Bureau of Industry and Security officials participate in a continuity of operations exercise.
This statement of principles represents the guiding philosophy of the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security in approaching its activities and fulfilling its responsibilities. This statement is not intended to dictate any particular regulatory action or enforcement action.
· The Bureau's paramount concern is the security of the United States. The Bureau's mission is to protect the security of the United States, which includes its national security, economic security, cyber security, and homeland security.
· The Bureau's credibilitywithin government, with industry, and with the American peopledepends upon its fidelity to this principle.
· For example, in the area of dual-use export controls, the Bureau will vigorously administer and enforce such controls to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them, to halt the spread of weapons to terrorists or countries of concern, and to further important U.S. foreign policy objectives. Where there is credible evidence suggesting that the export of a dual-use item threatens U.S. security, the Bureau must act to combat that threat.
· Protecting U.S. security includes not only supporting U.S. national defense, but also ensuring the health of the U.S. economy and the competitiveness of U.S. industry.
· The Bureau seeks to promote a strong and vibrant defense industrial base that can develop and provide technologies that will enable the United States to maintain its military superiority.
· The Bureau must take great care to ensure that its regulations do not impose unreasonable restrictions on legitimate international commercial activity that is necessary for the health of U.S. industry. In protecting U.S. security, the Bureau must avoid actions that compromise the international competitiveness of U.S. industry without any appreciable national security benefits.
· The Bureau strives to work in partnership with the private sector. The Bureau will seek to fulfill its mission, where possible, through public-private partnerships and market-based solutions.
· U.S. security cannot be achieved without the active cooperation of the private sector, which today controls a
greater share of critical U.S. resources than in the past. At the same time, the health of U.S. industry is dependent on
U.S. securityof our
borders, our critical infrastructures, and our computer networks.
· The symbiotic relationship between industry and security should be reflected in the formulation, application, and enforcement of Bureau rules and policies.
· The Bureau's activities and regulations need to be able to adapt to changing global conditions and challenges. The political, economic, technological, and security environment that exists today is substantially different than that of only a decade ago. Bureau activities and regulations can only be justified, and should only be maintained, to the extent they reflect current global realities. Laws, regulations, or practices that do not take into account these realitiesand that do not have sufficient flexibility to allow for adaptation in response to future changesultimately harm national security by imposing costs and burdens on U.S. industry without any corresponding benefit to U.S. security.
· In the area of exports, these significant geopolitical changes suggest that the U.S. control regime that in the past was primarily list-based must shift to a mix of list-based controls and controls that target specific end-uses and end-users of concern.
· The Bureau also should be creative in thinking about how new technologies can be utilized in designing better export controls and enforcing controls more effectively.
· The Bureau's rules, policies, and decisions should be stated clearly, applied consistently, and followed faithfully. The Bureau's rules, policies, and decisions should be transparent and clearly stated. Once promulgated, Bureau rules and policies should be applied consistently, and Bureau action should be guided by precedent.
· Uncertainty, and the delay it engenders, constitutes a needless transaction cost on U.S. companies and citizens, hampering their ability to compete effectively. Voluntary compliance with Bureau rules and regulations should be encouraged and, to the extent appropriate, rewarded.
· These precepts are particularly important with respect to the application and enforcement of export controls. An effective export control regime necessarily depends upon the private sector clearly understanding and seeking to implement Bureau rules and policies voluntarily.
· Decision making should be fact-based, analytically sound, and consistent with governing laws and regulations. Bureau decisions should be made after careful review of all available and relevant facts and without any philosophical predisposition.
· A "reasonable person" standard should be applied to all decisions: How would a "reasonable person" decide this issue? The Bureau's mission does not lend itself to "ideological" decision makingespecially when it comes to its licensing and enforcement functions.
· It is inappropriate to recommend outcomes based on an assumption that a position will be reviewed and "pared back" by another partywhether it be another office in the Bureau or another agency of the U.S. Government. Such an approach violates the public's trust, undermines the Bureau's credibility, and imposes substantial costs in terms of wasted time and effort.
· The Bureau strives to work cooperatively with other parts of the U.S. Government and with state and local governments.
· The Bureau shall seek to collaborate in a collegial and effective manner with other agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, including the National Security Council, the Office of Homeland Security, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Energy Department, and the Intelligence Community.
· The Bureau shall consult with its oversight committees and other appropriate Members of Congress and
congressional staff on matters of mutual
interest.
· The Bureau shall seek to enhance its relationships with state and local government officials and first responders to national emergencies.
· International cooperation is critical to the Bureau's activities. Fulfilling the Bureau's mission of promoting security depends heavily upon international cooperation with our principal trading partners and other countries of strategic importance, such as major transshipment hubs. Whether seeking to control the spread of dangerous goods and technologies, protect critical infrastructures, or ensure the existence of a strong defense industrial base, international cooperation is critical.
· With regard to export control laws in particular, effective enforcement is greatly enhanced by both international cooperation and an effort to harmonize the substance of U.S. laws with those of our principal trading partners.
· International cooperation, however, does not mean, settling on the "lowest common denominator." Where consensus cannot be broadly obtained, the Bureau will not abandon its principles, but should seek to achieve its goals through other means, including cooperation among smaller groups of like-minded partners.
The "Unverified List" consists of foreign end-users and consignees that have been involved in export transactions in which BIS officials (or other federal officials acting on BIS's behalf) have been unable to perform pre-license checks or post-shipment verifications for reasons outside the control of the U.S. Government. Participation of a person on the "Unverified List" in any proposed transaction is considered by BIS to raise a "red flag" for purposes of the "Know Your Customer" guidance set forth in Supplement No. 3 to Part 732 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Under that guidance, the "red flag" requires heightened scrutiny by the exporter before proceeding with a transaction in which a listed person is a party.
On November 21, 2002, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a notice removing S.B. Submarine Systems Co., Ltd. (located in the People's Republic of China), from the "Unverified List." (See 67 Fed. Reg. 70209.)
On March 28, 2003, BIS published a notice adding Brilliant Intervest (located in Malaysia) to the Unverified List and removing Xian XR Aerocomponents Co., Ltd. (located in the People's Republic of China). (See 68 Fed. Reg. 15151.)
On November 25, 2002, BIS published a rule removing the special controls on the export and reexport of arms-related items imposed on July 14, 1998 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY). This rule is consistent with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1367 of September 10, 2001, which terminated the international arms embargo against the FRY mandated by UNSC Resolution 1160 of March 3, 1998. (See 67 Fed. Reg. 70545.)
On January 14, 2003, BIS published a rule implementing revisions to national security controls for microprocessors that were agreed upon in the February 2002 meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement). This rule removed license requirements for exports and reexports of general purpose microprocessors to most destinations, retaining license requirements for designated terrorist-supporting countries. In addition, the rule established a new license requirement for the export or reexport of general purpose microprocessors if, at the time of the export or reexport, the exporter or reexporter knows, has reason to know, or is informed by BIS that the item will be or is intended to be used for a "military end-use" in a country that is of concern for national security reasons or by a "military end-user" in such a country. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 1796.)
On March 5, 2003, BIS published a rule implementing the revisions to the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Items that were agreed upon in the February 2002 meeting (and finalized in May 2002) and corresponding amendments. (Changes that affected microprocessors were published in a separate rule on January 14, 2003.) This rule made changes to the Commerce Control List (CCL) (specifically, certain entries controlled for national security reasons in Categories 2, 3, 4, 5 Part I (telecommunications), 5 Part II (information security), 6, 7, 8, and 9). (See 68 Fed. Reg. 10586.)
On April 2, 2003, BIS published a rule implementing revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Related to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This rule amended the CCL to reflect the reformatted MTCR Annex of October 14, 1999, and added the Czech Republic, Korea (Republic of), Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine to Country Group A:2 to reflect their membership in the MTCR. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 16144.)
On September 22, 2003, BIS published a rule implementing revisions to the CCL agreed to by MTCR member countries at the September 2002 plenary. BIS also amended certain entries on the CCL to clarify the scope of and jurisdiction for controls on global navigation satellite receiving equipment. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 54655.)
On April 3, 2003, BIS published a rule expanding the scope of explosives detection equipment controlled under Export Classification Control Number (ECCN) 2A983, previously 2A993, to include equipment that detects the presence of explosives, explosive residue, or detonators, and added controls on related software and technology. The rule also imposed broader foreign policy controls on these items. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 16208.)
On June 6, 2003, BIS published a rule expanding controls on designated terrorists by imposing a license requirement on the export and reexport of any item subject to the EAR by a U.S. person or non-U.S. person to persons designated in or pursuant to Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, also known as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 34192.)
On June 10, 2003, BIS published a rule implementing the understandings reached at the June 2002 plenary meeting of the Australia Group (AG). These AG-related changes to the EAR include: (1) revising the control threshold on fermenters; (2) adding eight new toxins; and (3) amending AG-based licensing policy. This rule also implemented an AG intersessional decision by revising the control threshold for cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment. Finally, this rule updated the list of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention by adding Andorra, Guatemala, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, and Thailand. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 34526.)
On June 17, 2003, BIS published a rule clarifying when encryption commodities and software may be given de minimis treatment, when short-range wireless devices incorporating encryption may be given mass market or retail treatment, and when exporters are required to submit encryption review requests. It also expanded the authorizations according to which travelers departing the United States may take encryption for their personal use, clarified that specially designed medical equipment and software are not controlled as encryption items under the EAR, and implemented Wassenaar Arrangement List changes (agreed upon in the September 2002 meeting and finalized in December 2002) that eliminated certain controls on certain types of "personalized smart cards" and equipment controlling access to copyright protected data. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 35783.)
