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Monday, June 19, 2000

# Part III

# Department of Commerce

**Bureau of Export Administration** 

# Department of Transportation

15 CFR Part 730, et al.

44 CFR Part 403

Easing of Export Restrictions on North Korea; Final Rules

# Department of the Treasury

Office of Foreign Assets Control

31 CFR Part 500 Foreign Assets Control Regulations in North Korea; Final Rule

#### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

#### **Bureau of Export Administration**

15 CFR Parts 730, 732, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 758, and 774

[Docket No. 000605165-0165-01]

#### RIN 0694-AC10

# Easing of Export Restrictions on North Korea

**AGENCY:** Bureau of Export Administration, Commerce.

### **ACTION:** Interim rule with request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the President's statement of September 17, 1999 easing sanctions against North Korea. The United States is taking this action in order to pursue improved overall relations.

**DATES:** This rule is effective June 19, 2000. Comments must be received no later than July 19, 2000.

**ADDRESSES:** Written comments should be sent to Kirsten Mortimer, Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James A. Lewis, Director, Office of Strategic Trade, at (202) 482–0092.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Background

On September 17, 1999, the President announced his decision to ease sanctions against North Korea. The United States is taking this action, which is consistent with the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 1999 Perry Report, in order to pursue improved overall relations.

Under this new policy, most items subject to the EAR designated as EAR99 may be exported or reexported to North Korea without a license. In addition, BXA is changing the licensing policy for certain items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) destined to North Korean civil end-users from a policy of denial to case-by-case review.

This regulation adds certain categories of items to the CCL for which a license will be required to North Korea. Consequently, this regulation identifies certain Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) that are controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons to North Korea only. These new ECCNs do not refer to any column on the Country Chart and therefore exporters are not required to consult the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 to determine licensing requirements for these entries.

This easing of sanctions does not affect U.S. anti-terrorism or nonproliferation export controls on North Korea, including end-user and end-use controls maintained under the **Enhanced Proliferation Control** Initiative. This does not relieve exporters or reexporters of their obligations under General Prohibition 5 in §736.2(b)(5) of the EAR which provides that, "you may not, without a license, knowingly export or reexport any item subject to the EAR to an enduser or end-use that is prohibited by part 744 of the EAR." BXA strongly urges the use of Supplement No. 3 to part 732 of the EAR, "BXA's "Know Your Customer" Guidance and Red Flags" when exporting or reexporting to North Korea.

This rule does not affect the export license denial policy imposed under the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, in place against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and its subunits, successors, and affiliated companies, and certain sectors of North Korean government-related activity, set forth in 63 FR 24585 (May 4, 1998) and more recently in 65 FR 20239 (April 14, 2000). This license denial policy requires BXA to deny license applications submitted for exports to Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and the related entities listed above. This entity is not on the Entity List (see Supp. No. 4 to part 744) and does not appear on the list of projects in Supp. No. 1 to part 740 which have the effect of triggering a license requirement for items subject to the EAR (e.g., including all items classified as EAR99).

Although the Export Administration Act (EAA) expired on August 20, 1994, the President invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and continued in effect the EAR, and, to the extent permitted by law, the provisions of the EAA in Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994, as extended by the President's notices of August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42767), August 14, 1996 (61 FR 42527), August 13, 1997 (62 FR 43629), August 13, 1998 (63 FR 44121), and August 10, 1999 (64 F.R. 44101).

#### **Rulemaking Requirements**

1. This interim rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Executive Order 12866.

2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information, subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. This rule involves collections of information subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*) These collections have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 0694– 0088.

3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications sufficient to warrant preparation of a Federalism assessment under Executive Order 13132.

4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable because this regulation involves a military and foreign affairs function of the United States. See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). Further, no other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment be given for this interim rule. Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment are not required to be given for this rule under 5 U.S.C. or by any other law, the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) are not applicable.

However, because of the importance of the issues raised by these regulations, this rule is issued in interim form and comments will be considered in the development of final regulations. Accordingly, the Department encourages interested persons who wish to comment to do so at the earliest possible time to permit the fullest consideration of their views.

