In re: DAVID McCAULEY. AWA Docket No. 02-0010. Order Denying Late Appeal filed July 12, 2004.

AWA - Late appeal.

The Judicial Officer denied Respondent's late-filed appeal. The Judicial Officer concluded that he had no jurisdiction to hear Respondent's appeal filed after Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson's decision became final.

Robert A. Ertman, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Initial decision issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], instituted this disciplinary administrative proceeding by filing a "Complaint" on February 4, 2002. Complainant instituted the proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159) [hereinafter the Animal Welfare Act]; the regulations issued under the Animal Welfare Act (9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-2.133) [hereinafter the Regulations]; and the Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary Under Various Statutes (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-.151) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice].

Complainant alleges that David McCauley [hereinafter Respondent] operated as a dealer as defined in the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations without an Animal Welfare Act license, in willful violation of section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2134) and section 2.1 of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.1) (Compl. ¶ II). On March 15, 2002, Respondent filed an answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint.

On October 9, 2002, Complainant filed a "Motion for Hearing," and on December 3, 2002, former Chief Administrative Law Judge James W. Hunt¹ [hereinafter the former Chief ALJ] conducted a telephone conference with Complainant's counsel and Respondent during which the former Chief ALJ scheduled a hearing to begin on July 16, 2003, in San Antonio, Texas.² On July 10, 2003, the former Chief ALJ postponed the hearing scheduled to begin on July 16, 2003.³ On July 18, 2003, the former Chief ALJ reassigned the proceeding to Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson [hereinafter the ALJ].⁴

On July 28, 2003, the ALJ conducted a telephone conference with Complainant's counsel and Respondent in which the ALJ scheduled the hearing to begin on October 22, 2003, in San Antonio, Texas.⁵ On August 26, 2003, with the agreement of Complainant and Respondent, the ALJ changed the commencement of the hearing from October 22, 2003, to October 23, 2003.⁶ On October 2, 2003, the ALJ issued a notice setting the specific time for the commencement of the October 23, 2003, hearing and the specific location of the October 23, 2003, hearing.⁷

Respondent failed to appear at the hearing. Section 1.141(e)(1) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.141(e)(1)) provides, if a respondent fails to appear at the hearing, the complainant may follow the procedure set forth in section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) or present evidence before the administrative law judge, as follows:

¹Chief Administrative Law Judge James W. Hunt retired from federal service effective August 1, 2003.

²"Summary of Telephone Conference--Scheduling of Hearing."

³"Order Postponing Hearing."

⁴"Order."

⁵"Summary of Telephone Conference-Rescheduling of Hearing."

⁶"Rescheduling of Hearing."

§ 1.141 Procedure for hearing.

. . .

(e) Failure to appear. (1) A respondent who, after being duly notified, fails to appear at the hearing without good cause, shall be deemed to have waived the right to an oral hearing in the proceeding and to have admitted any facts which may be presented at the hearing. Such failure by the respondent shall also constitute an admission of all the material allegations of fact contained in the complaint. Complainant shall have an election whether to follow the procedure set forth in § 1.139 or whether to present evidence, in whole or in part, in the form of affidavits or by oral testimony before the Judge. Failure to appear at a hearing shall not be deemed to be a waiver of the right to be served with a copy of the Judge's decision and to appeal and request oral argument before the Judicial Officer with respect thereto in the manner provided in § 1.145.

7 C.F.R. § 1.141(e)(1).

Complainant chose to proceed by presenting oral testimony before the ALJ, and on October 23, 2003, the ALJ conducted a hearing in San Antonio, Texas. Robert A. Ertman, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, DC, represented Complainant. Complainant presented the testimony of two witnesses and submitted 43 exhibits, which the ALJ received into evidence.⁸

On December 12, 2003, Complainant filed a "Proposed Decision and Order Upon Admission of Facts By Reason of Default and Motion for Adoption." On January 30, 2004, the ALJ filed a "Decision": (1) concluding that Respondent operated as a dealer as defined in the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations without an Animal Welfare Act license, in willful violation of the Animal Welfare Act and section 2.1(a)(1) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(1)); (2) directing Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations; (3) assessing Respondent a \$10,000 civil penalty; and (4) revoking Respondent's class B Animal Welfare Act license (Decision at 5-6).