On August 21, 2003, BIS published a rule, effective September 22, 2003, that added references to the Automated Export System (AES) and conformed the EAR to certain provisions of the Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 50470.)
On September 17, 2003, BIS published a rule proposing to incorporate guidance on how BIS makes penalty determinations when settling administrative enforcement cases. This guidance would also address related aspects of how BIS responds to violations of the EAR, such as charging decisions. (See 68 Fed. Reg. 54402.)
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) had a number of administrative accomplishments during Fiscal Year 2003, including: (1) development and implementation of a human capital initiative, (2) development and testing of emergency preparedness procedures, (3) enhancement of performance reporting capabilities, and (4) deployment of new personal computers to increase employee productivity while ensuring data integrity and IT security.
To meet current and future human capital needs, BIS has entered into an agreement with the Office of Personnel Management to develop a Succession Plan that will address competency gaps, and provide a framework to address critical human resources needs in the next few years.BIS has implemented a New Employee Orientation Program to provide employees with an understanding of the Bureau's activities. The Under Secretary and other senior officials make presentations at these sessions. BIS also has instituted a Career Development Detail Program to provide opportunities to employees to expand their career opportunities, enhance their competencies in mission critical occupations, and develop skills in new areas. This program provides supervisors with additional manpower to complete critical work assignments, and an opportunity to work with employees who may have potential for new opportunities in their organizations. Brown bag lunches were held where employees met senior officials to discuss programmatic activities. Employees have found these sessions to be informative.
In accordance with the requirements of Federal Preparedness Circular 65, BIS conducted a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) exercise in January 2003. The objective of the exercise was to implement the COOP in response to a simulated attack in the vicinity of the Herbert Clark Hoover Building (HCHB), in Washington, DC. This exercise allowed senior officials to practice relocating to an alternate location and test communication and management systems that would be needed to perform the Bureau's mission critical functions. The Department of Commerce Office of Security, the Department of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) participated in our COOP exercise.
BIS continued to enhance its emergency preparedness by storing additional emergency medical and office supplies and equipment at the HCHB and at the emergency relocation sites. BIS also purchased escape hoods for all employees and contractors working at HCHB, and they received training on when and how to use this equipment. Additionally, BIS employees volunteered to serve as floor wardens and stairwell monitors during emergency drills at HCHB.
Auditing Agencies
BIS continues to work with the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) on their studies of our programs and control systems, as well as to address all audit findings and recommendations.
The GAO completed four studies that dealt directly or indirectly with BIS programs in Fiscal Year 2003, including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Program, Intelligence Sharing, Performance and Accountability, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Implementation.
At the end of Fiscal Year 2003, five GAO studies addressing BIS programs and activities were active, with final reports anticipated in Fiscal Year 2004, including the review of Monitoring Exports of Controlled Technology to Countries of Concern, International Controls of Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Obtaining Equipment and Services from the Supplier Base on a Priority Basis, and the State Department's Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Account.
Three OIG reviews addressing BIS programs and activities were completed during Fiscal Year 2003, including the Annual Follow-Up Report on Previous Export Control Recommendations, as Mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, review of Export Enforcement, and (3) the Interagency review of Federal Enforcement Efforts.
At the end of Fiscal Year 2003, two OIG studies addressing BIS programs and activities were active, with a final report anticipated in Fiscal Year 2004, including the review of Deemed Exports and the review of Government-issued travel cards.
BIS processed 192 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for export licensing and enforcement, and other types of management information. BIS processed 10 Court requests for information, mostly related to bankruptcy filings.
In Fiscal Year 2003, BIS took additional steps to improve organizational performance. BIS conducted management studies of various program offices and recommended steps to improve their efficiency. BIS continued to improve its performance goals and measures by continuing the trend of focusing on outcomes instead of outputs, and measuring performance that is under BIS control. BIS also is continuing its data validation program to ensure that its performance data is accurate, complete, reliable, and timely. In Fiscal Year 2003, the GAO found that BIS had refined its performance goals and measures by focusing on quality and exporter satisfaction, developing measures using plain language, and developing new measures that accurately monitor BIS's program performance. GAO added that our goals and measures directly support our major management challenge - the control of exports of dual-use commodities and chemical weapons for national security and foreign policy (including nonproliferation) purposes. (See GAO's Report, Performance and Accountability: Reported Agency Actions and Plans to Address 2001 Management Challenges and Program Risks, dated October 2002 (GAO-03-225).)
Another important accomplishment for BIS in Fiscal Year 2003 was the introduction of the Monthly Performance Measurement Reporting System.
Provided Our Employees with the Latest Technology to Increase Efficiency in Completing Mission
Essential Functions While Ensuring the
Integrity of Data and of the Computer System
The Department of Commerce (DOC) Information Technology (IT) Security Compliance Review for BIS found that: (1) the March 2003 IT systems inventory was accurate, (2) progress had been made in completing system certification and accreditations, (3) all corrective actions recommended by the GAO in their Fiscal Year 2001 and Fiscal Year 2002 reports were implemented, and (4) there were no Department of Commerce recommendations requiring corrective action by BIS.
In Fiscal Year 2003, BIS provided IT security role-based training for all BIS IT employees and contractors using the Department's Automated Learning Management System. BIS also provided IT Security Awareness training to all of its employees and contractors.
BIS completed certification and accreditation on all operational IT systems, enhanced IT security controls by deploying intrusion detection and configuration management software on its critical servers, and deployed software for automated distribution of workstation patches over the network.
The BIS Web Site Redesign project was delivered on time, under budget, and in compliance with all applicable policies, guidelines, and regulations (including Section 508 accessibility). One major improvement to the web site is posting re-export guidance in four foreign languages to assist BIS customers.
The new BIS Web site provides a presence on the Internet that: (1) better reflects the Bureau's mission, (2) is easier to navigate, and (3) facilitates better use of the Web site through improved graphics and information presentation.
In June 2003, all BIS employees received new personal computers, and all workstations were migrated to the Herbert C. Hoover Building network (HCHBnet) in accordance with the planned migration schedule. BIS is committed to effectively serving the public by implementing improved information technology services to support business processes for employees and customers.
|
Bureau of Industry and Security officials participate in a continuity of operations exercise. |
Ihsan Elashyi
On October 23, 2002, Ihsan Elashyi was sentenced in the U.S. District Court in Dallas, Texas, to 48 months imprisonment and three years probation and ordered to pay $281,892.52 in restitution and to forfeit several properties. In June 2002, Ihsan Elashyi pled guilty to shipping computers and monitors to Saudi Arabia in violation of a previously issued Temporary Denial Order, access device fraud, money laundering, and wire fraud.
In June 2003, based upon this conviction, the Commerce Department denied the export privileges of Elashyi and related parties for a seven-year period ending October 23, 2009.
The investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) Dallas Field Office.
On January 6, 2003, Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI) of Mountain View, California, was ordered to pay $1 million in criminal fines. SGI pled guilty to two felony charges that the company violated the EAR by illegally exporting high performance computers to a Russian nuclear laboratory in 1996. In a related administrative case, SGI agreed to pay $182,000 the maximum penalty authorized by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to settle civil charges arising from the same exports to the Russian nuclear laboratory, as well as additional charges relating to illegal exports of computers to Israel and for failure to meet reporting requirements for exports to China, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
BIS's allegations included that, on two occasions in 1996, SGI exported four Challenge L computer systems, upgrades, and peripheral equipment to the All-Russian Institute for Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-70) in violation of U.S. export control regulations. Chelyabinsk-70, located in Snezhinsk, Russia, is a nuclear laboratory operated by Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy and is engaged in research, development, testing, and maintenance of nuclear devices.
In addition to the monetary penalties, the civil settlement provided for the denial of SGI's exporting privileges to Russia for three years. The denial of export privileges is suspended provided that SGI does not commit any export control violations involving Russia during the suspension period.
The investigation was conducted by the San Jose Field Office.
On February 14, 2003, Eduard Yamnik (Edsons Worldwide Service) was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Yamnik received two years supervised probation, a $2,000 criminal fine and $100 special assessment.
On March 20, 2002, Yamnik was indicted for exporting fingerprint materials to Belarus. Yamnik had previously submitted an application to export these commodities in 2000, which was rejected. After being denied a license to export, Yamnik exported the fingerprint materials to Belarus, in violation of the EAR.
The investigation was conducted by the Chicago Field Office.
On April 17, 2003, E.H. Wachs of Wheeling, Illinois (Wachs) was sentenced to pay a fine of $506,000, serve probation for 24 months, and institute an export compliance program after pleading guilty to exporting pipe cutting machines and spare parts to Iran without the required U.S. Government authorization. The sentencing and plea took place in U.S. District Court in Chicago.
In the related civil case, on June 3, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed the maximum penalty of $159,000 and a three year suspended denial of export privileges on Wachs to settle the allegations that Wachs committed multiple violations of the EAR when it conspired to export and did export pipe cutting machines and spare parts to the National Iranian Gas Company without the required U.S. Government authorization. Wachs split orders for more than 50 pipe-cutting machines and spare parts into small shipments and then exported the items through Canada to conceal the fact that they were destined for Iran. Wachs also paid a civil penalty of $85,000 to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of Treasury, for the associated violations of OFAC regulations stemming from the unauthorized exports.
The investigation was conducted by the Chicago Field Office.
On April 23, 2003, Minequip Corporation of Florida was sentenced to one year of corporate probation and a criminal fine of $3,000 and John Clements, President of Minequip, was sentenced to two years probation and a criminal fine of $1,000. Minequip and Clements previously pled guilty to conspiracy to make false statements. On January 13, 2003, Sigma Enterprises Limited (Sigma) pled guilty to conspiracy to violating IEEPA, and was ordered to pay a criminal fine of $20,000. On November 8, 2002, Jeffrey Woodbridge, Manager of Sigma, was convicted of conspiracy, and was sentenced to 2 years probation and a criminal fine of $7,000.