The period for submission of comments will close July 19, 2000. The Department will consider all comments received before the close of the comment period in developing final regulations. Comments received after the end of the comment period will be considered if possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department will not accept public comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of the material be treated confidentially because of its business proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return such comments and materials to the person submitting the comments and will not consider them in the development of final regulations. All public comments on these regulations will be a matter of public record and

will be available for public inspection and copying. In the interest of accuracy and completeness, the Department requires comments in written form.

Oral comments must be followed by written memoranda, which will also be a matter of public record and will be available for public review and copying. Communications from agencies of the United States Government or foreign governments will not be made available for public inspection.

The public record concerning these regulations will be maintained in the Bureau of Export Administration Freedom of Information Records Inspection Facility, Room 6881, Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Records in this facility, including written public comments and memoranda summarizing the substance of oral communications, may be inspected and copied in accordance with regulations published in part 4 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Information about the inspection and copying of records at the facility may be obtained from the Bureau of Export Administration Freedom of Information Officer, at the above address or by calling (202) 482-0500.

#### List of Subjects

#### 15 CFR Part 730

Administrative practice and procedure, Advisory committees, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Strategic and critical materials.

#### 15 CFR Parts 732, 740 and 758

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and Recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Parts 736, 742 and 774

Exports, Foreign trade.

#### 15 CFR Part 738

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Foreign trade.

#### 15 CFR Part 744

Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

#### 15 CFR Part 746

Embargoes, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Accordingly, parts 730, 732, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 758, and 774 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730 through 799) are amended as follows: 1. The authority citation for part 730 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; 10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 46 U.S.C. app. 466c; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; E.O. 11912, 41 FR 15825, 3 CFR, 1976 Comp., p. 114; E.O. 12002, 42 FR 35623, 3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p.133; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12214, 45 FR 29783, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 256; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12854, 58 FR 36587, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12867, 58 FR 51747, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 649; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 899; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 12981, 60 FR 62981, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 419; E.O. 13020, 61 FR 54079, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp. p. 219; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of November 12, 1998, 63 FR 63589, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., p. 305; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

2. The authority citation for part 732 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

3. The authority citation for part 736 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

4. The authority citation for part 738 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 46 U.S.C. app. 466c; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

5. The authority citation for part 740 is revised to read as follows:

**Authority:** 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

6. The authority citation for part 742 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; 18 U.S.C. 2510 *et seq.*;

22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of November 12, 1998, 63 FR 63589, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., p. 305; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

7. The authority citation for part 744 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of November 12, 1998, 63 FR 63589, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., p. 305; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

8. The authority citation for part 746 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 6004; E.O. 12854, 58 FR 36587, 3 CFR 1993 Comp., p. 614; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 899; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p.917; E.O. 13088, 63 FR 32109, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., p. 191; E.O. 13121 of April 30, 1999, 64 FR 24021 (May 5, 1999); Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

9. The authority citation for part 758 is revised to read as follows:

**Authority:** 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

10. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 774 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c, 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq., 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 46 U.S.C. app. 466c; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; Notice of August 10, 1999, 64 FR 44101, 3 CFR, 1999 Comp., p. 302.

#### PART 730—[AMENDED]

11. Supplement No. 3 to Part 730 is amended by removing the next to last entry entitled "Prohibition of Movement of American Carriers and Prohibition on Transportation of Goods Destined for North Korea". 38150

#### PART 732-[AMENDED]

12. Section 732.1 is amended: a. By revising the phrase "Libya, and North Korea." in the next to last sentence of paragraph (d)(2) to read "and Libya."; and

b. By revising the phrase "Libya, and North Korea" in the last sentence of paragraph (d)(3) to read "and Libya".

#### §732.2 [Amended]

13. Section 732.2 is amended by revising the phrase "North Korea, Libya," in paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read "Libya,".

#### §732.3 [Amended]

14. Section 732.3 is amended:

a. By revising the phrase "Libya, and North Korea;" in the first sentence of paragraph (d)(4) to read "and Libya;";

b. By revising the phrase "Libya, North Korea," in the first sentence of paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read "Libya,"; and

c. By revising the phrase "Libya, North Korea," in the first sentence of the introductory text of paragraph (i) to read "Libya,".

