

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
 GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **30-JUL-2008** TIME: **1515** HOURS

2. OPERATOR:

Merit Energy Company

REPRESENTATIVE: **Grossman, Julie**

TELEPHONE: **(281) 578-3388**

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G02404**

AREA: **HI** LATITUDE:

BLOCK: **A 283** LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: **A**

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION(POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOC/POD)

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC
- HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 - UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

- 9. WATER DEPTH: **185** FT.
- 10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **89** MI.
- 11. WIND DIRECTION: **SE**
SPEED: **12** M.P.H.
- 12. CURRENT DIRECTION: **N**
SPEED: **2** M.P.H.
- 13. SEA STATE: **4** FT.

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

Operating personnel were attempting to bring the platform back on line, but were unable to locate the appropriate production vessel's first out indicator in order to identify and correct the problem. The platform had been shut-in by a LSH on the wet oil tank, and the second time by a LSH on the Low Pressure Separator MBD 1100. One of the operators observed a hydrocarbon mist coming from the flare scrubber vent, when the wind direction blew the mist back to the generator's exhaust piping. The platform was shut-in, and the fire was quickly put out with one handheld fire extinguisher.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Allowing the flare scrubber to fill with fluid resulted in fluid carry-over to the generator's hot piping.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Malfunctioning of the Low Production Separator MBD 1100 LSH allowed condensate to carry over into the water outlet of the vessel to the flare scrubber vent.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Paint on top of the generator was scorched.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The Lake Jackson District recommends that a safety alert be sent to operators informing them of the following potential risks associated with trouble shooting start up(or up-set problems) production problems:

- 1) The LSH may have to be lowered on the MBD 1100 Low Pressure Separator while trouble shooting other production vessels for start up (or up-set problems) in order to prevent condensate from being carried over thru the water outlet to the flare scrubber.
- 2) Fluid levels can be verified by cleaning and viewing the sight glasses.
- 3) Review the location of the flare vent piping to ensure that it vents away from the generator's exhaust piping.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **YES**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 Human Error resulting from inadequate maintenance.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

08-AUG-2008

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Bernie Fink /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

John McCarroll

APPROVED

DATE: **25-AUG-2008**