The investigation revealed that a foreign national had attempted to purchase goods from an industry source in Chicago's area of responsibility. During an undercover operation the sale of the products was negotiated with the foreign national. The products, which were tracked and delivered to Minequip in Miami, Florida, were destined for illegal export through an Sigma in the United Kingdom on their way to the Great Man-Made River Project in Libya.
The investigation was jointly conducted by the Chicago and Los Angeles field offices.
On May 29, 2003, Zlatko Brkic, Vice President of Bosnian Trade Center, Inc. (BTC), was sentenced to pre-trial diversion for one year. Brkic pled guilty to attempting to export handcuffs controlled for crime control reasons to Bosnia after having been advised that an export license was required. Even after BTC's long-time freight forwarder refused to ship the goods without the required export license, Brkic recruited a second freight forwarder to ship the goods to Bosnia.
The investigation was conducted by the Chicago Field Office.
On July 1, 2003, Robert Tsai, d/b/a Tsai and Associates of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, a broker of copper wire and other recyclables, was sentenced to 15 months in federal prison followed by three years of supervised release for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Tsai was also ordered to pay $101,230 in restitution and a $5,000 criminal fine.
A four-year investigation disclosed that Robert Tsai, a convicted felon with ties to organized crime, together with other unindicted co-conspirators who controlled businesses in California known as McCanne Enterprises, Napa International Corp., and Eternity Marketing Corp., devised a scheme to defraud companies in China and South Korea by arranging to have shipping containers filled primarily with low grade scrap metal and construction debris in lieu of high grade copper wire called for in several contracts. In furtherance of this scheme, Tsai was instrumental in submitting bogus inspection reports to the Asian companies and arranged for the creation of fraudulent shipping documents including Shipper's Export Declarations and commercial invoices.
The investigation was conducted jointly by the New York Field Office and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE), Newark, New Jersey.
On July 9, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Joseph D'Allesio was sentenced to two years probation and a $100 special assessment and Anthony Cordae was ordered to pay a $100 special assessment. On March 17, 2003, D'Allesio and Cordae both pled guilty in that court to charges that they filed false export control documents with the U.S. Government to conceal the fact that D'Allesio and Cordae exported tank tracks to Thailand without the required license.
The investigation was conducted jointly by the Dallas Field Office, BICE and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) in Houston.
On July 10, 2003, Dosmatic U.S.A., Inc. of Carrollton, Texas, was sentenced to pay a fine of $50,000 and serve probation for a three year period, after having pled guilty to illegally exporting liquid injectors from the United States to Iran. On May 29, 2003, Reza Pirasteh, Dosmatic's former Chief Operating Officer, was sentenced to pay a fine of $2,000 and serve probation for three years, after having pled guilty to making a false statement to a federal investigator in the course of the investigation into Dosmatic's export activities.
In the related civil cases, Dosmatic agreed to pay a $44,000 penalty and to a 30-month suspended denial of its export privileges to settle allegations that it exported liquid injectors to Iran without the required U.S. Government authorization. Mr. Pirasteh agreed to pay a $4,500 civil penalty and his export privileges were denied for seven years in settlement of administrative charges against him related to the shipments to Iran. The Commerce Department issued orders implementing these settlements on September 30, 2003.
The investigation was conducted by the Dallas Field Office and the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force.
On July 17, 2003, DSV Samson Transport, Inc., a freight forwarding company based in New Jersey, pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and was sentenced to pay a $250,000 criminal fine and serve five years corporate probation for violations of U.S. export laws. DSV Samson also agreed to pay a $399,000 civil penalty to the Department of Commerce to settle the administrative case relating to these illegal exports.
Between November 1999 and May 12, 2001, DSV Samson made 30 exports to organizations on the Entity List in India without the required Department of Commerce export licenses. Despite being informed by Special Agents from the Office of Export Enforcement on at least three occasions about the regulations controlling such shipments, DSV Samson forwarded these shipments and caused violations of Department of Commerce export controls designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
The investigation was jointly conducted by the Boston and New York Field Offices.
Kiarash Arastafar was sentenced on July 25, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to six months of incarceration comprised of jail time and home detention, two years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and immediate deportation by the Department of Homeland Security upon the completion of his incarceration. Arastafar, a Dutch national of Iranian descent, pled guilty to unlawfully, knowingly and willfully attempting to procure industrial parts for the purpose of shipping such parts to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
On or about January 28, 2003, Arastafar met with an undercover agent who had posed as a sales person for a company in the United States. Arastafar attempted to entice the undercover agent to break U.S. export control laws by offering more money for the goods than they were worth. He was subsequently arrested.
The investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office.
On August 5, 2003, Worldwide Sports & Recreation Inc., currently doing business as Bushnell Corporation, (Bushnell) of Overland Park, Kansas, was sentenced in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., to a $650,000 criminal fine and five years probation for illegally exporting over 500 generation II night vision goggles to15 different countries. Bushnell also agreed to pay a $223,000 civil penalty to the Commerce Department and to receive a one-year denial of export privileges (suspended) to settle the administrative charges relating to illegal sales of night vision goggles to Japan. The Department of Commerce issued an order implementing this settlement on August 6, 2003. An investigation revealed that during a two-year period, Bushnell had knowingly participated in a scheme to sell night vision goggles from the United States without obtaining the required export licenses from the Department of Commerce.
The investigation was conducted jointly by the Boston Field Office and the Operations Division in Washington, D.C.
On April 10, 2002, Hakko Ltd of Japan (Hakko) was sentenced to pay a $68,000 fine and was placed on probation for five years, and Hideo Nakagawa, an employee of Hakko, was sentenced to time served and deported from the United States to Japan. Hakko and Nakagawa had pled guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws by participating in a scheme to export night vision goggles from the United States without obtaining the required export licenses from the Department of Commerce. These cases are related to the Bushnell case.
In the related civil cases, Hakko agreed to pay a $20,000 penalty and to a five year denial of export privileges (suspended) to settle administrative charges. Nakagawa agreed to pay a $20,000 penalty and to a five year denial of export privileges (both the monetary penalty and denial were suspended) to settle administrative charges. The Department of Commerce issued orders implementing these settlements on August 6, 2003.
The investigation was conducted jointly by the Boston Field Office and the Operations Division in Washington, D.C.
On September 30, 2003, Tariq Ahmed was sentenced in U.S. District Court in Connecticut to a prison term of two years, followed by three years of supervised release. On September 5, 2003, also in that court, Alan Haller was sentenced to a prison term of two years, followed by three years of supervised release and Mart Haller, Inc. was sentenced to a criminal fine of $50,000 and three years supervised release. On September 4, 2003, Yasmin Ahmed was sentenced in U.S. District Court in Connecticut to a prison term of six months, a fine of $50,000, and three years of supervised release.
On June 11 and 12, 2003, respectively, Tariq and Yasmin Ahmed pled guilty to one count of conspiracy each, after having been arrested upon entering the United States from Pakistan. On June 9, 2003, Alan Haller and his company Mart Haller, Inc., pled guilty to one count of conspiracy each. The charges against the Ahmeds, Haller, and the company were a result of their participation in a conspiracy to divert controlled commodities, including space radar and armored personnel carrier parts, exported from the United States to Pakistan.
Alan Haller and Advance Technical Systems both provided false end-user information on a Department of State license application for radar components. The end-user statement indicated that the ultimate consignee was the Bangladesh Air Force when in fact it was determined that the components were transhipped through the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan. The Ahmeds facilitated the shipment from Pakistan.
The investigation, which initially focused on alleged violations of the EAR, resulted in a guilty pleas regarding items
on the State Department's U.S. Munitions List. OEE's Boston Field Office participated in this
investigation.
On September 23, 2003, Omega Engineering Inc. (Omega) and on September 22, 2003, Ralph Michel, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Omega, were sentenced in U.S. District Court in Connecticut. Michel received ten months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised probation, and fined $50,000. Omega was fined $313,000, placed on corporate probation for five years, and ordered to implement an export compliance program. Michel and Omega had previously pled guilty to violating U.S. export control laws by exporting laboratory equipment to Pakistan without the required export license from the Department of Commerce. Omega and Michel accomplished the export to Pakistan by a series of shipments through Newport Electronics GmbH, a related firm in Germany.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
Embargoed Destinations
BIS and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) share jurisdiction over exports and some reexports to countries subject to U.N. or U.S. trade embargos. To avoid duplicate licensing responsibilities, the EAR in some cases (e.g., certain exports to Iran, Iraq, and Libya) provide that authorization from OFAC for an export also constitutes authorization under the EAR, and that exporting without OFAC authorization is a violation of the EAR. The following cases illustrate the enforcement of export controls to embargoed countries:
On October 21, 2002, BIS imposed a nine year denial of export privileges on Pars Company Inc., pursuant to Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act, following its criminal conviction for its role in exporting two gas monitors from the United States to Iran through the United Arab Emirates. On September 4, 2001, Pars Company Inc., entered a guilty plea in a U.S. District Court in North Carolina, and was ordered to pay a $10,000 criminal fine.
The investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
On November 12, 2002, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing settlement terms under which Oerlikon Schweisstechnik AG (Oerlikon) agreed to pay $33,000 and Reweld AG (Reweld) agreed to pay $22,000 in civil penalties to settle allegations that they conspired to export industrial materials from the United States to Iran in violation of the EAR. In addition to the fines, a one-year denial of export privileges was imposed on Oerlikon, six months of which are suspended, provided that Oerlikon does not commit any export control violations during the suspension period.
