1-03 series, Joint Reporting Structure.




Figure 4-51

b. It is highly unlikely that a plan would be implemented in its entirety without changes. Any changes made in early stages of the operation are likely to affect subsequent events envisioned in the plan's concept of operations. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate the planners' efforts on keeping the initial stages of a plan current. Normally, the JPEC intensively manages the first 7 days of air and 30 days of sea movement requirements to ensure continued database accuracy when converted to an OPORD. The supported commander can specify different time periods for intensive management. For example, in a very large and complex OPLAN, the commander may decide to have only the first five days of air movements intensively managed. When a plan is being implemented, later portions of the plan will be incrementally updated as earlier portions are being executed, to adjust to the actual results of the execution of earlier portions.

c. Being ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, the supported commander is the final authority for approving changes to any of the command's OPLAN and/or CONPLAN TPFDD.

Crisis Action Planning

Chapter 5

- **Introduction to Crisis Action Planning** 5-2
- **Crisis Action Procedures** 5-8
- **Crisis Action Procedures – Single-Crisis Environment** 5-9
- **Crisis Action Procedures – Multiple-Crisis Environment** 5-29
- **Joint Planning Summary** 5-31
- **Summary of Crisis Action Planning** 5-32

Crisis Action Planning

References: Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure*
Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*
(JOPES) Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*

500. INTRODUCTION TO CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

a. **Overview.** In peacetime, deliberate planning procedures are used to evaluate anticipated future situations to which the United States must be prepared to respond militarily. Because of their relative probability, importance to U.S. national security, and difficulty in scale of military response required to resolve them, these situations are hypothetical predictions of regional conditions and scenarios that are considered so critical that plans to respond to them must be prepared before they occur. Twelve months or more may be required to identify adequate responses, conduct the evaluation to select the best course of action, and prepare a feasible OPLAN. It is noteworthy that these potential situations are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and, even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, planning for all cannot be done feasibly. Further, in deliberate planning, resources are apportioned for planning. Even though forces, sustainment, and transportation resources apportioned to a plan may be sourced to that plan's requirements in anticipation of the event, the actual situation with respect to those particular resources may prevent them from being allocated by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to a real-time crisis response.

(1) While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising that might require U.S. military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical. In some instances they will be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. In such time-sensitive crisis situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures, prescribed in CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I.

(2) In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest information sources and intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time

available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. The key members of the JPEC need to know what others are doing, and they need to know what is expected of them.

(3) Crisis Action Planning procedures are used by the JPEC to plan and execute the deployment and employment of U.S. military forces in crisis situations.

These procedures ensure the following:

- That **logical procedures** are followed that begin with recognizing the problem and developing the solution, and progress to preparing and executing the operation order;
- **rapid and effective exchange of information** about the situation, its analysis, and alternative military responses;
- **timely preparation** of military courses of action for consideration by the NCA; and
- **timely relay** of the decisions of the NCA to the combatant commander to permit effective execution.

(4) The system is divided into six separate phases illustrated in **Figure 5-1**; each has a definite start, a finish, and actions to be performed. The roles of the key members of the JPEC are described as a checklist and a view of the overall process. The procedures begin when the situation develops; the theater commander recognizes the potential significance of the event and reports it, along with his assessment, to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). It also is possible that the situation may be reported to the NCA through other government agency channels such as the Department of State (DOS) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In most cases the NMCC receives these reports and is responsible for their dissemination to the military chain of command. The NCA assesses its diplomatic, economic, and informational implications and decides that a possible military response should be prepared. The CINC develops military courses of action in response to the situation. Should the NCA decide on the use of military forces to resolve the crisis, the NCA will select a COA for full development by the CINC. By direction of CJCS, the CINC prepares the detailed operation order (OPORD) to support the selected COA. At the direction of the NCA, the CINC executes the OPORD. Though this is a step-by-step academic description, in reality, the process is flexible. It permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether while ensuring that no critical planning factor is overlooked. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.

(5) Members of the JPEC are busy during the accelerated planning of a military response to a crisis. **Figure 5-2** illustrates the primary responsibilities of the Joint Planning and Execution Community during crisis action.

SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASES

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	Course of Action Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
Event					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Event occurs with possible national security implications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC's REPORT/ASSESSMENT received 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS sends WARNING ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS presents refined and prioritized COAs to NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC receives ALERT ORDER or PLANNING ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA decide to execute OPORD
Action					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor world situation Recognize problem Submit CINC's ASSESSMENT Monitor reporting from other agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase awareness Increase reporting JS assesses situation JS advises on possible military action NCA-CJCS evaluates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop COAs CINC assigns tasks to subordinates by evaluation request message CINC reviews evaluation response messages Create/modify TPFDD USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates Evaluate COAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS advises NCA CJCS may send PLANNING ORDER to begin execution planning before formal selection of COA by NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC develops OPORD Refine TPFDD Force preparation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS sends EXECUTE ORDER by authority of SECDEF CINC executes OPORD JOPES database maintained JPEC reports execution status Begin redeployment planning
Outcome					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assess that event may have national implications Report the event to NCA/CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC sends Commander's Estimate with recommended COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA select COA CJCS releases COA selection by NCA in ALERT ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC sends OPORD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crisis resolved Redeployment of forces

Figure 5-1

(6) Military planners facing crisis action planning requirements must understand that the NCA are considering diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options. The military option may initially be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute it may be made only after other, less drastic options have been judged unsuitable or ineffective to resolve the situation. In reaching a decision to develop a military COA, the NCA may consider the whole range of flexible deterrent options described in Chapter 4. Ultimate responsibility and authority in a crisis rest with the NCA, who must approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces.

ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT PLANNING & EXECUTION COMMUNITY DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approve the COA • Direct that major actions be taken, e.g., change deployment status, deploy forces, activate reserve forces call up • Authorize conduct of military operations against a potential enemy
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage planning process: review & analyze reports, resolve conflicts & shortfalls monitor deployment or employment • Offer options and recommendations to the NCA • Convey NCA decisions to military commands
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responds to, monitors and reports on a crisis • Prepares Commander's Estimate • Develops COAs with assistance of subordinate and supporting commands • Develops Operation Order for deployment or employment
Subordinate Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts parallel planning with supported command • Determines the force and resource requirements • Develops employment plan
Supporting Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generates and sources force and support requirements • Makes deployment estimates for organic lift assets
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinates deployment planning & execution • Makes deployment estimates • Develops transportation-feasible schedules • Optimizes use of transportation capability • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and supported commander
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furnish additional support forces through subordinate component commanders • Identify and prepare reserve forces

Figure 5-2

b. **Definition.** Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, and CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution. It is described as “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” Several characteristics of a crisis can be given: it may occur with little or no warning; it may be fast breaking requiring accelerated decisions; and, sometimes, a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of the situation, a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is being considered as a solution. In the U.S. defense establishment, the NCA decides on the use of military force.

c. **Available guidelines.** The procedures in CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I, are used to outline a military response in a crisis. The six phases of CAP are a logical sequence of events that lead to the timely preparation of a COA for a military response. Further, the procedures describe the flow of information from the combatant commander; the integration of CJCS military advice in the analysis of military options; the decision process by which the NCA begin detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute the military option; and the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the eventual operation order.

d. **Communications.** Timely, accurate communications are essential in exchanging information and transmitting directions during a crisis. Several means are available: oral transmission or video teleconferencing or telecommunications, confirmed with record copy as soon as possible; narrative text messages to transmit the initial report, situation updates, CINC's assessment of the situation, and orders, including decisions of the NCA; and deployment data transmitted via the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Only through rapid and accurate communication can the military response to a crisis be managed. Today, there also are means to heighten overall operations security of the planning and management of CAP: special category (SPECAT) messages and systems-high procedures for GCCS, data transfer, and the JOPES database. The reporting procedures to be followed in crisis action planning are defined in the Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting System*. CAP uses the OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT (OPREP-3PCA) format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

e. **Available ADP support.** The rapid development of an adequate and feasible military response is the purpose of crisis planning. The planner must quickly evaluate the adequacy of proposed COAs, rapidly build a force list and calculate sustainment, and effectively determine transportation feasibility. Crisis action procedures use the same ADP that supports deliberate planning in JOPES. Using JOPES ADP, the crisis action planner may build a TPFDD through access to plans prepared in deliberate planning.

f. **Differences between deliberate & crisis action planning.** Figure 5-3 illustrates the significant differences between CAP and the deliberate planning procedures discussed in Joint Pub 5-0, Chapter III.

COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

	Crisis Action Planning	Deliberate Planning
<i>Time Available to Plan</i>	Hours or days	18-24 months
<i>JPEC Involvement</i>	For security reasons, possibly very limited, using close-hold procedures	Participates fully
<i>Phases</i>	6 Phases from situation development to execution	5 Phases from Initiation to Supporting Plans
<i>Document Assigning Tasks</i>	WARNING ORDER to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with EVALUATION REQUEST message	JSCP to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive
<i>Forces for Planning</i>	Allocated in the WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, or EXECUTE ORDER	APPORTIONED in JSCP
<i>Early Planning Guidance to Staff</i>	WARNING ORDER from CJCS; CINC's EVALUATION REQUEST	Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase
<i>Commander's Estimate</i>	Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS/NCA	Communicates the CINC's decision to staff and subordinate commanders
<i>Decision on COA</i>	NCA decide COA	CINC decides COA with review by CJCS
<i>Execution Document</i>	EXECUTE ORDER	When an operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an EXECUTE ORDER
<i>Products</i>	Campaign plan (if required) with supporting OPORDs, or OPORD with supporting OPORDs	OPLAN, CONPLAN or FUNCTIONAL PLAN with supporting plans

Reference: Joint Pub 5-0

Figure 5-3

501. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

a. **Concept.** Since each crisis is unique, it is not reasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in response to every situation. JOPES Volume I defines a coordinated process that includes people, procedures, communications, and ADP hardware and software, and that produces a detailed plan to best accomplish the military mission.

(1) Crisis Action Planning procedures give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs procedures for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the NCA; they allow the NCA to communicate their decisions accurately through CJCS down the chain of command to the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and supporting defense agencies; and they permit the key players in the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and accurately, and to conduct parallel planning at different organization levels.

(2) The result is the development of an adequate and transportation-feasible military response during a time-constrained planning period. In addition, JOPES ADP offers the JPEC the capability to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

(3) The procedures accommodate the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the many command levels. They describe actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of U.S. military forces or to the point where the need for military force ends and military activity is canceled.

b. **Phases.** The procedures are categorized into six phases. Each phase of CAP begins with an event, such as the receipt of a report or order, and ends with a decision or resolution of the crisis. When the process moves into a new phase, the primary responsibility for taking action shifts between the NCA and CINC.

(1) Before beginning a full examination of CAP, it is important to understand that the time-sensitivity of certain critical situations may require so rapid a response that the normal procedural sequence may be altered significantly, i.e., CAP phases may be compressed, repeated, carried out concurrently, or eliminated. While there are detailed procedures to be followed in the process, circumstances may dictate that they be abbreviated, that is, decisions may be reached in conference and initially communicated orally. The amount of time spent in each phase depends on the tasks to be done and the time available.

(2) Within the CAP sequence of events, there are several points where decisions must be made for planning to continue, placing further actions “on hold,” or reverting planning to a previous phase. Following each major decision reached by the NCA, CJCS issues a formal order implementing that decision.

502. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES – SINGLE-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Reference: CJCSM 3122.01, *Planning Policies and Procedures (JOPES Volume I)*

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT**a. Phase I**

(1) **Introduction.** As a matter of routine, organizations of the U.S. Government monitor the world situation. In the course of that monitoring, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and report it to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Crisis Action Planning procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. The situation development phase contains four related variables -- the day-to-day situation is monitored, an event occurs, the event is recognized as a problem, and the event is reported.

(a) **Situation monitoring** is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide. Many available resources are used, ranging from strategic intelligence sources, to routine observations by a member of the military attaché staff, to television news broadcasts. So diverse are the sources of observation that the report could come up through the chain of command from observer to supervisor to senior military officer to component command to unified command watch officer. It is likely, though, that an event may be first seen in the Pentagon by a watch team member monitoring a cable news report. An event comes to the attention of a U.S. official through situation monitoring.

(b) An **event** is an occurrence assessed to be out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on U.S. national interests and national security.

(c) The **recognition of the event as a problem** or potential problem follows from the observation.

(d) A **report of the event** may come from various sources, e.g., CINC, subordinate unit such as an activity or unit commander, TV news, etc. However, regardless of the source, the focal point for reporting information crucial to the national security is the NMCC in Washington, D.C. **Figure 5-4** illustrates the diversity of information sources that report to the NMCC. Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Systems*, is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the **Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC)** and the **OPREP-3**

PINNACLE (OPREP-3P). Sample OPREP-3 reports are contained in JOPES Volume I. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for CAP to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington. Reports to the NCA from other U.S. government agencies also may initiate a crisis response from the NCA.




Figure 5-4

(2) Actions taken during situation development

(a) In Phase I the focus is generally on the CINC who is responsible for the U.S. military action that may be taken within a theater. The activities of the JPEC during Phase I are summarized in **Figure 5-5**. The major occurrences in the combatant command include the following:

- **observation of an event** with potential national security implications
- **an assessment by the CINC** that the potential of the situation warrants higher-echelon awareness
- **report to the NMCC** by CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE I – SITUATION DEVELOPMENT**

NCA	
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor situation • Evaluate incoming reports • Evaluate actions of CINC
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports significant event to NMCC • Publishes CINC's assessment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> nature of crisis forces available major constraints action being taken COAs being considered
Subordinate & Supporting Commands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather intelligence information • Furnish information and support
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors developing crisis
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor developing crisis

Figure 5-5

• **publication of the OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC's ASSESSMENT**, the CINC's assessment of action being considered or actions already taken (an important step that would be crucial to the CINC's influencing future decisions in a fast-breaking crisis).

(b) The Joint Staff monitors the situation, requests a report from the geographic CINC, evaluates the CINC's actions being taken under the rules of engagement, orders additional intelligence gathering, if necessary, and advises the NCA as the situation develops.

(c) If possible, other members of the JPEC collect information on the situation and develop an accurate picture of the crisis.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase I.** The **initial report** of the event, which any individual can make, must be timely and accurate. The CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE reports are normally used. They can be issued orally with a record copy to follow. Any commander may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE (general) to report any incident or event where national-level interest is indicated. The commander of a combatant command may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT to report the command's assessment of a developing or potential crisis. If the CINC does not make the initial report of an event, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communications with the CINC and request a report. In this instance, the CINC will normally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT that would include the following information:

- information on the current situation
- action being taken within the constraints of the current rules of engagement
- forces readily available
- expected time for earliest commitment of forces
- major constraints on the employment of forces
- succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander, as appropriate

(4) **ADP support.** During this phase the CINC's staff reviews applicable contingency plans. The JOPES database holds all the files for current complete plans, and the CINC reviews plans through access to GCCS. If circumstances warrant, a GCCS Teleconference (TLCF) may be established to allow a rapid exchange of information.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase I.** The situation development phase ends when the CINC's assessment is submitted to NCA and CJCS through the NMCC.

CRISIS ASSESSMENT

b. **Phase II.** In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA.

(1) **Introduction.** The phase begins with the receipt of the CINC's report and assessment of the event. The CINC has categorized the event as a problem of potential national concern. The detail and frequency of reporting increase to give the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information that is needed to evaluate developments and allow them to offer sound military advice to the NCA.

(2) **Actions taken during crisis assessment.** The focus of Phase II is on CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NCA.

(a) The NCA identify the national interests at stake; the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to achieve the objectives. The NCA decide that a crisis exists and that military COAs will be developed by the CINC.

(b) CJCS assesses the situation from the military point of view including operations, logistics, and command and control implications, and reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in JOPES. The Joint Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the CINC. CJCS may recommend to the NCA that orders be published to prepare to

deploy or to deploy forces, and may establish or direct the establishment of a crisis GCCS TLCF if the CINC has not already done so.

(c) Having reported the event and offered an assessment of the situation in Phase I, the CINC continues to issue status reports, assesses the disposition of assigned and available forces, and takes appropriate military action under current rules of engagement. The CINC also will alert the appropriate subordinate commands so that they can begin their parallel planning activities.

(d) The other members of the JPEC continue to monitor the situation: the Services may improve readiness and sustainability of forces that could be used and identify possible Reserve components; USCINCTRANS improves the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets, etc. **Figure 5-6** summarizes the activities of the JPEC.

(e) Because crisis action procedures are flexible, the NCA and CJCS have the latitude to either remain in this phase, increase reporting, and gather additional information for study; return to Phase I and continue to monitor the situation without further planning action; or progress to the next phase of CAP.

(3) **Crisis response organizations.** During the crisis assessment phase, special teams are assembled at all levels where the problem and its resolution are being developed. These teams vary in size and composition, as well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs, emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. Specially constituted crisis action organizations generally include representatives from all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved organizations. **Figure 5-7** illustrates the variety of organizations that respond to crises.

(4) **Exchange of reports during Phase II.** At any time during CAP, the NCA may find it desirable to prepare selected units for possible military action. They increase unit readiness by designating alert conditions or ordering a specified deployability posture to reduce the response time of selected forces. Increased readiness actions may be taken during any phase. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or terminate action. Changing the deployment posture of a unit is a strong statement that the United States is beginning action to conduct military operations. Both orders are issued by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The stage of a unit's readiness is defined by the deployability posture.

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE II – CRISIS ASSESSMENT**

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decide to develop the military COA
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give military assessment to NCA • Advise on possible military COAs • Review existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for suitability • Review & evaluate reports from CINC & other sources • Establish crisis TLCF as required
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continues to monitor and report status of situation • Evaluates event • Reviews existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for applicability • Evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces • Evaluates status of theater transportation assets
Subordinate & Supporting Commands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to monitor the crisis • Conduct parallel planning with supported command
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews status of strategic lift assets • Improves disposition & readiness of strategic lift assets
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluate available military force • Act to improve force readiness & sustainability • Identify Reserve Component requirement

Figure 5-6

(a) The Deployment Preparation Order and the Deployment Order are addressed to all combatant commanders and the National Security Agency/Central Security Services. The Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, and appropriate others receive copies.

(b) The format for both of these orders is in JOPES Volume I. They include all necessary information to deploy the forces, if it is not already given in other planning guidance documents from CJCS. The order takes the following overall outline:

- clear statement that it is a Deployment Preparation/Deployment Order issued under the authorization of the Secretary of Defense
 - situation
 - mission
 - execution
 - administration and logistics
 - command and signal

CRISIS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS

	Title	Purpose	Composition of Response Element
Office of Secretary of Defense	Crisis Coordinating Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disseminates crisis information in a timely fashion • Facilitates coordination within OSD • Draws on parent offices for support, guidance, and information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chaired by DUSD(P) • Staffed with representatives of principal OSD staff officers, military departments, combat support agencies, & Department of State
National Military Command Center	Operations Team (OT) Augmented Operations Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors operational activities worldwide • Gathers information on developing situations • Performs 24-hour monitoring of particular situations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned NMCC personnel • OT augmented as necessary with staff personnel
CJCS, The Joint Staff (activation based on level of crisis)	Response Cell (RC) <i>or</i> Crisis Action Team (CAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staffed full time by qualified personnel • May occupy normal workspaces • Reviews current strategy & applicable OPLANs/CONPLANS • Gathers intelligence • Reviews status of forces • Develops broad COAs • Assembles Situation Books • Activated by the Director, Joint Staff, or J-3 • Handles matters that exceed the operational capability of the RC • Proposes COAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formed by J-3 • Team Chief is an O-6 • Assigned representatives from Joint Staff directorates • Usually does not contain Service reps • Specific manning is tailored to fit the situation • Team Chief is an O-6 • Augmented RC with Service reps, combat support agencies
Supported Command Staff	Battle Staffs or Crisis Action Teams	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate, exchange, and receive information • Develop military options, COAs, and concepts of operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regularly assigned and augmenting personnel • Special response centers for Intelligence, Logistics • Nuclear operations • Special operations
USTRANSCOM	Crisis Action Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Orchestrates and monitors deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployment Directorate personnel

Figure 5-7

(c) Note that, while these orders are designed to increase deployability posture, positioning forces or taking preparatory actions may signal U.S. intent to conduct military operations. This may not be the desired message and CJCS and the NCA may consider the requirements for secrecy and surprise, and balance them against the need to notify selected Armed Forces for possible action. Operations security is vital and is practiced.

(5) ADP support. A GCCS TLCF should be established between key JPEC participants, which will allow issues to be addressed so that written orders transmitted at the beginning of the next phase will be clear and unambiguous. The JPEC may review available JOPES deployment databases.

(6) **Conclusion of Phase II.** The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINC's initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINC's assessment the only alternative considered.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

c. **Phase III.** Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. The CINC includes the COAs in the Commander's Estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the Commander's Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

(1) **Introduction.** Phase III begins when the NCA decide to develop possible military solutions to the crisis. The military response may be only one of many available options open to the NCA. In fact, the initial reluctance to use military forces may substantially alter the situation and thus limit the available military options when a decision to use military force is finally made.

(2) Actions taken during COA development. As **Figure 5-8** illustrates, the center of activity shifts to the supported commander:

(a) CJCS publishes a Warning Order to give initial guidance to the JPEC and requests that the CINC respond with a recommended COA to meet the situation.

(b) The supported commander develops COAs; which involve the subordinate and supporting commanders. With the Evaluation Request Message the CINC assigns those commands the task of identifying the forces and resources for the COAs being considered. If time and security considerations permit, subordinate evaluation of tentative COAs is valuable. Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs may prove useful in the rapid development of the COAs. The databases that outline the flow of forces and sustainment can be made available to the JPEC by the supported commander. Finally, the CINC prepares the Commander's Estimate, the recommended COA.

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE III – COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

NCA	Give guidance to CINC via CJCS
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish Warning Order <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• establish command relationships •• define tasks, objectives, constraints •• either allocate forces & lift or request that CINC list requirements •• set tentative C-day & L-hour •• direct CINC to develop COAs and submit • Commander's Estimate • Monitor COA development with JDS • Review Commander's Estimate
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responds to Warning Order • Develops and evaluates COAs using JOPES ADP • Coordinates involvement of subordinates • Releases Evaluation Request Message • Reviews existing OPLANs for applicability • Prepares & submits Commander's Estimate to CJCS
Subordinate & Supporting Commands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond to Evaluation Request Message and conduct parallel planning • Analyze COAs, as directed • Identify C, CS, CSS forces and generate movement requirement estimates • Create deployment database in JOPES for each COA • Coordinate sustainment calculations & movement requirements • Prepare Evaluation Response Message
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews CINC's COAs • Activates Crisis Action Team • Assists in refining requirements • Prepares deployment estimate for each COA • Sends deployment estimate to supported commander
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor COA development • Plan for sustainment • Monitor force readiness

Figure 5-8

(c) The subordinate and supporting commanders respond to the CINC with an Evaluation Response Message. This is part of the parallel planning effort among the CINC's staff, supporting commands and subordinate commands that helps streamline, coordinate and expedite planning. Alternative COAs are evaluated and forces are identified to support the operation. Existing plans in the JOPES database can be used; a force list for the proposed operation can be created in the JOPES database. Sustainment planning begins with coordination between the Service headquarters and the theater components. The Services monitor deployment planning and force readiness.

(d) USCINTRANS reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and prepares deployment estimates for each COA to send to the supported commander. As time permits, and as directed by the supported commander, JOPES data are used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and closure profile.

(3) Exchange of reports during Phase III. Several orders or messages may be published during this phase.

(a) Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required. The Warning Order equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process; an example is illustrated in JOPES Volume I. The message should

- describe the situation;
- establish command relationships;
- state mission, objectives, and assumptions;
- refer to applicable OPLANs and CONPLANs;

allocate forces and transportation assets or request that the CINC identify resource requirements;

- establish a tentative C-day and L-hour or solicit the CINC's recommendation;
- identify the anticipated D-day for planning purposes; and
- discuss guidance for administrative, logistics, public affairs, civil affairs, and C3 subjects.

The order will definitely request that the CINC develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept advised. Messages referring to the initial order transmit additional information and guidance. The order may also discuss and focus the CINC's attention toward COAs that have already been identified or considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. However, the CINC has flexibility to determine how to carry out the assigned tasks. If the NCA have already selected a COA, they may issue direction to begin execution planning (Phase V of CAP).

(b) The basic Operations Planning Report (OPREP-1) describes the formats of four messages exchanged in this phase: **Commander's Evaluation Request**, subordinate/supporting commanders' **Evaluation Response**, USTRANSCOM's **Deployment Estimate**, and the **Commander's Estimate**. The recommended format is flexible; listed sections can be omitted or other paragraphs can be added to meet the situation.

(c) If time permits, the CINC issues a **Commander's Evaluation Request** in OPREP-1 format to subordinate and supporting commanders. It communicates necessary planning guidance and assigns to members of the JPEC the task of evaluating the proposed COA, submitting force and support requirements, or supporting the CINC's recommended COA. The Commander's Evaluation Request includes the following:

- operation description – cites reference
- narrative – describes mission task, situation, factors affecting possible COAs, enemy capabilities, concept of operations, operational constraints
- objective – amplifies guidance for developing COA evaluations
- remarks – describe the OPLAN file used and its location in the JOPES database

(d) The subordinate and supporting commanders reply with a component's course of action **Evaluation Response** message. The format is similar to the OPREP-1 reports already discussed: description, narrative, objective, and remarks.

(e) In addition, if time permits, USTRANSCOM sends the preliminary **Deployment Estimate** to the supported commander. It is in OPREP-1 format and may include the following:

- operation description
- narrative – description of the closure estimate in days or hours for each COA
- remarks – identification of planning factors used in the simulation

(f) The final product of Phase III is the **Commander's Estimate** prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINC's analysis of the COAs that were considered. Contents of the message vary, depending on the situation. Joint Pub 1-03, *Joint Reporting Systems*, describes the recommended report format. It is an abbreviation of the CINC's total staff work and may have been developed in a matter of hours. The abbreviated guidelines are also found in JOPES Volume I; it should contain the following:

- operation description – cites references, describe military operations
- narrative – write five paragraphs described in JOPES Volume I: mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (enemy capabilities), comparison of own COAs, and recommendation
- objective – identify operational objective, object of reporting the information
- remarks – discuss planning factors, file within JOPES where force list may be found, etc.

(4) **ADP support.** Time available to the CINC is a most critical variable during this phase. Vast amounts of planning data must be transferred rapidly among JPEC participants. The GCCS and the JOPES deployment database maintained by the Joint Staff are the primary means for exchanging detailed planning information. The planning tasks to develop tentative COAs, evaluate the adequacy of each COA, create force lists and support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of each COA, and begin to

prepare deployment estimates for the recommended COA require much time. Fortunately, there is ADP support to help the crisis action planner take advantage of previous planning efforts that are already in the JOPES database, or to rapidly develop a plan from scratch.

