Advisory Committee for Blood Safety and Availability

Public Health Surveillance: Considerations for the Advisory Committee for Blood Safety and Availability

Robert W. Pinner, MD August 30, 2006





Blood Safety and Availability Background

- Matt Kuehnert, CDC Biovigilance Working Group Discussion
- Center for Biologics Evaluation and Review, FDA – Review and Management of AE Reports
- Robert Wise, FDA FDA's Safety Surveillance System for Blood and Blood Products
- Teresa Horan National Healthcare Safety Network
- Pierre Robillard, Quebec PHI Hemovigilance

General Considerations

- Authorities, incentives, punishments, making it reportable
- QA of production & distribution processes vs. surveillance for health outcomes
- Informatics standards, technologies
- Framing the questions; deciding what to count and why (then how)

Public Health Surveillance: A Definition

"...ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data regarding a health-related event, for use in public health action to reduce morbidity and improve health."

CDC. Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems. MMWR 2001;50:(RR-13)





Purposes of Surveillance

- Guide immediate action for cases of public health importance
- Estimate disease burden; follow trends
- Detection of outbreaks
- Evaluation of public policy
- Measure impact of practice changes
- Facilitate planning and allocation of resources
- Provide a basis for epidemiologic research



CDC. Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems. MMWR 2001;50:(RR-13)



Sources of Data for Surveillance


- Health care providers
- Laboratories
- Vital statistics (e.g., birth/death certificates)
- Medical records (e.g., hospital databases, emergency department visit data)
- Surveys (e.g., National Health Interview Survey, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Behavioral Risk Factor Survey)





Constitution of the United States of America: Preamble

We the People of the **United States, in Order to** form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this **Constitution for the United States of America.**



Constitution of the United States of America: Bill of Rights

Amendment I: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Amendment II Amendment III

Amendment IV

Amendment V


Amendment VI

Amendment VII

Amendment VIII

Amendment IX

Amendment X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.




Impact of Changing Circumstances – Examples from Notifiable Diseases Surveillance

- New case definition AIDS, 1993
- Advances in virology Hepatitis
- Changing surveillance requirements Polio





Impact of Change in AIDS Surveillance Case Definition






Reported Cases

*Includes Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Pacific Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.


ODC



Reported Cases per 100,000 Population

<u>ODC</u>

POLIOMYELITIS (paralytic) — by year, United States, 1951–1993.



Y-AXE B LD3 SCALE

Changing importance of specificity of case definition





Emerging Infections Programs

A population-based, scientific, public health network







Emerging Infections Programs A population-based, scientific, public health network

- Network of CDC and 11 state health departments
- Collaborators: local health departments, academic institutions, infection control practitioners, other federal agencies (FDA, USDA, EPA)
- Activities: (1) active surveillance; (2) applied epidemiology and laboratory research; (3) implementation and evaluation of pilot prevention and intervention projects; (4) flexible response





EIP ABCs Methods

- Case: pneumococcus isolated from normally sterile site
- Active contact with clinical laboratories to identify cases
- Audits to ensure complete reporting
- Susceptibility testing and serotyping at reference laboratories
- Chart review for clinical information

Emerging Infections Programs





Decline in invasive pneumococcal disease after introduction of protein-polysaccharide conjugate vaccine

 Whitney DB, Farley MM, Hadler J, Harrison LH, Bennett NM, Lynfield R, Reingold A, Cieslak PR, Pilishvili T, Jackson D, Facklam RR, Jorgensen JH, Schuchat A; Active Bacterial Core Surveillance of the Emerging Infections Program Network


N Engl J Med. 2003 May 1;348(18):1737-46





Effect in Target Age Group


Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Rates in Children <5 Years, ABCs, 1998-2003




CDCC CENTERS FOR DIBEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION


2003 data are preliminary

Herd Effect in Adults Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Rates over Time ABCs, 1998-2003





Penicillin Resistance in *S. pneumoniae* United States 1979-2003 vaccine



1995-2003: CDC Active Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs) /Emerging Infections Program

Perinatal Group B Streptococcal Disease (GBS)