BIS alleged that, between June 1999 and March 2000 these two firms conspired to purchase 30,000 pounds of Solka-Flok 200 cellulose valued at $21,000 for resale and transshipment to Iran. Solka-Flok 200 cellulose has a number of industrial uses including welding applications. BIS alleged that Oerlikon solicited Reweld to export the cellulose to Switzerland, where Oerlikon intended to take possession of the materials and reexport them to Iran.
The investigation was conducted by the Miami Field Office.
On March 14, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing settlement terms under which Randolph Engineering, Inc. (REI), of Randolph, Massachusetts, agreed to pay a $12,000 civil penalty to settle charges that it attempted to ship aviator sunglasses to Iran through Italy without obtaining prior authorization from OFAC, as required by the EAR. In connection with the attempted export, REI caused a Shipper's Export Declaration to be filed stating that the country of ultimate destination was Italy, when the actual country of destination was Iran.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On March 26, 2003, the Commerce Department renewed a temporary denial (TDO) of export privileges for 180 days on Yaudat Mustafa Talyi and related persons International Business Services, Ltd. (IBS) and Top Oil Tools, Ltd. (Top Oil). The renewal was based on evidence that Talyi, through his company IBS, had violated a previous TDO issued on September 30, 2002; exported or participated in the export of U.S.-origin items to Libya and Sudan without obtaining the required authorizations from BIS or OFAC; and attempted to mislead U.S. suppliers about the ultimate destination and end-user of the items ordered.
On July 24, 2003, the Commerce Department modified the TDO against Talyi and his companies to include as related persons Uni-Arab Engineering and Oil Field Services, Dean Sehweil, and Radi Mustafa, based on evidence that these persons had close business relationships with Talyi and IBS; that they had participated in transactions with Talyi in violation of the TDO; and that they had engaged in business activities with Libya without obtaining the required U.S. Government authorizations.
On September 24, 2003, the Department of Commerce renewed the TDO for 180 days against all persons subject to its terms.
The investigation was conducted by the Dallas Field Office.
On April 16, 2003, pursuant to a settlement agreement, the Commerce Department imposed a $30,000 civil penalty on Industrial Scientific Corporation. BIS alleged that in June 1998, Industrial Scientific Corporation conspired with Pars Company Inc. to export two gas monitors to the United Arab Emirates without obtaining an export license. Furthermore, BIS alleged that Industrial Scientific Corporation knew the monitors would be further reexported from the United Arab Emirates to Iran.
The investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
On June 24, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a combined civil penalty of $32,000 on Zooma Enterprises, Inc. (Zooma), of San Diego, California, and its president, Issa Salomi, to settle charges that they made false statements to the U.S. Government in connection with an attempted export of medical equipment to Iraq. Mr. Salomi was fined $24,000 and Zooma was fined $8,000 for their actions.
BIS charged that Zooma violated the EAR by listing the country of ultimate destination on a Shipper's Export Declaration as Jordan, when the destination was, in fact, Iraq. BIS also charged that Issa Salomi committed three violations of the EAR by filing a petition with the U.S. Customs Service that falsely represented facts about the sale of the medical equipment, an ampul filling and sealing machine, and its ultimate destination.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On June 24, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing the terms of a settlement agreement under which Bio Check, Inc., of Burlingame, California, Inc. (Bio Check), agreed to pay a $22,500 civil penalty to settle allegations it exported medical diagnostic equipment to Iran, through freight forwarders in Italy and the United Arab Emirates, without approval from OFAC, as required by the EAR. BIS also alleged that Bio Check failed to file Shipper's Export Declarations as required by the EAR. The alleged transactions occurred between May 1998 and May 2002.
The investigation was conducted by the San Jose Field Office.
On September 29, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a 20-year denial of export privileges on OTS Refining Equipment Corporation (OTS), of Markham, Ontario, Canada, and its president, Abdulamir Mahdi. In November 1999, Mahdi pled guilty in U.S. District Court in Orlando, Florida, to conspiring with the owner of a Florida firm to violate U.S. export controls and was sentenced to 51 months in prison. Mahdi used OTS to buy U.S. oil-field and industrial equipment for export to Iran and other countries in the Middle East. The exports to Iran in which Mahdi and OTS participated were not authorized by OFAC.
The investigation was conducted by the Miami Field Office.
As part of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), BIS requires a license for exports and reexports known to involve certain proliferation-related end-uses or end-users. The following case illustrates BIS's role in enforcing these requirements:
On September 26, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing the terms of a settlement agreement under which Astro-Med, Inc. of Warwick, Rhode Island (Astro-Med) agreed to pay a $5,000 civil penalty to settle charges that it attempted to export a Dash 10M data recorder to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India without the required Department of Commerce license. BIS charged that Astro-Med knew or had reason to know that the item to be exported would be used directly or indirectly in an unsafeguarded nuclear activity.
The case was investigated by the Boston Field Office.
The following cases illustrate BIS's role in enforcing national security export controls:
On May 6, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing settlement terms under which Howmet Corporation, of Darien, Connecticut, agreed to pay a $10,000 civil penalty to settle charges that it exported ceramic core technology to the United Kingdom and Japan and casting furnace equipment to Japan without obtaining the necessary licenses for these exports.
The investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office.
On June 24, 2003, BIS imposed a one-year denial of export privileges on Bassem Alhalabi pursuant to a settlement of a charge that Alhalabi caused the export of a thermal imaging camera to Syria without the required Department of Commerce export license.
BIS alleged that, on March 12, 1998, Alhalabi caused the unlicensed export of a thermal imaging camera to Syria. Thermal imaging cameras are controlled for export to Syria for national security, regional stability, and anti-terrorism reasons.
The investigation was conducted by the San Jose Field Office.
BIS controls the export of certain items that have crime control or police uses that also could be used to commit human rights violations. The following cases illustrate BIS's efforts to enforce these controls.
On November 8, 2002, BIS imposed a civil penalty of $11,000 on Sturm, Ruger and Company, (Sturm, Ruger) Inc., of Southport, Connecticut, in settlement of an allegation that it exported rifle scopes to Oman without the required license. BIS alleged that Sturm, Ruger had sent a shipment of 12 rifle scopes from the United States to Oman without obtaining the required export license. A license is required to export rifle scopes to most destinations in order to ensure that the scopes will not be used to violate human rights. The $11,000 penalty is the maximum authorized for that charge.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On April 16, 2003, Frank Curic, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, agreed to a three-year denial of export privileges to resolve charges that he attempted to export a shotgun to Bosnia and Herzegovina without the required Commerce Department license.
BIS charged that Curic attempted to export a Mossberg shotgun in July 2000 by concealing it in a vehicle that he was shipping from the United States. In addition, BIS charged that Curic falsely claimed that the export was authorized under a license exception that required that the vehicle not contain any personal belongings.
The investigation was jointly investigated by the Miami and Washington field offices.
BIS maintains export controls on certain toxic chemicals, chemical precursors, biological toxins, and equipment that can be used to manufacture chemical or biological weapons. The following cases are examples of BIS's work to enforce these controls.
On November 4, 2002, the Commerce Department imposed a $1,760,000 civil penalty on Sigma-Aldrich Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri, and two of its subsidiaries ("Sigma-Aldrich"), to settle charges involving illegal exports of biological toxins. The settlement is based on 318 charges, including charges of unlicensed exports of biological toxins made by a business that was acquired by Sigma-Aldrich. The penalty is the largest imposed by the Commerce Department in a case involving biological toxins, and one of the largest penalties ever paid to the Department for export control violations. The Department had instituted administrative enforcement actions against the Sigma-Aldrich companies alleging that a company they had acquired in 1997 had made unauthorized exports of controlled biological toxins to Europe and Asia on numerous occasions prior to the acquisition and that Sigma-Aldrich had continued the unlicensed exports of toxins, made false statements to the U.S. Government, and failed to maintain the required records.
This case puts companies on notice that, when acquiring another business, a company should scrutinize the export
control practices of the acquired company to avoid the risk of incurring liability for its past conduct. In this case, BIS alleged
that the acquiring companies not only failed to discover the prior unlicensed exports, but also allowed them to continue
for more than one year after the
acquisition.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On August 28, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a $178,500 civil penalty on W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., (W.R. Grace) to settle allegations that W.R. Grace violated the EAR by shipping chemicals without the required export licenses.
BIS alleged that W.R. Grace exported triethanolamine on 51 occasions to end-users in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Venezuela without the required licenses from BIS. Exports of triethanolamine require a license because the substance can be used to manufacture chemical weapons. W.R. Grace voluntarily disclosed the violations to BIS and cooperated fully in the investigation. The payment of the penalty will be subject to the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings involving W.R. Grace in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On July 28, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing the terms of a settlement agreement under which Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation (Sundstrand), of Windsor Locks, Connecticut, agreed to pay $171,500 to settle allegations that it violated the EAR.
BIS alleged that three subsidiaries of Sundstrand exported or reexported centrifugal pumps to various endusers in China, Taiwan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, without obtaining the required Department of Commerce export licenses. BIS also alleged that Sundstrand made false statements on Shipper's Export Declarations (SEDs), failed to file SEDs, and failed to provide required information on SEDs it did file. Sundstrand is a manufacturer of centrifugal pumps used for general, industrial, and chemical process application. These pumps are controlled for chemical and biological weapons reasons, as well as for antiterrorism reasons.
The investigation was jointly conducted by the Chicago and Los Angeles field offices.
On May 8, 2003, the Commerce Department issued an order implementing settlement terms under which Versa-Matic Pump Corp (Versa-Matic), located in Export, Pennsylvania, agreed to pay $55,000 to settle charges of illegally exporting diaphragm pumps, which are controlled for export because, among other applications, they can be used in the production process for chemical weapons. The settlement also included allegations that Versa-Matic made false statements on Shipper's Export Declarations.
The investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office.
BIS maintains controls on exports of high performance computers in recognition of their strategic and proliferation significance. The following cases highlight enforcement of these controls:
On August 18, 2003, the Department of Commerce imposed a $165,000 fine and a three-year denial of export privileges on E & M Computing Ltd. (E&M), of Ramat-Gan, Israel, to settle charges that the company violated the EAR when it sold and serviced computers and computer components to three customers in Israel, including a nuclear research center. The denial period was suspended for three years, and will thereafter be waived if the company does not violate U.S. export control laws during the period of suspension.
BIS's allegations included that E&M caused the export of central processing units (CPUs), a workstation, a server, and a high performance computer to Israel without the required export licenses. BIS also charged that E&M evaded the EAR by purchasing computers from another vendor after learning that BIS would deny the first vendor's license application to export the items.
The investigation was conducted by the San Jose Field Office.
On December 4, 2002, pursuant to a settlement agreement, BIS imposed a $40,000 civil penalty and a two year denial of export privileges on Jet Info Systems International. BIS alleged that on two occasions in 1996, Jet Info Systems International shipped computers from Germany, via the Netherlands, to the Russian Federal Nuclear Center for the Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics in violation of U.S. export laws. While the computers were manufactured abroad, they remained subject to U.S. regulations because they were produced with U.S.-origin technology. BIS agreed to suspend the denial period provided Jet Info Systems International does not commit any export control violations during the suspension period.
BIS also imposed a $20,000 civil penalty and a five year denial of export privileges on Alexander Zisman pursuant to a settlement agreement. Zisman is a Russian national who arranged for the transportation of one of the shipments from Germany to Russia.
The investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
The U.S. Government stands firm in its policy of opposing restrictive trade practices and boycotts against its allies. BIS is committed to enforcing the antiboycott provisions of the EAR, as illustrated by the cases discussed below.
On March 14, 2003, a $65,000 administrative penalty was imposed on Serfilco, Ltd., of Northbrook, Illinois, in a settlement of allegations that Serfilco violated a 1996 order denying its export privileges. Serfilco, a manufacturer of commercial filtration and pumping equipment, violated the terms of a denial order imposed by the Department of Commerce by selling goods to companies in the United States for export to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1996, and by negotiating the sale of goods to companies in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in 1996 and 1997. The 1996 denial order was imposed after Serfilco violated the antiboycott provisions of the EAR by giving information about its business relationship with Israel when it responded to a boycott questionnaire from an Iraqi distributor. In addition to the monetary penalty imposed in March 2003, Serfilco's export privileges to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Yemen were denied for three years.
The investigation was jointly conducted by the Chicago Field Office and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance in Washington, DC.
On May 23, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a $9,000 civil penalty on Rockwell Automation Inc, a Milwaukee, Wisconsin-based corporation and successor company to Reliance Electric Company, and two of Reliance's foreign subsidiaries to settle allegations that the Reliance companies committed four violations of the antiboycott provisions of the EAR.
BIS alleged that Dodge International, a division of Reliance Electric Company, violated the EAR's antiboycott
provisions by failing to report a request from a Kuwaiti purchaser for a declaration from Dodge that the goods at issue did not
originate in Israel and that Dodge was not affiliated with any Israeli boycotted or blacklisted company. BIS further alleged
that Dodge failed to maintain records containing information relating to a reportable boycott request as required by the
EAR's antiboycott provisions. BIS also alleged that the foreign subsidiaries furnished prohibited business information in
separate transactions involving the United Arab Emirates and
Pakistan.
The investigation was conducted by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance.
On June 17, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a civil penalty of $6,000 on Cook Composites and Polymers Company (Cook Composites), of North Kansas City, Missouri, pursuant to an agreement to settle allegations that the company violated the antiboycott provisions of the EAR.
BIS charged that Cook Composites furnished information about its business relationships with Israel when, in January 1998, in connection with a shipment to a customer in Bahrain, it provided a certificate to a bank stating that the goods being shipped were not of Israeli origin and did not contain Israeli materials. BIS also alleged that Cook Composites failed to report its receipt of the request for the information as required by the EAR.
The investigation was conducted by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance.
On June 24, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a civil penalty of $5,700 on Jagro Customs Brokers and International Freight Forwarders, Inc. (Jagro), of Irvington, New Jersey, pursuant to an agreement to settle allegations that the company violated the antiboycott provisions of the EAR.
BIS alleged that, in January 1998, in connection with a shipment of goods to Bahrain, Jagro furnished information about another company's business relationships with Israel when it furnished a commercial invoice that contained the statement: "We confirmed that the goods are not of Israeli origin nor do they contain any Israeli material." BIS also alleged that Jagro failed to report its receipt of the request for such an attestation.
The investigation was conducted by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance.
On July 28, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a civil penalty of $8,000 on McMaster-Carr Supply Company (McMaster-Carr), an Elmhurst, Illinois, supplier of industrial and commercial hardware, pursuant to an agreement to settle allegations that McMaster-Carr committed eight violations of the antiboycott provisions of the EAR.
BIS charged that McMaster-Carr failed to report its receipt of boycott-related requests within the time period required by the EAR. The alleged violations occurred in eight transactions involving sales of goods from the United States to Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. McMaster-Carr voluntarily disclosed the alleged violations to the Department.
The investigation was conducted by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance.
During Fiscal Year 2003, BIS also investigated the following cases:
On October 4, 2002, the Office of Exporter Services, in consultation with the Office of Export Enforcement, denied the export privileges of Bing Sun for ten years and Patte Sun for eight years, pursuant to Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act, based on their December 18, 2000, convictions of violating the Arms Export Control Act by knowingly and willfully attempting to export defense articles on the United States Munitions List from the United States to the People's Republic of China, without having first obtained authorization from the State Department. Both Bing and Patte Sun are currently incarcerated in federal prison.
The investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
On October 4, 2002, the Office of Exporter Services, in consultation with the Office of Export Enforcement, denied the export privileges of All Ports, Incorporated for ten years pursuant to Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act, based on the December 18, 2000, conviction of violating the Arms Export Control Act by knowingly and willfully attempting to export defense articles on the United States Munitions List from the United States to the People's Republic of China, without having first obtained authorization from the State Department.
The investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
On September 5, 2003, the Office of Exporter Services, in consultation with the Office of Export Enforcement, denied the export privileges of Gunter Kohlke for ten years, pursuant to Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act, based on his July 18, 2002, conviction of violating the Arms Export Control Act by knowingly and willfully attempting to export items on the United States Munitions List from the United States to Switzerland, without having first obtained authorization from the State Department. Mr. Kohlke is currently incarcerated in federal prison.
The investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office.
On October 29, 2002, pursuant to a settlement agreement, the Commerce Department imposed a $39,000 civil penalty on Compaq Computer Corporation. BIS alleged that on ten occasions, Digital Equipment Corporation and two of its overseas subsidiaries, now merged with and known as Compaq Computer Corporation, exported computers and computer equipment to various destinations in Asia. The shipments were made in violation of U.S. export laws and involved exports to the People's Republic of China and to South Korea and reexports of U.S.-origin goods from Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China and from Singapore to India.
This investigation was conducted by the Washington Field Office.
On October 31, 2002, the Commerce Department imposed a civil penalty of $115,000 and a five-year denial of export privileges on Maria Elena Ibanez of Miami, Florida. The five-year denial period for Ibanez will be suspended provided Ibanez does not commit any violations during the five-year period.
Ibanez agreed to the penalty to settle charges that she caused, aided, and abetted violations of the EAR by International High Tech Marketing (IHTM), a firm that she previously operated. BIS alleged that, on 265 occasions between May 1996 and September 1998, Ibanez caused, aided, and abetted IHTM in various export control violations, including improperly avoiding the requirement to file Shipper's Export Declarations.
In March 2002, a U.S. District Court judge in Miami placed Ibanez on probation for 18 months and fined her $5,000 for conspiring to falsify commercial invoices. Previously, in March 2000, IHTM pled guilty in U.S. District Court in Miami to five counts of export violations in connection with exports to Libya and Sudan and providing false information on commercial invoices. IHTM was fined $250,000 for these violations. IHTM is no longer in business.
The investigation was conducted by the Miami Field Office.
On December 12, 2002, BIS imposed a civil penalty of $44,000 on Realtek Semiconductor Corporation (Realtek) of Hsinchu, Taiwan, a manufacturer of integrated circuits, in settlement of allegations that Realtek violated an order denying its export privileges. The settlement also involved imposition of an order denying Realtek's export privileges for two years, all of which was suspended. BIS alleged that, in December 1996 and December 1999, Realtek violated the terms of a Commerce-imposed denial order when it purchased U.S.-origin air-conditioning equipment and when it attempted to purchase U.S.-origin computer software. The denial order against Realtek had been imposed in August 1995 because Realtek participated in an export of U.S.-origin microprocessor technology without the written assurance from the end-user that the EAR then required. Realtek is no longer subject to an effective (that is, non-suspended) denial order.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
On June 3, 2003, the Commerce Department imposed a $200,000 civil penalty against Flint Hill Resources LP, formerly known as Koch Petroleum Group LP, of Wichita, Kansas (Koch), to settle allegations that the company committed 40 violations of the EAR by exporting crude petroleum from the United States to Canada without the required Department of Commerce licenses. The Commerce Department controls the export of crude petroleum to any foreign destination to protect the domestic supply. The investigation was conducted by the Dallas Field Office.
