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U.S.
Department of Justice
Federal
Bureau of Investigation
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
National
Security
Branch
Overview
September 2006
Executive Assistant Director for National Security
Information
Sharing and Coordination
Responsibility
for Intelligence Activities
Integrating Intelligence and Investigations
National Security Branch Components
Terrorist
Screening Center Encounters
Investigation
of Criminal Enterprises Supporting Hizballah
Counterintelligence Operations
Providing Useful and Timely Information and Analysis
NSB Information Sharing Initiatives
Federal Information Sharing Efforts
Joint Efforts with Other Partners
Information Technology Initiative Highlights
Alert
Capability in Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)
Developing Effective Capabilities
Budget and Performance Measures
The Intelligence Career Service
Selection
and Hiring Action Plan
Training Initiatives for the ICS
New
Analyst Training—Cohort Program
Professional
Development Opportunities
Intelligence Officer Certification
Self-Regulation,
Enforcement, and Inspection
Background: DNI Authorities and Relationship to the
FBI
The
National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)
The
National Intelligence Program (NIP)
The
National Intelligence Strategy (NIS)
Communication between the DNI and FBI
Since September 11, 2001, the men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have worked tirelessly to reinforce our intelligence capabilities and improve our ability to protect the American people from national security threats. We have built on our established capacity to collect information and enhanced our ability to analyze and disseminate intelligence. Development of the National Security Branch (NSB) has been another step in enhancing the FBI’s mission as a dual law enforcement and intelligence agency.
On June 28, 2005,
the President directed the FBI to create a “National Security Service” within
the FBI. The Attorney General implemented this directive through the standing up of a new
organization—the National Security Branch—on September
12, 2005. On June 5,
2006, the FBI received notification that Congress had officially approved the
new structure as part of the larger reorganization of the FBI. The NSB consists of the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division, the Counterintelligence Division, the Directorate of Intelligence,
and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate.
The NSB integrates
the FBI’s primary national security programs under the leadership of an
Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch and through
policies and initiatives designed to enhance the Bureau’s capability to support
national security duties. The
mission of the NSB is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United
States against WMD, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and
espionage by:
·
Integrating
investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national
security threats;
·
Providing
useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law
enforcement communities; and
·
Effectively developing enabling capabilities,
processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General
and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties.
The NSB’s initiatives are all aimed at our goal of integrating intelligence and operations to protect our national security. Since 9/11, the FBI has implemented significant changes to enhance our ability to counter today’s most critical threats. The NSB will build on the FBI’s strengths, ensure integration of national security intelligence and investigations, promote the development of a national security workforce, and facilitate a new level of coordination with the U.S. Intelligence Community. With the continued commitment and dedication of the men and women of the FBI, these reforms will improve the Bureau’s ability to accomplish our national security investigative and intelligence missions and, ultimately, to protect the American people.
Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transforms the organization to enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism and other national security threats. We overhauled our counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business practices and technology, and improved coordination with our federal, state, local, and tribal partners. Development of the National Security Branch (NSB) has been another step in enhancing the FBI’s mission as a dual law enforcement and intelligence agency.
The NSB structure took effect on September 12, 2005, in response to a
directive from the President to the Attorney General. This directive mandated that the FBI establish a “National Security
Service” that combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI
under the leadership of a senior FBI official. On June 5, 2006, the FBI received
notification that Congress had officially approved the new structure as part of
the larger reorganization of the FBI.
Combining our national security workforce and mission under one
leadership umbrella enhances our contribution to the national intelligence
effort and provides us with the opportunity to leverage resources from our U.S.
Intelligence Community (USIC) partners, as well as our federal, state, local,
and tribal law enforcement partners.
The
mission of the NSB is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United
States against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist attacks, foreign
intelligence operations, and espionage by:
·
Integrating
investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national
security threats;
·
Providing useful and timely
information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities;
and
·
Effectively
developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent
with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
guidance, and civil liberties.
The
vision of the NSB—to the extent authorized under the law—is to build a national
awareness that permits recognition of a national security threat sufficiently
early to permit its disruption. This approach will promote the collection of relevant
information and minimize the gathering of extraneous data that distract from
the analytical process.
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) examined the FBI’s intelligence program and concluded in March 2005 that it had been significantly improved since 9/11. The commission rejected calling for the creation of a separate agency devoted to internal security without any law enforcement powers. It recognized that the FBI’s hybrid intelligence and investigative nature is one of our greatest strengths and emphasized the importance of the ongoing effort to integrate intelligence and investigative operations. At the same time, the commission noted the FBI’s structure did not sufficiently ensure that our intelligence activities were coordinated with the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the commission issued the following recommendation:
To ensure that the FBI’s intelligence
elements are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence, and to
capitalize on the FBI’s progress, we recommend the creation of a new National
Security Service within the FBI under a single Executive Assistant Director. This service would include the Bureau’s
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions and the Directorate of
Intelligence. The service would be
subject to the coordination and budget authorities of the Director of National Intelligence
as well as to the same Attorney General authorities that apply to other Bureau
divisions.
(WMD Commission Report at 465.)
The commission’s recommendation promoted the integration of the FBI’s intelligence activities within the U.S. Intelligence Community by ensuring the DNI has the ability to coordinate the FBI’s intelligence activities. At the same time, this proposal ensured that the FBI retains the ability to integrate national security investigative and intelligence activities while continuing to take advantage of our extensive network of partnerships, including our 800,000 state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.
On June 28, 2005, the President issued a memorandum acknowledging the substantial efforts the FBI has made in strengthening our national security capabilities and coordinating effectively with other elements of the government. The President also determined that additional action was required to meet evolving challenges to the security of the United States and, therefore, directed the FBI to create a “National Security Service” consistent with the WMD Commission’s recommendation. In establishing this new service, the President instructed the FBI to combine the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the leadership of a senior FBI official.
The Attorney General implemented this directive through the standing up of a new organization—the
National Security Branch—on September 12, 2005. On June 5, 2006, the FBI received
notification that Congress had officially approved the new structure as part of
the larger reorganization of the FBI. The
NSB integrates the FBI’s primary national security programs under the
leadership of a single FBI official and through policies and initiatives
designed to enhance the entire Bureau’s capability to support our national
security missions.
The
NSB consists of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the
Counterintelligence Division (CD), the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and
the WMD Directorate (WMDD). It integrates our counterterrorism and
counterintelligence investigative and operational capabilities with our
intelligence capabilities. Effective
September 12, 2005, the day the NSB structure took effect, these divisions and
the programs they administer were unified under the authority of a single official
who reports to the Deputy Director.
The CTD and CD retain
both their basic structure and their responsibility for management of
investigative operations related to counterterrorism and counterintelligence,
intelligence collection related to national security, and evidence
exploitation.
The DI also retains
its basic structure, including its embedded intelligence elements in each field
division and in the CTD, CD, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and Cyber
Division (CyD) at FBI Headquarters. The
DI will continue to supervise FBI-wide intelligence activities, including field
intelligence operations, from collection to dissemination.
While the CTD, CD, and DI will currently retain their basic structure,
the FBI will look for opportunities to incorporate structural changes across
the NSB that will create efficiencies and promote integration. One such recent change occurred on July 26,
2006, when the FBI established the WMDD within the NSB to support and
consolidate the FBI’s WMD components.
The Executive Assistant
Director for the National Security Branch (EAD-NSB) leads the NSB. An
Associate EAD and the Assistant Directors of the CTD, CD, DI, and WMDD, who bring
specialized expertise to the day-to-day management of each component, assist
the EAD-NSB.
As the head of the
NSB, the EAD has substantial personnel authority. He can transfer personnel from one division to another within the
NSB, consistent with FBI and applicable government policies and DNI guidance and
priorities. He is responsible for rating
the performance of the heads of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
intelligence, and WMD programs and is the reviewing official for the immediate
subordinates of those officials. This
creates a clear chain of command between the EAD-NSB and the heads of the
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and WMD programs.
The EAD-NSB
participates in the decision-making process for the selection of all Special
Agents in Charge (SACs) and Assistant Directors in Charge (ADICs) in FBI field
offices by serving as a voting member of the FBI Senior Executive Service (SES)
Board. The EAD-NSB also has input into
the evaluation of all SACs and ADICs.
Operational
Authority
The EAD-NSB has the
authority to initiate, direct, terminate, or reallocate any of the
investigations or other activities within the NSB. To facilitate exercise of this authority, the EAD-NSB has full
access to information from all counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
intelligence operations, as well as information about all of the Bureau’s
sources of information.
The EAD-NSB exercises direct budget authority over the
NSB’s components and related programs, including the investigative resources in
CTD and CD, Intelligence Career Service (ICS) personnel, human source management
resources, and national technical intelligence collection resources.
In addition, because
the NSB-controlled budget includes a pro rata share of FBI resources
supporting overall FBI operations, the EAD-NSB can influence components outside
the NSB that support our national security programs, such as training, human
resources, facilities, and information technology. In this way, the EAD-NSB can prioritize all FBI national security
investments.