#### PART 736-[AMENDED]

15. Section 736.2 is amended by revising the phrase "Cuba, North Korea, Libya," in paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read "Cuba, Libya,".

COMMERCE COUNTRY CHART

#### PART 738-[AMENDED]

16. Section 738.3 is amended by revising the phrase "ECCNs 0A988, 0A989, 0B986, 1C355, 1C995, 2A994, 2D994, and 2E994" in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) to read "ECCNs 0A988, 0A989, 0A999, 0B986, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1B999, 1C355, 1C995, 1C998, 1C999, 1D999, 2A994, 2A999, 2B999, 2D994, 2E994, 3A999, and 6A999".

17. Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 is amended by revising the entry for "Korea, North" to read as follows:

#### Supplement No. 1 to Part 738— COMMERCE COUNTRY CHART

\* \* \* \* \*

					[R	eason f	for cont	rol]								
Countries	Chemical & biologi- cal weapons			Nuclear non- proliferation		National se- curity		Mis- sile	Regional stability		Fire- arms	Crime control		trol	Anti-ter- rorism	
	CB 1	CB 2	CB 3	NP 1	NP 2	NS 1	NS 2	MT 1	RS 1	RS 2	FC 1	CC 1	CC CC 2 3	CC 3	AT AT 1 2	AT 2
Korea, North	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	х	Х	х		Х	х	х	х	Х

\* \* \* \* \*

#### PART 740—[AMENDED]

#### §740.5 [Amended]

18. Section 740.5 is amended by revising the phrase "Country Group D:1." to read "Country Group D:1, except North Korea.".

#### §740.9 [Amended]

19. Section 740.9 is amended: a. By revising the phrase "Cuba or North Korea" in the second sentence of paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read "Cuba";

b. By revising the phrase "Cuba, Libya, or North Korea." in the last sentence of paragraph (b)(3) to read "Cuba or Libya."; and

c. By revising the phrase "Cuba, Libya, or North Korea;" in paragraph (b)(4)(i) to read "Cuba or Libya;".

#### §740.10 [Amended]

20. Section 740.10 is amended:

a. By revising the phrase "except the PRC" in the heading of paragraph (b)(2)(iii) to read "except the PRC and North Korea"; and

b. By revising the phrase "(except the People's Republic of China (PRC))" in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) to read "(except the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea)"

#### §740.15 [Amended]

21. Section 740.15 is amended:

a. By revising the phrase "Cuba, or North Korea," in the first sentence of paragraph (b)(1) to read "Cuba,";

b. By revising the phrase "Country Group D:1 or North Korea" in the second sentence of paragraph (b)(1) to read "Country Group D:1"; c. By revising the phrase "Cuba, Libya, or North Korea," in paragraph (b)(2) to read "Cuba, or Libya,"; and

d. By revising the phrase "Cuba, North Korea or" in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2) introductory text and (c)(2)(ii) to read "Cuba or".

#### §740.16 [Amended]

22. Section 740.16 is amended by revising the phrase "Cambodia or Laos" in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) to read

"Cambodia, Laos, or North Korea".

23. Supplement No. 1 to part 740 is amended:

a. By revising the entry for "Korea, North" in Country Group D; and

b. By revising Country Group E to read as follows:

#### Supplement No. 1 to Part 740

\* \* \* \* \*

#### COUNTRY GROUP D

	Cou	ntry		[D:1] National se- curity	[D:2] Nuclear	[D:3] Chemical & biological	[D:4] Missile technology
*	*	*	*	*		*	*
Korea, North				Х	Х	Х	X 1

\* \* \* \* \*

#### COUNTRY GROUP E

Country	[E:1] UN embargo	[E:2] Unilateral embargo
Angola Cuba Iraq Libya Rwanda Serbia and Montenegro	x x x x x x	x x

#### PART 742—[AMENDED]

#### §742.1 [Amended]

24. Section 742.1 is amended: a. By removing the third sentence of paragraph (a);

b. By removing the phrase "North Korea," from the heading of paragraph (c) and the first sentence of paragraph (c);

c. By revising the phrase "Iran, Syria" in the first sentence of paragraph (d) to read "Iran, North Korea, Syria"; and

d. By revising the phrase "Iraq and North Korea," in the last sentence of paragraph (d) to read "and Iraq,".