On June 10, 2003, pursuant to a settlement agreement, the Commerce Department imposed a civil penalty of $5,000 on Kamino International Transport, Inc. (Kamino), a freight forwarder with offices in the United States and overseas, to resolve allegations that Kamino violated the EAR when an employee of the company made misstatements in connection with its retention of export control documents. BIS alleged that a Kamino employee told a BIS investigator that Kamino had disposed of export control documents that the investigator had requested Kamino to produce. In fact, Kamino had not disposed of the records. The EAR requires that such records be retained for five years and produced upon the request of a BIS representative.
The investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office.
On September 3, 2003, BIS imposed a civil penalty of $5,000 on Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (Expeditors), a Seattle, Washington-based freight forwarder, in settlement of allegations that Expeditors facilitated an export to a company in Taiwan that was, at the time, denied U.S. export privileges. BIS charged that, in December of 1996, Expeditors violated the terms of a Department of Commerce order denying the export privileges of Realtek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. (Realtek), in Taiwan, when it forwarded commercial air-conditioning units to Realtek. The Department settled related charges against Realtek in December of 2002.
The investigation was conducted by the Boston Field Office.
10/04/02 In the Matter of Knowingly and willfully attempted Section
38 of Bing Sun Export privileges Bing Sun to export defense articles on the
the AECA denied until United States Munitions List, from December 18, 2010
the United States to the People's
Republic of China, without having
first obtained from the Department
of State a license or written
authorization for such export
10/04/02 In the Matter of Knowingly and willfully attempted
Section 38 of Patte Sun Export privileges Patte Sun to export defense articles
on the the AECA denied until
United States Munitions List, from December 18, 2008
the United States to the People's
Republic of China, without having
first obtained from the Department
of State a license or written
authorization for such export
10/04/02 In the Matter of Knowingly and willfully attempted
Section 38 of All Ports, Export privileges All Ports, to export defense articles
on the the AECA Incorporated denied until
Incorporated United States Munitions List, from December
18, 2010
the United States to the People's
Republic of China, without having
first obtained from the Department
of State a license or written
authorization for such export
10/21/02 In the Matter of Exported and attempted to export Section Pars Company, Inc. Export privileges Pars Company, Inc. goods and technology to a person 1705(b) denied until in a third country with knowledge of the IEEPA September 4, 2010 that the goods and technology were intended to be supplied to Iran
10/29/02 In the Matter of Made false or misleading 764.2(g)[6] Compaq Computer Settlement representations or statements of 764.2(a)[2] Corporation (Digital agreement material fact to a United States Equipment civil penalty agency in connection with the Corporation) of $25,000 preparation, submission or use of export control documents; exported certain computer equipment to South Korea without obtaining the proper authorization; exported certain computers and computer equipment to China in violation of the conditions of the U.S. export license
10/29/02 In the Matter of Reexported one AlphaServer and 764.2(a)[1] Compaq Computer Settlement Compaq Computer four dual CPU modules, originally Corporation (Digital agreementcivil Corporation (Digital exported from the United States to Equipment penalty of $8,000 Equipment Method Research Center in International, Ltd.) International, Ltd.) Beijing, China without obtaining (Hong Kong) the proper authorization
10/29/02 In the Matter Reexported nine U.S.-origin 700 764.2(a)[1] Compaq Computer Settlement Compaq Computer MHZ dual CPU modules from Corporation (Digital greement Corporation (Digital Singapore to India without Equipment Asia civil penalty Equipment Asia obtaining the proper authorization Pacific Pte. Ltd.) of $6,000 Pacific Pte. Ltd.)
10/31/02 In the Matter of Caused, aided, and abetted 787A.2[77]
Maria Elena Ibanez Settlement Maria Elena Ibanez International High Tech Marketing
764.2(b)[188] agreement
(IHTM) in various export control civil penalty of
violations, including improperly $115,000; export
avoiding the requirement to file privileges denied
Shipper's Export Declarations for five years,
(SEDs) by understating values on all of which is
commercial invoices, submitting suspended
falsified SEDs to the U.S.
Government, and supplying its
freight forwarder with undervalued
commercial invoices that were
used by the freight forwarder to
prepare inaccurate SEDs and air waybills
11/04/02 In the Matter of Sigma Exported biological toxins to 787A.6 [6] Sigma Aldrich Settlement Aldrich Business various destinations, including 764.2(a) [262] Business Holdings, agreement Holdings, Inc.(SABH), France, Sweden, Netherlands, 764.2(g) [25] Inc., Sigma Aldrich civil penalty of Sigma Aldrich Germany, Korea, United Kingdom, 764.2(i) [25] Corporation and $1,760,000 Corporation (SAC) Japan and Taiwan without the Sigma Aldrich and Sigma obtaining the required export Research AldrichResearch licenses; made or caused to be Biochemicals, Inc. Biochemicals, made false and misleading material Inc. (SARBI) misrepresentations on Shipper's Export Declarations concerning the authority to export; and failed to maintain the records required under the Regulations
11/08/02 In the Matter of Sturm, Exported 12 rifle scopes to Oman 764.2(a) [1] Sturm, Ruger & Settlement Ruger & Company, Inc. without the required export license Company, Inc. agreementcivil penalty of $11,000
11/12/02 In the Matter of Conspiracy; solicited the export of 764.2(d) [1] Oerlikon Settlement Oerlikon cellulose from the United States to 764.2(c) [1] Schweisstechnik AG agreement Schweisstechnik AG Iran without the required 764.2(e) [1] export privileges authorization from the Office of denied for one year, Foreign Assets Control knowing last six months that it would be exported in suspended; civil violation of the Regulations penalty of $33,000
11/12/02 In the Matter of Conspiracy; attempted to export 764.2(b)
[1] Reweld AG Settlement Reweld AG 30,000 pounds of Cellulose Solka- 764.2(d)
[1] agreementcivil
Floe to Iran via Switzerland without penalty of $22,000
the required authorization from the
Office of Foreign Assets Control
12/04/02 In the Matter of Arranged for the transportation of
764.2(b) [1] Alexander Zisman Settlement Alexander Zisman computers from Germany
to the 764.2(e) [1] agreementcivil
Netherlands and from the penalty of $20,000;
Netherlands to the Russian Federal export privileges
Nuclear Center, Russian Research denied for five years
Institute of Experimental Physics
(Arzamas-16), Russia without
obtaining the necessary license for
the shipment that he knew or had
reason to know was required
12/04/02 In the Matter of Reexported computers from 787A.4 [1] Jet Info Systems Settlement Jet Info Systems Germany to the Netherlands and 787A.6 [1] International agreementcivil International reexported from the Netherlands 764.2(a) [1] penalty of $40,000; to the Russian Federal Nuclear 764.2(e) [1] export privileges Center, Russian Research Institute denied for two of Experimental Physics years, all of which (Arzamas-16), Russia without is suspended obtaining the individual validated license it knew or had reason to know was required
12/10/02 In the Matter Violated the terms of an order 764.2(k)
[2] Realtek Settlement of Realtek denying all of its U.S. export 764.2(e) [2]
Semiconductors agreementcivil
Semiconductors privileges by participating in Corporation
penalty of $44,000,
Corporation transactions involving export privileges
commodities that were subject
denied for two years,
to the Regulations with knowledge all of which is
that a violation of an order issued suspended
had occurred and was about to
occur
01/06/03 In the Matter of Exported high performance 787A.2 [1] Silicon Graphics, Inc. Settlement Silicon Graphics, Inc. computers to Israel and Russia 787A.4 [2] agreementcivil without the required licenses and 787A.6 [2] penalty of $182,000; with knowledge or reason to know 764.2(a)[8] export privileges that a violation of the Act or any 764.2(b)[1] export privileges regulation, order or license issued 764.2(e)[4] export privileges thereunder has occurred, was 764.2(g)[1] denied for three about to occur or was intended to years, all of which occur; engaged in prohibited is suspended conduct; made false or misleading statement of material fact in connection with the preparation, submission, issuance or use of an export control document; failed to comply with the National Defense Authorization Act reporting requirements for shipments it made from its manufacturing facility in Switzerland to the People's Republic of China, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
03/14/03 In the Matter of Sold commodities to companies in 787A.3
[1] Serfilco, Ltd. Settlement Serfilco the United States to be exported to
787A.4 [1] agreementcivil
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and 764.2(a) [4] penalty of
$65,000;
negotiated the sale of commodities export privileges
to be exported to the United Arab denied to Bahrain,
Emirates and Saudi Arabia, contrary Iraq, Kuwait,
to the terms of the June 10, 1996 Lebanon, Libya,
Order denying all of Serfilco's export Oman, Qatar,
privileges to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi the United Arab
Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and the
Emirates or the Republic of Yemen Republic of Yemen
For three years
03/14/03 In the Matter of Attempted to export aviator 764.2(a) [1] Randolph Settlement Randolph sunglasses through Italy to Iran 764.2(g) [1] Engineering, Inc. agreement civil Engineering Inc. without obtaining the required penalty of $12,000 authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control; made a false or misleading statement of Shipper's Export Declaration concerning ultimate destination
03/26/03 In the Matter of [TDO: Reason to believe that 764.2(a)
Yaudat Mustafa Talyi, Order Yaudat Mustafa there was a risk of an imminent
764.2(d) also known as temporarily
Talyi, also known as violation based on evidence that 764.2(g)
Joseph Talyi, and denying export
Joseph Talyi, and Talyi, through his company International
privileges renewed
International International Business Services, Business Services,
for 180 days Business Services, Ltd. Inc., exported or participated in the
Ltd. and Top
and Top Oil Tools, Ltd. export of U.S.-origin items to Libya
Oil Tools, Ltd.
