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"Russia and China: Nonproliferation Concerns and Export Controls"

June 6, 2002

Good morning. Today's hearing will examine how well Russia and China comply with nonproliferation agreements and enforce export controls.

We are holding this hearing on the eve of what the whole world fears could be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. These states conceivably would have never developed nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them without assistance from Russia and China.

President Bush has labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the "Axis of Evil" because of their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) aspirations. Last month, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, singled out Syria, Libya, and Cuba in a speech entitled, "Beyond the Axis of Evil."

Naming names of rogue states is only one side of the story. For every state seeking to buy or build a WMD capability, there is also a state enabling them to do so.

We have and should spend time discussing emerging proliferant states and second-tier suppliers, but to make a real difference nonproliferation must start with Russia and China, the major suppliers to proliferant countries.

Since 1992, the U.S. has sanctioned Russian entities more than six times for the illegal export of missile and nuclear technology and chemical and biological dual-use equipment.

The U.S. has sanctioned Chinese entities at least six times, including a few weeks ago for violations of the 2000 Iran Nonproliferation Act. Some of the named Chinese entities have been sanctioned before.

Multilateral export controls agreements, diplomacy, and sanctions are the tools the United States has used to address the supply-side of proliferation. They are imperfect instruments in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction – in part – because two key countries – Russia and China – do not seem to share our view of the dangers nor are they willing to enforce their pledges to prevent proliferation.

Both Russia and China claim to have export controls and agencies in place. Both can legitimately claim that the sheer size of their industrial base, new administrative agencies, growing private export companies, and confusion over new laws makes it hard for them to implement controls. But time and again the United States identifies the same companies and the same individuals involved in illegal activities. It is these companies, these individuals, and occasionally, government officials who proliferate.

Sometimes they do so illegally, but in many instances we are discussing transfers of restricted items that have been condoned by official agencies.

Our witnesses today will discuss the different issues surrounding this important topic. I would like to thank our Administration witnesses on the first panel for being with us today. Ambassador John Wolf is the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. He has been asked to discuss Russian and Chinese proliferation participation in multilateral export control agreements and whether current proliferation concerns are consistent with their compliance to these agreements. Mr. Matthew Borman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce and will address the export control regimes of Russia and China and U.S. assistance to their programs.

These are difficult issues, especially in light of our expanding diplomatic relations with both countries. But these questions need to be asked if we are to find ways to make it better.