#### §740.12 [Amended]

25. Section 742.12 is amended by revising the phrase "for North Korea see § 746.5." in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) to read "for North Korea see § 742.19(b).".

26. Part 742 is revised by adding new § 742.19 to read as follows:

#### §742.19 Anti-terrorism: North Korea

(a) *License requirements*. (1) All items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) (i.e., with a designation other than EAR 99) require a license for export or reexport to North Korea, except ECCNs 0A988 and 0A989. This includes all items controlled for AT reasons, including any item on the CCL containing AT column 1 or AT column 2 in the Country Chart column of the License Requirements section of an ECCN; and ECCNS 0A986, 0A999, 0B986, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1B999, 1C995, 1C999, 1D999, 2A994, 2B994, 2C994, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated North Korea as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy on terrorism-supporting countries, BXA maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs(c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No.2 to part 742 are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration

Act, as amended (EAA), if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users.

(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as items described in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(44) to all end-users, are controlled to North Korea under section 6(a) of the EAA. (See Supplement No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the EAA and § 750.6 of the EAR for procedures for processing license applications for items controlled under EAA section 6(j).)

(b) *Licensing policy*. (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in North Korea of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Items controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These items have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iii) Items controlled for nuclear weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain NP Column 1 or NP Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) Items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(v) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section in an ECCN on the CCL and are controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number "18."

(vi) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vii) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled any destination. These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(viii) Submersible systems controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(ix) Scuba gear and related equipment controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(x) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment controlled under ECCN 9A991.

(xi) Explosive device detectors controlled under ECCN 2A993.

(xii) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(xiii) Computer numerically

controlled machine tools controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xiv) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xv) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment controlled under ECCN 3B991.

(xvi) Digital computers with a CTP above 2000.

(xvii) Microprocessors with a CTP of 550 or above.

(2) Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(3) Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of items described in paragraphs (c)(12), (c)(24), (c)(34), (c)(37), (c)(38), and (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to nuclear endusers or nuclear end-uses. Applications for non-nuclear end-users or for nonnuclear end-uses, excluding items described in (c)(24)(iv)(A) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(4) License applications for items reviewed under section 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of section 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of North Korea, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance North Korea's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

27. Supplement No. 2 to Part 742 is revised to read as follows:

#### Supplement No. 2 to Part 742—Anti-Terrorism Controls: Iran, North Korea, Syria and Sudan Contract Sanctity Dates and Related Policies

Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BXA will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

(a) *Terrorist-supporting countries.* The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

(b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a). Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

(1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.

(2) License applications for items controlled to designated terroristsupporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

(3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are:

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and

(ii) The following items to all endusers: for Iran, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(42) of this Supplement; for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14), and (c)(16) through (c)(42) of this Supplement; and for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.

(c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are generally described in §§ 742.8, 742.9, 742.10, and 742.19 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for Iran, North Korea, Svria, and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefitting from preexisting contracts involving Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Exporters are advised that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran (See Executive Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15, 1995, May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997, respectively.) Exporters are further advised that exports and reexports to Iran of items that are listed on the CCL as requiring a license for national security or foreign policy reasons are subject to a policy of denial under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note (1994)). Transactions involving Iran and benefitting from a

contract that pre-dates October 23, 1992 may be considered under the applicable licensing policy in effect prior to that date.

(1) All items subject to national security controls.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of items valued at \$7 million or more: January 23, 1984.

(B) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of all other national security controlled items: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for nonmilitary end-users or end-uses: August 28, 1991, *unless* otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military end-users or enduses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls. Applications for all end-users in Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Iran and Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742

(3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR). Applications for all end-users in Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Iran and Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL).

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. No contract sanctity date is available.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military endusers or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number "18".

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for all endusers in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all endusers in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.,* items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more: January 23, 1984. (B) Contract sanctity date for other helicopters and aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by 9A991.d: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all endusers in Syria will generally be denied.

(A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.

(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

(C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986.

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all endusers in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

(7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors.(i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters.

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.