and Sudan without obtaining the
necessary authorizations from BIS
or the Treasury Department's Office
of Foreign Assets Control; attempted
to mislead U.S. suppliers about the
ultimate destination and end-user
of the items ordered by falsely
claiming that they were bound for
destinations such as the United Arab
Emirates or Venezuela while the items
were designed for oil field equipment
in Libya and Sudan]
04/16/03 In the Matter of Attempted to export a Mossberg 764.2(c)
[1] Frank Curic Settlement Frank Curic shotgun from the United States to 764.2(e)
[1] Agreementexport
Bosnia and Herzegovina without 764.2(g)(1)[1] privileges
denied
obtaining the required license that for three years
he knew or had reason to know
was required; made a false and
misleading material
misrepresentation on Shipper's
Export Declaration
04/16/03 In the Matter of Exported two STX gas monitors 764.2(a)[1] Industrial Scientific Settlement Industrial Scientific from the United States to United 764.2(a)[1] Corporation Agreementcivil Corporation Arab Emirates (UAE) without 764.2(d)[1] penalty of $30,000 obtaining the required authorization; transferred the gas monitors to the UAE with knowledge that they would be reexported to Iran; conspiracy
05/06/03 In the Matter of Exported or caused to be exported
764.2(a) [3] Howmet Settlement Howmet Corporation technology for the production
of Corporation Agreement civil
ceramic cores from the United States penalty of $10,000
to the United Kingdom and Japan
and exported parts for a directional
solidification casting furnace from the
United States to Japan without
obtaining the required licenses
05/08/03 In the Matter of Exported or caused to be exported
764.2(a) [7] Versa-Matic Pump Settlement Versa-Matic Pump diaphragm pumps from
the United 764.2(g) [3] Company Agreementcivil
Company States to Israel, China and Egypt penalty of
$55,000
without the required licenses;
submitted Shipper's Export
Declarations containing false
statements regarding the commodity
classification and license requirements
06/03/03 In the Matter of Conspiracy; exported or caused the 764.2(d) [1] E. H. Wachs Settlement E. H. Wachs export of pipe cutting machines 787A.2 [5] Company, Inc. Agreementcivil Company, Inc. and spare parts from the United 764.2(a) [2] penalty of $159,000; States to Iran without prior 787A.4 [5] export privileges authorization from the Office of 764.2(e) [2] denied for three Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. years, all of which Department of Treasury; sold pipe is suspended cutting machines and spare parts with knowledge that they were to be exported from the United States to Iran
06/03/03 In the Matter of Exported crude petroleum from the 764.2(a)[40] Flint Hill Resources, Settlement Flint Hill Resources, United States to Canada without L.P., formerly known Agreementcivil L.P., formerly known the required export licenses; failed as Koch Petroleum penalty of $200,000 as Koch Petroleum to file Shipper's Export Declarations Group, L.P. Group, L.P. for exports of crude petroleum from the United States to Canada
06/10/03 In the Matter of Made a false or misleading 764.2(g) [1] Kamino International Settlement
Kamino International statement of a material fact to Transport, Inc. Agreementcivil
Transport, Inc. BIS in the course of an penalty of $5,000
investigation
06/19/03 In the Matter of Knowingly and willfully violated a Section 1701 Ihsan Elashyi also Export privileges
Ihsan Elashyi also regulation and order of the United of IEEPA
known as Ihsan denied until known as Ihsan Elashi States Department of
Commerce, Elashi and Sammy October 23, 2009
and Sammy Elashyi, to wit, the Temporary Denial Elashyi, Tetrabal
Tetrabal Corporation, Order of September 6, 2001, by Corporation, Inc.,
Inc., Maysoon Al participating in a transaction Maysoon Al Kayali,
Kayali, Mynet.Net involving the export and attempted Mynet.Net
Corp. and
Corp. and Al Kayali export of commodities from the Al Kayali
Corporation Corporation United States to Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon
06/24/03 In the Matter of Exported items through Italy or the 764.2(a) [15] Bio Check, Inc. Settlement Bio Check, Inc. United Arab Emirates to Iran without 764.2(h) [15] Agreementcivil obtaining the required authorization penalty of $22,500 from Office of Foreign Assets Control; failed to file the required Shipper's Export Declaration
06/24/03 In the Matter of Caused to be exported a thermal 764.2(b)
[1] Bassem A. Alhalabi Settlement Bassem A. Alhalabi imaging camera from the
United Agreementexport
States to Syria without the required privileges denied
license for one year
06/24/03 In the Matter of Made a false or misleading 764.2(g) [1] Zooma Settlement Zooma Enterprises, representation to an official of a Enterprises, Inc. Agreementcivil Inc. U.S. Government agency in penalty of $8,000 connection with the preparation, submission, and use of an export control document
06/24/03 In the Matter of Made false or misleading 764.2(g) [3] Issa Salomi Settlement Issa Salomi representations to the U.S. Agreementcivil Customs Service in the course penalty of $24,000 of an investigation
07/17/03 In the Matter of Caused the export of items to 764.2(b)
[33] DSV Samson Settlement DSV Samson organizations listed on the BIS 764.2(e)
[23] Transport, Inc. Agreement civil
Transport, Inc. Entity List without the required 764.2(g) [3]
penalty of $399,000
license, with knowledge that the
goods would be exported in
violation of the Regulations; made
false and misleading material
misrepresentations on Shipper's
Export Declaration concerning
the authority to export
07/24/03 In the Matter of [TDO: Reason to believe that 764.2(a)
Uni-Arab Modification Yaudat Mustafa Talyi, there was a risk of an imminent
764.2(d) Engineering and of Order
also known as Joseph violation based on evidence that 764.2(g)
Oil Field Services, Temporarily
Talyi, and International Talyi, through his company Jaime
Radi Denying Export
Business Services, Ltd. International Business Services, Mustafa
and Privileges by and Top Oil Tools, Ltd. Inc., exported or participated
in the Nureddin Shafiff adding Uni-Arab
export of U.S.-origin items to Libya Sehweil Engineering
and
and Sudan without obtaining the Oil Field Services,
necessary authorizations from BIS Jaime Radi Mustafa
or the Treasury Department's Office and Nureddin Shafiff
of Foreign Assets Control; attempted Sehweil
to mislead U.S. suppliers about the
ultimate destination and end-user
of the items ordered by falsely
claiming that they were bound for
destinations such as the United Arab
Emirates or Venezuela while the items
were designed for oil field equipment
in Libya and Sudan]
07/28/03 In the Matter of Exported and reexported pumps to 764.2(a)
[33] Hamilton Sundstrand Settlement Hamilton Sundstrand various countries without
obtaining 764.2(g) [16] Corporation Agreementcivil
Corporation the required icenses; made false or penalty
of $171,500
misleading statements on Shipper's
Export Declarations (SEDs) stating
that no license was required, when in
fact a license was required; failed to
file SEDs as required and failed to
provide certain required information
on SEDs
08/06/03 In the Matter of Conspiracy; caused to be exported
764.2(d) [1] Hakko Co. Ltd. Settlement Hakko Co. Ltd. to Japan 100 units of
generation II 764.2(b) [1] Agreementcivil
night vision equipment without the penalty of $20,000;
required export license export privileges
denied for five years, all of which is
suspended
08/06/03 In the Matter of Conspiracy; caused to be exported 764.2(d) [1] Hideo Nakagawa Settlement Hideo Nakagawa to Japan 100 units of generation II 764.2(b) [1] Agreementcivil night vision equipment without the penalty of $20,000, required export license all of which is suspended; export privileges denied for five years, all of which is suspended
08/06/03 In the Matter of Conspiracy; sold night vision 764.2(d)
[1] Worldwide Sports & Settlement
Worldwide Sports & scopes to an end-user in Japan 787A.4 [4]
Recreation Inc. Agreementcivil
Recreation Inc. with knowledge that violations 787A.5 [4]
currently d/b/a penalty of $223,000;
currently d/b/a would occur; evaded the 764.2(e) [6] Bushnell
Corporation export privileges
Bushnell Corporation Regulationsby omitting the name 764.2(h) [6]
denied for one year,
of the Japanese company and its all of which is
address from the invoices to conceal suspended
the identity of ultimate end-user and
ultimate destination of the night
vision scopes
08/18/03 In the Matter of Caused the export of high 764.2(b)
[4] E&M Computing Ltd. Settlement
E&M Computing Ltd. performance computers and 764.2(e) [4]
agreementcivil
equipment from the United States 764.2(h) [4] penalty
of $165,000;
to Israel without the required BIS 764.2(g)(1)[3] export
privileges
licenses; evaded the Regulations denied for three
by purchasing computer equipment years, all of which
from another vendor after learning is suspended
that BIS would deny the first
vendor's license application to
export the items; loaned or sold
computers to customers until BIS
licenses could be obtained, and
provided false and misleading
information in support of the license
applications and NDAA
authorizations; attempted to avoid
detection of unauthorized sales or
loans by removing the computers
and equipment from end-users when
they were notified that BIS officials
were planning to conduct a post-
shipment verification; upgraded
computers above the export control
threshold with CPUs
08/28/03 In the Matter of W. R. Exported chemical products 764.2(a) [51] W. R. Grace & Settlement
Grace & Co. - Conn. containing triethanolamine from Co. -
Conn. Agreementcivil the United States to Mexico, penalty of $178,500
Thailand, Hong Kong, Venezuela,
Philippines, Taiwan, Dominican
Republic, Brazil and Singapore
without obtaining the required
licenses
09/03/03 In the Matter of Violated the terms of an order 764.2(k)
[1] Expeditors Settlement Expeditors denying all of the U.S. export International
of Agreementcivil
International of privileges of Realtek Washington, Inc.
