OPENING
STATEMENT OF
SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
The
Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse
July 30, 2002
Today is the second hearing held by the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations examining the role played by
some of
America
’s leading financial institutions in the collapse of
Enron. Our
investigation has revealed that certain financial
institutions knowingly participated in, and indeed
facilitated, transactions that Enron officials used to make
the company’s financial position appear more robust than
it actually was, thereby deceiving investors, customers, and
employees.
Last week, the Subcommittee examined one such type of
transaction; Enron and its bankers, JP Morgan Chase and
Citigroup, call them “prepays.”
The evidence, however, revealed them to be nothing
more than sham transactions designed to obtain, as one of
the banks continued to tout on its website, “financial
statement friendly financing.”
Like so many of the other deals at Enron, the
apparent motive was to portray a false image of the
company’s financial health.
As NYU law professor and former judge William Allen
noted in an April speech to the New York City Bar
Association, banks such as JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup are
supposed to play a valuable role in our system of corporate
checks and balances because “they monitor debtors more
closely than other providers of risk capital.”
Did the “lenders not understand that they were
enabling deception?” Professor Allen asked.
Much to my dismay, last week’s Subcommittee hearing
made clear that they did understand but chose to proceed
anyway.
Our focus this morning is whether Merrill Lynch also
participated in enabling Enron to deceive the public.
There are four principal aspects of the Merrill
Lynch-Enron relationship that we will examine.
The first involves Merrill’s purchase of Nigerian
barges with electricity-generating equipment from an
Enron-related entity in late 1999.
This transaction allowed Enron’s African division
to meet its quarterly reporting target and announce to the
financial world that Enron had sold a $12 million asset.
As with much at Enron though, the reality was a
different story. Merrill’s
purchase of the barges was predicated on Enron’s agreement
that it would find another buyer for them within six months.
Under a Securities and Exchange Commission accounting
bulletin published that very month, such an arrangement
clearly did not allow a seller to recognize revenue.
Handwritten notes by a Merrill employee warned that
there was “reputational risk i.e., aid/abet Enron income
[statement] manipulation,” but Merrill nevertheless went
ahead with the deal.
Second, the Subcommittee will examine the actions taken
by Merrill management in response to Enron complaints that
Merrill’s financial analyst had rated the company less
favorably than Enron would have liked.
Enron informed Merrill that it would not be selected as
a manager or co-manager of a large Enron stock offering solely
because Enron objected to the rating of its equity research
analyst. Merrill
appears to have gone to extraordinary lengths to placate Enron
and, subsequently, Merrill was added as a co-manager of the
offering.
After the offer went public, Merrill executives kept
Enron’s Chief Financial Officer updated on the activities of
the research analyst. On
at least three occasions, Merrill actually sent the CFO copies
of the analyst’s internal lists of calls that he made to
clients touting the offering.
The analyst in question subsequently left Merrill, and
his replacement immediately upgraded Enron.
This case raises troubling questions about conflicts of
interest compromising the integrity of the ratings on which
investors rely. Merrill
came under fire earlier this year because of a
New York
State
investigation that unearthed the fact that Merrill analysts
were recommending securities that they privately believed to
be undesirable. Merrill
reached a $100 million settlement with the New York Attorney
General and, as part of the settlement, implemented a set of
new disclosures specified by the Attorney General's office.
Third, the Subcommittee will pursue Merrill’s
decision to participate in an Enron loan syndication.
Enron sought Merrill’s participation in a deal that
had been arranged by JP Morgan Chase but had failed to raise
the needed $482 million for an Enron-related company.
Prior to the request, Enron had made it clear to
Merrill that it was at a “distinct disadvantage” for
obtaining future business from Enron because of its
“reluctance to use its balance sheet to support Enron’s
business activities.” Subsequently,
Merrill agreed to participate in the loan syndication, despite
indications that the investment would result in a financial
loss. Ultimately,
Merrill did indeed lose approximately $1.6 million in the
deal.
Finally, the Subcommittee will look closely at
Merrill’s dealings with an off-the-books partnership headed
by Enron’s CFO. Enron
CFO Andrew Fastow’s investment company, LJM2, asked Merrill
to provide a $10 million line of credit in connection with a
$65 million revolving credit facility being syndicated to
other banks by JP Morgan Chase.
An internal Merrill document advocating the credit
request states, “committing to this LJM2 facility will build
ML’s relationship with Andy Fastow, and assist ML in
securing future investment banking opportunities with
Enron.”
Other Merrill E-mails warned against it, citing the
lack of a rating and the nature of the credit risk.
Nevertheless, two of the witnesses who were scheduled
to testify before the Subcommittee today requested an
exception to bank policy for the loan for the following
reasons: “Enron is an excellent client. $40 MM in revenue in
1999[;]$20 MM in revenue for 2000 year to date[;] Andy Fastow
is in an influential position to direct business to
Merrill.” In the
end, the prospect of more lucrative business from Enron
trumped those at Merrill who urged caution.
As we learn more about how prestigious financial
institutions participated in transactions that allowed Enron
to deceive investors, I am reminded of a congressional hearing
almost a century ago with another banker.
In 1912, J.P. Morgan appeared before a House
subcommittee to be questioned about his firm’s banking
practices. He was
asked whether it was true that his bank had no legal
responsibility for the value of bonds it had sold clients.
He responded that the banks assumed something even more
important than legal responsibility - - moral responsibility.
Yet, last week, when asked by Chairman Levin whether it
was appropriate for a financial institution to act in a manner
it knew was deceptive, one banker responded, “it depends on
what the definition of a deception is.”
It is this sad quote that sums up the attitude of some
professionals on what their duty is in today’s markets.
This attitude must change.
The day of the deal that serves no other purpose than
to exploit an accounting loophole, and the day when the law
serves as the ceiling rather than the floor on the conduct of
Wall Street professionals and corporate executives, must come
to an end.
It is important to remember that the Enron debacle is
more than just a tale of one company’s greed.
As a result of Enron’s downward spiral and ultimate
bankruptcy, shareholders – large and small, individual and
institutional – lost an estimated sixty billion dollars.
The collapse of Enron caused thousands of Americans to
lose jobs, to lose savings, and to lose confidence in
corporate
America
. It is time to
halt practices that are beneficial to a select few and harmful
to thousands.
I want once again to commend Chairman Levin for his
leadership in this important investigation.
The testimony presented to the Subcommittee last week,
together with the testimony we will hear this morning, should
yield valuable lessons for strengthening our free enterprise
system, restoring public confidence in our capital market |