STATEMENT OF SENATOR
FRED THOMPSON
Ranking Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Enron Hearing
January 24, 2002
Mr. Chairman. This marks the first day of the first full Senate Committee
hearing on the Enron matter.
This is clearly an appropriate matter for the
Governmental Affairs Committee.
How our government agencies and institutions performed
is a vital part of the inquiry that needs to be made as
Congress works its way to the bottom of this.
I
would also like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am pleased that
you are chairing these hearings.
Having worked closely with you in the past, I know of
no one who has a more proven record of fairness and
objectivity and I look forward to working with you on this
matter.
We
have the opportunity to do some good here - to examine what
went wrong and to consider constructive changes to the
governance of our public capital markets which appear to be inadequate to the demands of the 21st century
and the complex financial transactions that now take place on
a daily basis.
It
is true that not every aspect of the Enron matter is either
unusual or especially cause for great concern.
For instance, to what extent is this simply
a case of individual misconduct or illegal conduct.
No system known to man can prevent unscrupulous and
clever individuals from manipulating the system and even
getting away with it for a period of time.
Also,
how much of this financial disaster was simply the result of
bad business judgment and legitimate risk taking that simply
didn't pan out? This
is not the first big company to go belly-up with losses to
stockholders and employees.
And when it happens it is not always because of illegal
conduct or unethical activities.
But
while it may be that part of what we are seeing here is
individual misconduct
or simple bad business judgement,
both of which our system is very capable of dealing
with, there also seems to be some systematic failures that are much
more troubling.
Our
free markets and our public financial system, much as our
government, are dependent upon certain checks and balances.
Some of the unfortunate tendencies of human nature that
were of concern to our Founding Fathers are just as prevalent
in the corporate world as in the political world.
People entrusted with power need watchdogs and must be
required to operate under public scrutiny. We
must ask ourselves where were the watchdogs here?
Where were the auditors, the law firms, the board of
directors, the analysts and the governmental agencies?
As the Economist recently pointed out, we must
especially look at the role played by auditors.
As they said: "The capital markets, and indeed
capitalism itself, can function efficiently only if the
highest standards of accounting, disclosure and transparency
are observed. In
America, well-policed stock markets, fearsome regulators at
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), stern accounting
standards in the form of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), and the perceived audit skills of the big
five accounting firms, have long been seen as crucial to the
biggest, most liquid and most admired capital markets in the
world."
The
most troubling feature of this issue is not so much as how
these entities failed in the
Enron matter but the fact that this
may be indicative of
problems with auditors, boards and other gatekeepers in
general. For one
thing, most are up to their necks in conflicts of interest. One way or the other, all of these people
have tremendous financial incentive for their company
to make the numbers and keep the stock price high.
This
of, course, plays right into the hands of the unscrupulous
corporate executive who is willing to cover up of the
financial realities of the corporation through non-disclosure,
taking corporate debt off the book, and any number of things
that would raise the question in the mind of the average high
school bookkeeping student.
And
as is often the case, the real scandal here may be from not
what is illegal, but what is totally permissible.
If the generally accepted accounting principles allow
the bookkeeping shenanigans that have been reported in the
press, then we all should go into the derivative business.
It seems that
all too often the name of the corporate game is to
conceal the true financial situation of the company while
doing the minimum amount of disclosure
to avoid legal exposure. The system
is clearly not designed with the primary interest of
the general public or the investor in mind.
Also,
what about the role of the government agencies?
What should they have caught?
Do they have an adequate staff?
We have 17,000 public companies; is the SEC supposed to
keep up with all of them?
Also,
what about those rare instances where the government catches
wrong doing? Are penalties sufficient to deter this kind of behavior?
So
while issues such as individual wrong-doing and who made
contacts with the Administration are interesting and
titillating, the issue of most long-term importance to our
country has to do with the integrity of our systems.
It is also the area in which we have the most
responsibility as legislators.
We must address our legal and regulatory framework not
as what we thought it was, but as we now know it to be and work together toward reform.
As I said, I believe we have an opportunity to do some
good here on a bi-partisan basis. And
who knows, in the process we may even finally decide that
allowing huge amounts of soft money contributions to public
officials is not such a good idea. We
may come to the conclusion that
this practice is always a scandal just waiting to
happen and that we do ourselves and the institution we serve a
disservice by tolerating it.
Mr.
Chairman, I look forward to working with you and other members
of the committee toward a constructive set of hearings. |