penalty of $5,000
Washington, Inc. Semiconductors Co. Ltd. by
participating in a transaction with
Realtek involving commodities that
were subject to the Regulations
and that were exported from the
United States
09/05/03 In the Matter of Knowingly and willfully attempted Section 38 Gunter Kohlke Export privileges Gunter Kohlke to export items on the United States of the AECA denied until July 18, Munitions List, from the United 2012 States to Switzerland, without first obtaining the required approval from the Department of State
09/24/03 In the Matter of TDO: Reason to believe that there
764.2(a) Yaudat Mustafa Order Yaudat Mustafa Talyi, was a risk of an imminent
violation 764.2(d) Talyi,also known as temporarily
also known as Joseph based on evidence that Talyi, 764.2(g)
Joseph Talyi, and denying export
Talyi, and International through his company International
International privileges renewed
Business Services, Business Services, Inc., exported Business
for 180 days
Ltd. and Top Oil or participated in the export of Services,
Ltd. and Tools, Ltd., Uni-Arab U.S.-origin items to Libya and Top Oil Tools,
Ltd.,
Engineering and Oil Sudan without obtaining the Uni-Arab
Engineering
Field Services, Jaime necessary authorizations from BIS and
Oil Field
Radi Mustafa and or the Treasury Department's Office Services,
Jaime
Nureddin Shafiff of Foreign Assets Control; attempted Radi
Mustafa Sehweil to mislead U.S. suppliers about the and Nureddin
ultimate destination and end-user Shafiff Sehweil
of the items ordered by falsely
claiming that they were bound for
destinations such as the United
Arab Emirates or Venezuela while
the items were designed for oil field
equipment in Libya and Sudan
09/26/03 In the Matter of Attempted to export a Dash 10M 764.2(c) [1] Astro-Med, Inc. Settlement Astro-Med, Inc. data recorder to the Nuclear Power Agreementcivil Corporation of India, an organization penalty of $5,000 listed on BIS's Entity List, without the required license
09/29/03 In the Matter of Conspiracy: exported oil field 764.2(d)
[1] Abdulamir Mahdi Export privileges Abdulamir Mahdi equipment, from the United
States 764.2(a) [2] and OTS Refining denied for 20 years
and OTS Refining through Canada to Iran, without prior 764.2(c)[1]
Equipment
Equipment Corporation authorization from the Office of 764.2(g)
[1] Corporation
Foreign Assets Control; solicited or 764.2(e)[1]
attempted the export of oil field
equipment from the United States
through Canada to Iran without
prior authorization; made a false
and misleading statement of
material fact directly or indirectly
to a United States agency in
connection with the preparation of
an export control document;
transferred and forwarded goods
with knowledge that they have been
exported in violation of the
Regulations
09/30/03 In the Matter of Aided and abetted the export of 764.2(b)
[2] Reza Moghadam Settlement Reza Moghadam liquid injectors from the United
764.2(h) [1] Pirasteh Agreementcivil
Pirasteh States to Iran without prior 764.2(g)(1) [1]
penalty of $4,500;
authorization from the Office of export privileges
Foreign Assets Control; evaded denied for seven
the provisions of the Regulations years
relating to Iran; made a false and
misleading statement to an OEE
Special Agent in the course of an
investigation
09/30/03 In the Matter of Exported or caused the export of 764.2(a)
[2] Dosmatic U.S.A., Settlement Dosmatic U.S.A., Inc. liquid injectors from
the United 764.2(g) [2] Inc. Agreementcivil
States to Iran without prior penalty of $44,000;
authorization from the Office of export privileges
Foreign Assets Control; made denied for
false statements to the U.S. 30 months, all of
Government by filing or causing which is suspended
to be filed a Shipper's Export
Declaration regarding the ultimate
destination and the ultimate
consignee
Serfilco Ltd. 03/15/03 6 violations: $65,000 and 3 year denial to 11 Middle Northbrook, IL 1 violation of 787A3 (act to solicit or East countries. attempt to violate an EAR order.) 1 violation of 787A4 (selling for export knowing of a violation of an EAR order) 4 violations of 764.2(a).(engaged in conduct contrary to an EAR order.)
Rockwell 05/23/03 2 violations of 760.5: $5,000 Automation Inc. 1 Failure to Report; 1 Record Keeping
Rockwell International, 05/23/03 1 violation of 760.2(d) [Furnishing $2,000 GmbH (Germany) prohibited business information]
Rockwell Automation, 05/23/03 1 violation of 760.2(d) [Furnishing $2,000 AG (Switzerland) prohibited business information]
Cook Composites and 06/17/03 2 violations: $6,000 Polymers Co. 1-760.2(d) [Furnished prohibited (N. Kansas City, MO.) business information]; 1-760.5 [Failed to report].
Jagro Customs Brokers 06/24/03 2 violations: $5,700
and International 1-760.2(d) [Furnished prohibited
Freight Forwarders, Inc. business information];
Irvington, NJ 1-760.5 [Failed to report].
McMaster-Carr 07/28/03 8 violations of 760.5 $8,000 Supply Company [Failed to report]. Elmhurst, IL
10/23/02 Ihsan Elashyi Shipping and attempting to ship Commerce
48 months imprisonment, goods to Libya and Syria without 3 years probation
and
authorization from the United $281,892.52 in restitution
States and related charges of
access device fraud, money
laundering, and wire fraud.
11/08/02 Jeffrey Woodbridge Conspiracy to violate the Commerce Jeffrey Woodbridge was International Emergency Economic sentenced to two years Powers Act. probation and a $7,000 fine.
01/06/03 Silicon Graphics Two felony charges that the Commerce
Silicon Graphics agreed to company violated Commerce pay $1 million in criminal
Department regulations by illegally fines.
Exporting high performance
computers to a Russian nuclear
laboratory in 1996.
01/13/03 Sigma Enterprises, Conspiracy to violate the Commerce Sigma Enterprises paid a LTD International Emergency $20,000 fine. Economic Powers Act.
02/14/03 Eduard Yamnik, Illegal export of crime control Commerce Two years supervised release D.B.A. Edsons items to Belarus. and a $2,000 criminal fine. Worldwide
04/17/03 E.H. Wachs Unauthorized export of Commerce Sentenced to twenty-four Company goods to Iran. months probation, a $506,000 fine and was ordered to institute an export compliance program.
04/23/03 Minequip Conspiracy to violate the Commerce Minequip was sentenced to International Emergency Economic one year corporate probation Powers Act. [Have S/A Nardella and a $3,000 criminal fine. verify whter plea was to 18 USC 1001 or IEEPA and make any necessary changes here and in the text].
04/23/03 John Clements Conspiracy to violate 18 USC 1001 Commerce John Clements was (false statements) sentenced to two years probation and a $1,000 criminal fine.
05/29/03 Zlatko Brkic Knowingly and willfully Commerce Was sentenced to one-year attempting to export crime control pre-trial diversion items to Bosnia.
Sentencing Enforcement Date Defendant(s) Charge(s) Organization(s) Sanction
07/01/03 Robert Tsai Conspiracy to defraud companies Commerce/
15 Months in prison, 3 years in China and Syria by arranging Homeland Security
supervised release, $101,230
to ship low grade scrap metal in in restitution and a $5,000
lieu of high grade copper wire criminal fine.
07/09/03 Joesph D'Allesio Filing false export control Commerce D'Allesio received two years documents. probation and paid a $100 special assessment.
07/09/03 Anthony Cordae Filing false export control documents. Commerce Cordae paid a $100 special assessment.
07/10/03 Dosmatic U.S.A. Illegal export of items subject Commerce/ Dosmatic received three to the EAR. North Texas Joint years probation and a Terrorism Task Force $50,000 fine.
07/10/03 Reza Pirasteh Making false statements Commerce/ Reza Pirasteh received three regarding export activities. North Texas Joint years probation and a $2,000 Terrorism Task Force fine.
07/17/03 DSV Samson Thirty counts of violation of the Commerce Five years corporate Transport, Inc. International Emergency Economic probation and a $250,000 criminal fine. Powers Act by shipping to listed parties in India.
07/25/03 Kiarash Arastafar Knowingly and willfully attempting Commerce Received six months jail and to procure industrial parts for Iran. home detention
08/05/03 Bushnell Corporation Illegal export of over 500 units Commerce Five years corporate of night vision goggles. probation and a $650,000 criminal fine.
08/05/03 Hakko Ltd. Conspiracy to make illegal exports Commerce Sentenced to five years of night vision goggles. probation and a $68,000 corporate fine.
08/05/03 Hideo Nakagawa Conspiracy to make illegal exports Commerce Sentenced to time served
of night vision goggles. and deportation to Japan.
09/04/03 Yasmin Ahmed Conspiracy to divert controlled Commerce
Yasmin Ahmed: Six months
Alan Haller commodities to Pakistan. imprisonment, three years
Mart Haller, Inc. supervised release and a
Tariq Ahmed $50,000 criminal fine;
Alan Haller: Two years imprisonment
and three years supervised release.
Mart Haller: Three years supervised
release and a $50,000 criminal fine. [Verify
that company received supervised
release.]
Tariq Ahmed: Two years imprisonment
and three years supervised release.
09/22/03 Ralph Michel Violation of the International Commerce Michel was sentenced to ten Emergency Economic Powers months imprisonment, Act and the Export Administration followed by three years of Regulations by exporting to supervised probation, Pakistan without the required and fined $50,000.00. export license
09/23/03 Omega Violation of the International Commerce Omega was fined Engineering, Inc. Emergency Economic Powers Act $313,000.00, placed on and the Export Administration corporate probation Regulations by exporting to Pakistan for five years, and without the required export license ordered to implement an export compliance program.