The EAD-NSB has full
management authority over all FBI Headquarters and field national security
programs through his control of both operations and the national security
budget. Specifically:
· The NSB, through its DI, ensures that FBI raw and strategic intelligence production is consistent with national security priorities.
· The NSB exercises its authority over national security activities at FBI Headquarters and in the field through its budget authority, including management of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget.
· The NSB relies on a regular inspection process and program-specific reviews to ensure our national security activities are consistent with the direction of the Attorney General and DNI. The EAD-NSB is implementing management strategies over field activities and operations, which provide direction, accountability, and measurable expectations. The EAD-NSB is also establishing policies and procedures to hold personnel accountable for performance results through such mechanisms as evaluation of individual performance, the regular inspection process, and program-specific reviews.
Information
Sharing and Coordination
The head of the NSB
serves as the FBI’s lead intelligence official and communicates with the
Attorney General and the DNI to ensure responsiveness to their guidance and to
facilitate coordination with other elements of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. On October 5, 2005, the FBI
Director designated the EAD-NSB as the principal FBI official for information
and intelligence sharing policy. In
this capacity, the EAD-NSB serves as the principal advisor to the Director for
these policies and provides policy direction to other FBI components with
respect to information and intelligence sharing policy.
Responsibility for Intelligence Activities
Consistent with the
President’s direction, the EAD-NSB’s principal responsibility is the
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to further
enhance the security of the nation. The
integration of national security components in the NSB strengthens the
continuous cycle of intelligence collection, analysis, production, and
dissemination.
The integration of investigative and intelligence
activities will be discussed in-depth in the following section, as we take a
closer look at the components that compose the NSB’s mission.
The mission of the National Security Branch is to
optimally position the FBI to protect the United States against weapons of mass
destruction, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage
by:
·
Integrating
investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national
security threats;
·
Providing useful and
timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement
communities; and
·
Effectively
developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent
with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
guidance, and civil liberties.
The structure of the National Security Branch
is designed to strengthen the integration of the FBI’s intelligence and investigative
missions. This structure will enable us
to capitalize on our established ability to collect information and extend that
strength to the analysis and production of intelligence.
Integration also ensures that intelligence can drive investigative operations. Information collected through FBI investigations is analyzed not just to build a case for prosecution, but to give us a greater awareness of threats. Intelligence, in turn, drives investigative strategies to ensure that our resources are targeting the most pressing threats and that we collect the information decision makers need most.
Criminal and national security threats are
often intertwined. Our greatest
opportunity to prevent terrorist attacks is to combine intelligence gathered
through both criminal investigations and national security investigations. The NSB will coordinate support from other
FBI divisions, whether it is exploitation of documents and electronic media
from a terrorist safe-house or outreach efforts to enlist the private sector to
track acquisition of weapons materials or defend Critical National Assets.
Training, finances, recruiting, logistical
support, pre-attack planning, and preparation are all required components of
terrorist operations. These different
facets of terrorist operations create vulnerabilities, particularly when the
terrorists engage in criminal activities to achieve their ends. At each stage, terrorists may trigger a
response that exposes their activities to FBI investigators, law enforcement
officers, and other federal partners. The
NSB will help strengthen our national security investigative and intelligence
web.
Although the FBI’s CTD, CD and the DI have
had many national security accomplishments prior to the standing up of the
National Security Branch, the NSB will help to further integrate the
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, WMD, and intelligence functions through
uniform processes and procedures. To
promote the integration of NSB components, we will continue to identify the
basic business and operational processes the NSB will employ to carry out and
support its programs. In addition, we
have made changes to our management structure, hiring processes, and training programs. We have modernized our work environment and
infrastructure and strengthened our partnerships. These steps, which have impacted every component of the FBI,
provide the foundation for development of the National Security Branch.
To support our
centralized, integrated approach, we put in place a new management structure
and reorganized and expanded both the CTD and CD and established a new WMDD. These
new structures help us coordinate operations and intelligence production
domestically and overseas, concentrate WMD essential capabilities into
key functional sections, and establish clear lines of accountability for
the overall development and success of our missions.
In the intelligence arena, we moved the FBI beyond case-focused intelligence gathering and analysis and enhanced our capacity to fuse intelligence from across the Bureau. The FBI now uses intelligence not just to pursue investigations but to have greater awareness of the threats we face.
The prevention of further terrorist attacks is the FBI’s overriding priority. We have reallocated resources and personnel and updated investigative strategies, policies, and procedures to support the counterterrorism mission, which is managed from FBI Headquarters. This broader approach helps us identify crucial gaps in intelligence and supports proactive investigative and analytic efforts to combat immediate threats, identify plots before they develop, and disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations.
The
counterterrorism mission has been assisted by the USA PATRIOT Act, which has dismantled
the wall that separated law enforcement from intelligence. Previously, the ability of law enforcement
and intelligence officers to share information and connect the dots in
terrorism and espionage investigations was limited. The USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions have reduced the statutory and
cultural barriers to information sharing, and it is this information sharing, as
the 9/11 and WMD Commissions made clear, that will make the difference in our
ongoing efforts to prevent terrorism.
Counterintelligence is the FBI’s second priority, and, here, too, we have added resources, improved our organization, and implemented strategies to address new and changing threats. We consolidated all counterespionage activity under a single command, to provide a more systematic national effort against espionage, including economic espionage, and other threats. In the field, we increased the number of field offices with counterintelligence squads from 23 to 56.
The
foreign intelligence threat currently facing the United States from foreign
nation-state and non-state actors is increasingly complex and asymmetrical. U.S. national security is gravely threatened
by foreign intelligence services and their assets, who are dedicated to using
all means at their disposal to obtain information that enhances the strategic
position of their country while disadvantaging the United States. Our adversaries are especially active in areas
where they perceive counterintelligence vulnerabilities.
As the lead agency for counterintelligence in the United States, and
the primary investigative component of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI
has the responsibility to oversee the integration of U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to ensure that all available means are brought to bear to
mitigate this ongoing and daunting threat, consistent with our laws and policy.
In counterintelligence, as in counterterrorism, we centralized management and adopted a proactive strategy where we collect and disseminate intelligence, disrupt threats, and prosecute offenders as warranted. Our National Strategy for Counterintelligence expands our focus beyond the traditional state-controlled agents and threats of the Cold War era to the asymmetrical threats we face today. Our new strategy addresses both state and non-state actors and focuses all field divisions on the three most pressing modern threats: acquisition of information about WMD; penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community and other government agencies/contractors; and the compromise of Critical National Assets.
To support the broader intelligence mission, we established the Directorate of Intelligence at FBI Headquarters to coordinate and manage intelligence functions throughout the Bureau. The DI oversees field intelligence operations through embedded intelligence elements called Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) in each of our 56 field offices. The FIGs perform intelligence functions through integrated teams of Special Agents (SAs), Intelligence Analysts (IAs), Language Analysts (LAs), and Surveillance Specialists. The DI also has embedded elements focused on intelligence in each of the operational divisions at FBI Headquarters—CTD, CD, and the WMDD, as well as the Criminal Investigative and Cyber Divisions. Through this integrated management structure, the DI ensures that the FBI’s raw intelligence production and strategic intelligence production are consistent with national intelligence priorities.
To integrate WMD components currently spread
throughout the FBI and concentrate WMD essential capabilities into key
functional sections, the NSB established the WMD Directorate on July 26,
2006. The WMDD
integrates and links the FBI's necessary counterterrorism, intelligence,
counterintelligence, and scientific and technological components to accomplish
the Bureau's overall WMD mission.
WMDD’s
vision is to eliminate the illicit use of weapons of mass destruction, and its
mission is to prevent WMD attacks, identify and respond to WMD threats, and
fully coordinate the investigative response.
This involves integrating intelligence and leading law enforcement
operations to identify, detect, and disrupt WMD operations.
The
newest NSB component, the WMDD is expected to provide flexibility for growth
and development; its structure will also allow for optimal coordination with
interagency partners. The directorate
will assign specific program responsibilities and will provide a mechanism to
perform the following essential capabilities: intelligence; countermeasures;
preparedness; assessment and response; investigative; science and technology
support; and policy and planning.
These and other changes—some occurring prior to the standing up of the National Security Branch—have enabled the FBI to participate in operations disrupting a wide variety of domestic and international terrorist undertakings. Since 9/11, we have substantially increased development of human sources, and our ability to integrate intelligence into our operations has allowed us to take an increasingly sophisticated and targeted approach to disrupt attacks during periods of heightened threat.