(11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(12) Electronic test equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment for all endusers: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for nonnuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(13) *Mobile communications* equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all endusers of all other mobile communications equipment: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.,* items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other acoustic underwater detection equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993). (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(15) Portable electric power generators.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other vessels and boats for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower).

(i) *Īran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for outboard engines of 45 HP or more for all endusers: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for all other marine and submarine engines for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(18) Underwater photographic equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987. (ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(19) Submersible systems.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such systems will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(20) Scuba gear and related equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. No contract sanctity is available for such items to Iran.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other computer numerically controlled machine tools for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically

controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(23) Vibration test equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(24) Digital computers with a CTP of 6 or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for military end-users and end-uses of items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea.

(A) Computers with a CTP above 2000 MTOPS: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.

(B) Computers with a CTP at or below 2000 MTOPS: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(25) *Telecommunications equipment.*(i) A license is required for the following telecommunications

equipment:

(A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or "spectral efficiency" greater than 3 bit/s/Hz;

(B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm;

(C) "Telecommunications transmission systems" or equipment with a "digital transfer rate" at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s. (ii) *Iran*. Applications for all endusers in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iv) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(v) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(26) Microprocessors.

(i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.

(A) *Iran.* Applications for all endusers in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(1) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(B) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. (1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.

(C) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(ii) With a CTP of 550 MTOPS or above.

(A) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(B) [Reserved]

(27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For Iran, Syria, Sudan, or North Korea a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses in Iran of packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other packet switches for all end-users: August 28, 1991. (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(30) Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such gravity meters for all endusers: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. (32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such magnetometers for all endusers: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such compounds will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such fluorocarbon compounds for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.,* items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such fibers will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for nonnuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. (36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines to all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

(37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other manual dimensional inspection machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis. (A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for nonnuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraphs (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for nonnuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(39) *Explosive device detectors described in ECCN 2A993.* 

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all endusers in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(40) [Reserved]

(41) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for nonmilitary end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(42) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all endusers in Syria of these items will generally be denied.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. (43) [Reserved]

(44) Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.

(i) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military enduses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for nonnuclear end-users or non-nuclear enduses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) [Reserved]

#### PART 744—[AMENDED]

28. Section 744.7 is amended by revising the phrase "North Korea or Country Group D:1" in paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2) introductory text, and (b)(2)(ii) to read "Country Group D:1".

#### PART 746—[AMENDED]

#### §746.1 [Amended]

29. Section 746.1 is amended: a. By revising the phrase "Libya, North Korea," in the introductory text of paragraph (a) to read "Libya,";

b. By revising the heading of paragraph (a)(1) to read "Cuba and Libya"; and

c. By revising the phrase "Cuba, Libya, or North Korea." in the first sentence of paragraph (a)(1) to read "Cuba or Libya." and revising the phrase "Cuba, Libya, and North Korea" in the second sentence of paragraph (a)(1) to read "Cuba or Libya."

(a)(1) to read "Cuba or Libya.". 30. Part 746 is amended by removing and reserving § 746.5.

#### PART 758—[AMENDED]

#### §758.3 [Amended]

31. Section 758.3 is amended by revising the phrase "Cuba, or North Korea." in paragraph (i)(2) to read "or Cuba.".

#### PART 774—[AMENDED]

32. In Supplement No. 1 to part 774 (the Commerce Control List) Category O—Nuclear Materials, Facilities, and Equipment (And Misc. Items), Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) are amended:

a. By revising the "License

- Requirements'' section in ECCN 0A986; b. By adding a new ECCN 0A999;
- c. By revising the "License Requirements" section in ECCN 0B986;
- d. By adding a new ECCN 0B999; and e. By adding a new ECCN 0D999 to

read as follows:

#### 0A986 Shotgun Shells, Except Buckshot Shotgun Shells, and Parts

#### **License Requirements**

*Reason for Control:* AT, FC, UN. *Control(s).* 

Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

FC applies to entire entry.

FC Column 1.

UN applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Rwanda and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### 0A999 Specific Processing Equipment, as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart. AT applies to entire entry. A license

is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: N/A. Related Definitions: N/A. Items: a. Ring Magnets; b. Reserved.