(a) **Develop tentative COAs.** An existing OPLAN may have been built that can be modified. An existing CONPLAN may be available that can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved concept of operations. Both of these formats are stored in the JOPES database and are available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a “NOPLAN” situation is said to exist; timely creation of a concept of operations and the time-phasing of forces and support are required.

(b) **Determine adequacy of each proposed COA.** An objective, comprehensive evaluation of proposed COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Some combatant commands are developing computer simulations to assist in measuring sensitivity of COAs to key parameters.

(c) **Develop force lists and support packages.** Using the force modules in JOPES, the planner can rapidly build an effective combat force, add support forces, and calculate sustainment. Using force modules from current OPLANs reduces the planning time, because these force modules are already “sourced” with actual Army and Air Force units and some Sea Service units.

(d) **Prepare deployment estimates.** The USTRANSCOM components begin to build the deployment estimates from information exchanged through the GCCS. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to CJCS and the CINC via GCCS and OPREP-1 message.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase III.** Course of action development ends when COAs are presented to the NCA. Emphasis once again shifts to NCA and the CJCS for the selection of a COA.

COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

d. **Phase IV.** In this phase, CJCS in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and analyzes the Commander’s Estimate and deployment estimates and, ultimately, presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. The activities of the JPEC are illustrated in **Figure 5-9**.

(1) **Introduction.** Phase IV of CAP begins when the recommended COAs are presented to the NCA. CJCS has received the Commander’s Estimate from the CINC. The Joint Staff has evaluated the recommendation; the COAs may have been refined or revised, or new COAs may have been developed in light of a changing situation. In fact,

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE IV – COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION**

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Select COA • Direct execution planning
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review and evaluate Commander's Estimate • Develop additional COAs, as necessary • Present COAs and recommend COA to NCA • Issue Planning Order to begin formal execution planning before NCA decision (if necessary) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• allocate forces and lift •• identify C-day & L-hour • Announce NCA decision • Issue Alert Order <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• describes COA •• changes, amplifies guidance in Warning Order •• directs execution planning to begin
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates execution planning on receipt of JCS direction • Refines estimates and resolves identified shortfalls
Subordinate & Supporting Commands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue parallel planning • Monitor situation
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continues planning • Monitors situation
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue planning • Monitor situation

Figure 5-9

when there is no clearly superior COA, a ranked list of recommendations may have to be given to the NCA.

(2) **Actions taken during COA selection.** The focus of activity is with CJCS and the NCA:

(a) CJCS performs his role as principal military adviser to the NCA, evaluating the COAs recommended by the CINC in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Depending on the recommendation to the NCA, CJCS may choose to issue guidance to the CINC and the JPEC with a **Planning Order** to speed up the execution planning though it does not replace formal NCA approval of a COA.

(b) The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning begin. On receipt of an NCA decision, CJCS issues an **Alert Order** to the CINC advising of the selected COA. With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS may issue a Deployment Preparation Order or Deployment Order.

(c) The CINC and the other members of the JPEC are continuing deployment and employment planning with the knowledge they have of the pending decision.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase IV.** Depending on the situation, either of two communications may be exchanged in this phase:

(a) CJCS issues the Planning Order before the NCA make a decision. The intent is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by message or via GCCS to the CINC with copies to all members of the JPEC. It is conceivable that the Planning Order could be the first record communication between CJCS and the JPEC on the crisis. In such a situation, vital planning information would be exchanged at this time. However, it is desirable to use such a message merely to update CJCS guidance that has been given earlier. The contents of the Planning Order may vary depending on the situation, but it should

- identify forces and resources for planning;
- define the objective, tasks, and constraints;
- contain further planning guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
- give a deadline for submitting the operation order (OPORD).

JOPES Volume I outlines an example of a Planning Order that illustrates a standardized format patterned after the OPREP-1 message in Joint Pub 1-03. The JOPES Volume I example includes a multisection narrative detailing situation, mission, details about the COA to be executed, resources allocated, and guidance for administration, logistics, PSYOP, public affairs, etc.

(b) On receiving the NCA decision on the course of action, CJCS publishes an **Alert Order**. The order is a record communication that the NCA have decided to develop in detail a military solution to the crisis. The contents of an Alert Order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published. The contents are similar in format to the Planning Order, except that the operation description clearly states that the message is an Alert Order and that execution planning for the selected COA has been authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

(4) **Conclusion of Phase IV.** This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. The Alert Order publishes that decision.

EXECUTION PLANNING

e. **Phase V.** In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an **operation order (OPORD)**. Phase V is similar in function to the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process. In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.

(1) **Introduction.** The NCA select the military course of action that will be further developed. Execution planning begins when the CINC and members of the JPEC receive the Planning Order or the Alert Order.

(2) **Actions taken during execution planning.** The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.

- **Execution planning** is the timely development of the OPORD that can be executed when the NCA direct. The OPORD is developed by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or building an OPORD from scratch when no plan exists (NOPLAN). Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning. JPEC actions are the same whether an Alert Order or Planning Order initiates execution planning.

- **Force preparation** focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The five categories for deployability posture describe the status of troops and equipment, the unit availability to deploy, positioning of units on strategic lift, positioning of transportation support units at intermediate and debarkation ports, etc. The deployment posture is changed by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

- **Deployability posture reporting.** After receiving the CJCS Alert Order, commanders issue situation reports (SITREPs) per Joint Pub 1-03 to report early attainment of, or deviations from, a specified deployability posture. Newly identified forces report the time that they anticipate attaining the directed deployability posture.

(a) Emphasis during the phase, particularly during the task of execution planning, rests with the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, as summarized in **Figure 5-10**. They review the Planning or Alert Order to get the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. They update and adjust planning done in Phase III, COA development, for any new force and sustainment requirements, and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC act to identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. As part of their parallel planning at this point, the Services and the CINC's

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE V – EXECUTION PLANNING**

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decide to authorize Deployment Preparation/Deployment Order
CJCS, The Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor execution planning • Publish Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order, as directed • Evaluate situation and furnish guidance to continue CAP • Resolve conflicting materiel priorities & transportation shortfalls
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Converts approved COA into OPORD • Reviews force and unit-related support requirements • Confirms first increment of movement requirements • Resolves shortfalls and limitations • Notifies JPEC that force requirements are ready for sourcing • Publishes TPFDD LOI
Subordinate & Supporting Commands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify early-deploying forces, assign tasks • Generate movement requirements • Develop supporting OPORDs • Begin SORTS reporting • Identify forces • Schedule movement for self-deploying forces • Identify shortfalls
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensures that adequate transportation is available to support approved COA • Develops feasible transportation schedules • May have to focus on first increment of movement • Coordinates changes caused by conflicts and shortfalls
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine mobilization requirements • Request authorization to mobilize, if necessary • Calculate sustainment • Identify shortfalls • Furnish augmentation forces • Schedule organic movements • Improve industrial preparedness • Begin SORTS reporting for identified forces

Figure 5-10

component commanders are sourcing the forces identified for planning. Planning concentrates on the earliest deploying units. Execution planning results in the preparation of the OPORD by the CINC. The subordinate and supporting commanders prepare supporting OPORDs.

(b) CJCS monitors the development of the CINC's OPORD in JOPES and resolves shortfalls that are presented. CJCS also reviews the final product for adequacy and feasibility and gives military advice to the NCA on the status of the situation.

(c) USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD by applying transportation assets against the transportation requirements identified by the supported commander. Air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel are established, and schedules for air and sea are created. Concentration is on the initial increment of movements, i.e., 7 days by air and 30 days by sealift.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase V.** The Planning/Alert Order is sent to the CINC as action addressee, and is also forwarded to subordinate commanders for their planning guidance. In addition, two important communications are exchanged in this phase.

(a) The supported commander publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that furnishes procedures for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces. The LOI gives instructions and direction to the components, supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC concerning lift allocation, reporting and validation requirements, and management of TPFDD data in general. JOPES Volume I gives an example of a TPFDD LOI.

(b) The OPORD is the product of the execution planning phase. Joint Pub 1-02 defines it as “a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation.” Joint Pub 1-03 gives the format for the OPREP-1 report, and CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I shows an abbreviated example. See Appendix H of this publication for a more detailed description of the contents of an OPORD. The supported commander’s OPORD is published with a major force list, instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistics and administrative plans for support of the operation. Movement data and schedules are entered into the JOPES database for access by all members of the JPEC. As part of the parallel planning, subordinate and supporting commands develop supporting OPORDs as required by the CINC. The CINC transmits copies of the completed OPORD by GENSER to CJCS to review for adequacy and feasibility. If an OPORD is contrary to the guidance contained in the CJCS Alert Order, or if circumstances change, requiring an adjustment in the OPORD, CJCS informs the CINC of the differences.

(4) **ADP support.** GCCS and JOPES ADP take on greater significance during this phase of the crisis: JPEC participants continue to use GCCS for communicating among themselves; GCCS allows rapid, accurate, and secure data transfer and offers access for file updating. The JPEC uses JOPES procedures and guidance furnished in the TPFDD LOI to build and refine the TPFDD. When planning participants do not have access to the JOPES computer files, they can use secure voice systems or message communications to exchange essential force and deployment data.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase V.** The phase ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order.

(6) **Phase timing.** The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described as occurring sequentially. During a crisis they may, in fact, be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. For example, the CINC's ASSESSMENT in Phase I may serve as the recommended COA in the Commander's Estimate normally developed in Phase III. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is the CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone or via TLECF throughout the JPEC during the entire CAP process.

EXECUTION

f. **Phase VI.** The execution phase starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense authorize CJCS to issue an **Execute Order** that directs the CINC to carry out the OPORD. The CINC then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs.

(1) **Introduction.** The Execute Order is a record communication that may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. USTRANSCOM monitors and coordinates the deployment per the supported commander's force and sustainment priorities. Members of the JPEC report movement of forces in the deployment database.

(2) **Actions taken during execution.** During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and nonunit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and POE and POD capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required. The JOPES deployment database should contain at least the following information at the time of OPORD execution: first, sourced combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements for assigned and augmentation forces; second, integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, POD, and LAD; and third, integrated nonunit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day. Practical considerations require that planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about seven days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of seven

days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements.

(a) CJCS publishes the CJCS Execute Order that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPOD. Throughout execution, the staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary.

(b) The CINC executes the order and transmits his own guidance to subordinates and supporting commanders. The CINC also monitors, assesses, and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and re-plans, redeploys, or terminates operations as necessary. Depending on the size and complexity of the operation, the CINC's staff and those of the subordinate and supporting commands may be required to perform additional detailed planning specific to termination and redeployment operations. Joint Pub 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment*, contains guidance on planning for such situations.

(c) The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their CINC-directed OPODs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the combat theater. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both statuses of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database. **Figure 5-11** summarizes the activities of the JPEC during this phase of CAP.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase VI.** Two communications are exchanged in this phase: the CJCS Execute Order addressed to the CINC with copies to the other members of the JPEC and the CINC's Execute Order addressed to subordinates and supporting commanders.

(a) **CJCS Execute Order** is the authorization by the NCA to execute the military operation, i.e., the NCA-selected course of action detailed in the CINC's OPOD. Ideally, the execution will follow the procedures outlined in the preceding phases of CAP: information will have been exchanged in OPREP-1 CINC Assessment Reports and Commander's Estimates, guidance will have been received via the CJCS-published Warning and Planning Orders, preparation will have been permitted using the Deployment Preparation/Deployment Orders, and formal NCA direction will have been received in the Secretary of Defense-authorized Alert Order. Following these procedures, the most current guidance will have been given, periodic updates will have been received, and modifications reflecting changing conditions will have been issued as necessary. This is the preferred exchange of information.

**THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE VI – EXECUTION**

<i>NCA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorize release of Execute Order
<i>CJCS, The Joint Staff</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish Execute Order to • Direct deployment & employment of forces • Set D-day & H-hour (if necessary) • Convey essential information not contained in the Warning & Alert Orders • Monitor deployment & employment of forces • Resolve or direct resolution of conflicts
<i>Supported Command</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executes OPORD • Monitors force deployment • Validates movement requirements in increments • Resolves, reports shortfalls • Controls employment of forces • Issues Execute Order to subordinates • Updates deployment status on JDS
<i>Subordinate & Supporting Commands</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execute supporting OPORDs • Continue to furnish forces • Report movement requirements
<i>USTRANSCOM</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manages common-user transportation assets for transportation of forces and supplies • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and CINC • Reports lift shortfalls to CJCS for resolution
<i>Services</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustain forces

Figure 5-11

(b) Unfortunately, in a fast-developing crisis the CJCS Execute Order may be the first record communication generated by CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the Execute Order is time-sensitive; the format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. Information already communicated in the Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders is not repeated. Under these conditions, the Execute Order need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. The broad outline of information that has already passed to the JPEC in the preceding Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders includes the following:

- reference
- narrative
- authority
- situation mission – a refined statement of tasks and purpose
- execution – course of action, allocation of combat forces, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, PSYOP guidance, deployability status, OPSEC, deception guidance, etc.
- admin and logistics – allocation of strategic lift, load planning, logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc.
- command and signal – communications guidance, command relationships

(c) The recommended format for the CINC's Execute Order to subordinates and supporting commanders is in JOPES Volume I. This follows the receipt of the CJCS message; it may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS Execute Order does not cover.

(4) **ADP support.** During execution the rapid exchange of information is necessary to allow a timely response to changing situations. GCCS permits communication of deployment schedules and rapid information update, and gives the JPEC the ability to monitor and report resource movement. Termination and redeployment planning also should continue.

503. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES – MULTIPLE-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Reference: CJCSM 3122.01, *Planning Policies and Procedures (JOPES Volume I)*

- a. **Definition.** Multiple-crisis procedures apply when these conditions are met:
 - Crisis Action Planning procedures are in progress for two or more crises;
 - competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability; and
 - the supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources
- b. **Guidelines.** The possibility exists that multiple crises having a conflicting impact on national security issues might occur either within a single supported commander's theater of operations or in separate theaters that involve two or more CINCs.
- c. **Procedures.** JOPES Volume I discusses multiple-crisis guidelines to supplement the CAP single-crisis procedures. The procedures unique to multiple-crisis situations follow:

(1) Phase I – Situation Development. There are no unique procedures in observing and reporting multiple crises.

(2) Phase II – Crisis Assessment. The exchange of information between members of the JPEC is essential early in the planning process when elements are exploring responses to dynamic situations. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports are furnished to all the supported commanders involved.

(3) Phase III – COA Development. The Warning Order for each crisis allocates combat force and lift resources to supported commanders. If forces or resources are insufficient, the Chairman will establish planning priorities. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed to allocate the available resources and strategic lift or recommend allocations to the Chairman. Support forces generally are allocated by the Services in rough proportion to the allocation of combat forces. The planning in Phase III can identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations early.

(4) Phase IV – COA Selection. In recommending COAs to the NCA, CJCS includes the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. If necessary, CJCS recommends plan priority, and that resources be allocated according to that priority.

(5) Phase V – Execution Planning. Conflicts between CINCs in satisfying resource requirements are resolved at the CJCS level. The JTB and JMPAB may be convened. Force and nonunit cargo requirements are sourced, conflicts from units assigned multiple tasks are resolved, and shortfalls from unfilled requirements are identified. USTRANSCOM develops and integrates transportation movement schedules.

(6) Phase VI – Execution. The recognition during the execution of one OPORD of new threats from multiple crises may require the reallocation of resources, even though existing deployments may need to be halted or redirected.

d. **Summary.** The planning and execution of simultaneous military operations requires early identification of conflicts and shortfalls. Early resolution permits alternative COA development, earliest possible identification of allocated resources, and effective coordination between members of the JPEC. Mechanisms exist within supported commands and at the CJCS level to resolve resource allocation problems. Guidance from the NCA or CJCS ultimately establishes priorities and determine allocations for overcommitted forces or resources. Late resolution may result in revising the mission statements and replanning or amending existing OPORDs.

504. JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY. Operation plans developed in deliberate planning are entered into the JOPES deployment database, where the data are maintained to keep them current. That information is always available to the JPEC for developing COAs and OPORDs in response to crises as they occur.

a. **Deliberate Planning.** During peacetime, joint planners use the deliberate planning process to develop Concept Summaries, CONPLANS, and detailed OPLANs for contingencies as assigned in the JSCP. OPLANs are completed in detail, including a transportation-feasible TPFDD, to furnish some assurance that such major contingencies could be responded to in a timely manner should they arise. The development of an OPLAN with its detailed identification of force and sustainment requirements and their necessary phased introduction into theater can take 18 months or more. Once developed, the information is maintained in the JOPES deployment database to permit rapid retrieval and modification to meet a crisis.

b. **Crisis Action Planning.** In a crisis, the luxury of time available for lengthy detailed planning does not exist. For a contingency considered in the JSCP, the JPEC may build an OPORD using or adapting an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN. For contingencies not anticipated by deliberate planning, joint planners and operators are likely to be in a NOPLAN situation. They must develop COAs, a concept of operations, and a deployment database without the months of previous planning for the contingency. However, even though the crisis at hand may not resemble existing operation plans in detail, there are probably aspects of one or more plans in the database that could be adapted to the situation, speeding up the CAP process. Even if the response to a crisis has to be completely developed without adapting plans or parts of plans in the database, the process of developing the database in deliberate planning is what keeps the JPEC familiar with the procedures, policies, and JOPES ADP capabilities that make rapid development of OPORDs possible. Throughout the CAP process, planning information is exchanged over the GCCS, on secure phone, and by OPREP messages. The product of CAP is an executable OPORD published by the supported commander. The NCA exercise ultimate authority over selection of the COA and execution of the OPORD.

c. **The role of JOPES.** The framework of policies, procedures, processes, and ADP capabilities within which the JPEC carries out both deliberate and crisis action planning is JOPES. **Figure 5-12** depicts the relationship to both forms of planning of the functions of JOPES, discussed in Chapter 4. As can be seen, JOPES is an entire system for conducting joint contingency planning in both the deliberate and crisis response modes; it encompasses but is not limited to the ADP capabilities that joint planners use as tools to get the planning job done.

505. SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING. In summary, a crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests. It often may develop rapidly and create a condition of such diplomatic, informational, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive situations, the JPEC follows formally established Crisis Action Planning and execution procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.




Figure 5-12

Appendix A

Joint Guidance

1. INTRODUCTION

Military officers have a number of valuable publications and resources available to assist in improving their joint knowledge and proficiency. A broad background of general military education and military experience is helpful for an officer in a joint assignment. Most officers find knowledge of certain documents and reporting systems essential in day-to-day performance during joint duty assignments. This appendix highlights selected documents, reports, and joint publications frequently used by joint staff officers. It also describes the development and documentation of joint doctrine in the Joint Publication System (JPS) and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) program. Current approved joint doctrine can be accessed through the World Wide Web at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>. CSI 3122.01, JOPES Volume I, 18 January 2000, lists references used by military staffs in joint operation planning. Enclosure U contains a list of references keyed to specific functional areas within the joint staff organization. That enclosure serves as a catalog from which staff officers can select a working library of relevant publications.

a. Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.06M, *Action Processing*, describes the memorandums used to implement CJCS decisions and policy. That document also includes an extensive list of references on Joint Staff action processing.

(1) **Chairman's Memorandum (CM)**. CMs are memorandums issued by CJCS in carrying out his responsibilities. They document such things as CJCS policy actions, guidance and instructions to the CINCs of combatant commands, and other items requiring CJCS action. Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signs all CMs.

(2) **Memorandum issued in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (MCM)**. MCMs are memorandums issued in the name of CJCS, and contain policy instructions or comments based on current CJCS policy. MCMs cover such things as OPLAN reviews and JSPS actions, and carry the signature of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Director or Vice Director of the Joint Staff. The Secretary of the Joint Staff may sign MCMs that address only administrative matters.

(3) **Director, Joint Staff, Memorandum (DJSM)**. DJSMs deal with staff-to-staff actions such as requesting information for review or furnishing information. They can state a Joint Staff position or give Joint Staff coordination on Service or Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) actions. The Director or Vice Director of the Joint Staff signs DJSMs.

(4) **CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP).** MOPs are numbered statements of policy issued in the name of CJCS. MOPs pertain to matters involving strategic planning; contingency planning; military requirements; programs and budgets; manpower; joint doctrine, training, and education; and policies and procedures that support fulfillment of the other statutory and directed responsibilities of the CJCS. The Chairman prepares MOPS for the Services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and Defense agencies. MOPs are reviewed annually and reissued, revised, or canceled when five years old. MOP 1 contains both numerical and subject indexes for all MOPS.

d. MOP 60, "Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information," establishes policy and procedures for release of Joint Staff and joint papers and information. The Joint Staff maintains and updates an extensive list of Joint Staff information and papers.

e. Under SM-98-93 dated 15 April 1993, existing MOPs, Joint Administrative Instructions (JAI), and directives to the combatant commands due for updating or revision are scheduled for conversion to the appropriate document described below:

f. **CJCS Instruction.** CJCS Instructions replace all types of correspondence containing CJCS policy and guidance that does not involve the employment of forces. They are of indefinite duration and are applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. CJCS Instructions remain in place until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. They do not contain joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures as defined in Joint Pub 1-02.

g. **CJCS Notice.** CJCS Notices replace all types of correspondence containing CJCS policy, guidance, and information of a one-time or brief nature applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. They contain a self-canceling provision and remain in effect no longer than one year.

h. **Joint Staff Instruction.** Joint Staff Instructions replace Joint Administrative Instructions and all other types of correspondence containing policy and guidance of indefinite duration applicable only to the Joint Staff.

i. **Joint Staff Notice.** Joint Staff Notices replace all types of correspondence containing policy guidance, or information of a one-time or brief nature applicable only to the Joint Staff. They contain a self-canceling provision and remain in effect no longer than one year.

j. **J Instruction.** J Instructions contain policy and guidance of indefinite duration applicable only to the issuing Joint Staff J directorate.

k. **J Notice.** J Notices contain policy, guidance, or information of a one-time or brief nature applicable only to the issuing Joint Staff J directorate. They contain a self-canceling provision and remain in effect no longer than one year.

Joint Staff Manual 57-01.1, *CJCS, Joint Staff J-Directorate Instructions, Manuals, and Notices Formats and Procedures*, dated 28 February 1995, contains additional guidance and information on notices and instructions.

2. JOINT PUBLICATION SYSTEM (JPS), JOINT DOCTRINE, AND JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (JTTP) DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Reference: Joint Pub 1-01, 25 April 1995

a. The purpose of the JPS is to enhance the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. The JPS furnishes the principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework for initiating, validating, developing, coordinating, evaluating, approving, and maintaining joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP); and joint technical publications for the Armed Forces. The Joint Staff J-7 manages the joint doctrine and JTTP program for CJCS.

b. The joint publication hierarchy furnishes a framework for organizing joint doctrine and JTTP publications into the functional series illustrated in **Figure A-1**. The organizational structure generally follows traditional joint staff lines of responsibility. Each series, except the 0 and 1 series, includes a keystone manual as the first publication in the series. Each keystone publication is the doctrinal foundation of its series. Organization of the series of functional publications follows:

(1) **Joint Pub 0 Series, Capstone Joint Warfare Doctrine.** Publications in the Joint Pub 0 Series link joint doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other government agencies and alliances. The UNAAF, Joint Pub 0-2, continues to furnish the basic organization and command and control relationships required for effective joint operations. This series also includes Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare for the U.S. Armed Forces*.

(2) **Joint Pub 1 Series, Joint Reference Publications.** The Joint Pub 1 Series includes a joint publication guide and index and general reference publications.

(3) **Joint Pub 2 Series, Doctrine for Intelligence Support of Joint Operations.** Publications in the Joint Pub 2 Series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence support of joint operations, including direction, planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.

(4) **Joint Pub 3 Series, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations.** Publications in this series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and executing joint military operations.




Figure A-1

(5) **Joint Pub 4 Series, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations.** Publications in this series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and carrying out logistics support of joint operations.

(6) **Joint Pub 5 Series, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.** Publications in this series establish the joint planning processes relating to the conduct of joint military operations, such as deliberate and crisis action planning.

(7) **Joint Pub 6 Series, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support of Joint Operations.** Publications in the Joint Pub 6 Series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for C4 systems support to joint operations.

c. Joint publications are publications of joint interest prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the military departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. CJCS approves joint publications, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff authenticates and distributes joint publications through Service channels. Only publications approved by CJCS carry the title “joint.” Publications involving two or more Services not reviewed and approved by CJCS are “multi-Service” publications and identify the participating Services.

d. Joint publications contain a publication number. The Joint Staff J-7 assigns publication numbers to ensure subject matter continuity. Joint publication numbers comprise three numerical groups.

(1) The first group identifies the functional field numerical series as described above.

(2) The second numerical group, preceded by a hyphen, places the publication within a functional field. A zero-digit designator indicates the keystone manual for the series of a functional field. (For example, Joint Pub 6-0 is the number for the keystone manual in the C4 Systems series.)

(3) The third numerical group, preceded by a period, designates the publications that furnish supporting or expanded doctrine or JTTP for sequenced manuals within a functional field. For example, Joint Pub 3-09.1 identifies the publication on Joint Lasers Designation Procedures, which supports Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*; both fall under the Joint Pub 3-0 Series of publications.

e. CJCS also issues publications containing material of joint interest but not involving doctrine. These include various pamphlets and handbooks designed to assist in joint and combined operations and planning. These publications are not part of the joint doctrine series outlined below.

3. SELECTED JOINT PUBLICATIONS

a. **Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States***, guides the joint action of U.S. Armed Forces, presenting concepts that mold those Armed Forces into the most effective fighting force. Application of these broadly stated concepts requires a leader’s judgment. This publication also guides U.S. multinational endeavors.

b. **Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)***, is a valuable reference that sets forth principles and doctrine governing the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces when Services of two or more military departments operate together. It includes guidance governing exercise of command by the combatant CINCs and joint force commanders, and explains the functions of CJCS and the military departments in support of joint

operations. UNAAF also furnishes guidance for the military departments and subordinate commands in the preparation of their respective detailed plans, and describes the command functions of joint commands.

c. **Joint Pub 1-01, *Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program)***, contains guidance and procedures on the nomination, development, coordination, and approval of joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) publications. It includes an index of all existing and planned publications and identifies the responsible lead agency for each publication.

d. **Joint Pub 1-01.1, *Compendium of Joint Publications***, furnishes a readily available list of all joint publications, with a brief synopsis of each, to joint force commanders, their staffs, and components. The publication specifically gives an overview of joint doctrine development, all published joint publications, all joint publications currently under development, and all validated joint doctrine projects.

e. **Joint Pub 1-01.2, *Joint Electronic Library User's Guide***, is a hands-on guide to using the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). The JEL furnishes a high-speed, full-text search and retrieval capability accessible through desktop computers via modem. Its Appendix J contains information on the JEL CD-ROM.

f. **Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms***, contains definitions of commonly used military terms. The standardization of military terminology is a major step toward effective communication and common understanding within the Department of Defense, between the United States and its allies, and within the civilian-military community.

g. ***Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*** covers the breadth of authoritative guidance for the employment of our Armed Forces. It contains executive summaries of capstone, keystone, and other key joint doctrine publications that are important to combatant commanders.

h. **Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support of Joint Operations***, describes doctrine for intelligence support to joint or multinational operations. It delineates the central role of the Joint Intelligence Center. It also contains a discussion of unique allied and coalition intelligence considerations.

i. **Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations***, outlines the translation of national strategy into assigned missions and military objectives, capabilities, and concepts of employment of component forces in joint operations. The publication also describes principles of command organization for all aspects of joint force operations. Concepts covered include developing the Commander's Estimate, discharging warfighting responsibilities, and planning and executing campaigns employing joint forces.

