

Log 1684

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ISSUED: June 15, 1984

Forwarded to:

Dr. Thomas E. Cooper
DOD Representative
DOD Advisory Committee on Federal Aviation
SAFALG Room 4D 865
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

A-84-61 and -62

On October 25, 1983, a Flying Tigers, Inc. DC 8-63, Flight 2468, landed at Chambers Field, Naval Air Station (NAS), Norfolk, Virginia. The airplane was damaged substantially when it slid off the side of runway 10, crossed a road, went through a chainlink fence, and came to a halt in a swamp. Heavy rain had fallen earlier in the day and the runway was wet. A postaccident report by crash-fire-rescue (CFR) personnel indicated that there was standing water on the runway, 1/2 to 3/4 inch deep in places.

Controllers in the air traffic control tower cab at NAS Norfolk are required to forward information to the radar room regarding anything unusual observed from the tower cab. This information can then be passed on to incoming flights. On October 25, 1983, the tower controller indicated that she observed nothing unusual, although she was aware that water had been spraying from the tails of some aircraft on the runways during the takeoff run.

A duty officer is assigned to air operations at NAS Norfolk 24 hours a day. The duty officer is not required to inspect the runways, however, and no local procedure has been specified to monitor water depth on the runways. The incoming pilot of Flight 2468 was not provided with an advisory regarding water on the runway.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not conduct airport certification inspections or examine the airport operations manuals of military airports. Based on this policy and by mutual agreement between the FAA and the Department of Defense, NAS Norfolk is certificated for operations under Subpart B of 14 CFR Part 139 although the airport is not inspected by the FAA. The inspection requirement is waived for military airports because the rules governing military airport operations are generally more stringent than those applicable to civil airports under 14 CFR Part 139, especially with regard to airport firefighting services and rescue equipment.

The Safety Board's investigation of the accident involving Flight 2468, however, revealed that NAS Norfolk does not conduct the airport condition assessment and reporting described in 14 CFR 139.69. The regulation requires that the airport operator provide appropriate procedures for identifying, assessing, and disseminating information to air carrier users of its airport regarding the presence and depth of snow, slush, ice, or

water on runways or taxiways. The Safety Board believes that similar procedures for airport condition assessment and reporting should be developed and implemented by NAS Norfolk and other military airports from which civil aircraft operate which do not already comply with 14 CFR Part 139.

On April 22, 1983, the Safety Board published Special Investigation Report: Large Airplane Operations on Contaminated Runways. This report contained several recommendations which, although addressed to civil air traffic controllers, are equally applicable to military controllers and at military airports from which civil aircraft operate. Two of those recommendations are of general applicability:

Amend air traffic control procedures to require that controllers disseminate "poor" and "nil" braking action reports promptly to airport management and to all departing and arriving flights until airport management reports that the braking action is "good." (Class II, Priority Action) (A-82-157)

Stress in initial and recurrent air traffic controller training programs, the importance of transmitting all known contaminated runway condition information to departing and arriving flights, that a "fair" or "poor" braking report from a pilot may indicate conditions which are hazardous for a heavier airplane, and that departing and arriving pilots should be informed when no recent landing by a comparable airplane has been made. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-82-158)

At some military airports where broadcasts are made on civil frequencies, the following recommendation would be applicable:

Amend air traffic control procedures to require that Automatic Terminal Information Service broadcasts: (1) be updated promptly after receipt of reports of braking conditions worse than those reported in the current broadcast, and (2) when conditions are conducive to deteriorating braking action, include a statement that braking action advisories are in effect. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-82-159)

Based on the above considerations, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Department of Defense:

Develop and institute procedures to meet the assessment and reporting requirements of 14 CFR 139.69 at military airports from which civil aircraft operate. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-84-61)

Distribute to all military airports from which civil aircraft operate National Transportation Safety Board Special Investigation Report, Large Airplane Operations on Contaminated Runways (NTSB/SIR-83/02), and institute the actions recommended in Safety Recommendations A-82-157 and A-82-158 at military airports from which civil aircraft operate. (Class III, Longer-Term Action) (A-84-62)

BURNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and BURSLEY and GROSE, Members, concurred in these recommendations.

By: 
Jim Burnett
Chairman