SENATOR
SUSAN M. COLLINS
PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
Oversight
of Investment Banks' Response to the Lessons of Enron
Today's hearing is the fourth the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations has held this year examining the
collapse of the Enron Corporation.
It is the third hearing looking specifically at the role
played by some of America's leading financial institutions in
transactions that enabled Enron to paint a false picture of its
financial health and that contributed to the ultimate bankruptcy
of the company.
Our earlier hearings documented that certain financial
institutions - - Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan Chase, and Citigroup -
- knowingly
participated in, and indeed facilitated, transactions that Enron
officials used to make the company's financial position appear
more robust than it actually was.
These complex transactions allowed Enron to deceive its
investors, customers, and employees.
Today's hearing will provide additional evidence of the
complicity of financial institutions in Enron's deceptions.
We will examine four multi-million-dollar structured
finance deals that enabled Enron to produce misleading financial
statements and, in one case, claim a highly questionable $125
million tax break. Citigroup
funded two of the four transactions, and JP Morgan Chase funded
the other two.
The first three transactions, known as Fishtail, Bacchus and
Sundance, involved Enron's so-called "sale" of certain
assets at inflated values to special purpose entities (SPEs)
that had been established by Enron, Citigroup or Chase.
In each case, the allegedly independent SPEs purchasing
the assets were funded with equity "commitments" by
Citigroup or Chase that did not truly place funds at risk or
were supported by secret oral guarantees by Enron that
invalidated the SPEs' independent status.
Each of the transactions, fabricated to look like an arms length
sale of a financial asset, was a artifice designed to enable
Enron to obtain a Citicorp or Chase loan or to sell an asset to
itself. The evidence
strongly suggests that Citigroup and Chase were not innocent
pawns in these transactions.
Warning flags were abundant.
An internal memorandum from a senior Citicorp official
strongly objected to the transactions, warning that the "GAAP
accounting is aggressive and a franchise risk to us if there is
publicity . . . ." Citigroup's
involvement in helping disguise what were essentially loans as
phony asset sales enabled Enron to inflate its sales revenues
and produce misleading financial statements.
The final transaction, known as Slapshot, involved a $1.4
billion loan and related transactions that were designed to take
advantage of foreign tax rules and produce Canadian tax benefits
for Enron. This
complex web of transactions was designed by JP Morgan Chase and
used Enron affiliates or SPEs in the United States, Canada and
the Netherlands. In
simplest terms, Slapshot involved a legitimate $375 million loan
issued by a consortium of banks and a phony $1 billion loan
issued by a JP Morgan Chase controlled SPE.
The $1 billion loan was issued and repaid on the same day
through a complex series of structured finance transactions.
The $375 million loan was to be repaid over five years.
Chase provided the $1 billion for the phony loan by approving a
$1 billion daylight overdraft on an Enron account at Chase.
The overdraft presented no risk, however, to Chase
because the bank required Enron to deposit a separate $1 billion
in an escrow account for the duration of the so-called
"loan." Chase
then circulated $1 billion through more than a dozen bank
accounts held by Enron and Chase affiliates and SPEs, returning
the $1 billion overdraft to the original Chase account by the
end of the day.
The end result of all the transactions used to accomplish both
loans was that Enron was able to treat its quarterly $22 million
loan repayments - each of which was a payment of principle and
interest on the $375 million loan - as purely interest payments
on the $1 billion loan. By
characterizing each $22 million loan payment as an interest
payment on the larger loan, Enron claimed that it was entitled
to deduct the entire $22 million from its Canadian taxes, for a
total of $125 million in Canadian tax benefits. In
return for designing this phony loan structure and arranging the
series of funding transfers, thereby enabling Enron to claim its
loan repayments as fully deductible, Chase received a fee of
$5.25 million from Enron. Outside
experts consulted by Chase cautioned "that in our opinion,
it is very likely that Revenue Canada will become aware of the
proposed transactions ... [and] will challenge them under the
[general anti-avoidance rule]."
The transactions that we are examining today once again
demonstrate the extraordinary actions that investment banks
undertook to keep Enron, an important client, happy.
The checks and balances that were supposed to ensure the
integrity of financial transactions apparently were compromised
by conflicts of interest and the lure of big fees.
It
undermines the integrity of our capital markets when some of the
most prestigious financial institutions in our country are
involved in designing, marketing, executing, and profiting from
financial transactions intended to enable public companies to
engage in deceptive accounting and tax strategies.
In
earlier testimony, the financial institutions have denied any
responsibility, claiming it is not their fault if their clients
choose to account for these transactions improperly.
But the troubling fact remains that Enron could not have
gotten away with what it did for so long without the active
participation of its financial institutions.
Numerous
documents examined by the Subcommittee clearly demonstrate that
the financial institutions that partnered with Enron knew of the
company's intentions. In
fact, in some cases, the financial institutions helped design
the transactions specifically so that Enron could cook its
books. For example, Chase's own documents highlight a particular
advantage of the deal as "[not providing] a 'road map' for
Revenue Canada," which was explained to Subcommittee staff
as a selling point so that the deal would not easily be
identified by the Canadian tax authorities and audited.
We
will also hear today from the watchdogs - - representatives of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal
Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
There are a number of questions about the role of the
regulators.
To
what extent do these regulatory agencies examine the type of
transactions engaged in by JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup that
enabled Enron to misrepresent its financial condition?
What
is their view of the legitimacy of the transactions we are
examining today? Do
the regulators have the authority and expertise to oversee these
complicated transactions?
Has
the current regulatory structure kept pace with changes in the
financial markets and the innovations in structured finance?
The
answers to these questions are critical to strengthening our
free enterprise system and restoring public confidence in our
capital markets. It
is important to remember that the Enron debacle is more than
just a tale of one company's greed.
As a result of Enron's downward spiral and ultimate
bankruptcy, shareholders - large and small, individual and
institutional - lost an estimated sixty billion dollars. The
collapse of Enron caused thousands of Americans to lose jobs, to
lose savings, and to lose confidence in corporate America and
U.S. financial institutions.
When
the individual investor doesn't have access to critical
information, information that is known only to corporate
management and their financial partners, the playing field is
far from level. We
must ensure that our financial institutions act with integrity.
And, we must ensure that investors, large and small, have
access to complete and accurate information to guide their
investment decisions.
In closing, I want to take a moment to express my appreciation
to Chairman Levin and our staffs for their handling of this
investigation. For the past year, our staffs have worked
together on this matter with what I believe may be an
unprecedented level of cooperation and partnership.
I want to thank the entire Subcommittee staff for their
hard work and dedication and Chairman Levin for his leadership
and commitment to this effort.
And special
recognition goes to Linda Gustitus who has led Senator Levin's
committee staff since 1979.
Linda will be retiring soon, and her skillful leadership
will be missed.
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