- j. **Joint Pub 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats***, establishes fundamental guidelines for countering air and missile threats in support of joint operations. The guidance includes fundamental concepts for countering air threats and missile threats originating from subsurface, surface, and airborne systems. It also gives fundamental principles and guidance for counterair operations, including command and control, planning, and execution of offensive and defensive counterair operations.
- k. **Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations***, establishes doctrine for planning and employing joint forces in amphibious operations with emphasis on assault operations.
- l. **Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations***, establishes fundamental principles of joint employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF). It includes a definition of special operations and describes SOF organizations, missions, capabilities and limitations; joint SOF organizations and operational concepts; and the functional relationships between SOF and conventional forces at all levels of war.
- m. **Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War***, contains guidance on preparing for and conducting selected military operations other than war. These selected military operations other than war include support for insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, peace operations, recovery operations, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, domestic support operations, and logistics support.
- n. **Joint Pub No. 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations***, contains guidance for U.S. forces assigned to peace operations including guidance on all aspects of peace operations involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking. It discusses requirements for peace operations in UN, regional, multinational, and unilateral environments. It also outlines education and training considerations for peace operations.
- o. **Joint Pub 3-08 Volumes I & II, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations***, is a key joint doctrine publication. It describes the strategic context for coordination between government agencies and identifies the fundamental principles that a joint force commander may employ in gaining interagency cooperation to accomplish a mission. It also describes operations involving interagency coordination and delineates procedures appropriate for joint force commanders and their staffs to effect such coordination. Volume I discusses the interagency environment and describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the DOD combatant commands and agencies of the U.S. Government, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. Volume II describes the key U.S. Government departments and agencies and non-governmental and international organizations – their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship with the Armed Forces of the United States.

p. **Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations***, contains the overarching operational guidance for information operations (IO) in the joint context (including information warfare) throughout the range of military operations. It discusses IO principles relating to both offensive and defensive IO and offers guidance on IO planning, coordinating, integration and deconfliction, and intelligence support.

q. **Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations***, consolidates multinational planning and operations guidance and principles already contained in various joint doctrine publications. It captures lessons learned from recent multinational operations and exercises that are applicable at the doctrinal rather than joint tactics, techniques, and procedures level. It describes multinational operations that the United States may participate in and outlines joint organizational structures essential to coordinate operations in a multinational environment.

r. **Joint Pub 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities***, is a key joint operations doctrine publication that describes the responsibilities, capabilities, and competencies contributed to a joint force by Service component forces (including the U.S. Coast Guard) and functional unified commands. It covers component and functional combatant command capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. It also discusses component and functional combatant command generic (notional) force structure and organization.

s. **Joint Pub 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone***, contains broad doctrinal guidance for joint forces involved in the use of airspace over the combat zone.

t. **Joint Pub 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs***, (in revision as *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations*), contains guidance for planning and conducting civil affairs and civil-military operations by joint forces. Commanders at all levels use these concepts to direct the unique capabilities of civil affairs assets, refine civil-military plans, and keep U.S. Government agencies informed of operations that require a high degree of detailed planning and coordination. The publication discusses areas of responsibility, coordinating and planning factors, Service-unique capabilities, forces and missions, operational constraints, and operational implications.

u. **Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations***, contains doctrine covering the entire spectrum of logistics. It includes the architectural framework for logistics support to joint operations, guidance for joint logistics planning, and the relationship between logistics and combat power.

v. **Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System***, covers interrelationships and employment of the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Its focus is on combatant commands, their service component commands, and all agencies that use the DTS along with their roles, responsibilities, and interrelationships.

w. **Joint Pub 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning***, covers the major planning and execution aspects of the mobilization process. This includes general responsibilities, concepts for coordination of mobilization planning, and responsibilities for planning by organizations outside DOD. It describes the systems and procedures used in the mobilization planning process.

x. **Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations***, contains keystone doctrine that establishes requirements, responsibilities, and guidelines for planning joint operations. It details core guidance for the planning of joint operations in all mission areas, including mobilization, deployment, sustainment, employment, and mission analysis. It identifies and defines the interdependent relationships between threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, and execution planning. It also explains the interrelationships between personnel, intelligence, logistics, C3 systems, and other staff agencies that enhance combat effectiveness through coordinated joint planning and execution.

y. **Joint Pub 5-00.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning***, will guide the planning and execution of joint campaigns at theater and subordinate command levels. It will describe the relationship between theater and subordinate campaign plans at the strategic and operational levels. It will also examine the relationship between campaign plans and JOPES in the development of theater and subordinate campaign plans.

z. **Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures***, furnishes planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, and deploying a joint task force (JTF). It includes an overview of the purpose of a JTF; responsibilities and authorities of the appointing authority, JTF commander, and JTF component, supporting, and supported commanders; and other command and control considerations related to the JTF. It relates JTF operations to the steps of Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

aa. **Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations***, is broad in scope, discussing the entire spectrum of C4 systems supporting commanders. It is applicable to joint operations at all levels of conflict.

4. JOINT PUB 1-03, JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE (JRS) GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

a. **The Joint Reporting Structure**, Joint Pub 1-03, outlines the reporting procedures directed for use throughout the military community. It specifically outlines requirements for the following:

- **military information** to the NCA
- a **central catalog of recurring reports to support command decisions** on military operations so as to minimize duplication
- **standardization** in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Services, and combat support agencies
- **central management and standard rules** for the application of message text formatting to reporting systems

b. **The JRS creates reports** with wide application in command and control, operation and support planning, plan execution, and analysis. It portrays essential data on personnel, materiel and equipment status; operational and logistics planning; and the overall military situation. It establishes

- **procedures** for preparing reports,
- the **framework for reporting systems** for transferring data between participating commands and agencies, and
- the **standards for automatic data processing** within the structure.

c. **Joint Pub 1-03 Series** includes numerous publications; each concerned with a particular functional area. The following are among them:

1-03.3	<i>Joint Reporting Structure Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)</i>
1-03.6	<i>Event or Incident Reports</i>
1-03.7	<i>Nuclear Weapons Reports</i>
1-03.8	<i>Situation Monitoring</i>
1-03.9	<i>Reconnaissance</i>
1-03.10	<i>Communications Status</i>
1-03.11	<i>Communications-Electronics</i>
1-03.12-14	<i>Military Installation Status</i>
1-03.15	<i>Intelligence</i>
1-03.17	<i>Personnel</i>

1-03.18 *Logistics*

1-03.19 *Nickname and Exercise Term Report*

d. **Intelligence reports.** In Joint Pub 1-03.15, the JRS outlines four intelligence reports.

(1) **Department of Defense Intelligence Digest (DODID).** The DODID agencies produce timely, finished intelligence concerning developments that could affect current and future planning and operations. DIA prepares this narrative report, and it normally covers a single activity, event, or situation. The primary objective of the DODID is to report on key developments, explain their occurrence, and assess their impact on the United States and its interests.

(2) **Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP).** The purpose of the SPIREP is to give CJCS, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the combatant commands, the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely intelligence information on developments with an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations. This is a narrative report, submitted to the national level by combatant commands, military Services, and military organizations of divisional level whenever critical developments appear imminent or are of potentially high interest to U.S. national-level decision-makers. Its content includes the nature of the event, where and when the event occurred, the source of the information, and remarks. Organizations transmit SPIREPs to the national level not later than one hour after receiving the critical information. Follow-up SPIREPs amplify or clarify information not available in the initial SITREP.

(3) **The Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM).** DISUMs furnish CJCS, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies with a **daily** analysis of an actual or simulated (training exercise) crisis and a summary of relevant intelligence information. DISUMs cover the preceding 24-hour period. The minimum required information includes subject, general hostile situation, and enemy operations during the period, other intelligence factors, and the counterintelligence situation. Combatant commands submit DISUMs to the national level.

(4) **DIA Intelligence Situation Summary (INTELSITSUM).** The INTELSITSUM furnishes timely, periodic intelligence summaries about an actual or simulated (training exercise) foreign crisis to CJCS, the combatant commands, the military Services, U.S. military commanders worldwide, and selected U.S. Government agencies. Reporting includes events with potential for an immediate effect (actual or simulated) on U.S. planning and operations. The summary contains the subject, situation summary and highlights, military activity, political issues, collection posture, and outlook.

e. **Situation Monitoring.** Joint Pub 1-03.8, *JRS, Situation Monitoring*, contains the instructions for the **Commander's Situation Report (SITREP)**, and **Commander's Operational Reports (OPREP-1, -2, -4, and -5)**.

(1) **SITREPs** keep CJCS, combatant commanders, Services, and agencies of the Government advised of critical national and international situations. These include existing political, military, and operational situations and plans; the readiness of combatant commanders to meet the requirements of CJCS-approved plans; the progress of ongoing large-scale military exercises; and any significant intelligence event. SITREPs are narrative reports that include the following kinds of data:

- Own situation, disposition, or status of forces: summary update of changes to force locations, mission readiness deterioration, proposed deployments, changes of operational control, and projected additional force requirements
- Situation overview: brief overall assessment of the situation, including conditions that increase or detract from capability and readiness of forces
- Operations: description and results of offensive or defensive operations, information on the operation of allied forces, summary of planned operations for the next 24 hours, and deviations from previously reported plans
- Intelligence and reconnaissance: brief overview of the situation, order of battle, capabilities, and threat changes, reference to significant SPIREPs submitted during the previous 24 hours
- Logistics: brief overview of logistics sustainability by class of supply, highlighting significant deficiencies affecting planned operations and problem areas beyond the commander's capability to overcome
- Communications and connectivity: significant outages, incompatibilities, quantitative equipment deficiencies, and their impact
- Personnel: factors affecting readiness of forces or units, daily battle casualties, and the effect on command mission of casualties sustained
- Significant political, military, and diplomatic events not reported by OPREP-3 PINNACLE but that may result in public reaction, results of government decisions made by key allies, civil unrest, etc.
- Commander's Estimate, or CINC's or Service chief's assessment summary of key points from preceding paragraphs highlighting areas requiring CJCS or NCA action or decision, intentions on execution, etc.

(2) **SITREPs** are submitted daily effective 2400Z to ensure receipt in Washington no later than 0400Z the following day. Duplicate reporting between SITREPs, OPREPs, and other JRS reports is discouraged. Information required via another JRS report is not included in SITREPs; the SITREP references the appropriate JRS report.

(3) **OPREPs** are normally narrative reports that advise CJCS, combatant commanders, Services, and U.S. Government agencies of events or incidents that could attract national or international attention. These include current operations and recommended operation plans describing the deployment or employment of military units, and the results of activities associated with military operations. The OPREP reporting system satisfies all echelons of command with a single reporting system. Joint Pub 1-03.8, *Situation Monitoring*, discusses submission of OPREPs-1, -2, -4, and -5.

- **OPREP-1, Operation Planning Report** describes planned operations for current situations.
- **OPREP-2, Operation Start Report** advises that an operation has started or directs execution of a plan or part of a plan.
- **OPREP-4, Operation Stop Report** reports the completion of an operation or a phase of an operation.
- **OPREP-5, Operation Summary Report** issues a statistical summary.

f. **Incident Reporting.** Joint Pub 1-03.6, JRS, *Event/Incident Reports*, furnishes instructions for reporting significant events or incidents with specific report content and format guidance for 11 different categories of events. It also contains instructions for report submission. The **OPREP-3, Event/Incident Report**, immediately notifies the National Military Command Center (NMCC) of any event or incident that may attract national attention.

5. GLOBAL STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (GSORTS)

Reference: Joint Pub 1-03.3

a. **Introduction.** GSORTS is the single automated report within DOD used to furnish the NCA, CJCS, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with authoritative identification, location, and resource information on units and organizations of the U.S. Armed Forces. GSORTS describes each registered unit in terms of personnel, equipment, and supplies on hand; equipment condition; and training in terms of unit category levels C-1 through C-6. These levels reflect the status of each unit's resources and training as measured against the resources and training standards required to begin the wartime mission for

which the unit is organized or designed. Units report their status of resources and training through GSORTS at the unit levels specified in Joint Pub 1-03.3. This includes combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the operating forces of each Service, including Active, National Guard, and Reserve units assigned tasks in either the SIOP or an OPLAN residing in JOPES. CJCS also directs reporting of selected foreign forces.

b. GSORTS is a primary source of data on force availability to meet planning requirements for current operations. It is an automated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data file that contains the identity of worldwide organization resources keyed to each unit's individual Unit Identification Code (UIC). These data support operation planning, and command and control functions, within the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Services, Service major commands, component commands, and combat support agencies. Units must update data regularly to maintain currency, because only accurate and timely GSORTS data is useful in support of planning. Joint Pub 1-03.3 describes report submission time and frequency requirements.

c. GSORTS provides for rapid recall of organization and unit identity and status information. Subordinate units submit GSORTS data for consolidation at higher echelons of command. Service components submit GSORTS data to both their Service headquarters and combatant command. Combatant commands consolidate component GSORTS information and forward it to both the Joint Staff and Service headquarters.

d. Computer processing demands precise formatting and strict adherence to administrative guidelines. Reporting format, data element definitions, and rules for their use are contained in Joint Pub 1-03 series. GSORTS reports contain basic identity, status, personnel strength, combat readiness, equipment and crew status, and other elements that present a picture of the unit and its daily readiness and capabilities. As GSORTS input is received, the status data are processed, entered into, and update the GSORTS File. The Joint Staff J-3 maintains the master GSORTS file.

e. GSORTS supports JOPES through GCCS by updating the JOPES database. There are several relationships between GSORTS and other systems. GSORTS interfaces with the Specified Geolocation Code File (GEOFILE), the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA), and the Major Equipment Code File (MEQPT).

6. JOPES REPORTING SYSTEM (JOPESREP)

References: Joint Pub 1-03.21, *JRS, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP)*
Joint Pub 5-03 Series, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*

a. JOPESREP is an information reporting system structured to support deliberate and crisis action planning. It describes standard procedures for reporting the information required to develop the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) database and the Summary Reference File (SRF) used to plan and flow force and sustainment in support of contingency plans. JOPESREP defines standard element descriptions, criteria for editing, and report procedures; specifies formats; and defines information to solve planning problems.

b. JOPESREP supports the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES is a tool to assist the JPEC to develop, review, coordinate, revise, and approve operation plans. It is useful in identifying movement constraints that result from lack of resources, port reception or throughput capabilities, and POL storage limitations. It may also assist in identifying shortfalls in resources to meet plan requirements and improve the accuracy of planning data.

7. JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED (JCLL)

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) collects, processes, analyzes, and distributes joint information and lessons learned from operations, training events, and other sources to enhance the combat effectiveness and interoperability of joint forces.
<http://www.jwfc.js.mil/pages/bulinter.htm>

a. **JCLL Services.** The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is the principal provider of JCLL services to the combatant commanders, the Services, and the combat support agencies. Its services include a wide range of assistance that may be helpful to the joint force commander in the planning, preparation, and execution of training. JCLL can give the commander and his staff the latest information pertaining to the CJCS Recommended Training Issues. Lessons learned and issues related to exercise management and design are available as well as the summaries and assessments of past exercises. The JCLL is also available to conduct limited issue and lessons learned database research for joint staffs.

b. **JCLL Access.** The Joint Center for Lessons Learned operates home pages on the Internet and the SIPRNET that contain the latest JCLL information, copies of the published JCLL Bulletins and linkages to other DOD Lessons Learned sites. The SIPRNET page also includes a searchable JCLL Master Database.

c. **Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)** is a PC-based software package designed to create, modify, and display observations from command post exercises, field training exercises, and actual operations. Service components and combatant commands consolidate after-action reports and lessons learned and forwarded to the Joint Staff J-7 (ESD). The Joint Staff J-7 edits and transcribes these observations into the JULLS database (Secret) and makes them available to the entire JPEC. MCM 86-90 furnishes details on system functioning.

d. **Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS)**. CJCS MOP 53 requires submission of after-action reports (AAR) following operations and exercises. The AAR is the most common method for data submissions to the JULLS database. Joint Pub 1-03.30 contains formats and procedures for preparing and submitting AAR documents.

Appendix B

ADP Support for Planning and Execution

1. INTRODUCTION. Command and control is the most important function of joint force commanders and their staffs. C2 is where planning and execution thought processes outlined in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and automated data processing (ADP) capabilities resident in both the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) all come together to support joint force commanders. The following definitions of JOPES, GCCS and GCSS are useful:

a. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. JOPES is the integrated joint conventional and nuclear command and control system used to support military operation planning, execution, and monitoring (including theater-level nuclear and chemical defense) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and underlying GCCS ADP support to give senior-level decision makers and their staffs enhanced capability to plan and conduct operations.

b. The Global Command and Control System. GCCS, which continues to evolve, will be the single, global Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) system supporting the warfighter, whether from a foxhole or from a commander-in-chief's (CINC's) command post. A major part of the GCCS application environment is JOPES, which was developed from legacy and prototype subsystems to run on the GCCS hardware. Commanders use JOPES-related tools on GCCS to determine the best course of action (COA) to accomplish assigned tasks and direct the actions to accomplish the mission.

c. The Global Combat Support System. GCSS provides integration and interoperability between combat support functions and command and control to support the operational needs of the warfighter. It directly supports C4I for the Warfighter and CJCS Joint Vision 2020. Using the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and/or common operating environment (COE) as well as the shared data environment, it ensures rapid integration of combat support applications, furnishing a seamless flow of operational and sustaining base information to the Warfighter.

2. JOPES – GCCS – GCSS INTEGRATION. This set of applications can be used independently while interacting on shared networks with shared databases. These programs support deliberate planning and crisis action planning as described in JOPES. The JOPES deliberate planning process would be unacceptably slow, unresponsive, and inflexible without the support of JOPES-related automated data processing (ADP). In the deliberate planning process, planners develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and prepare supporting plans using JOPES ADP. JOPES-related ADP is also used in crisis action planning to tailor and refine existing operation plans to produce executable OPORDs, or rapidly develop new courses of action (COAs) and work them into executable OPORDs. In deliberate planning, JOPES ADP helps primarily in the plan development phase to build and flow the force list, calculate and flow nonunit cargo and personnel required to sustain the force, complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support, and test for gross transportation feasibility. The product of this process is the Time-Phased Force Deployment Database (TPFDD). The TPFDD is a transportation-feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to execute and support the CINC's concept of operations. The TPFDD can be thought of as an expression of the CINC's concept of operations through the scheduled deployment of the forces and sustainment required to execute it. Throughout the planning process, planners have access to several applications programs designed to initialize the TPFDD (create the database), add forces, schedule support, and enter transportation planning data. Once the TPFDD is built, JOPES-related ADP helps the planners refine it before and during the refinement conferences. In addition to JOPES-related ADP supports plan review, development of supporting plans, and TPFDD maintenance required to keep the database current.

3. THE ENDURING PROCESSES OF JOPES. From the discussion above can be seen enduring planning processes common to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning that have been used by U.S. planners since at least the Mexican-American War.

a. The first of these is the receipt of a strategic or operational mission/task. During the deliberate planning process of JOPES, the strategic task comes from the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*; during crisis action, the task may come as early as a *Warning Order* or as late as an *Execute Order*. Communications capabilities inherent in the C4I system assist in moving information and operational missions and tasks.

b. The second enduring process is to establish situational awareness. Where or what is the enemy and what is it doing? And, where are our own friendly forces and what is their readiness to respond? Intelligence, meteorological, and readiness applications assist in gaining and maintaining situational awareness.

c. Next in the list of enduring processes is the development of a concept of operations. Given situational awareness, how can the friendly forces be used against the enemy to accomplish the mission? The JOPES procedures use the "estimate" process to de-

velop and compare COAs. The selected COA is then developed in a five-paragraph mission type order and issued for further planning. Video-teleconferencing capabilities of the C4I system assist in COA development, analysis and decisionmaking.

d. Once the concept of operations has been determined, forces must be arrayed for deployment and further developed into a concept of deployment. American planners have been doing this at least since the Civil War. Major combat formations are selected, routed and timed for deployment. Within the deliberate planning process, there is a formal “force planning” step; in crisis action planning, deployment planning begins as soon as possible. Since the early 1990’s, major efforts have resulted in at least five force planning applications to be used to create TPFDDs.

e. Once major forces have been arrayed for deployment, support planners may develop a concept of support. They make a best guess about how much “stuff” in the form of supplies, food, ammunition, fuel, etc., it will take to support the concept of operations. Since logistics is a “Service” responsibility in our Armed Forces, it is the Service components using Service planning tools that give the best estimate of support.

f. The concepts of operations, deployment and support finally allow planners to develop an concept of transportation. Answers are sought and found to the following questions: What are the best airfields and ports to use? Is there enough airlift and sealift capacity? Can we close the force and accomplish reception, staging, and onward movement and integration?

g. Following these processes, the decision-makers finally come to the point of execution of the operation. During crisis action, the NCA would make the decision to execute; during deliberate planning, the CINC would exercise or wargame his concept of operations to test his ability to achieve his task. Execution, exercising, and wargaming are enduring processes directly supported by C4I systems.

h. Finally, after planning and executing an operation, the joint commander reports up and down the chain of command. During the operation, Situation Reports (SITREPS) are sent to help maintain situational awareness. After execution of an operation, after action reporting, universal lessons learned, and unit histories give planners a means to avoid continuing the failures of the past.

4. ADP PLANNING AND EXECUTION SUPPORT SYSTEMS. GCCS/GCSS directly support the JOPES enduring planning processes described above and as shown below in figure B-1.

Enduring Process	GCCS/JOPES Application
Mission/tasking	E-mail, Newsgroups, Homepages, Netmeeting, Internet Relay Chatter
Situational Awareness	Common Operational Picture(COP), Global Reconnaissance Information System (GRIS), Global Status of Resources and Training (GSORTS), METOC, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS)
Concept Development	Theater Analysis and Graphical Execution Toolkit (TARGET), Common Operational Planning and Simulation Strategy (COMPASS), Adaptive Course of Action Toolkit (ACOA), Traditional Video Teleconferencing capability for collaborative planning
Force Planning	JOPES Editing Tool (JET), TPFDD Editor in JFAST, Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRG-II)
Support Planning	Logistics Sustainability and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE), Sustainment Generator in JFAST, Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES)Medical Analysis Tool (MAT)
Transportation Planning	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) Scheduling and Movement (S&M)
Execution	Force Validation Tool (FVT), Common Operational Picture (COP)
Reporting	E-mail, Newsgroups, Homepages, Netmeeting, Internet Relay Chatter

Figure B-1

5. COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES. GCCS/GCSS and JOPES-related information is on a classified network of networks called the SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network). GCCS uses commercial web-browsers, e-mail capability, Internet relay chatter, netmeetings, homepages and newsgroups for communications. These give the most powerful abilities for communications that the U.S. Armed Forces have had for more than fifty years – as long as users remember it is a command and control system and do not use it for normal day-to-day work. – and; as long as users remember that “need to know” still applies. The communications capabilities of GCCS support tasking, planning, execution, monitoring, and reporting information requirements of JOPES.

6. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TOOLS

a. The Common Operational Picture (COP). COP is the basic situational awareness tool designed to give commanders and staffs a friendly, enemy, and neutral picture of their battlespace. It fuses near-real-time tracks of air, land, sea, and subsurface force movements. The picture includes reconnaissance information from the Global Reconnaissance Information System (GRIS), weather data from METOC, and will eventually contain combat support information related to total asset visibility from the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), as well as JOPES scheduling and movement data.

b. Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). Although JDISS normally operates on the SCI-level Joint Worldwide Intelligence Support System (JWICS), there is a collateral level feed of intelligence information available on GCCS to ensure situational awareness through Intelink.

c. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). GSORTS provides information about the status and location of registered units of U.S. military forces and selected other foreign or domestic agencies or organizations. GSORTS allows joint commanders to maintain friendly forces awareness.

7. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT TOOLS. The most important collaborative planning capability of GCCS to date is its video teleconferencing capability. However, the following tools have been fielded to support COA development:

a. Theater Analysis Replanning Graphic Execution Toolkit (TARGET). TARGET was developed as a collaborative planning tool and included a Course of Action Selection Tool (COAST) module. It can be viewed as the Commander's Estimate on line.

b. Common Operational Planning and Simulation Strategy (COMPASS). COMPASS is an Army legacy system that was adopted for joint use in 1999.

c. Adaptive Course of Action Toolkit (ACOA). ACOA is a USCINCPAC initiative still under development but leading the way toward future Web-based collaboration in crisis planning and execution.

8. FORCE PLANNING TOOLS. The JOPES ADP programs use the following terms to represent the CINC's concept of operations in the TPFDD. At least five force planning tools were developed in the 1990's to assist planners and operators in developing a concept of deployment, and aid force planning.

B-6

a. TP-Edit function of DART. The TPFDD-Editor (TP-Edit) function of the Dynamic Analysis Replanning Tool (DART) is a graphic TPFDD editor in which deployment force requirements are shown across a visual time-line along which deployment flow could be adjusted by sliding location information (origins, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and destinations). It is still in use at some CINCDOMs.

b. Requirements Development and Analysis System (RDA). The JOPES force planning application that was introduced with GCCS was the Requirements Development and Analysis (RDA) system. It was first developed for force planning as DART and has been integrated into GCCS. RDA assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data.

c. JOPES Editing Tool (JET). JET, the current force planning tool resident in GCCS. It allows planners to create, analyze, and edit Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). JET is easier to use than and replaces the Requirements Development and Analysis (RDA) program. TPFDD changes made in JET are networked to all copies of a TPFDD on GCCS.

d. TPFDD Editor of JFAST. The Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) contains a TPFDD Editor that can be used to create generic (notional) deployment data during crisis action for COA deployment estimates. It can also be used to manipulate deployment data separate from GCCS either by individual requirement or by force module; JFAST TPFDD changes are not networked, but the planner can then cut a new TPFDD or individual transaction records to be loaded on GCCS. The TPFDD Editor in JFAST is evolving into a very powerful and user friendly force planning tool.

e. Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRG-II). Based on the Marine Corps MAGTF-II service feeder system to JOPES, JFRG-II promises to be the unit level feeder system to JOPES; it allows units to tailor their deployment information, then feed the actual movement requirements up the chain of command via the Global Transportation Network to JOPES on GCCS.