The NSB’s Counterterrorism Division’s
priorities are:
·
Detecting,
disrupting, and dismantling terrorist sleeper cells in the United States before
they act;
·
Identifying
and preventing acts of terrorism by individuals with a terrorist agenda acting
alone;
·
Detecting,
disrupting, and dismantling terrorist support networks, including financial
support networks;
·
Enhancing
our capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications, and details
of terrorist threats and improving our capacity to disseminate threat-related information
to local, state, and federal agencies, and to the private sector as needed; and
·
Enhancing
our overall contribution to the U.S. Intelligence Community and to senior
policy makers in government by providing timely and accurate in-depth analysis of
the terrorist threat and other information of value on an on-going basis.
To meet these priorities, we have made improvements to the core functions of CTD. The most telling measure of our progress is the way we have conducted individual operations consistent with our prevention mission. The extent of our transformation is most clearly seen in the approach we take when confronting specific terrorist threats. Our operations demonstrate that coordination and prevention through the development of actionable intelligence have become our guiding operational principles. The following sampling of our investigative activities shows the dimensions of our counterterrorism capabilities.
Terrorist
Screening Center Encounters
The FBI’s
Terrorist Screening Center was created by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6 to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorist screening and
to create a single comprehensive watch list—the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB)—of
known or suspected terrorists. The consolidation
of the various government watch lists into the TSDB occurred on March 12,
2004.
The TSC
shares access to its TSDB with many federal government agencies, including the DOJ,
Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and
Department of Defense (DOD). The TSC
also disseminates its Daily Summary Report to each of those agencies.
As detailed below, recent TSC successes include: (1) a traffic
stop resulting in the arrest of a suspect connected to Hamas, which is denoted as a
Specially Designated Terrorist Organization (SDTO) by the DOS, and (2) a customs
in-flight check with the FBI prompting an arrest at the Chicago Airport.
1.
In 2004, Maryland
authorities stopped a person who was filming the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. A routine check by the police officers
provided information that the person who was filming might have been of
interest to the FBI. A police officer
called the TSC from his location, and TSC personnel advised the officer that
the individual was, in fact, an unindicted co-conspirator with three others who
were members of Hamas. Within minutes,
the individual was arrested on an outstanding material witness warrant.
2.
In another
recent incident, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s National Tracking
Center (NTC) notified the TSC of a possible match with a name of a passenger
who was, at the time, on a flight from Amman, Jordan, to Chicago,
Illinois. TSC personnel checked
databases and verified a positive match.
FBI TSC personnel in Washington, D.C., contacted FBI personnel on the
Chicago FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The Chicago JTTF was advised that the subject on the plane should
be arrested immediately upon landing. When
his flight landed, the subject was arrested and taken into custody at the
airport in Chicago.
The investigation of Iyman Faris is a good example of how the FBI works cooperatively with our partners to investigate and neutralize a specific threat. The investigation was initiated and developed as a result of close coordination with our international, federal, state, and municipal partners. Faris initially came to our attention when information from a foreign source linked Faris to terrorists who had plotted attacks to coincide with Millennium celebrations. With help from FBI Headquarters, agents, and other JTTF members in our Cincinnati field office, we conducted an extensive investigation of Faris and ultimately interviewed Faris in March 2003. During the interview, Faris admitted that he had personal contact with several individuals tied to terrorism.
At about the same time, another foreign source indicated that an Ohio‑based truck driver had been tasked to attack U.S. bridges, particularly the Brooklyn Bridge. Once that information came together, we quickly composed a targeted plan for the Faris interview team, assigned operational leads to field offices and JTTFs around the country, and teamed up with New York Police Department investigators and analysts. As a result of these activities, Faris was arrested, and he ultimately pled guilty to the charge of providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. On October 28, 2003, Faris was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Investigation of
Criminal Enterprises Supporting Hizballah
Hizballah criminal enterprises, primarily based in the Detroit area, were engaged in a wide range of offenses, including credit card fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, contraband cigarette trafficking, trafficking in counterfeit cigarette tax stamps, transportation of stolen property, and trafficking in counterfeit goods. A team of investigators from several FBI JTTFs, Legal Attachés, and our partner agencies used an integrated strategy of intelligence collection and criminal investigative techniques to identify, disrupt, and defeat Hizballah support networks. To date, the investigation has resulted in 18 complaints, 37 indictments, 19 arrests, and 10 convictions.
The FBI’s counterintelligence (CI) strategy has established national counterintelligence priorities and proactively focused operations against the United States’ most aggressive adversaries. The program has made great strides in rebuilding the FBI’s professional cadre of counterintelligence Special Agents, deploying critical CI resources in all 56 field offices, and establishing evaluation criteria by which field offices can manage their programs and gauge their progress. In the future, these improvements will provide a foundation from which enhanced and expanded CI efforts can be launched.
These successes can be clearly linked to a variety of FBI Headquarters initiatives:
1. Country-specific program directives issued by FBI Headquarters and the coordination and participation of FBI Headquarters program managers in critical field operations.
2. Aggressive training schedules for executives, supervisors, Special Agents, and professional support staff.
3. The use of clearly defined performance standards linked to strategy elements, by which field office implementation activities can be assessed.
4. The use of CI professionals to conduct field office program reviews and provide recommendations for CI program improvements.
5. Outreach to U.S. Intelligence Community and government contractors to assist them in better protecting themselves against Foreign Intelligence Service attacks.
CI program executives are committed to reducing the hostile intelligence activities of the United States’ major adversaries over the next five years. This requires continuous progress toward full implementation of all aspects of the CI strategy. The CI program will work to significantly enhance program and operational capabilities across the board, with emphasis on counterproliferation and the non-traditional threat, to produce a substantial reduction in the current level of threat to vital U.S. interests. At the same time, the integrity and level of our efforts against the more traditional threat must not be diminished, as this threat continues to exist at higher levels and on a broader spectrum than during the Cold War.
As part of our CI mission, the FBI has taken steps to establish closer working relationships with the private sector and academia through business and academic alliances.
The FBI is building executive-level
relationships between high-tech, cutting edge technology companies and the
FBI. The purpose of this Business Alliance
is to make those companies the nation’s “first line of CI defense” against the
foreign intelligence threat. The FBI is
raising the awareness of Corporate America about the covert interests of
foreign intelligence services in their proprietary information and intellectual
property, as well as the methodologies hostile services are currently using to
gain access. The Business Alliance also fosters CI information sharing
between the FBI and industry.
Academic Alliance
On September 15, 2003, the creation of a National
Security Higher Education Advisory Board was announced. The board consists of the presidents and
chancellors of several prominent U.S. universities and is designed to foster
outreach and promote understanding between higher education and the FBI. The Board provides advice on the culture of
higher education, including the traditions of openness, academic freedom, and
international collaboration; along with seeking to establish lines of
communication on national priorities pertaining to terrorism,
counterintelligence, and homeland security.
The Board also assists in the development of research, degree programs,
course work, internships, opportunities for graduates, and consulting
opportunities for faculty relating to national security.
Lawrence
Franklin Investigation—A major FBI counterintelligence
investigation conducted recently involved Lawrence Franklin, a former Iran desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense at the Pentagon. Franklin, from
Kearneysville, West Virginia, was sentenced on January 20, 2006, by U.S.
District Judge T.S. Ellis III on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate
national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy
to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government; and
the unlawful retention of national defense information. Franklin was sentenced to a total of 151
months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000.
Other
Counterintelligence Arrests— On
December 15, 2005, a federal jury convicted Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr., of
Waldorf, Maryland, of unlawfully possessing classified information related to
the national defense and making a false statement to a U.S. government
agency. Ford was employed by the
National Security Agency (NSA) between June 2001 and late 2003. On January 11, 2004, FBI agents executed a
search warrant at Ford’s residence and discovered sensitive classified
information throughout his home, including numerous Top Secret documents in two
boxes in Ford’s kitchen. Ford was
arrested on January 12, 2004. Ford had
taken home the classified information on the last day of his employment at NSA
in December 2003, when Ford was to start working in the private sector on a
classified contract for a defense contractor.
On March 30, 2006, Ford was sentenced to 72 months in prison.
On
March 23, 2006, Howard Hsy, of Bellevue, Washington, was sentenced by U.S.
District Judge Thomas S. Zilly to two years of probation and a $15,000 fine in
the U.S. District Court in Seattle for conspiracy to violate the Arms Export
Control Act. Hsy conspired with others
to export night vision goggles and camera lenses to a contact in Taiwan. Exporting those items required a license and
written approval from the DOS, which Hsy did not have. The military equipment is later shipped to
the People’s Republic of China. Hsy
conspired with others in the Seattle area and Taiwan to purchase the military
gear for export. The military equipment
was primarily used by military pilots to fly and navigate at night. In October 2005, a Seattle-area
co-conspirator, Donald Shull, pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the Export
Administration Act and was sentenced in
February 2006 to two years of probation and a $10,000
fine.
On
January 25, 2006, the U.S. Southern
District Court of Indiana convicted Shaaban Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban of six
counts: conspiracy; acting as a foreign agent without notification; one
violation of the Iraqi Sanctions under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act; unlawful procurement of an identification document; and unlawful
procurement of naturalization. Shaaban
never registered as an agent of Iraq, yet, in 2002 and 2003 when he lived in
Indianapolis and Greenfield, Indiana, Shaaban committed the following acts:
·
Traveled to Baghdad in late
2002 where he offered to sell names of U.S. intelligence agents and operatives
to Iraq for $3 million.