0B986 Equipment Specially Designed for Manufacturing Shotgun Shells; and Ammunition Hand-Loading Equipment for Both Cartridges and Shotgun Shells

#### License Requirements

Reason for Control: AT, UN. Control(s). Country Chart. AT applies to entire entry. A license

is required for items controlled by this

entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

UN applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Rwanda and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information.

\* \* \* \*

#### 0B999 Specific Processing Equipment, as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: N/A. Related Definitions: N/A. Items: a. Hot cells; b. Glove boxes suitable for use with radioactive materials.

# 0D999 Specific Software, as Follows (See List of Items Controlled).

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart. AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

CIV: N/A TSR: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

*Unit:* \$ value.

Related Controls: N/A. Related Definitions: N/A.

Items:

a. Software for neutronic calculations/ modeling;

b. Software for radiation transport calculations/modeling;

c. Software for hydrodynamic calculations/modeling.

\* \* \* \* \*

33. In Supplement No. 1 to part 774 (the Commerce Control List) Category

1—Materials, Chemicals,

Microorganisms, and Toxins, ECCNs are amended:

a. By adding ECCNs 1A999, 1B999, 1C999, and 1D999; and

b. By revising the "License Requirements" section in ECCN 1C995, to read as follows:

#### 1A999 Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

*Reason for Control:* AT. *Control(s).* 

Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A. GBS: N/A. CIV: N/A.

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: N/A. Related Definitions: N/A.

Items:

a. Radiation detection, monitoring and measurement equipment, n.e.s.;

b. Radiographic detection equipment such as x-ray converters, and storage phosphor image plates.

\* \* \* \*

#### 1B999 Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s).

Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value.

Related Controls: See also 1B001, 1B101, 1B201, 1B225 and 1D999.

Related Definitions: N/A. Items:

a. Electrolytic cells for flourine production, n.e.s.;

b. Particle accelerators;

c. Industrial process control

hardware/systems designed for power industries, n.e.s.;

d. Freon and chilled water cooling systems capable of continuous cooling duties of 100,000 BTU/hr (29.3 kW) or greater;

e. Equipment for the production of structural composites, fibers, prepregs and preforms, n.e.s.

\* \*

#### 1C995 Mixtures Containing Precursor and Intermediate Chemicals Used in the "Production" of Chemical Warfare Agents That Are Not Controlled by **EČCN 1C350**

#### License Requirements

Reason for Control: AT.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information on Cuba, Iran, and Libya. See §742.19 of the EAR for additional information on North Korea.

#### 1C999 Specific Materials, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value.

Related Controls: See also 1C236. Related Definitions: N/A. Items:

a. Hardened steel and tungsten carbide precision ball bearings (3mm or greater diameter);

b. 304 and 316 stainless steel plate, n.e.s.;

c. Monel plate;

d. Tributyl phosphate;

e. Nitric acid in concentrations of 20

weight percent or greater;

f. Flourine;

g. Alpha-emitting radionuclides, n.e.s. \* \*

#### 1D999 Specific Software, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart. AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

CIV: N/A TSR: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: See also 1B999. Related Definitions: N/A.

Items:

a. Software specially designed for industrial process control hardware/ systems controlled by 1B999, n.e.s.;

b. Software specially designed for equipment for the production of structural composites, fibers, prepregs and preforms controlled by 1B999, n.e.s.

34. In Supplement No. 1 to part 774 (the Commerce Control List) Category 2, Materials Processing, of the Commerce Control List, ECCNs are amended:

a. By revising the "License

Requirements" section in ECCNs 2A994; b. By adding ECCNs 2A999 and 2B999; and

b. By revising the "License Requirements" section in ECCN 2D994, to read as follows:

#### 2A994 Portable Electric Generators and Specially Designed Parts

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s).

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The

Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information on Cuba, Iran, and Libya. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information on North Korea.

\* \*

#### 2A999 Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled).

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See §742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: See also 2A226, 2B350 Related Definitions: N/A. Items:

a. Bellows sealed valves; b. Reserved.

#### 2B999 Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled).

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart.

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value.

Related Controls: See also 0B001, 0B002, 0B004, 1B233, 2A293, 2B001.f, 2B004, 2B009, 2B104, 1B109, 2B204, 2B209, 2B228, 2B229, 2B231, 2B350. Related Definitions: N/A.