9. SUPPORT PLANNING TOOLS. This group of applications includes models used to plan personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain an operation.

a. Logistics Sustainability Analysis and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE). LOGSAFE is the baseline GCCS ADP tool introduced for use in support planning. LOGSAFE allows the planner to estimate logistics sustainment requirements of a proposed OPLAN for deliberate or crisis planning, and evaluate overall logistics feasibility of OPLANs and COAs, and furnishes sustainment data to transportation feasibility analysis tools. It also generates Cargo Increment Number (CIN) records for the TPFDD. This application program calculates the gross non-unit-related equipment and supplies required

to support the OPLAN. These calculations determine the nonunit movement requirements by using numbers of personnel, number and types of UTCs, Service planning factors, and planning guidance from the CINC's Strategic Concept and TPFDD LOI. These gross determinations for supplies are translated into weights and volumes and are added to the TPFDD as movement requirements.

b. Sustainment Generator in JFAST. The Sustainment Generator in JFAST allows a quick estimate of support when running deployment estimates in crisis action. Its major weakness is it does a per-person/per-day estimate rather than a unit consumption estimate of support.

c. Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). JEPES assists the planner in developing the Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP) appendix to an OPLAN. JEPES allows the planner to add, delete, modify, and analyze data in the JEPES database. JEPES data can be imported into the Logistics Sustainability Analysis and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) as part of the nonunit records of an OPLAN.

d. Medical Analysis Tool (MAT). MAT is a baseline GCCS application that supports both deliberate and crisis planning. The process considers the population at risk, length of stay in hospital facilities, and Service-developed frequency data for injury and death. The result is a planning tool to determine patient load, requirements for patient evacuations, and both Service and component medical planning requirements.

10. TRANSPORTATION PLANNING. This group includes applications used to analyze transportation feasibility and schedule movement requirements given movement assets.

a. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST). JFAST helps planners determine the transportation feasibility of an OPLAN or COA, makes closure estimates, helps planners determine optimum transportation modes, assesses attrition effects, identifies shortfalls, and determines gross lift capability. (Note: JFAST is used for JOPES but is part of GTN)

b. Global Transportation Network (GTN). Although unclassified, data on the GTN is used to feed JOPES on GCCS. Transportation movement information moves from the data base through the Transportation Coordinators Automated Information Management System (TC-AIMS-II) to the GTN; then to GCSS with an aim of giving a combat support element information feed to the Common Operational Picture (COP). GTN also helps in the effort to provide total asset visibility, an aim of Joint Vision 2020.

11. EXECUTION PLANNING TOOLS

a. Force Validation Tool (FVT). FVT allows planners at all levels to validate the accuracy of unit deployment requirements contained in crisis action plan TPFDDs before releasing the data to USTRANSCOM for lift allocation.

b. Scheduling and Movement (S&M). S&M allows planners to review, update, schedule, and create manifests of both Transportation Component Command (TCC) carriers and commercial U.S. carriers before and during deployment. It offers the capability to review and analyze an extensive variety of validated source requirements and scheduling and movement data.

12. REPORTING. This group of applications produces a variety of predefined or user-defined reports and displays.

a. Rapid Query Tool (RQT). RQT offers an efficient means to develop and save tailored queries to extract data from the JOPES core database.

b. JOPES System Information Trace (JSIT). JSIT furnishes a shortcut method for reviewing information in an OPLAN without having to launch any specific applications. It is a “read only” function.

13. JOPES FILES. The JOPES application programs accessed by the planner while building the TPFDD draw information from numerous data files. Standard reference files, several of which are listed in **Figures B-2 and B-3**, contain basic, relatively imperishable data required to build any TPFDD. Planning and execution files and support files also furnish data for manipulation by JOPES application programs. The user generates many of these through JOPES application programs. Most standard reference files are plan-independent; that is, the data they contain are not plan-specific, but are valid for generating any plan. TUCHA, GEOFILE, and CHSTR are examples of plan-independent files. Plan-unique files contain data valid only for a specific plan. Most plan-unique files are created by JOPES applications while building the TPFDD, and information is drawn from them by various JOPES applications to generate plan-specific TPFDD data. **Figure B-4** lists several examples of plan-unique files. The TPFDD itself is a plan-unique file.

JOPES ADP STANDARD REFERENCE FILES

APORTS	<i>Aerial Ports and Air Operating Bases File</i>	Airfield planning factors, e.g., throughput capacities for free-world air facilities, runway length & width, weight-bearing capacity, A/C parking space, fuel & cargo storage capacity, etc.
ASSETS	<i>Transportation Assets</i>	Time-phased availability of common-carrier air- & sealift Types and source of military and commercial transportation assets Created from data in JSCP
CHSTR	<i>Characteristics of Transportation Resources</i>	Standard planning factors for airlift available for deployment planning, e.g., utilization rate, passenger & cargo capacity, speed, range, load/off-load times, etc. Standard planning factors for sealift available for deployment planning, e.g., ship category capacity, average speed, load/off-load times, etc.
PORTS	<i>Port Characteristics</i>	Information on physical and operating characteristics of selected free-world ports, e.g., size, depth, number of berths, beach data, categories & capacities of cargo-handling & storage facilities
SDF	<i>Standard Distance File</i>	Distance between POE-POD pairs listing mode of transport, POE-POD, GEOLOC code, Suez/Panama Canal status, OPLAN identification, number of stops, computed distance
TUCHA	<i>Type Unit Data</i>	Movement characteristics for standard deployable units Force descriptions for nondeployable unit types
TUDET	<i>Type Unit Equipment Detail</i>	Descriptions & dimensions of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • specific pieces of wheel/track equipment for TUCHA file type units • all hazardous cargo • non-self-deployable aircraft • floating craft • items measuring more than 35'
LFF	<i>Logistics Factors File</i>	Standard logistics planning factors to compute resupply, determine ESI, and identify shortfalls
CEF	<i>Civil Engineering Files</i>	Description of deployable facility sets Operational capability of Service construction units Description of Service facility component systems
FM LIBRARY	<i>Force Module Library</i>	Collection of Service/joint force modules for C, CS, CSS forces plus 30 day's sustainment

Figure B-2

STANDARD REFERENCE FILES

GEOFILE	<i>Standard Geographic Locations</i>	Automated repository of the DOD for the registration of military locations, and worldwide geographic locations subject to reference during military planning and operations. Examples: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worldwide geographic locations and sites listed by country & states, installation types, and CINC AORs
GSORTS	<i>Status of Resources and Training System</i>	Report of unit readiness in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • authorized/actual personnel strength • percent of assigned equipment ready for operations

Figure B-3

PLAN-UNIQUE FILES

TPFDD	<i>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data File</i>	Description, routing, and aggregated cargo movement characteristics of forces defined for a specific OPLAN as well as the nonunit sustainment, i.e., supplies and cargo
SRF	<i>Summary Reference File</i>	Major repository for summarized or detailed information about specific records in the TPFDD file or other general information relating to the specific OPLAN, i.e., movement tables, cargo details for tailored and nonstandard units, etc.
PFF	<i>Planning Factors File</i>	Planning factors and parameters used in all phases of support planning, i.e., theater factors, lbs. of rations per person per day, etc.
PWF	<i>Personnel Working File</i>	Used in the support planning to designate origins and APOEs for replacement personnel as well as percentages to be routed from each ORIGIN or POE
FREF	<i>Force Record Extract File</i>	File created for LOGSAFE processing that contains cargo re-supply factors, i.e., attrition factors for equipment, based on threat level
POSF	<i>Ports of Support File</i>	Reference file to determine ports of support for the non-unit-related records
UCFF	<i>UTC Consumption Factors File</i>	Resupply consumption factors by UTC that are extracted from Logistics Factors File or introduced by the user, i.e., air defense ordnance used per day, etc.
MWF	<i>Medical Working File</i>	Population at risk records from OPLAN force list and planning factors entered by the medical planner, e.g., admission rates, evacuation policies, combat intensity, etc. (used in MEPES)

References: Applicable users' manuals

Figure B-4

14. APPLICATION OF ADP PLANNING TOOLS

a. Unit movement characteristics.

(1) Information on movement characteristics of a type (notional) unit is contained in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA). The acronym "TUCHA" comes from the previous name of the file, Type Unit Characteristics File. The TUCHA describes the capabilities of each type unit in narrative form and defines the unit in terms of total personnel; numbers requiring transportation; categories of cargo in the unit; weight of equipment and accompanying supplies; volume of equipment categorized as bulk, outsize, oversize, or non-air-transportable; and numbers and dimensions of individual units of equipment. The Services maintain the file and update it quarterly.

(2) Data in the TUCHA are accessed by using unit type codes (UTCs). These are five-element alphanumeric codes that identify units by common functional characteristics. Service planning documents and automated files list by type all units and show the number of each type available for planning.

(3) The unit identified by UTC in the TUCHA is a "notional" (generic), unit. As such, it is a representative unit with the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all the actual (real-world) units it represents. It is, for example, *an* infantry

battalion as opposed to, say, *the* 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry; or *a* CVN as opposed to, say, *the* USS *Nimitz*; or *an* F-15 fighter squadron as opposed to, say, *the* 94th Fighter Squadron.

b. Timing of movements. Before development of each force requirement is finished, the key dates for required movement must be determined and entered for each force record. Beginning with the CINC's RDD or CRD, the supported commander and subordinate planners calculate the EAD-LAD window at the POD or POS in addition to the EADs and LADs at intermediate locations. Services, supporting commander, and defense agency planners develop the RLDs and ALDs at the ORIGINS and POEs. Determination of these dates is not automated – the responsible planner must enter them.

c. Unique force record descriptions

(1) After the force list has been finished and assembled, each separate force record, or line entry, in it is assigned a plan-unique alphanumeric code called a force requirement number (FRN). When an FRN has been assigned to a unit in a plan, it generally is not changed in the course of the plan. The FRN is useful because it allows the planner to track a unit that may change sequence position in the TPFDD as the TPFDD is worked and refined. FRNs are two, three, four, or five alphanumeric characters that identify a single force requirement.

(2) Two additional characters, called fragmentation and insert codes, may be added to the FRN in positions 6 and 7. These two additional characters identify a force entry that requires more than one iteration of the FRN to satisfy the force requirement, such as three individual brigades to satisfy the requirement for a division, etc. The resulting identifier becomes the unit line number (ULN).

(3) JOPES and the JSCP both require that force planning be done using force modules. Generally, force modules are groupings of combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, with or without appropriate non-unit-related personnel and supplies. The elements of force modules are linked together or uniquely identified so that they can be tracked, extracted, or adjusted as an entity in the planning and execution databases. Force modules offer an efficient way to do force planning and build forces rapidly in the TPFDD. Each individual ULN is identified as being associated with one or more force modules. Each force module in a plan is identified by a three-character alphanumeric identifier called a force module identifier (FMI).

(4) To differentiate between CINC OPLAN TPFDD files and force modules in the JOPES database, the first characters of ULNs and FMIDs are assigned in JOPES Volume II. Whenever possible, the force module identifiers for a given TPFDD should be identical to the parent ULN for major combat forces.

B-12

d. The preceding descriptors are needed to explain force movements either in narrative form or computer jargon. The JOPES ADP programs use these terms to describe the CINC's concept of operations in the TPFDD. Three basic application programs assist the planner in the force build step.

e. The application program in JOPES/GCCS that deals specifically with force planning is the JOPES Editing Tool (JET). JET assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data. These data will be used later to determine the gross feasibility of transportation. ADP support is introduced here because it includes the manual procedures and a rational process for assembling the force list.

(1) JET, TPFDD Editor in JFAST, and JFRG-II allow planners to create, analyze and edit Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). JET supports force deployment planning during execution, and logistics planners and operators in deliberate and crisis action planning. These tools offer the capability to create and modify force and nonunit requirements associated with OPLANS. These applications allow manipulation of TPFDD data and create graphical displays to ease and compare transportation capabilities. They allow planners to analyze the force records; select, delete, or modify type units or force modules; modify the information that defines movements; modify narrative descriptions; split the movement of a force records into air and sea shipment; assign movement parameters to individual units or groups of force records; reorder the list of movements, using planner-selected descriptions; selectively create summaries of transportation requirements; identify for analysis a categorized listing of support forces; lay the groundwork to analyze the gross transportation feasibility of the force records; audit the file for format and content; and perform various administrative functions.

(2) Files. JET draws information from the following databases: TUCHA; descriptions and characteristics of major equipment or cargo categories listed in the major equipment file (MEF); standard worldwide geographic locations (GEOFILE); characteristics of transportation resources (CHSTR); the permanent databases used for reference, including standard distance files (SDF) and characteristics of airports (APORTS) and seaports (PORTS); transportation assets (ASSETS); and dimensions of equipment found in the type unit equipment detail file (TUDET). The planner creates the TPFDD and Summary Reference File (SRF) described in detail the CINC's concept of operations. The planner may also call for standard or ad hoc printed formats for use in analysis and to satisfy administrative requirements of the OPLAN.

f. Component planners use JOPES ADP force-building applications to compile a total component force list. Given the mission, the planner reviews the type combat forces apportioned in the task-assigning document and called for in the CINC's concept of operations, and determines applicable CS and CSS units from Service planning documents. The plan is built by selecting individual units by UTC or by selecting entire force modules; however, all force requirements are included in force modules.

(1) The merged collection of the components' force lists becomes the CINC's consolidated force list. The database is called the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file (TPFDD); various working papers can be printed that selectively display elements from the data file.

(2) The summary reference file (SRF) is created in the database along with the TPFDD. It includes administrative information on the plan identification number, date of the concept of operations, and number of records; force and nonunit record summaries describing numbers of unit and force records, fragmented forces, and aggregated cargo shipments; movement data for nonstandard units not included in the TUCHA; and descriptions of the planning factors and simulated environments used in the ADP support process.

(3) The components can use actual (real-world) forces, if they are known, to build their force lists. This obviously solves many problems early in planning by permitting actual data to be used in place of representative sizes, locations, etc. Some Services list actual units in Service planning documents; others, like the Navy, are unable to identify specific units very far in advance because of their mobility. Eventually, the type (notional) units will have to be replaced with more accurate information before the completion of plan development. In the case of the Navy, the geographic locations of both combat and support forces change drastically month to month, and most units are self-deploying. Type units are used for most Navy force requirements throughout the deliberate planning process.

(4) Supported commander's role. The supported commander participates fully in developing the component force lists. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and confidence that the forces in the force list will support the concept. The CINC's staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. This consolidated list is analyzed to confirm it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces from origin to destination, such as mode and source of transportation, POD, EAD-LAD, priority of off-load at POD, DEST, and RDD.

15. SUPPORT PLANNING. LOGSAFE and other support planning estimators allow planners to use data from a reference file to create an OPLAN-dependent ports of support file (POSF) categorized by Service, supply destination, air and sea transport, and munitions and POL; use data from a JOPES ADP reference file to create Planning Factor Files (PFFs) and UTC Consumption Factor Files (UCFFs) based on Service-developed logistics factors; and calculate the nonunit movement requirements. The planner can also selectively aggregate the data to reduce the number of nonunit cargo records using the

EAD-LAD window at each POS; phase the movement requirement for sustainment cargos to support the concept of operations; and efficiently use available lift, port, and materiel handling or transport facilities.

a. Planning parameters for the calculations are chosen from two sources: this involves the use of resupply consumption factors for unit type codes (UTCs) and the PFF includes a wide variety of planning factors that are used throughout the LOGSAFE process. Daily consumption rates for 43 subclasses of supply are computed by either pounds or gallons per UTC, or pounds or gallons per person per day. Fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and major end items are equipment-related supplies and are computed as a function of numbers of force records, for example, number of UTCs that describe 155mm artillery batteries. Other items of supply, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies, are better suited for planning factors listed in units of pounds per person per day. The Logistics Factors File (LFF), a JOPEs standard reference file, is the foundation for the UCFE and PFF. The LFF uses Service-developed consumption rates for UTCs, and origins for resupply. The LFF initializes the PFF, which the user can then update and modify with factors to describe more accurately the situation in the theater.

b. The planner has great flexibility in using planning factors in LOGSAFE. The planner can modify the following parameters:

- Size of the EAD-LAD window
- Beginning day of strategic resupply by sea
- Period of time for resupply by air of specified supply subclasses
- Up to ten origins for each supply class
- Buildup increments by supply class
- Rate of consumption by supply subclass modified by theater multiplier
- Average travel time from POD to DEST in each of up to 26 objective area countries
- Safety level of supplies in number of days to be maintained in-country
- Conversion of up to 35 subclasses of supply from weight to volume
- Identification of fuel types with up to 15 types for each fuel resupply category
- Percentage of attrition of supplies to combat loss for four periods
- 20 subclasses of supply specification of five combat intensity levels over four time periods.

16. TRANSPORTATION PLANNING. The purpose of the three steps of transportation planning is to determine the gross strategic transportation feasibility of the CINC's

OPLAN. The CINC compares each subordinate commander's transportation requirements and the total apportioned strategic transportation capabilities. A GTN application program called the Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (**JFAST**) simulates strategic movement.

a. Planners at the supported command run a computer simulation of air, land, and sea movements of the forces and their support requirements from ORIGIN to POE to POD. JFAST uses the transportation assets identified in the JSCP for the OPLAN to "move" the forces and supplies. JFAST incorporates all the factors that influence the movement of force and nonunit requirements and calculates computer-simulated feasible dates to arrive and be unloaded at the POD. The feasibility of the OPLAN is determined when the modeled dates are compared with the CINC's latest arrival dates (LADs). The simulated deployment movement of a requirement that results in an arrival on or before the LAD is considered by the CINC to be grossly transportation feasible.

b. JFAST is especially useful to planners not just because of its speed of analysis, but because it displays the results of that analysis graphically. This greatly enhances the planner's ability to assess the feasibility of the plan and identify transportation shortfalls. The user can modify lift allocation and port throughput capability within JFAST to aid in shortfall resolution. If resolution requires altering the phasing of resources, the TPFDD must be modified outside of JFAST and then brought back into JFAST for further transportation analysis.

17. PLANNING AND EXECUTION ADP SUPPORT SUMMARY. No matter what the command and control system is called, or whether there is a JOPES, there will always be enduring processes, things that must be done to command and control forces the ability to receive missions and tasks; gain and maintain enemy and friendly situational awareness; develop a concept of operations using the estimate process; then accomplish force, support, and transportation planning – and finally execution. This is joint force command and control, which must be supported by ADP systems. The actual applications will change and improve, but the process will remain.

Appendix C

Staff Work: Methods and Applications

1. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Every military organization has a commander who alone must accept responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. The commander must authorize all plans, policies, and basic decisions before they are put into effect. All orders from a higher command to a subordinate unit are issued by or for the commander of the parent unit and are given to the subordinate commanders. By this means, authority and responsibility are fixed and the channels of command are established.

b. It should be apparent, however, that the day-to-day operation of any organization involves hundreds of details. As the size of the organization increases, the number and variety of the details increase. The commander cannot devote personal attention to all of them. **A staff is an aid to command.** It serves to ease the commander's workload by furnishing basic information and technical advice by which he or she may arrive at decisions.

c. A properly functioning staff extends the eyes, ears, and will of a commander by

- **learning the commander's policies** and working within them;
- **keeping the commander informed** of pertinent information;
- **developing** basic decisions into **adequate plans**;
- **anticipating future needs** and **drafting tentative plans** to meet them;
- **translating plans into orders**, and transmitting them to subordinate commands;
- **ensuring compliance** with these orders through constructive inspection and observation; and
- **supplementing the commander's efforts** to **ensure unity of effort** throughout the command.

2. PROBLEM SOLVING

a. The responsibilities of the commander it serves determine the exact nature of the work done by a military staff. The staff of a joint task force commander assigned to assault an enemy beach faces problems significantly different from those of the staff of a unified commander charged with the peacetime military security of a broad area and protection of U.S. interests from attack.

b. No matter how significantly joint staffs vary, there are, nevertheless, common features. A military commander continually faces problems that involve uncertainties and alternative possibilities in their solution. Since the purpose of a staff is to assist the commander in the exercise of command, the work of the staff revolves around the solution of problems.

c. Problem solving, in any field of endeavor, can be reduced to five logical steps:

- **recognize** the problem
- **collect** necessary information
- **develop** possible solutions
- **analyze and compare** possible solutions
- **select** the best solution

d. Over the years, military staffs have developed a number of logical and orderly processes to assist them in problem solving. As shown elsewhere in this book, the joint planning process uses a variation of the basic problem-solving method.

3. THE ROLE OF THE STAFF ACTION OFFICER

a. A staff action officer is designated at the Joint Staff, a combatant command, a Service headquarters, or a command to work on a particular action or series of related actions. It is the responsibility of the action officer (AO) to develop, coordinate, and complete the required analysis; formulate recommendations; present the action for decision; and, ultimately, prepare a message or other correspondence implementing the recommendations. The responsibility continues during the internal routing of the implementing document and ends only when that document has been dispatched or when competent authority decides that further action is not required.

b. Pride of authorship is a curse. While the AO is responsible for “working the problem,” the final solution is derived from the knowledge, experience, study, and foresight of the entire staff. The AO should coordinate and consult by the quickest and most informal method available, using discussions, personal visits, e-mail, and telephone calls as much as possible. When practicable, such actions should be taken during draft stages to avoid revision of final copy.

- c. A good staff officer will stand up and be counted – on issues, not on trivial matters.
- d. Even when the problem has been carefully identified at the outset, the AO must be ever alert to changes and modifications as time passes.
- e. A good staff action officer continually cultivates close, informal contacts with a wide range of officers with similar or related areas of interest interdepartmentally and internationally. An AO solicits ideas from everywhere.
- f. The AO's Responsibilities in the Coordination Process
 - (1) Coordination gives interested and affected organizations an opportunity to contribute to and comment on joint actions. Early involvement of all concerned organizations is crucial.
 - (2) Preliminary coordination is normally sought at the AO level to gather input that strengthens the action and identifies issues. After preliminary coordination, the AO staffs the action again.
 - (3) Organizations that do not agree with an action as written may recommend changes to the text. The AO must indicate whether the changes were incorporated.
 - (4) Final coordination is a request for formal Service and agency concurrence or nonconcurrence on a proposed joint action. Requests for concurrence are sent to whom-ever in the receiving organization is the focal point for staffing final coordination, e.g. a division chief. Thus, during final coordination, the concurrence, nonconcurrence, or comments received on an action are considered to be the views of the head of the organization.
 - (5) Coordinating organizations are expected to concur or nonconcur in a timely manner. Nonconcurrence should be accompanied by specific objections and supporting rationales. Suggested changes to an action that do not form the basis for concurrence or nonconcurrence may be submitted; however, these recommendations should be clearly distinguished from issues on which nonconcurrence is based. Nonconcurrence requires the lead organization to evaluate the data and make a recommendation in consideration of the nonconcurrence.

4. MEETINGS

a. To have productive meetings, the AO must understand what goes into planning and conducting such meetings. The AO will prepare an agenda that is well organized, logical, and deals with the important issues in a timely manner, and does not get side-tracked.

b. The calling of a meeting in itself will not insure the development of a productive group. The following are steps in conducting effective meetings:

(1) Ensure that there is a comfortable and conducive physical setting for the meeting. If possible, arrange chairs so that people can see each other face to face.

(2) Prepare an agenda and stick to it. Deal with the most important things first. Get the agenda out as soon as possible. Under each agenda item indicate the specific questions to be discussed so that participants will have time to think about them beforehand.

(3) Start the meeting by clearly stating, and reaching agreement on the meeting purpose. Start out with a statement such as, "The purpose of this meeting is to..."

(4) Be well organized. Structure your meetings. Unstructured, free-for-all discussions are rarely productive. Use the first few minutes to review and finalize the agenda, and agree on how the group will accomplish its task. When members are directly involved in setting the agenda and rules on how the meeting is to be conducted, they tend to assume more responsibility for what happens.

(5) Be prepared. Identify and coordinate with all knowledgeable individuals beforehand. Gather all information, both pro and con, the group will need to consider in making a decision.

(6) Keep the discussion going by asking pertinent questions.

(7) Periodically summarize. Summarizing during the meetings clarifies for the group where it is and where it needs to go.

(8) End the meeting with a review of what was accomplished, and what still needs to be done or decided. Review what each person has agreed to do in carrying out the activity or in preparing for the next meeting.

(9) Keep in touch with members between meetings to get feedback as to progress being made.

5. MILITARY BRIEFINGS

a. The military briefing is concise, usually limited to bare, unglossed facts – the minimum needed for comprehension. There are no “attention-getters”; the essentials are delivered in a purely objective manner. The military briefing is often a one-time-only presentation of facts, with reference to enough familiar material to establish a basis for understanding by the listeners. Briefers often will be required to discuss a very broad subject in a very limited time.

b. There are four recognizable types of military briefings: information briefing, decision briefing, staff briefing, and mission briefing. Although there are elements common to all, each type is distinct, and the briefer must understand precisely what is required in each situation. Each type of briefing is designed to accomplish a specific purpose: to impart information, to obtain a decision, to exchange information, or to review important details. The objective common to every briefing is to facilitate a rapid, coordinated response.

(1) **The information briefing.** The purpose is to present facts to the listeners-- to keep them abreast of the current situation or to supply specific requested information. It does not require a decision; the desired response is comprehension.

(2) **The decision briefing.** This briefing contains the elements of the information briefing, but it is usually more comprehensive in scope, and it is presented for an entirely different purpose. The specific response to the decision briefing is an answer to a question or a decision about possible courses of action to be taken.

(3) **The staff briefing.** The staff briefing is, perhaps, the most widely used form of military briefing. It is designed for the rapid oral exchange of information within a group of people and is, in this sense, similar to the information briefing. It is also similar to the decision briefing whenever it leads to a command decision. It is known and used at every military echelon to keep a commander and staff mutually informed of the current situation. The anticipated response is a coordinated effort.

(4) **The mission briefing.** This briefing is designed especially for combat operations. It is also used to brief training missions that simulate combat conditions. Its purpose can be a combination of any or all of the following: to impart last-minute information, to give specific instructions, or to instill an appreciation of the overall mission. The desired response is a thorough and up-to-date understanding of operational conditions that could affect the successful execution of the mission. It, too, is closely related to the information briefing.

c. An AO must remember the five step process required in preparing a briefing; **research** your subject, **plan**, prepare a **draft**, **revise** your work, and finally **proofread**.

d. An AO must remember a couple of things while briefing.

(1) Be prepared psychologically and mentally to cope with any audience reaction, which can range from passive acceptance to strong objection and heated discussion. The AO must remain objective, answer questions without emotion, and promise and deliver, a quick response if additional information must be gathered.

(2) Successful briefing ability comes from mastery of fundamental speaking skills and briefing techniques, from practice and study, from good judgment, and from being aware of the audience's feedback.

6. STAFF ACTIONS: THE TOOLS OF THE TRADE. Action officers create staff action papers. The joint environment, whether it is at a combatant command or the Joint Staff, demands consistency and uniformity in written communications to be efficient. It is essential that AOs master whatever forms their command uses. Each form represents a preferred method that the organization uses to operate in the staff environment and is the vehicle by which most of the communication travels. Typical staff action papers are shown in the following paragraphs.

a. **INFORMATION PAPERS.** These papers normally are used to pass information to the boss (combatant commander, deputy combatant commander, and chief of staff of a combatant command), to pass information between staff offices when no reply is expected, and to issue directives from the boss to directors and chiefs of special staff offices.