·
Sought to gain Iraqi support
to establish an Arabic television station in the United States that would
broadcast news and discussions that would be pro-Iraqi.
·
Sought to enter into a
“cooperation agreement” where he would be paid a fee by Iraq to organize
volunteers to act as human shields to protect Iraqi infrastructure during the
war.
·
Broadcasted messages of
support for the Iraqi government on Iraqi media stations that advocated support
for Iraq and encouraged others to forcibly resist the United States and others
who opposed Iraq.
Former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger pled guilty
in April 2005 in Washington, D.C., to one count of US Title 18, Section 1924 (unauthorized
removal and retention of classified documents or material) to avoid a jail
sentence. In September 2005 Berger was
sentenced and required to perform 100 hours of community service and pay a
$50,000 fine for the removal of classified documents from the National Archives
and intentional destruction of some of them, as well as $6,905 for the
administrative costs of his two-year probation.
The purpose of the FBI’s intelligence program is to leverage
our investigative and information gathering capability to detect and disrupt
threats before they manifest themselves in a terrorist or criminal act.
The
DI is responsible for building an intelligence program throughout the FBI. We must collect and disseminate information
in a manner consistent with the civil liberties and civil rights of all we
serve.
The
DI will leverage the FBI’s strong history of partnerships by uniting FBI
intelligence professionals with the private sector and state, local, and tribal
law enforcement. We will engage in
joint operations in a shared information space, where we can create a common
view of the threat and a clear understanding of our respective roles in
countering that threat.
Each
of our 56 field offices has a FIG made up of Special Agents, Intelligence
Analysts, and depending on the size of the office Surveillance Specialists and
Language Analysts. Officers and
analysts from other intelligence and law enforcement agencies are often
included as well. FIGs are central to
the integration of the intelligence cycle—the six-step process of developing
unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers—into
field operations.
The FIG provides regional integration of the larger FBI intelligence
program. It provides a flow of national
requirements and information needs into the field office, and it informs local
collection and direction. The FIG also
integrates field office insight into the national picture.
The FBI has long
recognized that human source information is one of the most important ways to
investigate criminal activity. We have
long‑standing expertise in recruiting and working with human sources, and
we have used those skills to great effect across a wide range of investigative
programs, including organized crime, drugs, public corruption, and white collar
crime. The Bureau has placed a priority
on developing human intelligence source reporting on international and domestic
terrorists. We have revised our
training program, personnel evaluation criteria, and operational priorities to
focus on source development,
and are enhancing the guidance, oversight, and training provided to agents to
ensure proper management of human sources.
In the President’s Memorandum to the Attorney General dated November 18, 2004, the FBI was directed to provide a comprehensive plan for source validation. In addition, the Office of the DNI (ODNI) drafted U.S. Intelligence Community-wide validation standards for sources. The FBI, in compliance with ODNI standards, and in response to the President’s memorandum, has drafted a Confidential Validation Standards Manual that was approved by Deputy Director John S. Pistole on May 23, 2006. The FBI has implemented a phased in validation process that allows us to validate all of our sources on a continuous basis. Our validation process has been coordinated closely with ODNI, DIA and elements of DOD. As a result of its implementation, each division at FBI Headquarters has established entities specifically dedicated to the validation of sources reporting on their specific programs.
A primary accomplishment of the FBI’s Intelligence Program in 2005 was the creation of an Intelligence Career Service, whose members work at FBI Headquarters and in all 56 field offices. As just one example of the Directorate of Intelligence’s progress in building up the ICS, the FBI focused on and increased the Intelligence Analyst staffing level in the field, thereby supporting the strategic emphasis of putting analysts “where the intelligence is.” The number of analysts in the field grew from 617 in January 2004 to 1,105 as of July 2006. The DI also increased the Language Analyst Funded Staffing Level (FSL), from 494 in FY 2005 to 773 in FY 2006.
Finally, the DI certified the first FBI Intelligence Officers in December 2005 as part of the pilot implementation of the FBI Intelligence Officer Certification (FIOC) Program. FIOC is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term commitment to the intelligence profession as demonstrated through experience, education, and training. Eight FBI executives were certified, on the basis of prior training and activities, after review by a board of U.S. Intelligence Community executives and approval by the FBI Director. An additional three FBI executives were named Certified FBI Intelligence Officers in July 2006, bringing the total number of Certified Intelligence Officers to 11.
NSB employees work together to accomplish the second component of the NSB’s mission statement—providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities—which will be discussed in-depth in the following section.
The mission of the National
Security Branch is to optimally
position the FBI to protect the United States against weapons of mass
destruction, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage
by:
·
Integrating investigative
and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security
threats;
·
Providing useful
and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement
communities; and
·
Effectively
developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent
with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
guidance, and civil liberties.
The FBI has moved beyond solely case-focused intelligence to building a
Bureau-wide intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination program that
has enhanced our capacity to fuse intelligence from across the Bureau. The FBI now uses intelligence not just to
pursue investigations but to have greater awareness of the national security threats
we face and an enhanced understanding of the total threat environment. We look at information for its predictive
value and share that information with our partners in law enforcement and the U.S.
Intelligence Community.
Information about threats comes from many
diverse sources and must be broadly shared among all who need to take action to
eliminate the threat. For that reason,
the FBI is committed to sharing information—save that which we are legally
proscribed from releasing—with our law enforcement and U.S. Intelligence
Community partners, while at the same time always protecting sources, methods,
and other operationally sensitive details. We share by rule and withhold by exception.
The FBI agrees with
the recommendations and observations of the 9/11 Commission and recognizes that
the intelligence we collect has greater value when combined with information
from our partners. We work side by side
with personnel from the ODNI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of
Defense (DOD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the new National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and with state, local, and tribal partners in
taskforces around the country. The FBI
shares intelligence gathered at home and overseas to provide a coordinated
strategic and tactical response to threats.
The FBI’s Information Sharing Policy Board (ISPB) is chaired by the
EAD-NSB. The ISPB brings together the Bureau entities that
generate and disseminate law enforcement information and intelligence to
implement the FBI’s goal of sharing by rule and withholding by exception. The ISPB initiates, develops, enacts,
monitors, and maintains the primary policies, decisions, and relevant
procedures concerning substantive criminal and intelligence information sharing
internally within the FBI and externally with entities outside of the FBI.
Within the U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI has a two-level
approach. For those agencies that operate
at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)-level, we are expanding our secure facilities
for the FBI network (SCI On-Line, or SCION) that is linked to the DOD-based Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
network used by the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and other national
agencies. For those agencies that
operate at the Secret level, we have connected the FBI’s internal electronic
communications system to the DOD-based SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) that serves military,
intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement users. As a result, FBI agents or analysts who need to communicate at
the Secret-level with other agencies can do so from their desktops.
The FBI’s National Information Sharing
Strategy (NISS) ensures that we share information as fully and appropriately as
possible with our federal, state, local, and tribal partners in the
intelligence and law enforcement communities.
NISS is based on the principle that FBI information and information
technology (IT) systems must be designed to ensure that those protecting the
public have the information they need to take action. It also ensures that information is shared
within the bounds of the Constitution.
NISS includes three components: Law Enforcement National Data Exchange
(N-DEx); Law Enforcement Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx); and the Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) network. N-DEx
will provide a nationwide capability to exchange data derived from incident and
event reports. R-DEx enables the FBI to
join participating federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies
in regional full-text information sharing systems under standard technical
procedures and policy agreements. LEO provides
Web-based communications to the law enforcement community to exchange
information, conduct online education programs, and participate in professional
special interest groups and topically focused dialog.
Each FBI field office now has a FIG.
The FIGs are the FBI’s primary component for receiving and disseminating
information. The FIGs play a major role
in ensuring that we share what we know with others in the U.S. Intelligence
Community and our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners,
in part by assigning personnel to state and regional Intelligence Fusion
Centers and other regional multi-agency intelligence centers, where appropriate
and practical, or through liaison and/or technical connectivity.
The Terrorist Screening Center leverages the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) backbone to provide real-time actionable
intelligence to state and local law enforcement. The TSC was developed to screen for known and suspected
terrorists as well as provide for appropriate and lawful use of terrorist
information. Multiple federal agencies
participate, including the FBI, DOJ, DHS, Department of State, and Department
of Treasury.
In the National Counterterrorism Center, analysts from the FBI, CIA,
DHS, and DOD work side by side to piece together the big picture of threats to
the United States and our interests.
NCTC analysts produce the National Threat Bulletin (NTB) for the
President, the Threat Matrix, and other analytic products. FBI personnel at NCTC are part of the NSB’s
Directorate of Intelligence.