On February 11, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the ALJ's Decision. On May 13, 2004, Respondent appealed to the Judicial Officer. On June 1, 2004, Complainant filed "Memorandum in Response to Late Appeal." On June 7, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

CONCLUSION BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER

The record establishes that the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the ALJ's Decision on February 11, 2004. Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice provides that an administrative law judge's written decision must be appealed to the Judicial Officer within 30 days after service, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge's decision, if the decision is a written decision, or within 30 days after the issuance of the Judge's decision, if the decision is an oral decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, any part of the decision, or any ruling by the Judge or who alleges any deprivation of rights, may appeal the decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a).

⁸Transcript and Complainant's Exhibits.

⁹United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0310 4078.

¹⁰ See note 9.

Therefore, Respondent was required to file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk no later than March 12, 2004. Respondent did not file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk until May 13, 2004.

The Judicial Officer has continuously and consistently held under the Rules of Practice that the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge's decision becomes final. The ALJ's Decision became final on March 17, 2004. Respondent filed an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk on May 13, 2004, 1 month 26 days after the ALJ's Decision became final. Therefore, I have no jurisdiction to hear Respondent's appeal.

The United States Department of Agriculture's construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

¹¹In re Belinda Atherton, 62 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 20, 2003) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed the day the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Samuel K. Angel, 61 Agric. Dec. 275 (2002) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 3 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Paul Eugenio, 60 Agric. Dec. 676 (2001) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Harold P. Kafka, 58 Agric. Dec. 357 (1999) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 15 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final), aff'd per curiam, 259 F.3d 716 (3d Cir. 2001) (Table); In re Kevin Ackerman, 58 Agric. Dec. 340 (1999) (dismissing Kevin Ackerman's appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Severin Peterson, 57 Agric. Dec. 1304 (1998) (dismissing the applicants' appeal petition filed 23 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Queen City Farms, Inc., 57 Agric. Dec. 813 (1998) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 58 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Gail Davis, 56 Agric. Dec. 373 (1997) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 41 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Field Market Produce, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1418 (1996) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 8 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became effective); In re Ow Duk Kwon, 55 Agric. Dec. 78 (1996) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 35 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became effective); In re New York Primate Center, Inc., 53 Agric. Dec. 529 (1994) (dismissing the respondents' appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re K. Lester, 52 Agric. Dec. 332 (1993) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 14 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective); In re Amril L. Carrington, 52 Agric. Dec. 331 (1993) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 7 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective); In re Teofilo Benicta, 52 Agric. Dec. 321 (1993) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 6 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective); In re Newark Produce Distributors, Inc., 51 Agric. Dec. 955 (1992) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective); In re Laura May Kurjan, 51 Agric. Dec. 438 (1992) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Kermit Breed, 50 Agric. Dec. 675 (1991) (dismissing the respondent's late-filed appeal petition); In re Bihari Lall, 49 Agric. Dec. 896 (1990) (stating the respondent's appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge's decision became final, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Dale Haley, 48 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1989) (stating the respondents' appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge's decision became final and effective, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Mary Fran Hamilton, 45 Agric. Dec. 2395 (1986) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed with the Hearing Clerk on the day the administrative law judge's decision and order had become final and effective); In re Bushelle Cattle Co., 45 Agric. Dec. 1131 (1986) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective); In re William T. Powell, 44 Agric. Dec. 1220 (1985) (stating it has consistently been held that, under the Rules of Practice, the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the administrative law judge's decision and order becomes final); In re Toscony Provision Co., 43 Agric. Dec. 1106 (1984) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge's decision becomes final), aff'd, No. 81-1729 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 1985) (court reviewed merits notwithstanding late administrative appeal), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) (unpublished); In re Dock Case Brokerage Co., 42 Agric. Dec. 1950 (1983) (dismissing the respondents' appeal petition filed 5 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final); In re Veg-Pro Distributors, 42 Agric. Dec. 1173 (1983) (denying the respondent's appeal petition filed 1 day after the default decision and order became final); In re Samuel Simon Petro, 42 Agric. Dec. 921 (1983) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge's decision and order becomes final and effective); In re Yankee Brokerage, Inc., 42 Agric. Dec. 427 (1983) (dismissing the respondent's appeal petition filed on the day the administrative law judge's decision became effective); In re Charles Brink, 41 Agric. Dec. 2146 (1982) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to consider the respondent's appeal dated before the administrative law judge's decision and order became final, but not filed until 4 days after the administrative law judge's decision and order became final and effective), reconsideration denied, 41 Agric. Dec. 2147 (1982); In re Mel's Produce, Inc., 40 Agric. Dec. 792 (1981) (stating since the respondent's petition for reconsideration was not filed within 35 days after service of the default decision, the default decision became final and neither the administrative law judge nor the Judicial Officer has jurisdiction to consider the respondent's petition); In re Animal Research Center of Massachusetts, Inc., 38 Agric. Dec. 379 (1978) (stating failure to file an appeal petition before the effective date of the administrative law judge's decision is jurisdictional); In re Willie Cook, 39 Agric. Dec. 116 (1978) (stating it is the consistent policy of the United States Department of Agriculture not to consider appeals filed more than 35 days after service of the administrative law judge's decision).