(1) Fact Sheets convey information to an informed principal. They are used to update the combatant commander returning from trips, to furnish material for a Congressional hearing, to submit material for briefing books for a trip, or to answer a query. There is no established format; the only mandatory information is writer's name, rank, division, directorate, phone number, and date of presentation. They should be limited to one page and normally are used to provide a rapid update on a specific topic with which the user is familiar. Brevity is the keynote in preparation.

(2) Memorandums for Record are used to record an event or action taken that would not otherwise be recorded, and are normally limited to one page. For example, they may be used to record the minutes of a meeting, a telephone conversation, or information from a one-time source.

(3) Memorandums normally are limited to one page. When necessary, enclosures such as itineraries and schedules may be attached. Memorandums are often informal notes to individual staff members in the daily conduct of routine business.

b. **DISCUSSION OR POSITION PAPERS.** The purpose of these papers is to give the user a short outline guide for discussions during consultations, meetings, and command visits. They may contain substantiation of the command position, opposition to other command views, questions, or any other material that would be useful in discussions.

(1) On the **Joint Staff**, three types of papers are used. The **Position Paper** is used to summarize an issue, including its status and any recommendations. The paper is written in simple narrative style using direct, active voice sentences and is no more than two pages in length. Level of detail is determined by knowledge level of the intended user. A **Talking Paper** is prepared in “bullet” format and is intended to be used in oral discussions for an audience that is intimately familiar with the subject. An **Information Paper** is used to convey information in preparation for a meeting or briefing. Facts should be presented in clear, concise wording using “tick” and “bullet” format. For officers assigned to the Joint Staff, additional guidance is found in the Joint Staff Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.06M, *Action Processing*. Other joint staffs normally have their own staff guides for reference.

(2) **Point Papers** are often used to guide the user in discussions outside the command. They should not exceed two pages. An abbreviated sentence structure is desirable, but clarity must be maintained. Point papers are often compiled into books for use during trips, command visits, discussion with visitors, and conferences. Typical point paper format is shown below:

Outline:

- background - essential events or actions
- discussion - be brief, consider reader’s position, be specific
- important points - one page, may include enclosures, respond on time
- staff comment - you are the expert, be positive in tone, state critic’s position

(3) **Position Papers** present the command position on unresolved issues, with necessary background information to justify that position and to refute contrary views. They may include a talking paper as an enclosure, if a discussion is anticipated and it would assist the user in covering the subject.

Outline:

- **purpose** - reason for the paper, e.g., paper was requested by . . ., paper required for a meeting, etc.
- **discussion** - tailor to level of reader's knowledge, identify key points, avoid telegraphic messages and technical or military jargon, etc.
- **recommendation** - logical recommendation that flows from purpose and discussion

(4) **Discussion Papers** are often prepared for subjects on which discussion could be initiated, to obtain views or decisions, extend a commendation, emphasize a command position, or other appropriate reasons. A good discussion summary advises the CINC about the discussion objectives, subjects to avoid, and the recommended position to take.

(5) **Background Papers** give chronological background data, the current status, and actions to be accomplished for a particular problem or subject. Frequently they are used as backup and background material for members of the command group and staff at meetings and conferences, and during visits. If practical, they should be limited to one page. A condensed outline style, rather than complete sentences and paragraphs, should be used to achieve brevity and clarity. Additional details may be in enclosures or tabs to the basic paper.

c. **COORDINATION PAPERS.** These are used to coordinate routine actions within the staff.

(1) **Summary Sheets** are informal means of communicating with the various elements of the Joint Staff. Their format is self-explanatory. The Joint Staff uses Form 136, a specialized summary sheet indicating the level of staff and Service coordination that has taken place on the accompanying action paper.

(2) **Staff Summary Routing Sheets** are standard multipurpose forms that serve as referral slips, memorandums, summaries of action, and permanent records of the internal coordination on an action. Action papers are often forwarded under such sheets, as are copies of routine correspondence submitted for information.

d. **DECISION PAPERS.** These are papers used to present staff recommendations for decision and/or formal approval.

(1) **Summary Sheets** (generic) must include the substantive points necessary to reach a logical decision without excessive recourse to enclosures or the study they summarize. They must clearly state the problem or action requiring decision, the limitations that will affect the solution, the logical courses of action that could be followed, the effects of the various courses of action, and the recommended action to be taken.

(2) **Action Summaries** are memorandums, preferably no more than one single-spaced page, that accompany correspondence or messages to be signed or released. Summaries contain the problem, facts, discussion, and conclusions. A recommendation drawn from the attached correspondence or message is clearly stated as the last element of a summary.

e. **THE STAFF STUDY**

(1) The staff study is one of the more flexible problem-solving procedures available to a staff. Mainly used for administrative and managerial problems where operational considerations are not immediately involved, the staff study lists conclusions and recommendations on a specific, clearly stated problem. Many organizations use staff studies--some more than others. Their broad outline is illustrated in **Figure C-1**, where it is compared with the rational steps of the problem-solving process.

A Comparison:

Staff Study	Action Required
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Problem 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognize the problem
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assumptions • Facts bearing on the problem 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect necessary information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop possible solutions • Analyze and compare possible solutions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conclusions • Recommendations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Select the best solution

Figure C-1

(2) The staff study is a formal paper that follows a prescribed format. It is flexible in content and can be applied to a variety of problems. Although mainly confined to use within the staff, the staff study is not merely a dressed-up staff memorandum.

(3) The successive paragraphs of a staff study logically develop an analysis of a problem, leading to recommendations for its solution.

(a) **The problem.** Stating the problem concisely and accurately is one of the more difficult tasks in any problem-solving process. A correct statement is the foundation for all that follows. The problem may be stated as a question, a statement of need, or an infinitive phrase.

(b) **Assumptions** (Include this paragraph only when it is needed.)

(1) Assumptions are important, but they can be dangerous in military staff work. They constitute the reasonable suppositions that must be made to work out a problem logically. In effect, they are artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge. One should ensure that the assumptions are valid and necessary. The validity of a staff study is tied directly to the validity of the assumptions.

(2) Do not make assumptions that are essentially self-evident.

(c) **Facts bearing on the problem**

(1) A list of every fact related to the study is, in most cases, too lengthy and involved. Select those that need to be highlighted and list them in logical sequence (preferably the order in which they will be used in the discussion to follow).

(2) Facts also may be introduced in the discussion paragraph itself. Whether they are singled out for listing in this paragraph or introduced in the course of the discussion, they must be authenticated. Practice varies in this detail. The annexes are the appropriate place to expand on facts, if detailed explanations are necessary.

(d) **Discussion**

(1) The discussion is the heart of the staff study; it is where the problem is analyzed and the options are considered. One method is to describe the advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions, introducing facts and reasoning sequences as necessary. Another technique is to list criteria and test each possible solution against each criterion.

(2) If a full discussion requires more than two or three typed pages, include it as an annex. However, an annex should not be used merely to avoid the labor of making the discussion concise and logical. The purpose of a staff study is to save the commander's time by doing a careful job of writing; referring to a long, rambling discussion annex will not accomplish this purpose.

(e) **Conclusions**

(1) This paragraph is where the best solution to the problem is selected. The conclusions must follow logically from the discussion and should contain a brief restatement of the best solution.

(2) The writer must be careful not to include new material or new viewpoints in the conclusion paragraph.

(f) **Recommendations.** This paragraph explains how the conclusions can be implemented.

(1) If a letter, memorandum, or message is needed to implement the conclusions, it is customarily attached as enclosure "A." All that should remain for the commander to do is to approve and, if necessary, sign the enclosure.

(2) The basic question that must be answered is, "If the commander approves the recommendation, will the problem be solved?"

f. **LETTERS.** Frequently, a letter is the recommended action and is attached to a decision paper for approval, signature, and dispatch. Commands are free to choose the style of letter for their use.

g. **MESSAGES**

Reference: MIL STD 6040, *U.S. Message Text Formatting Program*

(1) Some actions may recommend dispatching a message. Messages may be transmitted electronically, or they may be sent by mail or courier, depending on requirements for speed of delivery and security. Precedence categories indicate the relative order in which a message is processed in the telecommunications system and the speed with which it must be handled during internal headquarters processing. The time objective established as a general guide is as follows:

Precedence	Code	Time Objective
Flash	ZZ	As fast as possible (less than 10 minutes)
Immediate	OO	30 minutes
Priority	PP	3 hours
Routine	RR	6 hours

(2) Whenever a message is prepared that includes the word "not" – where the accidental omission of the "not" would produce the opposite or other action than that desired – add the words, "repeat not," e.g., "Execution will not repeat not be made pending receipt of further orders."

(3) References should be listed in messages. All references should be briefly summarized in the first part of the message so that the message stands alone and can be completely understood without reading the other documents.

h. **ESTIMATES**

References: Joint Pub 3-0, Appendix B, FM 101-5

(1) Most discussions of the staff study imply that for every problem, there is a neat and tidy solution. Experienced action officers will suggest that, in reality, this simply not the case. The best staff studies may have to conclude that there is no feasible solution to the stated problem and that, at least for the time being, the best “course of action” is to do nothing. Normally, however, operational military situations do not permit doing nothing.

Although the commander often is faced with so many uncertainties and so wide a variety of alternative courses of action that the overall problem seems unsolvable, postponing decisions or deferring action until the situation clears is usually impossible. For better or for worse, the operational commander must have the best available estimate of how to proceed – and often must have it in a short time.

(2) A device that has evolved over years of military experience is the **estimate of the situation**. This is the operational counterpart to the staff study and, although it has several forms, there are two distinct categories:

(a) **the Commander’s Estimate (of the Situation)**

(b) **the Staff Estimate**

Staff Estimates are discussed with deliberate planning, Chapter 4; Commander’s Estimates are discussed in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, Chapters 4 and 5 of this book.

7. NONQUANTIFIABLE FACTORS IN STAFF WORK

a. Staff officers must remain objective in their work. It is easy to conduct a study to find the best solution when the “right answer” is known even before the study begins. Unfortunately, people are often blind to their own prejudices and parochialisms, so the obvious solution may be a poor one, indeed.

b. If experience is the best teacher, then experience must be considered an important resource that can be used to help solve problems. Experience is more than just knowing facts and figures. It includes that all-important human factor: a “feel for the problem.” Even though science cannot explain how the human-experience factor works, a planner should appreciate its value, actively seek out a source of experience, and consider (but not blindly follow) advice based on experience.

c. “Gut feeling” is not a formally recognized part of the problem-solving method, but it, too, can be helpful in staff work. Even when action officers have done their work according to the book, quantified the process, and come up with the optimal solution, an inside alarm can go off and say, “Wait a minute, something’s not quite right yet.” If that happens, the planner should review all the data one more time, see if all important factors have been identified and considered, and determine whether the recommended solution really makes sense. This “gut feeling” can be especially helpful if the planner has attempted to use a purely analytical method. Automated systems, used carefully and correctly, can be helpful in analyzing data, but they must not be allowed to make decisions. Human beings are responsible for their decisions; a computer is not.

d. Staff officers must look beyond all the traditional factors that may favor a particular course of action, and call the attention of the commander to several other considerations that cannot be quantified. This is true because, when the time comes for commanders to make final decisions on a piece of completed staff work, they must wrestle with these issues that are not easily measured or defined. They must consider the questions of law, morals, ethics, aesthetics, politics, culture, and history, any or all of which may play an important role in the final decision.

8. EFFECTIVENESS AS AN AO

a. The ability to express ones thoughts clearly, both orally and in writing, will most often determine the effectiveness as a staff officer. Many commanders have said during Staff College interviews that their action officers need to learn how to communicate more effectively. There are many fine Service publications, as well as civilian sources, available to assist you in improving in these areas. For instance, there is Army Pamphlet 600-67, *Effective Writing for Army Leaders, Guide to Naval Writing* by Robert Shenk (Naval Institute Press), Air Force Pamphlet 4-19 *Tongue and Quill*, or *Revising Business Prose* by Richard Lanham (Scribner’s) among many others. Use them! **Figure C-2** summarizes some key rules from the Army reference.

b. Effective speaking or writing does not mean using long, infrequently used words that require listeners or readers to break out their dictionaries; on the contrary, the most effective communication contains the everyday words that best express your meaning.

c. Your role as an effective action officer is to give senior officers accurate and adequate information to make a decision and to implement a plan or program. In effect, your job is to do the “leg work” so that the senior officer can merely approve or “sign off” on the project.

Style Rules

**Put the recommendation, conclusion, or reason
for writing in the first or second sentence**

Use the active voice

Use short sentences (15 words or less)

Use short words (three syllables or fewer)

Write paragraphs no more than 1 inch deep

Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation

Use “I,” “you,” and “we” as subjects of sentences

Reference: Department of Army Pamphlet 600-67

Figure C-2

Appendix D

Principles of War

References: Joint Pub 1 and Joint Pub 3-0

1. The principles of war represent fundamental truths in the practice of military art that have stood the test of time. Students who have reviewed and researched warfare over the years still have not reached consensus on a single list of principles of war; but they all will attest that such principles are a good starting point for evaluating military strategy and tactics, and these principles form the foundation for the application of operation planning.
2. In-depth discussions of our current principles of war can be found in joint and Service publications. Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, discusses the principles of war and their application in joint warfare. Army Field Manual No. 100-1, *The Army*, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*, Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force*, and Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 6-4, *Marine Rifle Company/Platoon*, all contain extensive discussions of the principles of war. Excellent articles about the principles of war can be found in *Military Review* (May 1955 and September 1981) and *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 1986). **Figure D-1** lists the principles of war adopted by five different countries to facilitate comparisons and contrasts.
3. The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Several principles can be involved in any particular application concerned. The following lists the purposes of each:
 - **Objective:** To direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
 - **Offensive:** To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
 - **Mass:** To concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.
 - **Economy of Force:** To allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
 - **Maneuver:** To place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

D-2

- **Unity of Command:** To ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
- **Security:** To never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.
- **Surprise:** To strike the enemy at a time or place or Ina manner for which it is unprepared.
- **Simplicity:** To prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN AUSTRALIA	FORMER SOVIET UNION "Principles of Military Art"	FRANCE	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Objective	Selection & Maintenance of Aim			Selection & Maintenance of Aim
Offensive	Offensive Action			Offensive Action
Mass	Concentration of Force	Massing & Correlation of Forces	Concentration of Effort	Concentration of Force
Economy of Force	Economy of Force	Economy, Sufficiency of Force		
Maneuver	Flexibility	Initiative		Initiative & Flexibility
Unity of Command	Cooperation			Coordination
Security	Security			Security
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise
Simplicity				
	Maintenance of Morale	Mobility & Tempo, Simultaneous Attack on All Levels, Preservation of Combat Effectiveness, Interworking & Coordination	Liberty of Action	Morale, Mobility, Political Mobilization, Freedom of Action

Adapted from JT Pub 1, FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4
Military Review, May 1955, and Soviet Battlefield Development Plan

Figure D-1

Appendix E

The Military in Operations Other than War (MOOTW)

Reference: Joint Pub 3-0

1. GENERAL

Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. These operations are often conducted outside the United States and they include military support to U.S. civil authorities. Military operations other than war involve the traditional military elements such as air, land, sea, space and special operations forces as well as other governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

a. Many U.S. Government agencies other than DOD can be involved in operations other than war, including the Department of State; Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Justice; Department of Transportation; the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

b. The American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund are examples of nongovernmental organizations. Examples of international organizations are the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN High Commissioner for refugees. Military planners should establish contacts with these agencies to ensure success.

2. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MOOTW

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level, from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out.

First, all military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW –, for example, peacekeeping –, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant political implications.

Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious, but it is imperative that they be recognized, because failure to do so early on may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations. **(Joint Pub 3-07, Chapter I, para. 3)**

3. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. The military must work together with other agencies of the U.S. Government as well as other nations' governments. Consensus building is essential to understanding each other's capabilities, limitations as well as constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. It is essential to establish an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between all agencies involved in order to accomplish a specific mission.

b. Command and Control. Each operation other than war can be unique. There is no single C2 structure that works best. JFCs should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements.

c. Intelligence and Information Gathering. Force Protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. In some MOOTW (such as peacekeeping), the term information gathering is used rather than the term intelligence because of the sensitivity of the operation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. JFC commanders may face numerous restrictions associated with ROE. As a consequence, legal rights, ROE, and funding of the MOOTW should be considered by the combatant commander's staff.

e. Training and education. The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to conduct MOOTW with very little notice. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency operations should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from other U.S. Government agencies, and nongovernmental and international organizations should be invited to participate in these programs.

f. **Post Conflict Operations.** Planning for post conflict operations should begin as early as possible. As combat operations are nearing termination, military forces should prepare to transition to operations other than war. Typical post conflict activities include: Transition to Civil Authorities, Support Truce Negotiations, SOF Activities (civil affairs), Public Affairs Operations, and Redeployment.

TYPES OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

- **Arms Control**
- **Combating Terrorism**
- **Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations**
- **Nation Assistance**
- **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**
- **Civil Support Operations**
- **Peace Operations**
- **Support to Insurgencies**

g. **Arms Control.** The main purpose of arms control is to enhance national security. U.S. military personnel may be involved in an arms control treaty, or escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets.

h. **Combating Terrorism.** These measures are both offensive (counterterrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the United States, while the latter may occur anywhere in the world.

i. **DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations.** The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is issued by the President pursuant to the antidrug plans and programs of the Department of Defense. The plans and programs activities include detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; support for interdiction; support to drug enforcement agencies; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; research and development; and C4I support.

j. **Nation Assistance.** The main objective of nation assistance is to assist a host nation with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the people. The primary means of providing nation assistance is through Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense.

E-4

k. Security Assistance refers to a group of programs that provides defense articles and services, including training, to foreign countries that further U.S. national security objectives.

l. Foreign Internal Defense supports a host nation's fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.

m. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The purpose of a NEO is to safely and quickly remove civilian noncombatants from an area outside the United States where they are, or may be, threatened.

n. Other Civil Support Operations. These operations encompass worldwide humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities and military assistance for civil disturbances.

o. Peace Operations. This term encompasses three general areas: diplomatic (peacemaking), traditional peacekeeping (noncombat military operations) and forceful military actions (peace enforcement).

p. Support to Insurgencies. U.S. support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "U.S. Intelligence Activities," and is subject to approval by the U.S. Congress.

4. INTERAGENCY

Reference: Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vols. I and II.

The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Military Operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO), and regional and international organizations. These actions must be mutually supported and proceed in a logical sequence. The common thread throughout all major operations, is the broad range of agencies that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.

5. FOREIGN OPERATIONS

The Department of State advises and assists the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. Coordination between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies may occur in a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General may be involved.

a. The combatant commander's regional focus is mirrored at the Department Of State in its regional bureaus. Similarly, many other USG agencies are regionally organized. Within individual countries, the Ambassador and country team are the focal point.

b. The chief of mission (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority over all elements of the U.S. Government in country, except forces assigned to a combatant command. Other key USG organizations in place within most nations include the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the Security assistance Officer (SAO) both part of the country team. In some countries these two functions may be performed by one military office. The Ambassador is the senior representative of the President in foreign nations and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the foreign country.

c. The country team is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. **(Joint Pub 1-02)**

d. The Defense Attaché is normally the senior military service attaché assigned to the embassy. While keeping the combatant commander informed of their activities, the attaché is rated and funded by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

e. The Security Assistance Officer (SAO) reports to the U.S. Ambassador but is rated by the combatant commander and funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Security Assistance is made up of a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related articles by grant, loan, credit or cash sales to further national policies and objectives. **(Joint Pub 1-02)**

f. During a foreign disaster, when crisis action planning becomes necessary, the geographic combatant commander (or Political Advisor {POLAD}) communicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s) as part of crisis assessment. Because there are few opera-

tional-level counterparts to the combatant commander within other agencies, establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination is appropriate and is necessary precondition to effective coordinated operations.

Early on, an assessment must be made of what resources are required immediately to stabilize the humanitarian crisis (e.g. “stop the dying”), the capability of the organizations already operating in the crisis area to meet those needs, and the shortfall that the military force must provide until the humanitarian relief organizations can marshal their resources. A Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) can accomplish this function. A HAST can facilitate multiagency inclusion, acquire necessary information about the operational area, plan the operation, assess existing conditions, available infrastructure and the capabilities and size of the force required for the mission.

6. NONGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations (NGO and PVO) do not operate within either the military or the governmental hierarchy. Therefore, the relationships between the Armed Forces and NGO’s and PVO’s is neither supported nor supporting. An associate or partnership relationship may accurately describe that which exists between military forces and engaged NGO’s and PVO’s. If formed, the focal point where U.S. military forces provide coordinated support to NGO’s and PVO’s would be the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).

7. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in many respects, may include support to civil authorities (MSCA), which provides DOD support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies that result from natural or man-made causes, or military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA).

Crisis response to natural disasters and civil defense needs inside the United States are implemented through the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP applies to natural disasters such as earthquakes, forest fires, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. Following a request for assistance from the Governor of the affected state or territory, the President implements the FRP by declaring a domestic disaster. With this presidential declaration, the resources of the Federal Government, through the interagency process – can be focused on restoring normalcy.

The Secretary of the Army is the DOD Executive Agent for the execution and management of military support to civil authorities in domestic operations.

8. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56: MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

PDD 56 is an unclassified document that explains the key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations. This document is promulgated for use by government officials as a handy reference for interagency planning of future complex contingency operations.

PDD 56 defines "complex contingency operations" as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia and the foreign humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort; and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in Central Africa and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh. This PDD does not apply to domestic disaster relief or small scale operations, nor military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict.

While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts.

PDD 56 calls for all U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. The PDD's intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations.

9. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

References: Joint Pub 2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 6-0, INSS, *Coalition Command and Control*, NDU press, 1994

U.S. military operations are often conducted with Armed Forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition:

a. Alliance. The result of formal agreements (i.e. treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example.

b. Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. The coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members. The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other than U.S. leadership.

10. CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	
NATIONAL GOALS	CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Reach agreement on common goals and objectives to bind multinational forces.	Employ linguistics and area experts to assist with cultural and language challenges.
UNITY OF EFFORT	MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES
Multinational objectives must be supported by each member nation.	Support forces of member nations with national assets or through the coalition.
DOCTRINE, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT	NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Improve other national forces through training, assistance, and sharing of resources.	Have direct and immediate communications capability to respective leaderships.

National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives.

Unity of Effort. Motivation of member nations may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, and supported by each member nation.

Doctrine, Training, and Equipment. The doctrine, operational competence as well as types and quality of equipment can vary substantially among the military forces of member nations. The JFC should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces through training assistance and sharing of resources consistent with U.S. and alliance or coalition terms of reference.

Cultural Differences. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of language, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue.

Management of Resources. Forces of member nations must be supported by either national or coalition assets. Resource contributions will vary between members.

National Communications. JFCs should anticipate that some national forces will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective political leadership. These communications can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leadership external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed forces.

11. CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. **Rules of engagement.** JFC's should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

b. **The Media.** JFCs should seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations, consistent with operational security requirements. This task is complicated in a multinational situation where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements.

c. **Local Law Enforcement.** U.S. forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations.

d. **Command and Control.** Multinational Force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decision making in multinational organizations. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require willingness to compromise in order to achieve the common objectives.

e. **Intelligence.** The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge. Alliance or coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. JFCs need to determine

what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process.

f. Logistics. Multinational logistics is a major challenge. Multinational forces will have different logistics doctrine, stockage levels, logistics mobility assets, and interoperability issues. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities, rail lines, ports and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistics coordination and support multinational operations.

g. Protection measures. JFCs must consider the same protection measures that apply to joint operations during multinational operations. JFCs must consider, air defense, defensive air, counterair, reconnaissance and surveillance and security measures for the multinational force.

12. PEACE OPERATIONS

References: JP 3-07.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations)

Legal Basis. The UN Security Council is vested with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapters VI, and VII, of the charter are the vehicles used to achieve this purpose. Chapter VI addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace through conciliation, mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy. Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council with a wide range of enforcement actions – from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force by the air, sea, and land forces of member nations.

13. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) take place under different circumstances characterized by three critical factors: consent, impartiality, and use of force. Commanders who are aware of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation.

Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation. These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation.

Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim. This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties. During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties-employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. Parties may believe that the PO force favors the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. But impartiality does not imply that a PO will affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict. This standard does not preclude the use of force in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for self-defense. In the latter, force is used to compel or coerce compliance with established rules. Moreover the central goal of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission. In some mandates, impartiality may not be desired because the scope of UN Charter Chapter VII is so broad.

PKO and PEO are distinct operations, the dividing line being determined by the variables of consent, impartiality, the use of force, and the decisions by the NCA. The existence of a cease-fire to the conflict among the parties and a demonstrated willingness to negotiate on their part are indicators of the presence of consent. Other variables are more clearly within the control of outside actors. Gray areas can develop in the environment in which these operations take place. Such operations foist on commanders and policymakers the potential for uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity, which requires extremely close political-military communication.

Appendix F

Professional Reading List

As a framework for expanding your professional knowledge in this area, the following professional reading list on classic military thought is recommended. For a more complete list, see the bibliographies listed in many of the following publications and in professional military journals. For a list of professional readings recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*. For the study of military classic literature, see the historical bibliography #8 compiled by Dr. Robert H. Berlin of the Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6800. For the study of the "Great Captains," see special bibliography #279 compiled by Air University Bibliography Branch, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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Appendix G

Glossary of Terms and Definitions

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following lists acronyms or abbreviations frequently used in joint/combined operation planning. Acronyms and abbreviations should be avoided if practical. However, if a long title or term must be used repeatedly, the acronym or abbreviation may be employed provided the first time it is used the long title is spelled out fully along with its related acronym or abbreviation.