The FBI currently has agents and analysts detailed to other federal
entities, including the CIA, NSA, National Security Council, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, DOD’s Regional Commands,
Department of Energy, and other federal and state agencies.
Recognizing the importance of partnerships to the success of
our national security mission, the FBI increased the number of Joint Terrorism
Task Forces from 35 on September 11, 2001, to 101 today. JTTFs
partner FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from various federal,
state, and local agencies.
We also created a National JTTF, consisting of representatives from 38 agencies, that manages the activities of the JTTFs, coordinates national intelligence collection strategies, and facilitates information sharing with JTTF partner agencies’ headquarters. We work with our partners at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC, and most military operations commands.
The FBI operates six highly specialized Regional Computer Forensic
Laboratories designed to provide forensic examinations of digital
evidence. In each one, law enforcement
agencies from all levels of government train, work, and share information.
In addition to liaison
through Intelligence Fusion Centers and the multi-agency intelligence centers, the FBI is also working more
closely with other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies to advance the
counterintelligence mission through national, regional, and local
counterintelligence working groups and FBI-DOD technology taskforces around the
country. The FBI has also taken steps
to establish closer working relationships with the private sector through business,
academic, and laboratory alliances.
Finally, the FBI is
working with international partners in new ways. We offer whatever assistance we can to other governments to
support their counterterrorism efforts, whether it is training or investigative
support. In some countries, we are working
together on task forces and conducting joint operations. To support this new approach, we expanded
the number of Legal Attaché offices from 23 on September 11, 2001, to more than
60 today. We now routinely deploy
integrated teams of personnel, including agents, analysts, and crime scene
experts, to assist in the investigation of terrorist attacks.
JTTF Facts History: Task forces started in 1979 as an effort to address bank robberies, and JTTFs imported the concept. The first JTTF was implemented in 1980 in the FBI’s New York Office. The FBI subsequently applied the task force concept to its counterterrorism effort in other field offices. Function: Operational Unit that conducts field investigations of actual or potential terrorism threats. Size: 35 JTTFs before September 11, 2001; 101 as of September 2006. Management Structure: Each JTTF is housed in the FBI’s field office and select resident agencies; the members are assigned taskings, and investigative process and strategy are overseen by FBI management. |
Information Technology Initiative
The National Security Branch has launched initiatives in several areas,
including information technology and training, to support our information
sharing mission.
The
NSB is working with the FBI’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) to
implement new tools—and upgrade existing ones—that will make it easier for
analysts and agents to access, analyze, and share information throughout the
FBI and with our U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners.
Alert Capability in Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)
Investigative
Data Warehouse is a centralized, Web-enabled repository for relevant
intelligence and investigative data that allows users to query the information
utilizing advanced software tools. At the NSB’s request, the Office of the Chief Technology
Officer (OCTO) has implemented an “alert capability” that allows users of IDW
to create queries of the system and be automatically notified when a new
document is uploaded to the database that meets their search criteria.
As of July 2006, over 1,000 Intelligence Analysts have received this
capability, which allows users to build profiles on targets of interest,
including names, phrases, addresses, e-mail accounts, phone numbers, and bank
account/credit card numbers. We expect
that all IDW users will be provided with this capability by the end of
2006.
Training and orientation materials provided to our federal, state,
local, and tribal law enforcement partners enable us to educate these partners
on what the FBI is doing, enhance our information sharing efforts, and build
trust among all parties.
Orientation Training
Orientation training is designed to inform those not working regularly on
national security matters about the FBI’s national security mission. This includes FBI, other DOJ and federal
agencies, as well as state, local, and tribal agencies.
The orientation training that has been developed includes:
·
A package
of training materials about the NSB for use in outreach to state and local law
enforcement.
·
A
15-minute video about the NSB and how it relates to local law enforcement that
is designed to be shown at police department roll calls. The video is scheduled to be rolled out via
DVD and LEO in fall 2006.
·
A
12-minute video about the Terrorist Screening Center instructing state and
local police officers how to proceed if they encounter someone who is identified
in a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check as a suspected terrorist.
·
A
two-part series on national and international perspectives on suicide bombing
trends. This series was “multicast” to state and local law enforcement partners
via LEO and to FBI and DOJ employees via the FBI’s Virtual Academy, Justice
Television Network, and FBI secure satellite television in March 2006.
These
successes in information sharing can only be realized when the NSB develops
enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure that are consistent with
applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
guidance, and civil liberties. This
final mission of the NSB will be discussed in-depth in the next section.
The
mission of the National Security Branch is to optimally position the FBI to
protect the United States against weapons of mass destruction, terrorist
attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage by:
·
Integrating
investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national
security threats;
·
Providing useful and
timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement
communities; and
·
Effectively
developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent
with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
guidance, and civil liberties.
In addition to operational matters, the National Security Branch is
also responsible for the continued development of a specialized national
security workforce and ensuring that NSB components have the tools, resources,
and infrastructure they need to carry out the FBI's national security
mission. This is why the EAD-NSB has
full operational and management authority over all FBI Headquarters and field
national security programs, including the authority to initiate, terminate, or
reallocate any of the investigations or other activities of the FBI. This allows the NSB to focus resources where
they are needed most. As detailed
earlier in this paper, the NSB is committed to providing its workforce with the
technology tools and other resources it needs to do its work. But none of these
capabilities can be achieved without an underlying infrastructure that provides
the budget resources and, most importantly, the human resources needed to carry
out our mission.
The NSB is coordinating with the FBI’s Office of General Counsel
to address policy and legal issues for intelligence and information sharing
both within and outside the FBI.
Collaborating with our partners in the Department of Justice and the U.S. Intelligence Community, the NSB is ensuring FBI representation and
participation in U.S.
Intelligence Community working groups and policy-related activities regarding information
sharing, classification, confidential human sources, and information
technology. The NSB is also working
with the DNI to create standard policies and procedures for the U.S. Intelligence Community.
The NSB’s policy and legal accomplishments include the following:
·
Developed
the FBI Intelligence Policy Manual, which includes dissemination policy,
classification, declassification, dissemination caveats, sanitization, and
tearlines. The manual implements the
policies on intelligence and information sharing set forth by the President, by
Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and by the DNI in the soon-to-be-released U.S. Intelligence
Community Directive 500. One of the key
areas of focus for the manual is how to strike the proper balance between the
need to share information versus the need to protect intelligence sources and
methods. It also provides policy
specifying the categories of intelligence that can be disseminated to different
groups of customers.
·
Coordinated
the FBI’s role in implementing new U.S.
Intelligence Community
information sharing policies, including the Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 8/1 on information sharing.
This directive establishes policy to maximize intelligence information
sharing, identifies key policy elements that will govern implementation of the
policy, and assigns responsibilities for ensuring that the policy is
effectively carried out within the U.S.
Intelligence Community.
The NSB is working with its components and the FBI’s Finance Division
to develop procedures for formulating and executing the FBI’s budget for
programs and projects funded by the National Intelligence Program. The DNI requires that programs funded by the
NIP must have performance-based measurements, including a description of how
the money will be spent, how progress will be measured, and what was
accomplished with the money.
The NSB’s accomplishments in budget and metrics include:
·
2008
Performance Plan: Developing
an FY 2008 performance plan that ties spending on NIP-funded FBI programs to
performance measures based on the DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy.
·
2007
Performance Measures:
Completed FY 2007 performance measures that align with the expenditure of NIP
funding and assist NSB managers in the evaluation of FBI's national security
performance.
·
Congressional
Budget Justification Booklet:
Added key performance goals to 23 funding categories in the Congressional
Budget Justification Booklet (CBJB), which is the NIP’s request to Congress.
·
Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT) Supplemental: Submitted a supplemental request to Congress for FBI activities
associated with the GWOT.
·
Money-saving opportunities: Coordinated
within the NSB and other FBI divisions to consolidate various contracts and
vendor purchases to promote cost-saving measures.
The NSB is also
reviewing its various programs to ensure consistency throughout its
divisions. For example, the NSB worked
with the Inspection Division to revise Inspection Interrogatories and
workpapers to ensure they measure relevant national security
accomplishments. These new
interrogatories were implemented in April 2006 and have allowed inspections to
more closely mirror the goals and objectives of the FBI’s National Security
Programs.
The FBI’s most valuable
resource is our people, and it is our employees who will enable us to
successfully complete our national security missions. The NSB is developing and
supporting a specialized, integrated FBI intelligence workforce consisting of
agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists with deep
investigative and intelligence expertise in national security and criminal
tools. To build this intelligence
cadre, the NSB is creating a workforce environment that will attract and retain
intelligence personnel with critical skills and competencies needed to protect
the nation against current and emerging threats. Among the human resource initiatives the NSB is undertaking are:
·
Defining core national security competencies—a
cluster of interrelated knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform a
specific job—and revising recruiting practices to target those competencies.