Items:

a. Isostatic presses, n.e.s.;

b. Bellows manufacturing equipment, including hydraulic forming equipment and bellows forming dies;

c. Laser welding machines;

d. MIG welders;

e. E-beam welders;

f. Monel equipment, including valves, piping, tanks and vessels;

g. 304 and 316 stainless steel valves, piping, tanks and vessels;

h. Mining and drilling equipment, as follows:

h.1. Large boring equipment capable of drilling holes greater than two feet in diameter:

h.2. Large earth-moving equipment used in the mining industry;

i. Electroplating equipment designed for coating parts with nickel or aluminum;

j. Pumps designed for industrial service and for use with an electrical motor of 5 HP or greater;

k. Vacuum valves, piping, flanges, gaskets and related equipment specially designed for use in high-vacuum service, n.e.s.;

l. Spin forming and flow forming machines, n.e.s.;

m. Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines, n.e.s.;

n. Austenitic stainless steel plate, valves, piping, tanks and vessels.

#### 2D994 "Software" Specially Designed for the "Development" or "Production" of Portable Electric Generators Controlled by 2A994

\* \* \* \* \*

#### License Requirements

*Reason for Control:* AT. *Control(s).* 

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information on Cuba, Iran, and Libya. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information on North Korea.

\* \* \* \*

35. Category 2, Materials Processing, of the Commerce Control List, is amended by revising the "License Requirements" section in ECCN 2E994 to read as follows:

#### 2E994 "Technology" for the "Use" of Portable Electric Generators Controlled by 2A994

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **License Requirements**

*Reason for Control:* AT. *Control(s).* 

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements for this entry. See part 746 of the EAR for additional information on Cuba, Iran, and Libya. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information on North Korea.

36. In Supplement No. 1 to part 774 (the Commerce Control List)—Category 3, Electronics, Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) are amended:

a. By revising the "License Requirements" section in ECCN 3A991; and

b. By adding ECCN 3A999, as follows:

#### 3A991 Electronic Devices and Components Not Controlled by 3A001

#### License Requirements

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s): AT applies to entire entry. Country Chart: AT Column 1. License Requirements Notes:

1. Microprocessors with a CTP below 550 MTOPS listed in paragraph (a) of this entry may be shipped NLR (No License Required) when destined to North Korea, provided restrictions set forth in other sections of the EAR (*e.g.*, end-use restrictions), do not apply.

#### 3A999 Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s). Country Chart. AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value. Related Controls: See also 0B002, 3A225 (for frequency changes capable of operating in the frequency range of 600 Hz and above), 3A233.

Related Definitions: N/A. Items:

a. Frequency changers capable of operating in the frequency range from 300 up to 600 Hz, n.e.s;

b. Mass spectrometers n.e.s;

c. All flash x-ray machines, and components of pulsed power systems designed thereof, including Marx generators, high power pulse shaping networks, high voltage capacitors, and triggers;

d. Pulse amplifiers, n.e.s.;

e. Electronic equipment for time delay generation or time interval measurement, as follows:

e.1. Digital time delay generators with a resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater; *or* 

e.2. Multi-channel (three or more) or modular time interval meter and chronometry equipment with resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater;

f. Chromatography and spectrometry analytical instruments.

37. In Supplement No. 1 to part 774 (the Commerce Control List)—Category 6, Sensors and Lasers is amended by adding ECCN 6A999, as follows:

#### 6A999 Specific Processing Equipment, as Follows (See List of Items Controlled)

#### **License Requirements**

\*

Reason for Control: AT. Control(s).

Country Chart.

\*

\*

AT applies to entire entry. A license is required for items controlled by this entry to North Korea for anti-terrorism reasons. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine AT licensing requirements for this entry. See § 742.19 of the EAR for additional information.

#### **License Exceptions**

LVS: N/A GBS: N/A CIV: N/A

#### List of Items Controlled

Unit: \$ value.

Related Controls: See also 6A203. Related Definitions: N/A. Items:

a. Seismic detection equipment;

b. Radiation hardened TV cameras, n.e.s.