A

AAFCE	Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (NATO)
AAR	after action report
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACCHAN	Allied Command Channel (NATO)
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD	advanced deployability posture
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADP	automatic data processing
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFNORTHWEST	Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (NATO)
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AHQ	ad hoc query
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
ALCON	all concerned
ALD	available-to-load date at POE
AMC	Air Mobility Command/Army Materiel Command
AMHS	Automated Message Handling Service
ANMCC	Alternate National Military Command Center
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
APA	Army Pre-positioned Afloat

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APF	afloat pre-positioning force (NTPF + MPS)
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
APORTS	Aerial Ports and Air Operating Bases File
APS	Army and Air Force Afloat Pre-positioning Ships
ARCENT	U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARRDATE	arrival date
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service
ASAP	as soon as possible
ASSETS	Transportation Assets File
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AWRPS	Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets

B

BBLS/CBBLS	barrels/hundreds of barrels
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
BY	Budget Year in FYDP

C

C2W	command and control warfare
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CAP	Crisis Action Procedures
CAT	crisis action team
CB	chemical, biological
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CEF	Civil Engineering File
CENTAF	U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Central Command
CENTAG	Central Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)
CEP	circular error probable
CESP	Civil Engineering Support Plan
CESPG	Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator
CFC	Combined Forces Command (Republic of Korea-U.S.)
CG	Chairman's Guidance
CHOP	change of operational command
CHSTR	Characteristics of Transportation Resource File
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency

CIN	cargo increment number
CINC	commander in chief (of unified or specified command)
CIO	Central Imagery Office
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
CM	Chairman's Memorandum
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command
COI	communications operating instructions
COM	chief of mission
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	Continental United States
COS	Critical Occupational Specialties or Chief of Staff
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendations
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRD	CINC's Required Date
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Report
CRS	Chairman's Readiness System or Current Readiness System
CS	combat support
CSA	Combat Support Agency
CSPA	CINC's Strategic Priorities Assessment
CSPAR	CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report
CSS	combat service support
CTAPS	Contingency Tactical Air Planning System
CY	Current Year in FYDP
CW	chemical warfare

D

DAB	Defense Acquisition Board
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DC	Deputies Committee
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DCS	Defense Communications System

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DDN	Defense Data Network
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEST	destination
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DJSM	Director, Joint Staff, Memorandum
DJTAC	deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DODIC	DOD Identification Code
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DOS	Department of State or days of supply
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPC	Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPP	deliberate planning process
DPRB	Defense Planning Resources Board
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications Systems
DSSO	Defense Systems Support Organization
DTG	date-time group
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DUSD(R)	Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness

E

E&E	escape and evasion
EAD	earliest arrival date at POD
ECCM	electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EDC	estimated date of completion of loading (at POE)
EDD	estimated departure date or earliest delivery date
EDP	emergency defense plan
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EI	essential elements of information
EIC	Equipment Identification Code
ELINT	electronic intelligence
EMCON	emission control

EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ETA	estimated time of arrival
EVAC	Evacuation System
EW	electronic warfare

F

FAD	feasible arrival date or force activity designator
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FAPES	Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System
FDO	flexible deterrent option
FDR	foreign disaster relief
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIC	Force Indicator Code
FIDP	Foreign Internal Defense Plan
FM	Field Manual or Force Module
FMFM	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMI	force module identifier
FML	Force Module Library
FMP	force module packages
FMS	Force Module Subsystem or Foreign Military Sales
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FRAG/FRAGO	Fragmentary Order or Fragmentation Code
FREF	Force Record Extract File
FRG	Force Requirements Generator
FRN	force requirement number
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
FTS	File Transfer Service
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Plan

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEOFILE	Standard Specified Geographic Location File
GEOLOC	Standard Specific Geolocation Code
GEOREF	Geographic Reference System Report
GENSER	general service (message)
GHATN	Global Humanitarian Assistance Transportation Network
GRIS	GCCS Reconnaissance Information System
GSA	General Services Administration
GSORTS	Global Status of Resources and Training

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GTN Global Transportation Network

H

HAC House Appropriations Committee
HASC House Armed Services Committee
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence

I

ID increased deployability posture
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMINT imagery intelligence
IMRAS Individual Manpower Requirements and Availability System
INCNR increment number
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IPL Integrated Priority List
IPS Integrated Program Summary or Illustrative Planning Scenario
IPSS Initial Pre-planned Supply Support
IRC Internet Relay Chatter
IRM Information Resource Manager
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITV in-transit visibility
IW information warfare
IWG Interagency Working Group

J

JAARS Joint After-Action Reporting System
JAO joint area of operations
JCC Joint Coordination Center
JCGRO Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCLL Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JCSM Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL Joint Duty Assignment List

JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JEL	Joint Electronic Library
JEPES	Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC	joint force commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JMCIS	Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JNOCC	JOPEs Network Operations Control Center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPEsREP	JOPEs Reporting System
JPAO	Joint Public Affairs Office
JPD	Joint Planning Document
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JPOC	Joint Psychological Operations Center
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRIS	Joint Reconnaissance Information System
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JSO NOM	Joint Specialty Officer Nominee
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTF	joint task force
JTO	JOPEs Training Organization
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center

L

LAD	latest arrival date at POD
LAN	local area network
LAT	latitude
LD	loaded deployability posture
LFF	Logistic Factors File
LOC	line of communications
LOGSAFE	Logistics Sustainability Analysis and Feasibility Estimator
LOI	letter of instruction
LONG	longitude
LMRS	Large Medium-speed Roll-on/roll-off Ships

M

MAAG	military assistance advisory group
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPP	Modern Aids to Planning Program
MAPS	Mobility Analysis & Planning System (MTMC)
MARFOR	Marine Forces
MASINT	measures and signals intelligence
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MBPO	Military Blood Program Office
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MCCP	Marine Corps Capabilities Plan
MCM	Memorandum issued in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
MD	marshalled deployability posture
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEF	Major Equipment File or Marine Expeditionary Force
MEPES	Medical Planning and Execution System
MEU (SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MHE	materials handling equipment
MIA	missing in action
MIJI	meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion
MILCON	military construction
MILGP	military group
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MNC	Major NATO Command
MNS	Mission Need Statement
MODE	transportation mode

MODEM	modulator-demodulator
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOG	maximum on ground
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOP	Memorandum of Policy (CJCS)
MPF	Maritime Pre-positioning Force
MPM	Medical Planning Module
MPS	maritime pre-positioning ships
MRG	Movement Requirements Generator
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MSC	Military Sealift Command; or Major Subordinate Command (NATO)
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTON or M/T	measurement ton
MTW	major theater of war
MWF	Medical Working File
 N	
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NAOC	National Airborne Operations Center
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR	naval forces
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCMP	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
NCS	National Communications System
ND	normal deployment posture
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	National Military Strategy
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOP	nuclear operations
NOPLAN	no plan available or prepared
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)
NPG	Nonunit Personnel Generator
NRC	non-unit-related cargo
NRP	non-unit-related personnel
NS	nonstandard

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NSA	National Security Agency or National Security Act
NSC	National Security Council
NSDAB	non-self-deployable aircraft and boats
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSN	national stock number
NSP	Navy Support Plan
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NSWTU	Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
NTPF	Near Term Pre-positioned Force
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
NWRS	Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study
NWS	National Weather Service

O

O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMO	other military operations
OOTW	operations other than war
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OPORD	operation order
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP	commander's operational report (JRS)
OPREP-1	message format used for OPORD (JRS)
OPREP-3	message format used for event/incident report (JRS)
OPSEC	operations security
OPSG	Operation Plans Steering Group
ORG	origin
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUT	outside cargo
OVR	oversize cargo

P

PAO	Public Affairs Office
PAR	Population at risk
PARMIS	Pacific Command Reconnaissance Mission Information System
PAX	passengers
PB	President's Budget
PBD	Program Budget Decision

PC	Principals Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PE	peace enforcement
PFF	Planning Factors File
PIC	Parent Indicator Code
PID	plan identification number
PIN	personnel increment number
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PO	peace operations
POC	point of contact
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political adviser
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POMCUS	pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (JOPES), or pre-positioned overseas materiel, configured to unit sets (DOD), or pre-positioned organizational materiel, configured to unit sets (USA)
PORTS	Port Characteristics File
POS	ports of support or peacetime operating stocks
POSF	Ports of Support File
POW/PW	prisoner of war
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
PRG	Program Review Group
PRI	priority
PROVORG	providing organization
PSC	Principal Subordinate Command (NATO)
PSRC	Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up
PSYOP	psychological operations
PWF	Personnel Working File
PWRMR	pre-positioned war reserve materiel requirement
PWRMS	pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks
PWRS	pre-positioned war reserve stocks
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization

Q

?QRF	quick response force
QTY	quantity

R

R&D	Research and Development
RAP	Remedial Action Program
RC	Reserve component
RDA	Requirements Development and Analysis System
RDD	required delivery date (at DEST)
RDF	rapid deployment force
RDT&E	research, development, test, and evaluation
REDCON	readiness condition
RLD	ready-to-load date at origin
ROE	rules of engagement
RO/RO	roll-on/roll-off
RRF	Ready Reserve Force

S

S&M	Scheduling and Movement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAG	Surface Action Group
SAR	search and rescue
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDDM	Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
SDF	Standard Distance File
SEAL	sea-air-land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense (<u>address</u> element only)
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SERV	service
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SITREP	situation report
SITSUM	Situation Summary
SLOC	sea line of communications
SM	System Monitor
SNL	standard nomenclature list
SO	special operations
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standing operating procedure
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SOUTHAF	U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Southern Command
SPECAT	special category messages
SPIREP	Spot Intelligence Report

SPMAGTF	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
SRF	Summary Reference File or Secure Reserve Force
SRIG	Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group
SROC	Senior Readiness Oversight Council
SSC	small-scale contingency
STANAG	Standardization Agreement (NATO)
STON or S/T or ST	short ton
SVC	service

T

TACON	Tactical Control
TADIL	Tactical Digital Information Link
TARGET	Theater Analysis and Replanning Graphical Execution Toolkit
TC-AIMS	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TCP	Traditional CINC Programs
TELNET	telecommunications network
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TIP	Technology Insertion Project
TO	table of organization
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TSP	Time-Sensitive Planning
TUCHA	Type Unit Characteristics File
TUDET	Type Unit Equipment Detail File

U

UCFF	UTC Consumption Factors File
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UIC	unit identification code
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
ULC	unit level code
ULN	unit line number
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Pub 0-2)
UNC	United Nations Command (Korea)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USCINCJF	Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
USCINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
USCINCSPACE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
USCINCSTRAT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
USERID	user identification
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
UW	unconventional warfare

V

VEH	vehicular cargo
VIP	visual information projection or very important person
VTC	video teleconference

W

WIA	wounded in action
WMP	War and Mobilization Plan (USAF)
WRM	war reserve materiel (USAF)

DEFINITIONS

Refer to the Joint Forces Staff College homepage, www.jfsc.edu, for a comprehensive consolidated glossary of terms (from Joint, Service, CJCS, and other references) typically used in joint, multinational, and interagency planning.

acceptability. (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. See also adequacy; completeness; feasibility; suitability.

accompanying supplies. (DOD) Unit supplies that deploy with forces. **(JP 1-02)**

adaptive planning. The concept that calls for development of a range of options, encompassing the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military), during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. These options are referred to as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO). (adapted from the National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan)

adequacy. (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. See also acceptability; completeness; feasibility; suitability. **(JP 1-02)**

administrative control (ADCON). (DOD) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. **(JP 1-02)**

aerial port. (DOD) An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, and to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country in which located. **(JP 1-02)**

afloat pre-positioning force (APF). (DOD) Shipping maintained in full operational status to afloat pre-position military equipment and supplies in support of combatant commanders' operation plans. The afloat pre-positioning force consists of the three maritime pre-positioning ships squadrons and the afloat pre-positioning ships. **(JP 1-02)**

afloat pre-positioning ships (APS). (DOD) Forward deployed merchant ships loaded with tactical equipment and supplies to support the initial deployment of military forces. **(JP 1-02)**

air expeditionary force (AEF). (DOD) Deployed U.S. Air Force wings, groups, and squadrons committed to a joint operation. **(JP 1-02)**

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airhead. (DOD, NATO) 1. A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. 2. A designated location in an area of operations used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. See also beachhead. **(JP 1-02)**

air superiority. **(JP 1-02, NATO)** That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

air supremacy. **(JP 1-02, NATO)** That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

air tasking order (ATO). (DOD) A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. **(JP 1-02)**

alert order. (DOD) 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. **(JP 1-02)**

alliance. (DOD) These are formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. See also coalition. **(JP 1-02)**

allocated forces. (DOD) These are forces and resources provided by the NCA for execution, planning, or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning. In actual implementation, allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred or attached to the receiving combatant command. See also assigned forces; apportioned forces. **(JP 5-0)**

allocation. (DOD) This is the distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. See also apportionment. **(JP 1-02)**

amphibious objective area (AOA). (DOD) A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. **(JP 1-02)**

apportioned forces. (DOD) These are forces and resources that are assumed to be available for deliberate planning as of a specified date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for execution planning. Also see allocated forces; assigned forces. **(JP 5-0)**

apportionment. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP) The designation of forces and resources to a CINC for deliberate planning. (DOD) It also is the distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionment (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) is described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. Also see allocation. **(JP 1-02)**

appropriation act. An act of Congress that permits federal agencies to incur obligations and make payments out of the treasury for a specified period of time and purpose. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

area of influence. **(JP 1-02, NATO)** A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of controlling operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command and control.

area of interest (AOI). (DOD) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. **(JP 1-02)**

area of operations. (DOD) An area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces which do not typically encompass the entire joint operational area, but are large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. See also area of responsibility. **(JP 1-02)**

area of responsibility (AOR). (DOD) 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. **(JP 1-02)**

arranging operations. (DOD) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of major operations. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential op-

erations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space. Phasing, branches, and sequels are all subsets of “arranging operations.” (JP 3-0)

assembly area. (DOD, NATO) 1. An area in which command units are brought together preparatory to further action. 2. In a supply installation, the gross area used for collecting and combining components into complete units, kits, or assemblies. (JP 1-02)

assign. (DOD, NATO) 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attached forces. (JP 1-02)

assigned forces. (DOD) These are forces and resources placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. Forces and resources assigned are available for normal peacetime operations. Also see apportioned forces; allocated forces. (JP 5-0)

assumption. (DOD) A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 1-02)

attach. (DOD) 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02)

augmentation forces. (DOD) Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities. (JP 1-02)

availability. (DOD) Availability shown in the apportionment tables is based on a unit's capability to start and sustain movement from its normal geographic location (installation or mobilization station). Forward-deployed (in-place) forces are assumed to be available immediately for employment or repositioning. Forces are listed with availability as it pertains to notification day for Active forces, and PSRC and partial mobilization for Reserve forces. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

available-to-load date (ALD). (DOD) A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data, that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation. (JP 1-02)

basic load. (DOD, NATO) The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and which can be moved by, a unit or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation and maintained at the prescribed levels.

battle damage assessment (BDA). (DOD) The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. (DOD) The environment, factors, and conditions, which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. See also joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. (JP 1-02)

beachhead. (DOD) A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

branch plan. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP) A plan that stems from the base case plan and is only executed subsequent to certain trigger events or decisions. A branch plan is not necessarily executed just because the base plan is executed; however, the likelihood of the trigger events occurring is high enough, or the consequences of not being prepared for its possibility are so severe, that the branch warrants deliberate planning

breakbulk cargo. Any commodity that, because of its weight, dimensions, or incompatibility with other cargo, must be shipped by mode other than MILVAN or SEAVAN. (AR 55-9/NAVSUPINST 4600.79/AFR 75-10/MCO 4610.31)

budget authority. Authority conferred by law to enter into obligations, that is, appropriations, authority to borrow, or contract authority, that will result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

budget estimates submission. Service and DOD agency budget estimates based on approved programs in the Program Decision Memorandums and the most recent fiscal and monetary guidelines and assumptions. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

bulk cargo. (DOD) That which is generally shipped in volume where the transportation conveyance is the only external container; such as liquids, ore, or grain. **(JP 1-02)**

campaign. (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. **(JP 1-02)**

campaign plan. **(JP 1-02)** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

campaign planning. (DOD) The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign. **(JP 1-02)**

cargo increment number (CIN). A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit cargo entry in a TPFDD. The first two characters identify the Service and the type of cargo; the last five are the CIN assignment. (adapted from JOPES User's Manual)

centers of gravity. (DOD) Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. **(JP 1-02)**

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). (DOD) The CPA contains the Chairman's alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for Secretary of Defense considerations in refining the defense program and budget. These adjustments are intended to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more adequately reflect strategic and CINC priorities. (CJCSI 3137.01/JWCA)

Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). (DOD) The CPR provides the Chairman's personal recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration in the Defense Planning Guidance. The recommendations represent the Chairman's view of programs important for creating or enhancing joint warfighting capabilities. (CJCSI 3137.01/JWCA)

Chairman's Readiness System or Current Readiness System (CRS). (DOD) The system, which provides CJCS the information necessary to fulfill his requirements as established in title 10, United States Code. This comprehensive system provides uniform policy and procedures for reporting the ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to fight and to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. (CJCS Guide 3401A/CRS)

CINC's required date (CRD). (DOD) The original date relative to C-day, specified by the combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. (JP 1-02)

CINC's Strategic Concept (CSC). (DOD) Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasking. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called "the concept of operations." (JP 1-02)

civil affairs (CA). (DOD) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil engineering support plan (CESP). (DOD) An appendix to the Logistics annex or separate annex of an operation plan that identifies the minimum essential engineering services and construction requirements required to support the commitment of military forces. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center (CMOC). (DOD) An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02)

civil reserve air fleet (CRAF). (DOD) A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a U.S. entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense (DOD). These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as Long-Range International (cargo and passenger), Short-Range International, Domestic, Alaskan, Aeromedical, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) can be incrementally activated by the Department of Defense in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft are under the mission control of the Department of Defense while remaining a civil resource under the operational control of the responsible U.S. entity or citizen.

a. CRAF Stage I. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements. The Commander, Air Mobility Command, may authorize activation of this stage and assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage I.

b. CRAF Stage II. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that the air carriers will furnish to Department of Defense in a time of defense airlift emergency. The Secretary of Defense, or designee, may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage II.

c. CRAF Stage III. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources owned by a U.S. entity or citizen that the air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense in a time of declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense. The aircraft in this stage are allocated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage III. (JP 1-02)

classes of supply. (FM 101-5-1) The grouping of supplies by type into 10 categories to facilitate supply management and planning.

<u>Supply Class</u>	<u>Definition/Examples</u>
I.	Subsistence items (meals ready to eat (MRE), T-rations, and fresh fruits and vegetables) and gratuitous-issue health and comfort items.
II.	Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, maps, and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.

- III. Petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal.
- IV. Construction materials including installed equipment, and all fortification and obstacle materials.
- V. Ammunition of all types including chemical, bombs, explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items.
- VI. Personal demand items such as health and hygiene products, writing material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, and cameras (nonmilitary items).
- VII. Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.
- VIII. Medical material, including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment and management of blood.
- IX. Repair parts and components, to include kits, assemblies, and subassemblies (repairable or nonrepairable), that are required for maintenance support of all equipment.
- X. Material required to support nonmilitary programs, such as agricultural and economic development projects (not included in classes I through IX).
- MISC. Water, captured enemy material, salvage material.

closure. (DOD) In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (JP 1-02)

closure shortfall. (DOD) The specified movement requirement or portion thereof that did not meet scheduling criteria and/or movement dates. (JP 1-02)

coalition. (DOD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance; multination. (JP 1-02)

coalition force. (DOD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. **(JP 1-02)**

combat power. (JP 1-02, NATO) The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

combat service support. (DOD) The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. **(JP 1-02)**

combat support. (DOD, NATO) Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. **(JP 1-02)**

combatant command. (DOD) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. **(JP 1-02)**

combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). (DOD) Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces, as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). **(JP 1-02)**

combatant commander. (DOD) A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. **(JP 1-02)**

combating terrorism. (DOD) Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02)

combined. (DOD, NATO) Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) See also joint. (JP 1-02)

combined operations. (DOD) An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (JP 1-02)

command and control (C²). (DOD) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

command and control system. (DOD) The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

command and control warfare (C²W). (DOD) The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information warfare in military operations and is a subset of information warfare. Command and control warfare applies across the range of military operations and all levels of conflict. C²W is both offensive and defensive:

a. C²-attack. Prevent effective C² of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C² system.

b. C²-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C² system. See also command and control; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations. (JP 1-02)

command, control, communications, and computer systems (C⁴ systems). (DOD) Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). (DOD) A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. **(JP 1-02)**

commander's estimate of the situation. (DOD) A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. **(JP 1-02)**

commander's intent. (DOD) Commander's personal expression of why an operation is being conducted and what he hopes to achieve. It is a clear and concise statement of a mission's overall purpose, acceptable risk, and resulting end state (with respect to the relationship of the force, the enemy, and the terrain). **(FM 101-5-1)**

commander's strategic concept. (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. **(JP 1-02)**

common servicing. (DOD) That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving support. **(JP 1-02)**

common supplies. (DOD) Those supplies common to two or more Services. **(JP 1-02)**

common-user lift. (DOD) U.S. Transportation Command-controlled lift: The pool of strategic transportation assets either government owned or chartered that are under the operational control of Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, or Military Traffic Management Command for the purpose of providing common-user transportation to the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. These assets range from common-user organic or chartered pool of common-user assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from other sources. **(JP 1-02)**

completeness. (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination that each course of action must be complete and answer the questions: who, what, when, where, and how. See also acceptability; completeness; feasibility; suitability. **(JP 1-02)**

component. (DOD) 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. (JP 1-02)

concept of logistic support. (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations (commander's concept). (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. (JP 1-02)

contingency. (DOD) An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. See also contingency planning. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. (DOD) A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). (DOD) A document issued annually by the Secretary of Defense. The CPG contains SECDEF guidance on developing theater engagement plans, to include prioritized regional objectives. The CPG also contains guidance with regard to contingency planning. The content of the CPG is reflected in the JSCP, issued annually, or as requested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with specific tasking to the CINCs, Executive Agents, Services, and Defense agencies for accomplishing the direction contained in the CPG. (CJCSM 3113.01/TEP)

control. (JV 2010) Inherent in the exercise of command; regulates forces and functions to execute the commander's intent; allows staffs to assist commanders; allows commanders to delegate authority, and synchronize actions throughout the battlespace.

coordinating authority. (DOD) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

Country Team. (DOD) The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of mission. (JP 1-02)

course of action (COA). (DOD) 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this database will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. (JP 1-02)

crisis. (DOD) An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or national security interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning (CAP). (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

critical events. (DRAFT CJCSM 3500.05A/JTF HQ MTG) Critical events are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (e.g., the series of component tasks to be performed on D-day). This may be expanded to review component tasks over a phase of an operation (e.g., lodgment phase) or over a period of time (C-day through D-day).

critical item. (DOD) An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short supply for an extended period. **(JP 1-02)**

critical joint duty assignment billet. (DOD) A joint duty assignment position for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, it is highly important that the assigned officer is particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. Critical billets are selected by heads of joint organizations, approved by the Secretary of Defense and documented in the Joint Duty Assignment List. **(JP 1-02)**

cross-servicing. (DOD) That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. **(JP 1-02)**

debarkation. (DOD) The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft. **(JP 1-02)**

decision. (DOD) In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission. **(JP 1-02)**

decision point (DP). (DOD) A point identified in time or space where the commander must make a decision to ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources. A decision point is not a decisive point (which is linked to attacking the enemy's center of gravity). (CJCSM 3500.05A/JTF HQ MTG)

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). (DOD) This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. **(JP 1-02)**

deliberate planning. (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. **(JP 1-02)**

demonstration. (DOD, NATO) 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought and made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. (DOD) 2. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended.

(JP 1-02)

deploy decisive force. (DOD) Response to a threat after receipt of unambiguous warning. Includes rapid deployment of a war-winning force to the threatened region. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

deployability posture. (DOD) The state or stage of a unit's preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows:

a. normal deployability posture. The unit is conducting normal activities. Commanders are monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions are being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation are available.

b. increased deployability posture. The unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel are recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as required, to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Pre-deployment personnel actions are completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at continental United States (CONUS) or overseas installations are identified.

c. advanced deployability posture. All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies are checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. The unit remains at home station. Movement requirements are confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra-CONUS transportation resources are identified, and initial movement schedules are completed by the Transportation Component Commands.

d. marshaled deployability posture. The first increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies is marshaled at designated ports of embarkation but not loaded. Sufficient aircraft or sealift assets are positioned at, or en route to, the port of embarkation, either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting airlift control elements (ALCE), stage crews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations will be positioned, as required.

e. loaded deployability posture. All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies are loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to the designated objective area. Personnel are prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel are en route or available to meet projected ship-loading schedules. Sufficient airlift is positioned and loaded at the port of embarkation to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support per-

sonnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations are positioned, as required. (JP 1-02)

Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). (DOD) An organization may provide the planning expertise and continuity from the commander in chief's planning team to jump-start the JTF planning process. These organizations typically include two separate groups: an operational planning team (OPT) to assist in joint planning, and a joint training team (JTT) to assist and act as a focal point for training the JTF staff. (JP 5-00.2)

deployment. (DOD) 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. See also deployment order; deployment preparation order. (JP 1-02)

deployment database. (DOD) The JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) database containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The database reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. See also time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

deployment estimate. (DOD) A report providing a consolidated (land, air, and sea) closure estimate (time required for all ULNs, CINs, and PINs of a TPFDD to arrive at the PODs expressed in C-days, from the time of notification to closure) for each COA. It also identifies significant transportation limitations, if applicable (late closures, maximum port workloads, insufficient strategic lift), and other deployment difficulties (e.g., insufficient or inaccurate movement data, unsourced units, incomplete data, etc.). (CJCSM 3122.01/JOPES Vol. I)

deployment order. (DOD) A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. (JP 1-02)

deployment preparation order. (DOD) An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). See also deployment; deployment planning; deployment preparation order. (JP 1-02)

destination (DEST). (DOD) The terminal geographic location in the routing scheme for forces only. (Resupply and replacement personnel are routed to a port of support.) The destination identifies the station or location in the objective area where the unit will be employed. For some units, the destination may be the same as their POD. (JOPES User's Manual)

destroyed. (JP 1-02) A condition of a target so damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition

deterrence. (JP 1-02) The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction

direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). (DOD) That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. **(JP 1-02)**

direct support. (JP 1-02) A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance

directive authority for logistics. A CINC's authority to issue directives, including peacetime measures, to subordinate commanders necessary to ensure effective execution of operations, economy of operation, and prevention of unnecessary duplication by the component commands. **(JP 4-0)**

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). (DOD) United States Agency for International Development's (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of U.S. Government response to disasters. **(JP 1-02)**

doctrine. (DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. **(JP 1-02)**

dominant user concept. (DOD) The concept that the Service which is the principal consumer will have the responsibility for performance of a support workload for all using Services.

dual apportionment. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP) A condition that exists when forces, equipment, or lift assets appear in two MTW plans that could be executed nearly simultaneously.

earliest arrival date (EAD). (DOD) A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival data, it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. See also latest arrival date. **(JP 1-02)**

effective U.S. control (EUSC). (DOD) Merchant ships, majority owned by U.S. citizens or corporations that are operated under Liberian, Panamanian, Honduran, Bahamian, and Marshall Islands registries. These ships are considered requisitionable assets available to the U.S. Government in time of national emergency and therefore under the effective control of the U.S. Government. **(JP 1-02)**

electronic warfare (EW). (DOD) Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

embarkation. (DOD, NATO) The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. **(JP 1-02)**

Emergency Action Plan (EAP). (DOD) Reference materials maintained by U.S. Embassies that support the formulation of a NEO operation plan. One section addresses the military-assisted evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. Included are possible courses of action for different threat environments, location of evacuation sites, location of assembly areas and major supply routes, key personnel, and amount of Class I on hand. **(JP 3-07.5)**

employment. (DOD) The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. **(JP 1-02)**

employment planning. (DOD) Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Combatant commanders through their component commanders develop employment-planning concepts. See also employment. **(JP 1-02)**

end state. (DOD) What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude--both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. See also National Command Authorities. **(JP 1-02)**

enemy capabilities. (DOD) Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities” are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

engagement. (DOD) All military activities involving other nations intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP, CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS, CJCSM 3113.01/TEP)

essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). (DOD) Key questions likely to be asked by enemy and its intelligence systems about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness.