·
Determining the critical skills hiring goals for
Special Agents for the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division,
the DI, and the WMD Directorate and coordinating with the Human Resources
Division (HRD) to develop Special Agent hiring goals and recruitment
strategies. Critical skills are: intelligence experience; language proficiency;
computer science/information technology; science; engineering; accounting/finance;
law enforcement; and military experience.
·
Collaborating
with the ODNI on
various directives, including:
o Aligning the FBI’s Human Capital Plan and
priorities with the ODNI’s Strategic Human Capital Plan;
o Crafting a common compensation structure for the
U.S. Intelligence Community workforce; and
o
Participating
in and establishing Bureau policy for ODNI Joint U.S. Intelligence Community
Duty Assignments.
To enhance our intelligence workforce, the NSB’s DI has created an Intelligence Career Service, which is composed of Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, Surveillance Specialists, and a dedicated number of Special Agents.
Membership in the ICS begins with a new hiring process that screens candidates based on competencies specific to each position. Personnel hired to the ICS then have a clear career path with opportunities for training, development, specialization, and, ultimately, promotion to upper-management ranks.
The FBI has also
reformed the way we recruit, hire, train, assign, and promote Special Agents. These reforms have led to a highly trained
and specialized corps of agents dedicated to national security missions, and
they include a program for career-long development that builds specialized
expertise in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence, while
providing a solid foundation in law enforcement and Constitutional protections.
For the ICS, we
shifted from a local recruiting model to a centralized, nationwide recruiting
strategy, much like that used for FBI Special Agents. Each new hire must sign a mobility agreement (similar to that
which exists for Special Agents) so that Intelligence Analysts, Language
Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists can be redeployed consistent with the
needs of the enterprise.
We refined our recruitment strategy to target and provide incentives to
applicants with critical skills in intelligence, foreign languages, technology,
area studies, and other specialties.
We also use the Pat Roberts Intelligence
Scholars Program, which offers $25,000 scholarships to current FBI Intelligence
Analysts to help fund their past, current, or future studies in a specialized
critical skill or area of specialty.
The purpose of this program is to enhance the FBI’s retention of ICS
personnel with specialized critical skills.
So far in 2006, we have awarded 23 scholarships.
For Special Agents,
the FBI revised the hiring process by changing the list of critical skills we
are looking for in candidates, including skills or a background in
intelligence, languages helpful to our counterterrorism and/or
counterintelligence missions, information technology and computer science,
engineering, physical sciences, accounting, or international business. The result has been a significant increase
in the number of new Special Agents with expertise in these areas.
Selection and Hiring Action Plan
We have more than doubled the number of Intelligence Analysts onboard,
from approximately 1,000 pre-9/11 to more than 2,100 today, through
improvements in our selection and hiring processes and technology tools.
Career Paths
The FBI is committed to creating advancement opportunities that build
on initiatives already underway
in the DI. To that end, we are
developing career paths for Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance
Specialists to allow these ICS members to pursue technical, as well as
management, paths in their chosen jobs.
Career paths that reward and develop technical experts in intelligence
operations are essential to our ability to retain a top-notch national
intelligence workforce. To date, the
FBI achieved a key milestone in extending the Intelligence Analyst career path to
the GS-14 level in field offices.
Previously, analysts serving in the field could advance only to the
GS-12 level. Representatives from the
DI and other FBI Headquarters divisions are developing proposals to extend the
career ladder for other ICS personnel.
The
Special Agent Career Path Program is designed to increase specialization and
develop national security expertise in the agent workforce. Specifically, the agent career paths will
fall into two overall programs (national security and criminal) and five
subprograms (intelligence, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and
cyber) positions.
The FBI submitted our first required report to Congress at the end of
Calendar Year 2005 by providing a Concept of Operations for a Pay for
Performance system for the FBI Intelligence Community. Our Concept of Operations was developed in
consultation with the OPM, the ODNI, the National Academy for Public
Administration (NAPA), and the DOJ. In addition,
the FBI is working with the ODNI and other elements of the USIC on overarching
architecture for pay reform across the U.S. Intelligence Community.
A main component of the FBI’s ICS pay for performance system will be a
performance management system (PMS) that makes meaningful distinctions among
employees’ individual and organizational contributions as a basis for pay. The FBI fielded a new five-level PMS in
March 2006, replacing our pass-fail system.
The new PMS will be the cornerstone for the new pay for performance
system.
New
Analyst Training—Cohort Program
The FBI is committed to providing our personnel with the best training
available in the U.S. Intelligence Community.
For example, the ICS Cohort Program, launched in October 2005,
is a training program designed for new Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts,
and Surveillance Specialists. For the
first time at the FBI, these ICS members enter on duty to the FBI together as a
Cohort class for five weeks of training at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia. The Cohort Program equips ICS
members with basic intelligence tradecraft, an appreciation for how each role
contributes to the intelligence cycle, and a nationwide network from which to
draw as they embark on their FBI careers. Additionally, new Analysts and Special
Agents participate together in joint training exercises as part of the Cohort
Program. The regular Cohort schedule of
classes began in January 2006, and we have trained 392 ICS personnel through
Cohort as of July 2006.
After completing the five-week ICS Cohort Program, the career tracks receive additional specialized training: four weeks for Intelligence Analysts, two weeks for Language Analysts, and three to six weeks for Surveillance Specialists depending on their job role.
Special Agent Basics
The basic curriculum for Special Agents now includes these topics:
|
All new
agents participate in an 18-week basic training course of instruction at the
FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. This
program introduces agents to the full range of intelligence and law enforcement
tools and emphasizes how intelligence and criminal investigative techniques are
used in tandem as part of the FBI’s strategic mission. We also emphasize the development of an
intelligence base through the operation of human sources and liaison with other
agencies.
Basic Training
Basic training will be provided to all NSB employees, to ensure they have
a baseline understanding of all of the FBI’s national security missions. NSB employees must complete four core
courses online through the FBI Virtual Academy: National Security Branch
Introduction; Introduction to Counterintelligence; International Terrorism; and
Domestic Terrorism.
We are developing intermediate intelligence training using U.S.
Intelligence Community curricula as a basis for our curriculum
development. The format will be
requirements-driven with a practicum based on real world problems. The following training courses are being
implemented:
·
On August 7-10,
2006, the Managers of Analysts Workshop was piloted with 50 managers, including
Supervisory Special Agents and Supervisory Intelligence Analysts in
attendance.
·
In September
2006, we will pilot the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Source, Targeting & Development
Course. This class will have active participation
from the CIA.
·
In early FY
2007, we plan to implement Reports Officer (RO) training and Intelligence
Information Reports (IIR) courses. The
RO training will focus on the roles and responsibilities associated with the RO
position, identifying intelligence, legal issues, and IIR exercises. The IIR course will allow ICS personnel to
gain more in-depth knowledge of the IIR process and will include several
exercises.
In addition to basic and intermediate training, advanced training continues to be developed for the
intelligence workforce with the goal of providing a catalog specializing in
national security. This catalog of
training, in conjunction with the DNI, will be broken down into core and
elective instruction tailored to each employee’s role and
responsibilities. Once implemented, it
is anticipated that employees will be expected to complete training obligations
as a condition of promotion. Courses
will be available in a variety of formats, including the FBI Virtual Academy;
local, regional, and national instruction; and Web casts.
All NSB Special Agents receive advanced training as part of an ongoing
career development program. Some of
this training is provided to agents through the FBI’s intranet, and other
specialized training is brought directly to the field offices. Special Agents also attend specialized
training in their region of the country or return to the Washington, D.C., area
for advanced training. This training
delves into dozens of individualized topics such as counterproliferation and
source recruitment, development, and handling.
Several opportunities for joint training with members of the U.S.
Intelligence Community exist as FBI personnel attend other agencies’ classes
and personnel from other Community agencies attend FBI classes. In addition, the FBI routinely details
Special Agents to other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies. Finally, the FBI continues to coordinate all
advanced and specialized training with the ODNI, as its requirements are outlined
and refined.
Professional
Development Opportunities
The FBI has also developed multiple joint-training opportunities with
the U.S. Intelligence Community and higher-education institutions. The training partnerships and activities we
are pursuing with other government agencies, academia, and the private sector
include the following:
·
Joint
Military Intelligence College (JMIC): We continue to offer FBI employees the
opportunity to participate in JMIC. JMIC
is a center of excellence for the education of intelligence professionals; the
two degrees granted by JMIC are the only accredited degrees in strategic
intelligence in the United States. JMIC
programs include core and elective courses in analytic methods, intelligence
collection, national security policy, intelligence community organization,
regional assessments, and transnational issues.
· Kellogg School of Management: We have implemented joint-training seminars with Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists. The major theme for the seminars is accelerating the Bureau’s transformation process and, more specifically, integrating the intelligence process into Bureau operations. Topics discussed include strategic leadership, change implementation, and the role of intelligence in criminal as well as counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. More than 1,500 Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists have completed the 2.5 day “Navigating Strategic Change” course, and more than 40 senior and mid-level executives have completed the five-day “Leading Strategic Change” course.
