

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION  
**ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **04-JUN-2006** TIME: **0703** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **BP Exploration & Production Inc.**

REPRESENTATIVE: **Linda Onstott**

TELEPHONE: **(281) 366-0219**

3. LEASE: **G11081**

AREA: **GC** LATITUDE:

BLOCK: **645** LONGITUDE:

4. PLATFORM: **A-Holstein Spar**  
RIG NAME: **HOLSTEIN SPAR RIG**

5. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION(POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

6. TYPE:  FIRE  
 EXPLOSION  
 BLOWOUT  
 COLLISION  
 INJURY NO. 0  
 FATALITY NO. 0  
 POLLUTION  
 OTHER **Top Drive Unplanned Descent**

7. OPERATION:  PRODUCTION  
 DRILLING  
 WORKOVER  
 COMPLETION  
 MOTOR VESSEL  
 PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

8. CAUSE:  EQUIPMENT FAILURE  
 HUMAN ERROR  
 EXTERNAL DAMAGE  
 SLIP/TRIP/FALL  
 WEATHER RELATED  
 LEAK  
 UPSET H2O TREATING  
 OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

9. WATER DEPTH: **4352** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **125** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: **N**  
SPEED: **5** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: **3** FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/  
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:  
**William R. Lott**

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: **Pride International, Inc.**

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/  
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:  
**Mark Envy**

TELEPHONE:

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

Electric Line was rigged up on the Holstein's A-15 well at approximately 1400 hrs. on June 3, 2006. On Sunday, June 4th, the Halliburton Energy Services (HES) Crew was making the third and final wireline run to set a sump packer. At the beginning of the wire line operations, after the wire line sheave had been lifted to the correct height, the draw works parking brake was set and power to the draw works was turned off. Air to the brakes was being supplied per normal operating procedures.

The Pride Drill crew made a tour change at 0600 hrs. on June 4, 2006. The oncoming crew held a pre-job Safety Meeting (PJSM) and prepared to change out a leaking Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) on the air intensifier for the draw works air system. The replacement procedure to change out the PSV requires the air pressure on the draw works air system to be bled to zero psi. At 0641 hrs., in the process of bleeding the air pressure from the system, a abandon rig alarm (this was only a drill) was sounded. At that point, the crew suspended the operation, secured the system and attended the drill. System air pressure was approximately 50 psi and all equipment appeared to be operating normally. The abandon drill was completed at 0650 hrs. after which the crew returned to their previous task.

At 0703 hrs., with e-line at a depth of approximately                    feet and 3-5 psi on the system air pressure, the traveling equipment began an uncontrolled descent to the rig floor. The Floorhand noticed the block movement on the close circuit TV (CCTV). The Driller immediately acknowledged the movement and hit the E-Stop at his station, but the traveling equipment continued to descend. The Assistant Driller's (AD) E-Stop was activated but the traveling equipment continued to fall. The elevators struck the floor and the block and top drive came to rest. The forward momentum of the draw works continued to spool the drill line from the drum until it eventually pulled the drill line out of the anchor and the draw works drum. The drill line progressed through the sheaves and finally landed on the drill floor. The suspended wire line load plus the traveling equipment weighed 83,691 lbs. The elevators traveled a distance of 80.5 feet in 15 seconds (as reviewed by CCTV).

The electric line was severed leaving the tool string and approximately                    feet of wire in the wellbore.

No injuries resulted from this incident and only minor property damage was incurred.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The friction pads on the brake rotors were out of tolerance. The excessive wear exceeded the parking brake capacity (spring force) once the pressure was bled from the dynamic brake.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Incorrect system maintenance due to incorrect interpretation of maintenance procedure.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Guards on draw works, Guards on blocks,  
Drill line clamp, Drill line, Electric  
line

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Due to brake failure, the electric line  
was cut and the drill line on the draw  
works spooled out the when the top drive  
assembly descended to the rig floor.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):           **\$100,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

**Due to the nature of this event, the Houma District has no recommendations to the  
Regional Office.**

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**06-JUN-2006**

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

**Kelly Bouzigard / Jerry Freeman /**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED:   **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**Michael J. Saucier**

APPROVED

DATE:   **28-JUL-2006**