essential elements of information (EEI). (DOD) The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision (JP 1-02)

essential task. (DOD) Tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to the success of a mission. (CJCSI 3500.01B/JTP & CJCSM 3500.04B/UJTL)

evacuation policy. (DOD) 1. Command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and destinations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. (JP 1-02)

execute order. (DOD) 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 1-02)

execution planning. (DOD) The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. **(JP 1-02)**

executive agent (EA). (DOD) A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. Such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. **(JP 1-02)**

feasibility. (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. See also acceptability; adequacy; completeness; suitability. **(JP 1-02)**

fire support coordination line. **(JP 1-02)** A line established by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander to ensure coordination of fire not under the commander's control but which may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL without prior coordination with the land or amphibious force commander provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.

flexible deterrent option (FDO). (DOD) A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures) are implemented into the planning process. **(JP 1-02)**

flexible response. **(JP 1-02)** The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing.

force closure. (DOD) The point in time when a supported commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned area of operations to carry out assigned tasks. (JP 1-02)

force entry operations. The aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combinations thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations to an objective area. Force entry into an objective area may be opposed or unopposed. (JP 5-00.1)

force list. (DOD) A total list of forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and other forces to be employed in support of the plan. (JP 1-02)

force module (FM). (DOD) A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. (JP 1-02)

force module package (FMP). (DOD) A force module with a specific functional orientation (e.g. air superiority, close air support, reconnaissance, ground defense) that includes combat, associated combat support, and combat service support forces. Additionally, force module packages will contain sustainment in accordance with logistic policy contained in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Annex B. See also force module. (JP 1-02)

force projection. (DOD) The ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (JP 1-02)

force protection. (DOD) Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

force record. A description of a TPFDD unit composed of three parts:

- a. force requirement **routing data** composed of force description information, such as FRN, UTC, unit level code (ULC), personnel strength, ILOC, POD, DEST, load configuration, movement dates, and preferred mode and source of transportation

- b. force unit **identification** incorporating UIC, unit name, ORIGIN, RLD, POE, ALD, and preferred transportation mode
- c. force movement **characteristics**, including passengers and cargo of a type unit defined by TUCHA file data for that standard UTC. It is part of the ULN. (adapted from **JP 1-03.16**)

force requirement number (FRN). (DOD) An alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify force entries in a given operation plan time-phased force and deployment data. (**JP 1-02**)

force shortfall. (DOD) A deficiency in the number of types of units available for planning within the time required for the performance of an assigned task. (**JP 1-02**)

force sourcing. (DOD) The identification of the actual units, their origins, ports of embarkation, and movement characteristics to satisfy the time-phased force requirements of a supported commander. (**JP 1-02**)

forcible entry. Seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (**JP 5-00.1**)

foreign internal defense (FID). (DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (**JP 1-02**)

fragmentary order. (DOD) An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (**JP 1-02**)

functional component command. (DOD) A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. See also component; Service component command. (**JP 1-02**)

functional plan (FUNCPLAN). (DOD) Plan involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (**JP 1-02**)

Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). (DOD) The official document and database that summarizes forces and resources associated with DOD programs. The FYDP is updated and published at least three times during an annual Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) cycle to coincide with submission of the Services' and Defense Agencies' Program Objective Memorandum (POM), DOD's Budget Estimate Submission (BES), and the President's Budget (PB). (CJCSI 8501.01/PBBS)

Global Command and Control System (GCCS). (DOD) Highly mobile, deployable command and control system supporting forces for joint and multinational operations across the range of military operations, any time and anywhere in the world with compatible, interoperable, and integrated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems. (JP 1-02)

Global Patient Movement Requirements Center. (DOD) A joint activity reporting directly to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, the Department of Defense single manager for the regulation of movement of uniformed services patients. The Global Patient Movement Requirements Center authorizes transfers to medical treatment facilities of the Military Departments or the Department of Veterans Affairs and coordinates intertheater and inside continental United States patient movement requirements with the appropriate transportation component commands of U.S. Transportation Command. See also medical treatment facility. (JP 1-02)

global transportation network (GTN). (DOD) The automated support necessary to enable USTRANSCOM and its components to provide global transportation management. The global transportation network provides the integrated transportation data and systems necessary to accomplish global transportation planning, command and control, and in-transit visibility across the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

governing factors. (DOD) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art), other critical factors (for example, political constraints), and mission accomplishment. (JP 3-0) [The planner will note that certain features begin to appear dominant as the wargaming and analysis continue. Some of these factors will clearly favor friendly forces while others will favor the enemy. These dominant considerations are known as governing factors. The J-5 and the CINC use them to focus the evaluation of friendly COAs.]

gross transportation feasibility. (DOD) A determination made by the supported commander that a draft operation plan can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. This determination is made by using a transportation feasibility estimator to simulate movement of personnel and cargo from port of embarkation to port of debarkation within a specified time frame. (JP 1-02)

hostile act. (DOD) A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel and vital U.S. Government property. When a hostile act is in progress, the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. (CJCSI 3121.01/Standing ROE)

hostile intent. (DOD) Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property. When hostile intent is present the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. (CJCSI 3121.01/Standing ROE)

host-nation support. (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (**JP 1-02**)

humanitarian and civic assistance. (DOD) Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, U.S. Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (**JP 1-02**)

implementation. (DOD) Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities. (**JP 1-02**)

implementation planning. (DOD) Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to the combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of operation plans and operation orders to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions. See also joint operation planning. (**JP 1-02**)

implied task. (DOD) A task that is not stated but necessary to do the mission. (CJCSI 3500.01B/JTP)

indications and warning (I&W). (DOD) Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied/coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied/coalition nations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. **(JP 1-02)**

indicator. (DOD, NATO) In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. See also Times. **(JP 1-02)**

information operations (IO). (DOD) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. **(JP 1-02)**

information requirements. (DOD, NATO) Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. See also priority intelligence requirements. **(JP 1-02)**

information warfare (IW). **(JP 1-02)** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.. See also crisis; information; information operations; operation

in-place force. (DOD) 1. A NATO assigned force which, in peacetime, is principally stationed in the designated combat zone of the NATO command to which it is committed. 2. Force within a combatant commander's area of responsibility and under the combatant commander's combatant command (command authority). **(JP 1-02)**

integrated priority list (IPL). (DOD) A list of a combatant commander's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander's recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. **(JP 1-02)**

integrated TPFDD. (DOD) Two separate but related supported CINC TPFDDs, analyzed as a combined product, with the intent of deconflicting requirements, attaining greater refinement, and increasing efficiencies. An integrated TPFDD permits assessment of

force closure and transportation feasibility. Integrated TPFDDs are used for the first and second MTW plans from different theaters. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

intelligence estimate. (DOD, NATO) The appraisal expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. (DOD) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

interagency operations. (DOD) Operations in which government or nongovernment agencies interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. These agencies may include the National Security Council, headquarters of operating elements of the Department of State and Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Adjutants General of the 50 states and four territories; and other U.S. government agencies; agencies of partner nations; nongovernmental organizations; regional and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations; and the agencies of the host country. (CJCSI 3500.01B/JTP & CJCSM 3500.04B/UJTL)

intermodal systems. (DOD) Specialized transportation facilities, assets, and handling procedures designed to create a seamless transportation system by combining multimodal operations and facilities during the shipment of cargo. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development (IDAD). (DOD) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 1-02)

international logistics. (DOD) The negotiating, planning, and implementation of supporting logistics arrangements between nations, their forces, and agencies. It includes furnishing logistic support (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logistic support from, one or more friendly foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces, with or without reimbursement. It also includes planning and actions related to the intermeshing of a significant element, activity, or component of the military logistics systems or procedures of the United States with those of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces on a temporary or permanent basis. It includes planning and actions related to the utilization of United States logistics policies, systems, and/or procedures to meet requirements of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or forces. (JP 1-02)

international logistic support. (DOD) The provision of military logistic support by one participating nation to one or more participating nations, either with or without reimbursement. See also inter-Service support. **(JP 1-02)**

inter-Service support. (DOD) Action by one Military Service or element thereof to provide logistic and/or administrative support to another Military Service or element thereof. Such action can be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. **(JP 1-02)**

intertheater. Between theaters or between the continental United States and theaters. **(JP 1-02)**

intratheater. Within a theater. **(JP 1-02)**

joint. (DOD) Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS). (DOD) The formal process for the collection and dissemination of observations, lessons learned, and issues generated from joint operations and exercises. (CJCSI 3150.25/JAARS)

joint doctrine. (DOD) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. **(JP 1-02)**

joint duty assignment (JDA). (DOD) An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified or specified command. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). (DOD) Positions designated as joint duty assignments are reflected in a list approved by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by the Joint Staff. The Joint Duty Assignment List is reflected in the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System. **(JP 1-02)**

joint flow and analysis system for transportation (JFAST). Application software designed to furnish a quick-response capability to determine the transportation feasibility of a concept. JFAST accesses the TPFDD to perform closure estimates, determine optimum mode, assess the effects of attrition, identify shortfalls in movement capability versus required capability, and determine gross lift capability. JFAST replaces the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE).

joint force. (DOD) A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. **(JP 1-02)**

joint force air component commander (JFACC). (DOD) The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. See also joint force commander. **(JP 1-02)**

joint force commander (JFC). (DOD) A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. See also joint force. **(JP 1-02)**

joint force land component commander (JFLCC). (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. **(JP 1-02)**

joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. **(JP 1-02)**

joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities.

(JP 1-02)

Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). (DOD) A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by a joint force commander, and maintained by a joint task force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander's objectives and guidance. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB). (DOD) The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. (JP 1-02)

joint logistics. (DOD) The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Services of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

joint mission essential task (JMET). (DOD) A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of a task. Force providers will also select additional tasks in accordance with their joint training mission for assigned combatant headquarters and forces and deemed essential to the mission of the combatant headquarters and forces. (CJCSI 3500.01B/JTP & CJCSM 3500.04B/UJTL)

Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). (DOD) The JMRR provides the CJCS a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to fight, across all three levels of war [*Strategic, Operational and Tactical*]. (CJCS Guide 3401A/CRS)

joint movement center. (DOD) The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned area of responsibility, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. **(JP 1-02)**

joint operation planning. (DOD) Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. See also contingency plan; execution planning; implementation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; joint operation planning process. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). (DOD) A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. See also joint operation planning. **(JP 1-02)**

joint operation planning process. (DOD) A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. See also joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. **(JP 1-02)**

joint operations. (DOD) A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. **(JP 1-02)**

joint operations area (JOA). (DOD) An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. **(JP 1-02)**

joint planning and execution community (JPEC). (DOD) Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. **(JP 1-02)**

joint planning document (JPD). (DOD) The JPD represents the earliest formal, authoritative planning and broad programming advice from the Chairman to the SECDEF. OSD begins the process of developing the initial draft of the Defense Planning guidance (DPG). The JPD articulates the Chairman's strategy-based planning, broad programming direction, and priorities while taking into account coordinated inputs from the Services and CINCs. (CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS)

joint planning group (JPG). (DOD) A joint force planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander (JFC). Joint planning group membership should be designated spokespersons for their respective sections or organizations. Responsibilities and authority of the joint planning group are assigned by the JFC. Normally headed by the joint force chief planner, joint planning group responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, crisis action planning (to include course of action development and refinement), coordination of joint force operation order development, and planning for future operations (e.g., transition, termination, follow-on). **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). (DOD) That portion of professional military education concentrating on the instruction of joint matters. (CJCSI 3500.01B/JTP, CJCSM 3500.03/JTM, CJCSM 3500.04B/UJT)

joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF). (DOD) A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. The joint psychological operation task force assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and

tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. The joint psychological operations task force may have conventional or special operations psychological units assigned or attached to support the joint task force commander. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Reception Center (JRC). (DOD) The center established upon direction of the joint force commander, with responsibility for the reception, accountability, training, processing, of military and civilian individual augmentees upon their arrival in the joint operational area. Also the center where augmentees will normally be outprocessed through upon departure from the joint operational area. **(JP 1-02)**

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). (DOD) A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. **(JP 4-01.8)**

Joint Requirements Board (JRB). (DOD) Is the council of one- and two-star officers who consider and prepare issues for JROC consideration. (CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS)

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). (DOD) An advisory council to the CJCS to provide assistance in: identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements and acquisition programs to meet the national military strategy, considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements, and assigning joint priority among existing and future major programs meeting valid requirements identified by the combatant commands, Services, and other DOD agencies. (CJCSI 3137.01/JWCA)

joint servicing. That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in support of two or more military Services. **(JP 1-02)**

joint special operations area (JSOA). (DOD) A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)/joint specialist. (DOD) An officer on the active duty list who is particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Specialty Officer nominee. (DOD) An officer who has completed a program of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), or an officer who has a critical occupational specialty tour. In either instance, the Military Department concerned has designated the officer as a Joint Specialty Officer nominee. **(JP 1-02)**

joint special operations task force (JSOTF). A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. **(JP 1-02)**

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. Joint Staff. The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman, and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). (DOD) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish task and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The primary means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in giving strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and gives net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. **(JP 1-02)**

Joint Strategy Review (JSR). (DOD) The JSR provides the primary means for the Chairman, in consultation with the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies, to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. This analysis provides a basis for changes to the Joint Vision and National Military Strategy. (CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be published by CJCS, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. (JP 1-02)

joint task force (JTF). (DOD) A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint theater missile defense (JTMD). (DOD) The integration of joint force capabilities to destroy enemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence measures. Enemy theater missiles are those that are aimed at targets outside the continental United States. (JP 1-02)

Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). (DOD) A software package designed to create, modify, and display observations, lessons learned, and issues from joint exercises and operations. (CJCSI 3150.25/JAARS)

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA). (DOD) Continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, and others as required. JWCA products and recommendations are used to assist the Chairman in the development of the CPR and CPA. (CJCSI 3137.01/JWCA)

JOPEs ADP. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) standard computer-based system consisting of standard data files, standard ADP programs, and instructions for the reporting and exchange of data used to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans.

key terrain. (JP 1-02, NATO) Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.

latest arrival date (LAD). (DOD) A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. See also earliest arrival date. (JP 1-02)

lead agency. (DOD) Designated among U.S. Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. **(JP 1-02)**

lead nation. (DOD) One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. **(JP 1-02)**

level of detail. (DOD) Within the current joint planning and execution systems, movement characteristics are described at five distinct levels of detail. These levels are:

a. level I. aggregated level. Expressed as total number of passengers and total short tons, total measurement tons, total square feet and/or total hundreds of barrels by unit line number (ULN), cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN).

b. level II. summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of bulk, oversize, outsize, and non-air-transportable cargo by ULN and CIN.

c. level III. detail by cargo category. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, and/or measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of cargo as identified by the ULN or CIN three-position cargo category code.

d. level IV. detail expressed as number of passengers and individual dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of cargo by equipment type by ULN.

e. level V. detail by priority of shipment. Expressed as total number of passengers by Service specialty code in deployment sequence by ULN individual weight (in pounds) and dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of equipment in deployment sequence by ULN. **(JP 1-02)**

lift. (DOD - CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

a. Strategic lift. Air, land, and sea transport assets designated for deploying forces and cargo between theaters of operations or between CONUS and theaters of operations.

b. Theater lift. Air, land, and sea transport assets normally assigned to a theater CINC for moving forces and cargo within a theater of operations.

c. Organic lift. Lift used by aircraft owned by the Department of Defense.

limiting factor. (DOD) A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, poorly positioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

(JP 1-02)

lines of communications. All the routes—land, water, and air—that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. **(JP 4-0)**

lodgment. (DOD) A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, will ensure the continuous landing of troops and material and provide maneuver space for subsequent operations. **(JP 3-33)**

logistic assessment. (DOD, NATO) An evaluation of the following:

- a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area.
- b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. **(JP 1-02)**

logistics. (DOD) The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;
 - b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;
 - c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
- and
- d. acquisition or furnishing of services. **(JP 1-02)**

logistics-over-the-shore operations (LOTS). (DOD) The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or undefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. **(JP 1-02)**

logistics sourcing. (DOD) The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistics requirements. **(JP 1-02)**

logistic support. (DOD) Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. **(JP 1-02)**

logistics sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator (LOGSAFE). Application software that gives the JPEC the capability to estimate logistics sustainment requirements and evaluate materiel supportability for deliberate planning and COAs. LOGSAFE replaces the Movement Requirements Generator (MRG).

major combat element. (DOD) Those organizations and units described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that directly produce combat capability. The size of the element varies by Service, force capability, and the total number of such elements available. Examples are Army divisions and separate brigades, Air Force squadrons, Navy task forces, and Marine expeditionary forces. See also major force. **(JP 1-02)**

major defense program or major force program. A category of program elements that represents a major force, mission, or support function, e.g., strategic forces, intelligence and communications, research and development, supply and maintenance, etc. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

major fleet. (DOD) A principal, permanent subdivision of the operating forces of the Navy with certain supporting shore activities. Presently there are two such fleets: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. **(JP 1-02)**

major force. (DOD) A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated combat support, combat service support, and sustainment increments. The major force is capable of sustained military operations in response to plan employment requirements. See also major combat element. **(JP 1-02)**

Major Theater War (MTW). (DOD) A regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interests in a region that warrants the deployment of forces greater than division-wing-battle group combinations. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

manifest. (DOD) A document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination. **(JP 1-02)**

maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS). (DOD) Civilian-crewed, Military Sealift Command-chartered ships which are organized into three squadrons and are usually forward-deployed. These ships are loaded with pre-positioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support three Marine expeditionary brigades. **(JP 1-02)**

master force list (MFL). (DOD) A file which contains the current status of each requirement for a given operation plan. The master force list is made available for file transfer service (FTS) transfer to other Global Command and Control System activities from a file produced from the joint deployment system database. **(JP 1-02)**

materiel. (DOD) All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. **(JP 1-02)**

materiel planning. (DOD) A subset of logistic planning and consists of a four-step process:

a. requirements definition. Requirements for significant items must be calculated at item level detail (i.e., national stock number) to support sustainability planning and analysis. Requirements include unit roundout, consumption and attrition replacement, safety stock, and the needs of allies.

b. apportionment. Items are apportioned to the combatant commanders based on a global scenario to avoid sourcing of items to multiple theaters. The basis for apportionment is the capability provided by unit stocks, host nation support, theater pre-positioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and continental United States Department of Defense stockpiles and available production. Item apportionment cannot exceed total capabilities.

c. sourcing. Sourcing is the matching of available capabilities on a given date against item requirements to support sustainability analysis and the identification of locations to support transportation planning. Sourcing of any item is done within the combatant commander's apportionment.

d. documentation. Sourced item requirements and corresponding shortfalls are major inputs to the combatant commander's sustainability analysis. Sourced item requirements are translated into movement requirements and documented in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base for transportation feasibility analysis. Movement requirements for insignificant items are estimated in tonnage. **(JP 1-02)**

medical planning module. The JOPES ADP application program used to determine the impact of an operation on the total medical system, including the amount of medical support needed, such as bed, MEDEVAC, and blood/fluid requirements. (adapted from JOPES User's Manual)

memorandum of policy (MOP). (DOD) A statement of policy approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and issued for the guidance of the Services, unified and specified commands, and Joint Staff. **(JP 1-01)**

Military Assistance Program. (DOD) That portion of the U.S. security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides defense articles and services to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis. **(JP 1-02)**

military capability. (DOD) The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

a. force structure – Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings.

b. modernization – technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment.

c. unit readiness –The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.

d. sustainability – the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. See also readiness. (JP 1-02)

military deception. (DOD) Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are:

a. strategic military deception – Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations.

b. operational military deception – military deception planned and executed in support of operational-level commanders resulting in adversary actions that are favorable to friendly force objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception – military deception planned and executed in support of tactical commanders resulting in adversary actions that are favorable to friendly force objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception – Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.

e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC) – military deception planned and executed in support of all levels of command for the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. See also deception means.

(JP 1-02)

military department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). (JP 1-02)

military objectives. (DOD) The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement National Command Authorities guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. See also national objectives. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war (MOOTW). (DOD) Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. (JP 1-02)

military options. (DOD) A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention campaigns; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare campaigns and operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. (JP 1-02)

military strategy. (DOD) The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. (JP 1-02)

military support to civil authorities (MSCA). (DOD) Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (JP 1-02)

mission. (DOD) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

mission analysis. (DOD) To analyze the assigned mission (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks in the context of the next higher echelon's campaign plan or operation order, and the strategic aim. Mission analysis leads to the identification of specified and implied tasks, selection of priorities for multiple tasks, and creation of mission statements. The mission statement is the impetus for detailed planning and is the JFC's expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. It is framed as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved. It is expressed in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose). (CJCSM 3500.04B/UJTL)

mission type order. (DOD) 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)

mobility analysis. (DOD) An in-depth examination of all aspects of transportation planning in support of operation plan and operation order development. (JP 1-02)

mobilization. (DOD) 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. selective mobilization – Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization – Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization – Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

d. total mobilization – Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (JP 1-02)

mobilization-deployment planning. The act of using authorized systems and measures for planning, coordinating, and monitoring movements and deployments of mobilized forces and materiel necessary to meet military objectives. (JOPES User's Manual)

module. A collection of one or more software programs that accomplishes major functions in an application program or subsystem.

movement control. (DOD) 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. See also non-unit-related cargo; non-unit-related personnel. (JP 1-02)

movement schedule. (DOD) A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship) that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment.

Arrival and departure times at ports of embarkation, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation. **(JP 1-02)**

multiapportionment. The apportionment of the same forces to more than one CINC for use in developing plans that cover the same specific period of time.

multinational operations. (DOD) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition; coalition action. **(JP 1-02)**

multi-Service doctrine. (DOD) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by two or more Services, and is promulgated in multi-Service publications that identify the participating Services, e.g., Army-Navy doctrine. See also combined doctrine; joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. **(JP 1-02)**

nation assistance. (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other U.S. Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. **(JP 1-02)**

National Command Authorities (NCA). (DOD) The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. **(JP 1-02)**

national emergency. (DOD) A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. See also mobilization. **(JP 1-02)**

national intelligence estimate (NIE). (DOD) A strategic estimate of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations which is produced at the national level as a composite of the views of the intelligence community. **(JP 1-02)**

National Military Command System (NMCS). (DOD) The priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. **(JP 1-02)**

National Military Strategy (NMS). (DOD) The CJCS document prepared in consultation with the CINCs and the JCS that conveys advice on strategic direction for the Armed Forces. (CJCSI 8501.01/PBBS)

national objectives. (DOD) The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. See also military objectives. (JP 1-02)

National Security Council (NSC). (DOD) A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. (JP 1-02)

national security interests. (DOD) The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving U.S. political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. (JP 1-02)

national security strategy (national strategy, grand strategy). (DOD) The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1-02)

NEOPACK. (DOD) An assembled package of selected maps, charts, and other geographic materials of various scales to support the planning and conduct of noncombatant evacuation operations in selected countries or areas. See also noncombatant evacuation operations. (JP 1-02)

non-air-transportable (NAT) cargo. Cargo that exceeds any of the following dimensions: 1,453” x 216” x 156”, or between 114” and 156” high and exceeding 144” wide. (adapted from JOPES User’s Data Element Dictionary)

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). (DOD) Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization (NGO). (DOD) Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. See also private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)

nonorganic transportation requirement. Unit personnel and cargo for which the transportation source must be an outside agency, normally a component of USTRANSCOM. (adapted from the JOPES User's Manual)

nonstandard unit. A force requirement identified in a TPFDD for which movement characteristics have not been described in the TUCHA file. The planner is required to submit detailed movement characteristics for these units. (adapted from JOPES User's Manual)

nonunit record. A TPFDD file entry for non-unit-related cargo and personnel; characteristics include using and providing organization, type of movement, routing data, cargo category, weight, volume, area required, and number of personnel requiring transportation. (adapted from **JP 1-03.16**)

non-unit-related cargo. (DOD) All equipment and supplies requiring transportation to an area of operations, other than those identified as the equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply, military support for allies, and support for nonmilitary programs, such as civil relief). (**JP 1-02**)

non-unit-related personnel. (DOD) All personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit (e.g., filler personnel; replacements; temporary duty/temporary additional duty personnel; civilians; medical evacuees; and retrograde personnel). (**JP 1-02**)

NOPLAN. Designation for a contingency operation in a situation for which no operation plan has been published or developed.

normal operations. (DOD) Generally and collectively, the broad functions which a combatant commander undertakes when assigned responsibility for a given geographic or functional area. Except as otherwise qualified in certain unified command plan paragraphs which relate to particular commands, "normal operations" of a combatant commander include: planning for and execution of operations throughout the range of military operations; planning and conduct of cold war activities; planning for and administration of military assistance; and maintaining the relationships and exercising the directive or coordinating authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2, Admin. Pub 1.1, and Joint Pub 4-01. (**JP 1-02**)

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). (DOD) The United States government agency [within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)] that administers the President's authority to provide emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in response to disasters declared by the Ambassador (also known as the Chief of Mission) within the affected country or higher Department of State authority. USAID/OFDA may also expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, PVOs, regional and international organizations, and other sources of relief capacity. (**JP 3-08**, Vol. II)

on-call. (DOD) 1. A term used to signify a prearranged call for a concentration of fire, air strike, or final protective fire. 2. Preplanned, identified force or materiel requirements without designated time-phase and destination information. Such requirements will be called forward upon order of competent authority. (JP 1-02)

on-line. Having direct and immediate connection to the computer. (JOPEs User's Data Element Dictionary)

one day's supply. (DOD, NATO) A unit or quantity of supplies adopted as a standard of measurement, used in estimating the average daily expenditure under stated conditions. It may also be expressed in terms of a factor, e.g., rounds of ammunition per weapon per day. (JP 1-02)

operation. (DOD, NATO) A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operation order (OPORD). (DOD) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. (DOD) Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. Operation Plan (OPLAN) – An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.

b. Concept Plan (CONPLAN) – An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

c. Concept Plan with Time-Phased Force Deployment Database (CONPLAN with TPFDD) – A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. See also operation order; time-phased force and deployment data. **(JP 1-02)**

operational art. (DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and /or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 1-02) (NOTE: See individual "operational art terms" in JP 3-0: leverage; synergy; anticipation; arranging operations; balance; timing and tempo; simultaneity and depth; centers of gravity; forces and functions; operational reach and approach; direct versus indirect; decisive points; culmination; termination.)

operational authority. (DOD) That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. **(JP 1-02)**

operational chain of command. The chain of command established for a particular operation or series of continuing operations. **(JP 1-02)**

operational control (OPCON). (DOD) Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority). **(JP 1-02)**

operational environment. **(JP 1-02)** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are:

a. permissive environment – operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

b. uncertain environment – operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations.