·
Intelligence
Community Assignment Program (ICAP): We are currently participating in the ICAP, a
structured rotational program within the U.S. Intelligence Community. ICAP is designed to provide intelligence
professionals with the opportunity to gain U.S. Intelligence Community experience
through rotational assignments to intelligence or intelligence-related
positions in sister agencies.
·
CIA
University: The Mission Academy, which is one of CIA University’s schools, offers
substantive training to CIA personnel and across the U.S. Intelligence
Community. So far in 2006, more than
200 FBI employees have attended course offerings.
·
Joint Intelligence
Virtual University (JIVU): We are currently participating in the JIVU,
which offers access to training from other agencies and components. Registered users can take courses from their
desktop at any time. JIVU’s catalog
includes in-demand course topics such as analytic tradecraft, foreign denial
and deception, national intelligence, and counterterrorism, as well as a robust
foreign language catalog with more than 700 modules and nine languages.
·
Mercyhurst
College’s Graduate Program in Applied Intelligence: We have partnered with Mercyhurst College to
establish a national intelligence studies sabbatical for our cadre of
analytical personnel. The masters of
science degree in applied intelligence is a 33-credit program designed to
provide a theoretical and practical framework for the study of intelligence and
its application.
·
Joint
Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC): JMITC recently invited the FBI to
participate in the U.S. Military Familiarization Course for the Civilian
Intelligence Analyst (MILFAM). MILFAM
is a two-week interactive field course designed for new Intelligence Analysts
who have no previous military background.
The analysts gain real-life experiences with all five of the uniformed
services with a focus on military intelligence.
· Summer Hard Problem Program (SHARP): SHARP is a four-week program sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis. This study program investigates the intelligence implications of the factors that cause individuals and communities of interest to coalesce into pro-social, anti-social, terrorist, or extra-legal movements.
The creation of the NSB’s
DI acknowledges the importance of our intelligence mission and elevates the stature
of our intelligence professionals. Our
intelligence professionals will not simply be granted that elevated stature but
will earn it through a rigorous certification process based on competency
models. With the implementation of the
FBI Intelligence Officer Certification (FIOC) Program, some FBI intelligence
professionals will be eligible to become Certified FBI Intelligence Officers.
A Certified FBI
Intelligence Officer is a recognized organizational authority whose demonstrated
in-depth knowledge and understanding of the national threat environment and
intelligence issues drives organizational and strategic decision-making through
the effective integration of FBI operational and intelligence
capabilities. Intelligence Officer
Certification is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term
commitment to the intelligence profession as demonstrated through experience,
education, and training.
All Special Agents, Intelligence
Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists are eligible to
participate in certification. Not all
personnel occupying these positions are required to obtain certification. However, certification will eventually be
required for certain management positions, including DI executive management,
all Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs), and certain section chiefs
serving in an operational or intelligence capacity.
Eight FBI executives
were certified in December 2005, on the basis of prior training and activities,
as FBI Intelligence Officers, after review by a board of U.S. Intelligence
Community executives and approval by the FBI Director. Three FBI executives were named
certified FBI Intelligence Officers in July 2006 after review by the
Certification Approval Board, bringing the total number of Certified
Intelligence Officers to 11. An incremental rollout for ASACs and
additional FBI executives began in spring 2006, and we will begin registering
eligible onboard FBI employees in October 2006.
In addition to the guidance and initiatives cited above, the
National Security Branch is committed to the FBI’s unwavering respect for civil
liberties. The FBI’s job is both to
protect Americans from crime and terrorism and to preserve their constitutional
and statutory rights. Our long history
of protecting civil rights and uncovering public corruption gives us a unique perspective
that helps us maintain a proper balance between protection and privacy.
Thanks to the professionalism of our personnel and the
respect for civil liberties institutionalized within the Bureau, the FBI has carried
out our expanded post-9/11 mission with full adherence to the Constitution and the
principles of personal liberty and privacy.
We believe that, while we cannot
afford to miss information about terrorist threats, we also cannot afford to
lose the support of the American people.
Protecting a territory the size of the United States can only occur when
citizens act as partners who trust us and are willing to talk to and share
information with us. We value this
essential support and will not jeopardize it.
Our strict adherence
to civil liberties is also aided by the regime of oversight, legal guidance,
and self-regulation that governs our investigative activities within the United
States. This regime is comprehensive
and has many facets, including the following.
These examples of
statutes, which are implemented by DOJ and FBI policies, serve to guide the
Bureau’s operations so that our activities always remain clearly within the
bounds of the Constitution and of propriety:
·
The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as amended)—This law established a process for obtaining
judicial approval of electronic surveillance and physical searches for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information.
·
The
Whistleblower Protection Acts of 1989 and 1998—These laws protect whistleblowers from
retaliation.
·
The Freedom
of Information Act of 1966 (as amended)—This law provides the public with effective access to all FBI
documents not covered by a specific statutory exemption.
·
The Privacy
Act of 1974 (as amended)—This
law forbids the FBI and other federal agencies from collecting information
about how individuals exercise their First Amendment rights, unless that collection
is expressly authorized by statute or by the individual, or is pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.
·
Attorney
General’s Crimes Guidelines—The
Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (General Crimes Guidelines) have
been in effect, in one form or another, since the mid-1970s. These guidelines govern all investigations by
the FBI of crimes and crime-related activities. They set forth the standards and requirements under which an
investigation may be initiated, and they define the permissible scope,
duration, subject matters, and objectives of an FBI criminal
investigation. They are designed to
provide Special Agents with a framework that maintains the proper balance
between the public’s need for effective law enforcement and terrorism
prevention, on the one hand, and the preservation of individual rights and
liberties, on the other.
Among the provisions that specifically serve
to protect individual rights are the following: (1) the prohibition
against initiating investigations directed solely at the exercise of First
Amendment rights or other constitutionally protected activity; and (2) the
requirement that agents consider using the least intrusive method necessary to
achieve their investigative goals. In
short, the guidelines translate the DOJ’s respect for individual rights and liberties
into practical policy and thereby prevent investigative abuses.
·
Attorney
General’s National Security/Foreign Intelligence Guidelines—The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI
National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) were
first issued in 1976 and recently updated in October 2003. (The guidelines are reviewed and updated
whenever necessary due to changes in the law or to accommodate changing social
needs.) These classified guidelines
govern the manner in which the FBI conducts national
security investigations—those investigations that focus on protecting the
United States from threats to the national security.
The National Security Guidelines, like the
domestic General Crimes Guidelines, were designed to maintain the proper
balance between the public’s need for effective protection
of our national security interests and the imperative to respect and protect
individual rights. Like the General
Crimes Guidelines, the NSIG are designed to ensure that individual
rights and liberties will be protected.
First Amendment activities are fully protected, investigative techniques
are carefully managed, both by predication and by higher authority, and a U.S.
person may be the subject of a national security
investigation only if circumstances indicate that he or she might be acting for
or on behalf of a foreign power.
·
Congressional
Oversight—Committees of the
U.S. Congress, primarily the House and Senate Committees Overseeing Judiciary,
Intelligence, Appropriations, Government Reform/Governmental Affairs, and
Homeland Security, have broad oversight authority over the FBI. These committees—along with others—exercise regular,
vigorous oversight into all aspects of the FBI’s operations. This oversight has significantly increased in
breadth and intensity since the 1970s, and it provides the public with additional
assurance that the FBI conducts investigations in accordance with the law and
the Constitution.
·
Department
of Justice Oversight—The FBI’s national
security investigations are subject to significant outside oversight beyond
that conducted by Congress. The DOJ’s
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review was established in 1981, in part as an
oversight body for FBI intelligence activities. It monitors national security investigations conducted by
U.S. intelligence agencies and provides Congress a series of semi-annual
reports on various aspects of the FBI’s counterintelligence operations.
·
Intelligence
Oversight Board—The FBI is also
subject to oversight by the Intelligence Oversight Board, formerly the
President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. Established in 1981, the board is composed of four members
appointed from the membership of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. Among its other
responsibilities, the Intelligence Oversight Board reviews all violations of
national security law, Executive Orders, or Presidential Decision Directives by
the FBI and the other intelligence agencies, and issues reports thereon to the
President and the Attorney General.
·
Office of
the Inspector General (OIG)—OIG
receives copies of all reports that are sent to the FBI’s Office of
Inspections, and OIG has the option of investigating any issue itself.
Self-Regulation, Enforcement, and Inspection
·
Inspections—The FBI’s Office of Inspections is
responsible for inspecting FBI investigative, financial, and administrative
programs to ensure their economic value and effective compliance with
objectives, governing laws, rules, regulations, and policies. These inspections
also ensure that FBI personnel conduct the organization’s activities in a
proper and professional manner. The inspection process is a continual one,
with the goal of inspecting every FBI entity, field office, FBI Headquarters division,
and Legal Attaché Office at
least every three years.
·
Internal
Enforcement—The FBI’s Office
of Office of Inspections and the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General
investigate allegations of misconduct.