\* \* \* \*

**38164** Federal Register/Vol. 65, No. 118/Monday, June 19, 2000/Rules and Regulations

Dated: June 12, 2000. **R. Roger Majak**, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. [FR Doc. 00–15168 Filed 6–16–00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510–33–P

#### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

#### 44 CFR Part 403

#### RIN 2105-AC70

# Repeal of Traffic Restrictions to North Korea

**AGENCY:** Department of Commerce and Department of Transportation. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** The Departments of Transportation and Commerce maintain joint restrictions on shipping to North Korea, prohibiting any ships documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States from engaging in transportation to and from North Korea. In view of the President's recent decision to ease certain sanctions against North Korea, the two departments are repealing the restrictions. This action requires a change to the Code of Federal Regulations.

**DATES:** This final rule is effective June 19, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Christopher T. Tourtellot, Office of the Assistant General Counsel for International Law, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366–9183. Ms. Rochelle Woodard, Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel for Export Administration, Room 3839, 14th Street & Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20230. Telephone: (202) 482–5304.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The regulations in 44 CFR Part 403 (Transportation Order T–2), which are the joint responsibility of the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, currently impose a shipping restriction that prohibits any ships documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft under the laws of the United States from engaging in transportation to and from North Korea.

On September 17, 1999, the President announced his intention to ease certain sanctions against North Korea in order to pursue improved relations. There is also a need to facilitate transportation to and from North Korea in support of the Agreed Framework of October 1994.

To accomplish this goal, the Departments of Transportation and Commerce are repealing Order T–2, 44 CFR Part 403, the effect of which is to permit any ships documented under the laws of the United States and any aircraft registered under laws of the United States to engage in transportation to and from North Korea, subject to applicable regulatory restrictions such as the transportation and export control regulations.

This is being released as a final rule. Prior notice and opportunity for public comment are not required to be provided for this rule pursuant to the military and foreign affairs exemption contained in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). Therefore, the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., are inapplicable. Because of the need to facilitate transportation to and from North Korea, especially the delivery of humanitarian aid, and because of the need to support the Agreed Framework to pursue improved relations with North Korea in furtherance of United States foreign policy, we are making the rule effective on less than 30-day's notice.

#### **International Trade Impact Statement**

This final regulation applies to all United States air carriers and shipping lines, as well as all privately owned aircraft and ships that are documented or registered under the laws of the United States. The rule should improve United States companies' ability to compete in international markets and to participate in trade and travel in the North Korea market. The overall level of travel to and from the United States is not expected to be significantly affected.

#### **Regulatory Impact**

#### Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rulemaking affects other federal agencies and involves important matters of public policy, and is therefore significant under DOT Policies and Procedures. It is also a significantly regulatory action for the purposes of Executive Order 12866.

#### **Economic Analysis**

The repeal of the regulation will have only the smallest economic impact on affected parties. Given this *de minimis* effect, the Department finds that further economic analysis is unnecessary.

#### **Paperwork Reduction Act**

The repeal of this rule will not alter any recordkeeping or reporting requirements.

#### **Other Executive Orders**

The repeal of this rule will not implicate any interests affected by the provisions of Executive Order 12630, Government Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights; Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform; or Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks.

#### **Federalism Implications**

The repeal of this regulation has no direct impact on the individual states, on the balance of power in their respective governments, or on the burden of responsibilities assigned them by the national government. In accordance with Executive Order 13132 consultation with state and local governments is, therefore, not required.

# Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

The repeal of this rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of \$100 million or more to either state, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or on the private sector.

#### List of Subjects in 44 CFR Part 403

Air carriers, Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of, Maritime carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Accordingly, under the authority of Sec. 704, 64 Stat. 816, as amended; 50 U.S.C. App. 2154; interpret or apply sec.101, 64 Stat. 799, as amended; 50 U.S.C. App. 2071; E.O. 10480, 18 FR 4939, 3 CFR 1953 Supp.; sec. 4(a) Pub. L. 89–670, 80 Stat. 933; 49 U.S.C. 1653; and the authority delegated by 49 CFR 1.56a(c) for the Department of Transportation; and as discussed in the Supplementary Information, amend 44 CFR Chapter IV as follows:

#### PART 403—[REMOVED]

1. Part 403 is removed.