c. hostile environment – operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.

operational level of war. (DOD) The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. **(JP 1-02)**

operational mobility. The quality or capability that permits military forces to move from place to place within designated areas of the theater while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

operational phasing. (DOD) The technique by which JFCs best arrange major operations either in simultaneous or sequential manner to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. **(JP 3-0)**

operational reach and approach. **(JP 3-0—operational art term)** Operational reach is the distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively. Reach may be influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It may be extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward; by increasing the range of weapon systems; by conducting aerial refueling, by including space support capabilities; and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directly affects operational reach and approach.

operations security (OPSEC). (DOD) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. See also command and control warfare. (**JP 1-02**)

OPLAN. (DOD) An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order. An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in time-phased force and deployment data files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the JOPES manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. (See operation plan and CONPLAN.) (CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS)

OPLAN/CONPLAN Evaluation Criteria. (DOD) The four evaluation criteria are:

- a. adequacy. Will the plan satisfy the tasking and accomplish the mission? Do planning assumptions provide guidance for development of the plan?
- b. feasibility. Does the plan accomplish the assigned tasks with the resources that are available within the time frames contemplated within the plan?
- c. acceptability. Is the plan proportional and worth the anticipated costs? Can the mission be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position? Is the plan militarily and politically supportable?
- d. compliance. Does the plan comply with approved joint doctrine?
(CJCSM 3122.01/JOPES Vol. I)

OPLAN-dependent force module. A force module that has been created or tailored by the supported commander or components to fit a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules usually include sustainment based on theater planning factors and sourced force records.

organic. (DOD) Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy. (**JP 1-02**)

organic transportation. Transportation resources that are assigned to a unit and can give the lift capability for all or part of that unit's movement requirements.

origin. (DOD) Beginning point of a deployment where unit or non-unit-related cargo or personnel are located. (**JP 1-02**)

outsized cargo. Cargo that exceeds 1,090" x 117" x 105", that is, too large for C-130/C-141 aircraft. (JOPES User's Data Element Dictionary)

oversized cargo. Cargo that exceeds the usable dimension of a 463L pallet, 104" x 84" x 96", or a height set by the particular model of aircraft. (JOPES User's Data Element Dictionary)

peace building. (DOD) Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. **(JP 1-02)**

peace enforcement (PE). (DOD) Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace building; peace operations; peacekeeping; peacemaking. **(JP 1-02)**

peace operations (PO). (DOD) A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking. **(JP 1-02)**

peacekeeping (PK). (DOD) Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peace operations; peacemaking. **(JP 1-02)**

peacemaking. (DOD) The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace operations. **(JP 1-02)**

personnel increment number (PIN). (DOD) A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-related personnel entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. **(JP 1-02)**

phase. (DOD) A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase—such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations—indicates a shift in emphasis. **(JP 3-0)**

pipeline. (DOD, NATO) In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flows from sources of procurement to their point of use. **(JP 1-02)**

plan identification number (PID). (DOD) 1. A command-unique four-digit number followed by a suffix indicating the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) year for which the plan is written, e.g., "2220-95." 2. In the Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES) data base, a five-digit number representing the command-unique four-digit identifier, followed by a one character, alphabetic suffix indicating the operation plan option, or a one-digit number numeric value indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written. (JP 1-02)

plan information capability. (DOD) This capability allows a supported command to enter and update key elements of information in an operation plan stored in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

plan summary. A required element of an operation plan that gives a brief description of the mission, the general situation, the concept of operations, the major forces required, command arrangements, and the commander's appraisal of logistics feasibility. (JOPES User's Manual)

planned resupply. The shipping of supplies in a regular flow described by existing pre-planned schedules and organizations, which will usually include some form of planned procurement. (adapted from JP 1-02)

planned risk. (DOD) The possibility of mission failure and/or high casualties when assessing military operations. When judging deliberate military plans, planned risk is described by the following gradients:

a. unacceptable risk. Mission failure is the likely outcome. Huge public outcry over casualties and/or unacceptable collateral damage in relation to the planned objective will occur. A costly protracted engagement is assured. Even under the most fortunate of conditions, mission success is only probable.

b. high risk. Mission failure and mission success are equally likely outcomes. Under favorable conditions, mission success is likely. High casualties and/or extensive collateral damage are likely. A protracted engagement is to be expected.

c. moderate risk. Mission success is likely, even if some conditions are not favorable. High levels of casualties and significant collateral damage may occur. A protracted engagement is possible.

d. low risk. Mission success is virtually assured, even if executed under somewhat unfavorable conditions. Probability of a protracted engagement is minimal. Minimal casualties and/or collateral damage expected. (CJCSM 3122.03A/JOPES Vol. II)

planning factor. (DOD, NATO) A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (JP 1-02)

planning order. (DOD) 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course

of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. See also execution planning. **(JP 1-02)**

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). (DOD) A system based on a cyclic decision-making process with three distinct but interrelated phases of planning, programming, and budgeting. The process involves the development of all Service and defense agency budgets, their review and consolidation to produce the DOD portion of the President's budget submission to Congress. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.14 and CJCSI 8501.01/PPBS)

port. (DOD) A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term "ports" should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. **(JP 1-02)**

port of debarkation (POD). (DOD) The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. See also port of embarkation. **(JP 1-02)**

port of embarkation (POE). (DOD) The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. May be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. See also port of debarkation. **(JP 1-02)**

port of support. The geographic point (port or airport) in an objective area that is the terminal point for strategic deployment for non-unit-related supplies. Each component designates ports of support for four categories of resupply: general cargo, ammunition, POL, and air deliveries. (adapted from the JOPES User's Manual)

Posse Comitatus Act. (DOD) Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to U.S. military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus" – United States Code, Section 1385) **(JP 1-02)**

power projection. (DOD) The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power – political, economic, informational, or military – to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. **(JP 1-02)**

preliminary movement schedule. (DOD) A projection of the routing of movement requirements reflected in the time-phased force and deployment data, from origin to destination, including identification of origins, ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation, and en route stops; associated time frames for arrival and departure at each location; type of lift assets required to accomplish the move; and cargo details by carrier. Schedules are sufficiently detailed to support comparative analysis of requirements against capabilities and to develop location workloads for reception and onward movement. **(JP 1-02)**

pre-position. (DOD, NATO) To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force during initial phases of an operation. **(JP 1-02)**

pre-positioned war reserve requirement. (DOD) That portion of the war reserve materiel requirement which the current Secretary of Defense guidance dictates be reserved and positioned at or near the point of planned use or issue to the user prior to hostilities to reduce reaction time and to assure timely support of a specific force/project until replenishment can be effected. **(JP 1-02)**

pre-positioned war reserve stock. (DOD) The assets that are designated to satisfy the pre-positioned war reserve materiel requirement. **(JP 1-02)**

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). (DOD) One of a series of directives that announce Presidential decisions implementing national policy objectives in all areas of national security. All PDDs in this series are individually identified by number and signed by the President. (Prior administrations had different names for them, such as “national security directive.”) (From the NSC)

Presidential Callup. (DOD) Procedures by which the President brings all or part of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard to active Federal service under section 12406 and Chapter 15 of title 10, U.S. Code. **(JP 1-02)**

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority. (DOD) Provision of Public Law 10 USC 12304 provides the Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not, operating as a service in the Navy) a means to order not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty without their consent for not more than 270 days when the President determines it is necessary to augment any operational mission, without a declaration of a national emergency. (NOTE: This authority is particularly useful in circumstances in which the potential escalatory nature of partial or full mobilization would make them undesirable. As a tool for a tailored operational response, this authority has multiple uses, therefore, fixed Service slices or fixed apportionments for all contingencies should not be assumed.)

a. For regional conflicts, the PSRC could be expected to augment the Active component to satisfy specific force shortfalls (units and individual mobilization augmentees) relevant to the contingency. It may be initiated before, concurrent with, or after the onset of hostilities.

b. The PSRC may be viewed as a precursor to partial mobilization and should be available before unambiguous warning of a potential adversary attack. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored or operational response of limited scope or may be used as a precursor to subsequent mobilization. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

preventive deployment. (NATO) (**JP 3-07.3**) Preventive deployments within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

prioritized regional objectives. (DOD) Theater Engagement Plans are based on prioritized regional objectives contained in the contingency planning guidance (CPG) and the JSCP. CINCs and executive agents derive their engagement objectives relating specifically to the theater, region, or countries within their areas of responsibility (AOR). Objectives are prioritized by the national interest they seek to advance and defined in the Defense Planning Guidance: Vital - Tier I; Important - Tier II; Lesser - Tier III. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (DOD) Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making. (**JP 1-02**)

private voluntary organizations (PVO). (DOD) Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." See also nongovernmental organizations. (**JP 1-02**)

procedure. (DOD) A procedure begins with a specific, documented event that causes an activity to occur. The activity must produce a product that normally affects another external organization. Frequently, that product will be the event that causes another procedure to occur. It is important to recognize that a procedure determines "what" an organization must do at critical periods but does not direct "how" it will be done. (**JP 1-02**)

Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). (DOD) A set of documents within which Defense Resource Board (DRB) program review decisions are recorded, signed by the SECDEF or DepSecDef, and issued to the Services and DOD components. The PDMs are the basis for development of the DOD budget estimate submission (BES). (CJCSI 8501.01/PBBS)

program element. (DOD) A primary data element in the Future-Years Defense Program that represents (1) DOD missions or (2) units and their resources. (Adapted from DODI 7045.7/PPBS)

Program Objectives Memoranda (POM). (DOD) Recommendation of the DOD components [*Services and defense agencies*] to the SECDEF on the allocation of resources for proposed programs to achieve assigned missions and objectives. Proposed programs are consistent with the strategy and guidance stated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and constrained by FG [Fiscal Guidance]. (CJCSI 8501.01/PPBS)

psychological operations (PSYOP). (DOD) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02)

public affairs guidance (PAG). (DOD) Normally, a package of information to support the public discussion of defense issues and operations. Such guidance can range from a telephonic response to a specific question to a more comprehensive package. Included could be an approved public affairs policy, news statements, answers to anticipated media questions, and community relations guidance. The public affairs guidance also addresses the method(s), timing, location, and other details governing the release of information to the public. Public affairs guidance is approved by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. (JP 1-02)

query. As applied to JOPES permissions, "query" is one of the ten functional permissions granted users. The permission is limited to retrieving and viewing information on the terminal display screen. The other primary functions allow users to update, perform database management and scheduling functions, and print charts and reports. (adapted from JOPES User's Manual)

readiness planning. (DOD) Operational planning required for peacetime operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to combatant commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning. (JP 1-02)

ready-to-load date (RLD). (DOD) The day, relative to C-day, in a time-phased force and deployment data when the unit, nonunit equipment, and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on U.S. Transportation Command-provided transportation. (JP 1-02)

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reconstitution. (DOD) The capability to expand military power by establishing and training new units. Actions include mobilization of assets (up to total mobilization) and the expansion of the industrial base with the reestablishment of a global warfighting capability. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

record. A collection of data elements pertaining to one logical subject. In JOPES, for example, all the data elements used to describe a force requirement and its routing are stored in the “force record.” For resupply and replacement personnel, all the data elements are stored in non-unit-related cargo records and non-unit-related personnel records. (JDS User’s Manual)

redeployment. (DOD) The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. (**JP 1-02**)

regeneration. The capability to generate additional military power in a timely manner to counter a rapid buildup of enemy forces. Actions include activation of all Reserve component units with increased readiness and training levels (up to full mobilization--no new units) and the acceleration of the industrial production base.

Report of Potential Evacuees (F-77 Report). (DOD, DOS) A Department of State (DOS) document that identifies the potential number of evacuees in each American Embassy’s area of responsibility. (**JP 3-07.5**)

required delivery date (RDD). (DOD) A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations. (**JP 1-02**)

requirements capability. (DOD) This capability provides a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System user the ability to identify, update, review, and delete data on forces and sustainment required to support an operation plan or course of action. (**JP 1-02**)

reserve component category. (DOD) The category that identifies an individual’s status in a reserve component. The three reserve component categories are Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each reservist is identified by a specific reserve component category designation. (**JP 1-02**)

resources. (DOD) The forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command. (**JP 1-02**)

response time. The estimated or actual time necessary for a unit, when alerted, to achieve the directed deployability posture.

retrograde cargo. (DOD) Cargo evacuated from a theater of operations. (**JP 1-02**)

retrograde personnel. (DOD) Personnel evacuated from a theater of operations who may include medical patients, noncombatants, and civilians. **(JP 1-02)**

Rules of Engagement (ROE). (DOD) Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. **(JP 1-02, CJCSI 3121.01/CJCS Standing ROE)**

safe haven. (DOD) For Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO planning - Designated area(s) to which noncombatants of the United States Government's responsibility, and commercial vehicles and materiel, may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid emergency. **(JP 1-02)**

safety level of supply. (DOD) The quantity of materiel, in addition to the operating level of supply, required to be on hand to permit continuous operations in the event of minor interruption of normal replenishment or unpredictable fluctuations in demand. **(JP 1-02)**

scheduled arrival date. (DOD) The projected arrival date of a specified movement requirement at a specified location. **(JP 1-02)**

schedules. (DOD) The carrier itinerary which may involve cargo and passengers. **(JP 1-02)**

scheduling and movement capability. (DOD) The capability required by Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planners and operators to allow for review and update of scheduling and movement data before and during implementation of a deployment operation. **(JP 1-02)**

Sealift Enhancement Program (SEP). (DOD) Special equipment and modifications that adapt merchant-type dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions. They are typically installed on Ready Reserve Force ships or ships under Military Sealift Command control. Sealift enhancements fall into three categories: productivity, survivability, and operational enhancements. **(JP 1-02)**

sealift readiness program. (DOD) A formal agreement, pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, between U.S.-flag, dry-cargo carriers and the government for the acquisition of ships and related equipment under conditions of less than full mobilization. **(JP 1-02)**

security assistance. (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. **(JP 1-02)**

Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). (DOD) An executive readiness overview briefed to senior OSD officials, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense. These presentations give OSD leadership increased visibility on current readiness of the force and provide a forum to address near-term readiness concerns. (CJCS Guide 3401A/CRS)

sequel. (DOD) Subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation: victory, defeat, or stalemate; phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan. (JP 3-0)

Service component command. (DOD) Command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. See also component; functional component command. (JP 1-02)

Service force module. A hypothetical force module built per Service doctrine composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment for an estimated period (e.g., 1 day's of supply)

shortfall. (DOD) The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 1-02)

show of force. (DOD) An operation, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve, which involves increased visibility of U.S. deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives. (JP 1-02)

SIGINT operational control. (DOD) The authoritative direction of signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported. (JP 1-02)

slice. (DOD) An average logistic planning factor used to obtain estimates of requirements for personnel and materiel. A personnel slice, e.g., generally consists of the total strength of the stated basic combatant elements, plus its proportionate share of all supporting and higher headquarters personnel. (JP 1-02)

smaller scale contingency (SSC). (DOD) A regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling national interest or threat than those involved in a MTW. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater

warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies. (National Security Strategy [NSS], CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

sourcing. (DOD) The process of identifying an actual unit, personnel, and equipment to fulfill a requirement in the TPFDD. (CJCSM 3122.03A/JOPES Vol. II)

sourcing (logistics). The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the non-unit-related logistics requirements in the TPFDD. (JOPES User's Manual)

space control operations. (DOD) Operations that provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying it to an enemy, and include the broad aspects of protection of U.S. and U.S. allied space systems and negation of enemy space systems. **(JP 1-02)**

space support operations. (DOD) Operations required to ensure that space control and support of terrestrial forces are maintained. They include activities such as launching and deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining space vehicles while on orbit, and recovering space vehicles if required. **(JP 1-02)**

special operations (SO). (DOD) Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. **(JP 1-02)**

special operations command (SOC). (DOD) A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. See also special operations. **(JP 1-02)**

specified command (specified combatant command). (DOD) A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. **(JP 1-02)**

staff estimates. (DOD) Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander's estimate. **(JP 1-02)**

staging. (DOD) Assembling, holding and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. The organizing and preparation for movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational commander's requirements. (JP 1-02)

standard unit. A type unit whose UTC and movement characteristics are described in the TUCHA file. (JOPES User's Manual)

status of forces agreement (SOFA). (JP 1-02) An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of the local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements.

strategic direction. The guidance expressed through national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy relative to the attainment of strategic goals and objectives. (JP 5-00.1)

strategic estimate. (DOD) The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. See also commander's estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

strategic intent. The expression of the goals and desired ends of a strategy. (JP 5-00.1)

strategic level of war. (DOD) The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

strategic logistics. In a general sense, the art and science of harnessing the economic and societal strengths of a nation for national defense. In the specific sense, strategic logistics is the process of planning for, coordinating, and allocating the manpower, materiel, infrastructure, and services required for military, war production, and civil sector needs. It

requires coordination between the executive and legislative branches, state governments, and industry. Force generation and mobilization are inclusive components of strategic logistics. **(JP 5-00.1)**

strategic mobility. (DOD) The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. See also mobility. **(JP 1-02)**

strategic sealift force. Common-user sealift assets of the MSC force, including fast sealift ships and pre-positioned ships on completion of their mission and release that furnish the capability to deploy and sustain military forces. The normal peacetime force may be augmented by shipping from the Ready Reserve Fleet and National Defense Reserve Fleet and from U.S. and allied merchant fleets. **(JP 1-01)**

strategic vulnerability. **(JP 1-02)** The susceptibility of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological, or military factors.

strategy determination. (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action. **(JP 1-02)**

subordinate command. (DOD) A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. **(JP 1-02)**

subordinate unified command (subunified command). (DOD) A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area. **(JP 1-02)**

suitability. (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination that the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objectives, mission, or task if carried out successfully. See also acceptability; adequacy; completeness; feasibility. **(JP 1-02)**

summary reference file. A JOPES file containing information that expands requirements data contained in a JOPES TPFDD. (adapted from JOPES User's Manual)

supported commander. (DOD) The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also joint operation planning. **(JP 1-02)**

supporting commander. (DOD) A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. See also supported commander; supporting plan. **(JP 1-02)**

supporting forces. (DOD) Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. **(JP 1-02)**

supporting plan. (DOD) An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. See also supported commander; supporting commander. (JP 1-02)

sustaining supply. Materiel required to support a unit after arrival in-theater from the time accompanying supply and PWRMS are anticipated to run out until regular resupply begins. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02, "sustaining stocks")

sustainment. (DOD) The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. **(JP 1-02)**

synchronization. (DOD) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. **(JP 1-02)**

tactical control (TACON). **(JP 1-02)** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control.

tactical level of war. (DOD) The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat

elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. **(JP 1-02)**

task. (DOD) A discrete event or action, not specific to a single unit, weapon system, or individual, that enables a mission or function to be accomplished by individuals and/or organizations. (CJCSM 3500.03/JTM)

technical control. (TECHCON) (FM 101-5-1) The authority a controlling element has to direct all technical aspects of other unit operations.

termination objectives. Specific objectives that define the intended manner to end conflict and the required military and diplomatic achievements to attain it. **(JP 5-00.1)**

theater. (DOD) The geographical area for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. **(JP 1-02)**

theater engagement plan (TEP). (DOD) Engagement plans reflect CINC's deliberate proactive intent and planned military activities that are intended to shape the theater security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and theater objectives. The elements of an engagement plan may be included in the overall theater strategic plan. (CJCSI 3100.01A/JSPS)

theater of focus. (DOD) A theater in which operations are most critical to national interests and are assigned the highest priority for allocation of resources. **(JP 1-02)**

theater of operations. (DOD) A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. See also theater of war. **(JP 1-02)**

theater of war. (DOD) Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. See also area of responsibility; theater of operations. **(JP 1-02)**

theater strategy. (DOD) The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. **(JP 1-02)**

threat identification and assessment. (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function that provides timely warning of potential threats to U.S. interests; intelligence collection requirements; the effects of environmental, physical, and health hazards, and cultural factors on friendly and enemy operations; and determines the enemy military posture and possible intentions. (JP 1-02)

throughput. (DOD) The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from the discharge from a ship or plane to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:

- a. In-place units.
- b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.
- c. Routing of forces to be deployed.
- d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.
- e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.
- f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. See also time-phased force and deployment list. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). (DOD) Appendix 1 to Annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. See also time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

times. (DOD) (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

- a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible

for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e. I-day (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP) The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

f. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence

g. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

h. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

i. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

j. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000).

k. T-day. The effective day coincident with presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).

l. W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (JP 1-02 except for I-day as noted above.)

total obligation authority or obligation authority. The sum of (1) budget authority conferred for a given fiscal year, (2) balances of amounts brought forward from prior years that remain available for obligation, and (3) amounts authorized to be credited to a specific fund or account during that year. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

TPFDD Letter of Instruction. (DOD) The TPFDD LOI provides planning and execution instructions to the supported combatant command's components, supporting combatant commands, and supporting agencies as they refine, verify, and manifest their portion of the joint force TPFDD. The intent of the supported combatant commander's TPFDD LOI is to eliminate confusion, facilitate parallel planning, and expedite TPFDD refinement by providing component commands, supporting commands, and agencies with a

single set of instructions for TPFDD input and management. Prudent use of the TPFDD LOI ensures that actual OPORD movement requirements are properly documented and validated for transportation scheduling. **(JP 3-35)**

transmittal document. (DOD) A general term for the document published at the conclusion of the concept development phase of deliberate planning to convey the CINC's concept of operations, concept of support, and other planning information to the joint planning and execution community JPEC. The format is not specified, but may take one of several forms: an outline plan, a letter of instruction (LOI), a plan directive, or a draft OPLAN. (CJCSM 3122.03A/JOPES Vol. II)

transportation closure. (DOD) The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation. **(JP 1-02)**

transportation component command (TCC). (DOD) The three component commands of USTRANSCOM: Air Force Air Mobility Command, Navy Military Sealift Command, and Army Military Traffic Management Command. Each transportation component command remains a major command of its parent Service and continues to organize, train, and equip its forces as specified by law. Each transportation component command also continues to perform Service-unique missions. **(JP 1-02)**

transportation feasibility. (DOD) Operation plans and operation plans in concept format are considered transportation feasible when the capability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point of origin to the final destination according to the plan. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions.

a. The supported commander of a combatant command (CINC) will analyze deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and theater distribution of forces, equipment, and supplies to final destination.

b. Supporting CINCs will provide an assessment on movement of forces from point of origin to aerial port of embarkation and/or seaport of embarkation.

c. The Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command will assess the strategic leg of the time-phased force and deployment data for transportation feasibility, indicating to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported CINC that movements arrive at the port of debarkation consistent with the supported CINC's assessment of JRSOI and theater distribution.

d. Following analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC is responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable. **(JP 1-02)**

transportation system. (DOD) All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of U.S. forces and their supplies during peacetime training, conflict, or war, involving both mature and contingency theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. **(JP 1-02)**

type unit. (DOD) A type of organizational or functional entity established within the Armed Forces and uniquely identified by a five-character, alphanumeric code called a unit type code. (JP 1-02)

type unit data file. (DOD) A file that provides standard planning data and movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with type units. (JP 1-02)

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). (DOD) A publication (*JP 0-1*) setting forth the policies, principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Military Departments or Service elements thereof are acting together. (JP 1-02)

unified command (unified combatant command). (DOD) A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also combatant command; subordinate command. (JP 1-02)

Unified Command Plan (UCP). (DOD) The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. See also combatant command; combatant commander. (JP 1-02)

unit designation list. (DOD) A list of actual units by unit identification code designated to fulfill requirements of a force list. (JP 1-02)

unit identification code (UIC). (DOD) A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces. (JP 1-02)

unit line number (ULN). (DOD) A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a unit entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

unit type code (UTC). (DOD) A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces. (JP 1-02)

unit-related equipment and supplies. All equipment and supplies that are assigned to a specific unit or that are designated as accompanying supplies. The logistics dimensions of these items are contained in the TUCHA standard reference file. (JOPES User's Manual)

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). (DOD) A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission essential task list. (JP 1-02)

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (DOD) USAID administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance program and acts as lead Federal agency for U.S. foreign disaster assistance. USAID works largely in support of the Department of State and manages a worldwide network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic growth, encourages political freedom and good governance, and invests in human resource development. (JP 3-08, Vol. II)

U.S. Country Team. (DOD) The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

U.S. Transportation Command coordinating instructions. (DOD) Instructions of the U.S. Transportation Command that establish suspense dates for selected members of the joint planning and execution community to complete updates to the operation plan data base. Instructions will ensure the target date movement requirements will be validated and available for scheduling. (JP 1-02)

validate. (DOD) Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and U.S. Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). (DOD) VISA is a program that requires carriers to contractually commit time-phased ship capacity and Intermodal resources to DOD during contingencies. When fully developed, VISA will replace the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). VISA provides commercial carriers flexibility to plan their contingency contribution, pool assets to reduce market disruption, and provides adequate and assured financial compensation. This voluntary program provides DOD assured access to U.S. flag ships and intermodal systems to augment common-user sealift during a contingency.

a. VISA STAGE I. Is still under development; however, the goal of Stage I is to access 15 percent of the total carrier fleet.

b. VISA STAGE II. Is still under development, however the goal of Stage II is to access 40 percent of the carrier fleet.

c. VISA STAGE III. Provides shipping to meet two MTW requirements short of requisitioning. (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP)

warden system. (DOD) An informal method of communication used to pass information to U.S. citizens during emergencies. See also noncombatant evacuation operations. **(JP 1-02)** (Note: Warden systems are established and operated by each American Embassy within its area of responsibility.)

wargaming. (DOD) Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of an operation, given own strengths and weaknesses and dispositions, enemy assets and possible COAs. It attempts to foresee the action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of an operation. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. **(JP 5-00.2)**

warning order. (DOD, NATO) 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (DOD) 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. **(JP 1-02)**

Appendix H

References

JFSC Pub 1 has evolved over the years from many sources. Wherever possible, joint publications have been used. When these do not cover the particular subject, we have adapted material from applicable Service manuals. JFSC Pub 1 traces its roots to the following publications:

- (1) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
- (2) Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*
- (3) Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
- (4) Joint Pub 1-03 Series, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions*
- (5) Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*
- (6) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
- (7) Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*
- (8) Joint Pub 4-01, *Mobility System Policies, Procedures and Considerations*
- (9) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
- (10) Joint Pub 5-03 Series, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*
- (11) Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*
- (12) CJCS MOP 7, “The Joint Strategic Planning System”
- (13) JCS MOP 136, “JCS, CINC, and OJCS Involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System”
- (14) *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*
- (15) *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*
- (16) U.S. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

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- (17) U.S. Marine Corps Manual FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*
- (18) U.S. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 28-3, *USAF Operation Planning Process*
- (19) JCS Action Officer Orientation
- (20) American Forces Information Service, DOD, *The Armed Forces Officer*
- (21) U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*
- (22) Joint Admin Pub 1.2, *Joint Officer Management*
- (23) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*
- (24) Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Title IV, Joint Officer Management
- (25) Report of the Panel on Military Education, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1989



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