·
Internal
Safeguards—Internal
safeguards include the Privacy Council, which reviews the plans of any record
system that is proposed within the FBI for compliance with the Privacy Act and
related privacy policies, and the Criminal Undercover Operations Review
Committee, which is composed of senior DOJ and FBI officials and reviews all
proposed undercover operations that involve sensitive circumstances. There is also a Criminal Informant Review
Committee, composed of senior FBI and DOJ officials, which provides oversight
over several categories of human sources, such as high-level criminal
informants and long-term sources.
·
Training—The Bureau’s training program emphasizes
respect for the Constitutional rights and dignity of individuals. Agents receive extensive instruction on Constitutional
law and criminal procedure, and all new agents visit the Holocaust Museum to
learn the consequences of government oppression and persecution. Then, throughout their careers, agents
receive quarterly training from the Chief Division Counsel in each field office
to keep them up to speed on the latest guidelines, changes to laws and
regulations, and judicial decisions related to Constitutional rights and
liberties.
This comprehensive infrastructure of legal limitations, oversight, and self-regulation effectively ensures that the Bureau’s operations are carried out within constitutional and statutory parameters, and they comport with the expectations of the public.
The NSB consolidates the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
intelligence, and WMD missions into a single national security mission. The FBI has always answered the call to
combat threats to our national security. From gangsters in the 1930s, to intelligence threats during the
Cold War era, to organized crime in the 1970s, to drug trafficking in the
1980s, the Bureau has accepted the nation’s most pressing challenges and risen
to the occasion. In our dual role as
both a law enforcement and intelligence agency, we are uniquely positioned to
respond to a changing world with evolving threats and adversaries.
We have a mandate from the President, Congress, the Attorney General,
and the Director of National Intelligence to protect national security by
producing intelligence in support of our investigative mission, national
intelligence priorities, and the needs of other customers. The FBI has always used intelligence to solve
cases; however, today, we count on our agents and analysts working hand-in-hand
with colleagues around the country and around the world to collectively piece
together information about multiple, interrelated issues.
The NSB’s initiatives are all aimed at our goal of integrating intelligence and operations to protect our national security. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has implemented significant changes to enhance our ability to counter today’s most critical threats. The NSB builds on the FBI’s strengths to ensure integration of national security intelligence and investigations, promote the development of a national security workforce, and facilitate enhanced coordination with the U.S. Intelligence Community. With the continued commitment and dedication of the men and women of the FBI, these reforms will improve the Bureau’s ability to accomplish our national security investigative and intelligence missions and, ultimately, to protect the American people.
Background: DNI Authorities and Relationship to the FBI
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the head of the U.S.
Intelligence Community (USIC) and the principal advisor to the President,
National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on intelligence
matters. [Note: The Director of the FBI reports to the Attorney General, not
the DNI. Nothing in the relationship
with the DNI weakens the FBI’s accountability to the Director of the FBI and
the Attorney General in the Department of Justice (DOJ) chain of command to
ensure the ability to support the DOJ and FBI missions.]
The DNI has
specified authority to concur in the appointment of the Executive Assistant
Director of the National Security Branch (EAD-NSB), who serves as the FBI’s
lead intelligence official. The
Director of the FBI forwards his recommendation to the Attorney General for the
appointment of the EAD-NSB. The
Attorney General then seeks the concurrence of the DNI before making the
appointment, consistent with the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The EAD-NSB communicates with the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to ensure responsiveness to DNI
guidance and to facilitate coordination with other elements of the USIC.
The NSB National
Security Issues Group oversees and coordinates the implementation of new DNI
policy guidance and FBI representation on USIC policy bodies. The group represents the FBI on the USIC
Information Sharing Working Group and the Community Interoperability and
Information Sharing Office Group.
The National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)
The National
Intelligence Priorities Framework is the DNI’s guidance to the USIC on the
national intelligence priorities approved by the President. The NIPF’s purpose is to provide a
comprehensive prioritization methodology and mechanism to serve as basic
guidance for the operation, planning, and programming of U.S. intelligence
analysis and collection. The NIPF,
updated semiannually, is managed by the Assistant Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for the NIPF.
The FBI and other
members of the USIC support the DNI’s efforts to establish national
intelligence priorities within the NIPF.
The FBI has adopted the NIPF as a method of prioritizing intelligence
collection and production for the FBI.
As such, the FBI is expected to collect against NIPF requirements and to
integrate efforts with the DNI Mission Managers and the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Collection (DDNI/C).
All FBI intelligence requirements for collection (both Standing and Ad
Hoc requirements; FBI Headquarters and field) are and must be based on and
traceable to the NIPF.
The National
Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, both as amended, designated the
FBI as a member of the USIC and authorized us to collect, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence.
Therefore, the priorities that are the output of the NIPF are applicable
to the execution of the FBI’s intelligence process (requirements, planning and
direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and
dissemination) as well as to acquisition decisions and resource
management. The priorities allow
managers to determine the order in which requirements will be addressed and the
level of resource commitment appropriate to the effort.
The National
Intelligence Program (NIP)
The NIP [formerly
the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)] is the funding stream for
national intelligence activities. The IRTPA
redesignated the NFIP as the NIP to illustrate the DNI’s responsibility for
foreign and domestic intelligence.
The DNI develops,
determines, and presents to the President for approval the annual consolidated
NIP budget, which includes the FBI’s National Security Program budget. In addition to the information to which the
DNI has access as “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the
national security,” the FBI Director must provide the DNI other requested
information needed to determine the NIP budget. The DNI also is authorized to provide guidance for developing the
annual budget for intelligence elements not part of the NIP.
The EAD-NSB is
responsible for building and submitting the FBI national security budget
request. The EAD-NSB has budget
oversight authority over the FBI’s Intelligence and Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence
Decision Units, which includes funding for all FBI national security programs and the
FBI’s NIP resources.
All efforts to
create and manage the FBI intelligence budget are directed at ensuring the DNI
is able to exercise oversight for all national intelligence spending. The FBI’s intelligence requirements and
collection management process is fully aligned with the DNI’s NIP.
Under the IRTPA, the
DNI has authority over the national intelligence budget, known as the NIP,
including that portion of the NIP allocated to the FBI. The DNI has the authority to develop and
determine the NIP and to reprogram NIP resources, subject to certain
limitations. The DNI also monitors the
implementation of the NIP budget and ensures that it is effectively
executed. In addition, the DNI is
authorized to provide guidance on the development and execution of the
remainder of the budget under the management of the EAD-NSB, pursuant to the
authority granted by the IRTPA.
This allocation of
budget authority between the Attorney General and the DNI is appropriate
because it will give the DNI significant authority over the FBI’s national
security budget while maintaining the authority of the Attorney General and the
FBI Director over the FBI’s investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement
resources. Preserving this chain of
command ensures that the Attorney General can meet his statutory
responsibilities to enforce federal law.
The National
Intelligence Strategy (NIS)
In October 2005 the
DNI’s office released the National Intelligence Strategy, which establishes the
strategic objectives for the USIC. The
document sets forth the framework for a more unified, coordinated, and
effective USIC and will guide USIC policy, planning, collection, analysis, operations,
programming, acquisition, budgeting, and execution. The strategy outlines 15 strategic objectives that are referred
to as either mission or enterprise objectives, and the DNI is leading an effort
within the USIC to develop strategic implementation plans for all 15
objectives.
Communication between the DNI and FBI
The creation of a unified management structure to oversee the primary national security components of the FBI makes our principal intelligence gathering units—including the counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs—subject to the DNI’s oversight. This operational structure ensures that these resources can be directed appropriately in coordination with other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies under the DNI’s leadership.
The FBI, through the
National Security Branch, is actively communicating with and responding to
taskings from the ODNI. Among the ODNI
products to which the FBI has contributed are the DNI 2005 Annual Report of the
United States Intelligence Community, Coordination of USIC Human Capital
Policies, and 15 National Intelligence Strategy Implementation Plans.
The FBI has detailed
personnel with specialized expertise to the ODNI and its entities.
The FBI has also
participated actively in many U.S. Intelligence Community interagency policy
groups under the authority of the ODNI, including the Intelligence Community
Leadership Council, Intelligence Community Program Managers, National
Counterintelligence Policy Board, Intelligence Policy Advisory Council, Chief Information
Officer’s Principals Council, Chief Human Capital Officer’s Executive Council,
and Information Sharing Council.
Finally, NSB executives and staff are in daily contact with their ODNI counterparts, and the FBI continues to work with the ODNI and the Department of Justice to re-examine existing authorities governing the FBI’s criminal and intelligence missions and budget and mission-management structures.
In executing the following priorities, we will produce and use
intelligence to protect the nation from threats and to bring to justice those
who violate the law.
1. Protect the United
States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United
States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.
3. Protect the United
States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.
4. Combat public
corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat
transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises.
7. Combat major
white-collar crime.
8. Combat significant
violent crime.
9. Support federal, state,
local, and international partners.