

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 17-FEB-2006 TIME: 1000 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Samson Contour Energy E&P,
LLC

REPRESENTATIVE: David Rudolph

TELEPHONE: (713) 577-2005

3. LEASE: G01142

AREA: VR LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 218 LONGITUDE:

4. PLATFORM: B

RIG NAME

5. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

6. TYPE: FIRE

EXPLOSION

BLOWOUT

COLLISION

INJURY NO. 0

FATALITY NO. 0

POLLUTION

OTHER Crane boom failure

7. OPERATION: PRODUCTION

DRILLING

WORKOVER

COMPLETION

MOTOR VESSEL

PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. _____ TELEPHONE:

OTHER PLATFORM SHUT IN SINCE RITA

8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE

HUMAN ERROR

EXTERNAL DAMAGE

SLIP/TRIP/FALL

WEATHER RELATED

LEAK

UPSET H2O TREATING

OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID

OTHER maintenance

9. WATER DEPTH: 120 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 58 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

GARY HARTZ

CITY: STATE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

CITY: STATE:

TELEPHONE:

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

The crane operator did state that he had problems with sticky levers previously on this crane. After review of work tickets and inspections, no information was found on problems with sticky levers

On February 17, 2006 the crane operator at Vr 218 was back loading an air compressor from the platform to the boat. The crane operator had performed his pre-use inspection earlier in the day.

The operator attached to the load and swung out over the water to let the load down on the boat that was tied off to the platform. The boat was a little too far away to complete the operation. At this time the operator swung the load to a safe location (away from boat, over water only) and exited the crane to go get a marine radio to make contact with the boat.

He exited the crane and went into the living quarters to find a radio. Within one to two minutes a construction hand hollered out that the crane was booming up. At this point the crane had reached its limits and the crane boom cradled. The boom fell forward and the attached load was submerged in the water.

Investigation Findings:

The crane operator immediately shut off the engine. He did however state that "the boom winch was still engaged at the time that the engine was shut off."

After the engine was shut off, the crane operator found the "Boom Lever" was partially stuck in the "Boom Up" position. All operations were suspended at this time until an investigation could be performed.

On 2-21-06 a crane inspector was dispatched to the platform. He found that the "Boom Kickout Valve" was functioning mechanically, but a hydraulic function test cannot be performed at this time. He also found that the boom lever was sticking, that when you boom up or down the lever does not go back to neutral. He went on to say that there is a ring on the king post, where the boom stop that is on the heel, has struck the king post before. He knows this because paint is removed when the crane is swinging.

The tickets from the crane refurbish in 5-04 states that "boom kickout device was set and checked. The tickets from the last annual in 3-05 states that the "boom kickout device" was tested and was checked off as good.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

STICKY BOOM LEVER. FAULTY BOOM KICKOUT DEVICE.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

CRANE OPERATOR STARTED LIFT WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE BOAT. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON PRECAUTIONS ON JSA.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:
CRANE BOOM, CRANE PEDESTAL, DRIP PAN, CRANE BOOM CRADLED. TENSION.
KING POST ASSEMBLY.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **\$300,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:
No recommendations for MMS

MAKE COMMUNICATION AVAILABLE BEFORE LIFT IS STARTED. SHUT DOWN CRANE OPERATIONS IF ANY PROBLEMS ARE NOTICED. IE. STICKY CONTROLS.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:
21-FEB-2006

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:
ERIC FONTENOT /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:
FPausina for LWilliamson

APPROVED

DATE: **14-APR-2006**