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

As stated in *Eaton v. Jamrog*, 984 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993):

We have repeatedly held that compliance with Rule 4(a)(1) is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court may neither waive nor extend. *See, e.g., Baker v. Raulie*, 879 F.2d 1396, 1398 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); *Myers v. Ace Hardware, Inc.*, 777 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985). So strictly has this rule been applied, that even a notice of appeal filed five minutes late has been deemed untimely. *Baker*, 879 F.2d at 1398.^[13]

The Rules of Practice do not provide for an extension of time (for good cause or excusable neglect) for filing a notice of appeal after an administrative law judge's decision has become final. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time to file a notice of appeal upon a motion filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise provided in the rules for the filing of a notice of appeal. The absence of such a rule in the Rules of Practice emphasizes that no such jurisdiction has been granted to the Judicial Officer to extend the time for filing an appeal after an administrative law judge's decision has become final. Therefore, under the Rules of Practice, I cannot extend the time for Respondent's filing an appeal petition after the ALJ's Decision became final.

Moreover, the jurisdictional bar under the Rules of Practice, which precludes the Judicial Officer from hearing an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge's decision becomes final, is consistent with the judicial construction of the Administrative Orders Review Act ("Hobbs Act"). As stated in *Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. ICC*, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted):

The Administrative Orders Review Act ("Hobbs Act") requires a petition to review a final order of an administrative agency to be brought within sixty days of the entry of the order. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976). This sixty-day time limit is jurisdictional in nature and may not be enlarged by the courts. *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The purpose of the time limit is to impart finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and protecting the reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to the administrative regulations. *Id.* at 602. [15]

¹³Accord Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (stating since the court of appeals properly held petitioner's notice of appeal from the decision on the merits to be untimely filed, and since the time of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to review the decision on the merits); Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107, a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; this 30-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978); Martinez v. Hoke, 38 F.3d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the time for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and the court of appeals has no authority to extend time for filing); Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the filing of notice of appeal within the 30-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional, and unless appellant's notice is timely, the appeal must be dismissed); In re Eichelberger, 943 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after entry of the judgment; Rule 4(a)'s provisions are mandatory and jurisdictional); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d 899, 900 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with Rule 4(a) requires dismissal of the appeal and the fact that appellant is incarcerated and proceeding pro se does not change the clear language of the Rule), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1060 (1990); Jerningham v. Humphreys, 868 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1989) (Order) (stating the failure of an appellant to timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction; compliance with Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court can neither waive nor extend).

¹⁴Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).

Accordingly, Respondent's appeal petition must be denied, since it is too late for the matter to be further considered. Moreover, the matter should not be considered by a reviewing court since, under section 1.142(c)(4) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.142(c)(4)), "no decision shall be final for purposes of judicial review except a final decision of the Judicial Officer upon appeal."

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

Respondent's appeal petition, filed May 13, 2004, is denied. Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson's Decision, filed January 30, 2004, is the final decision in this proceeding.

^{15(...}continued)