- Emerged 1970s
- Newborn disease cost ~\$300 mill (1992)
- Preventable through use of intrapartum antibiotics (IAP) to women at risk





First U.S. Consensus Recommendations (CDC '96, ACOG '96, AAP '97)

Screening-based approach:

35-37 wks culture, offer intrapartum antibiotic prophylaxis (IAP) to GBS carriers and to preterm unless neg. culture result available

Oľ


Risk-based approach:

IAP to preterm, membrane rupture \geq 18 hours, or intrapartum fever (T \geq 38C)

Both strategies also give IAP to women with GBS bacteriuria, or previous infant with GBS disease




Rate of Early- and Late-onset GBS Disease in the 1990s, U.S.





Schrag, NEJM 2000


GBS Policies in US Hospitals Implementation by Year



ABCs Hospitals, EIP Network MMWR 1998; 47:665-670




Change in incidence of early-onset GBS disease in hospitals w/ and w/out new policies



Factor, Obstet Gynecol 2000;95:377-82



Rate of Early- Onset GBS Disease since 1989, U.S. (ABCs sites)



Year

Schrag, New Engl J Med 2000 *2002 estimate provisional (www.cdc.gov/abcs)




Factors associated with early-onset GBS disease: multivariable analysis


Characteristic	Adjusted RR (95% CI)		
GBS screening	0.46 (0.36-0.60)		
Proionged ROM (> 18 h)	1 41 (0.07-2.06)		
Pre-term delivery	1.50 (1.07-2.10)		
Black race	1.87 (1.45-2.43)		
Maternal age <20 y	2.22 (1.59-3.11)		
Previous GBS infant	5.54 (1.71-17.94)		
Intrapartum fever	5.36 (3.60-7.99)		

Study Design – multistate, retrospective cohort study using EIP ABCs infrastructure

Schrag et al. NEJM 2002, 347:233-9







CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLE"

The Recommendations

MMWR, Vol 51 (RR-11)




U.S. Efforts on Surveillance and Informatics (Public Health Information Network)

- Capture and analyze data in real time, using data that are already electronic
- Organize surveillance by relevant data sources, not diseases
- Standards-based development in a defined architecture
- Integrate public health and health care data, as appropriate
- Emphasize adoption and implementation of standards




FIGURE 1. Disease surveillance, by state and method — National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, United Sates, April 2005



- Substantial recent progress
- Much work remains
- Connecting IT and surveillance effectively remains important challenge



Quest Diagnostics Corporation Data Warehouse



Total Positives = 9274

PulseNet USA: Overview of the Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance in the United States

Kelley B. Hise, MPH Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Atlanta, GA May 9, 2005





The National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance



What is PulseNet USA?

- A national network of public health and food regulatory agency laboratories coordinated by CDC
 - State health departments, Local health departments, Federal agencies (CDC, USDA, FDA)
- Perform standardized molecular typing of foodborne disease-causing bacteria by Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE)
- PFGE data are shared electronically and maintained in a database at CDC
- Database available on-demand to participants





Objectives of PulseNet USA

- Detect foodborne disease case clusters by PFGE
- Facilitate early identification of common source outbreaks*
- Assist epidemiologists in investigating outbreaks
 - Help separate outbreak-associated cases from other sporadic cases *
 - Assist in rapidly identifying the source of outbreaks *
 - Act as a rapid and effective means of communication between public health laboratories








The National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne Disease Surveillance





Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 at a State Fair – North Carolina, 2004

In November 2004, PulseNet helped in the investigation of an outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 associated with a petting zoo at the North Carolina State Fair.

 On November 4th, 2004, the PulseNet laboratory in North Carolina alerted other PulseNet participants of the outbreak through a WebBoard posting.

Help Logoff Post Refresh Search Chat Mark Read More...

9 12/14/2004 (2)

Q 12/14/200

2005 PulseNet Update Meeting (15, 15 New) new 🔤

Important PulseNet Documents (44, 40 New) new

General PulseNet Information (180, 54 New) new

+ Ohio E. coli O157:H7 @ 2/23/2005 (31, 60 New) new

)502GA-c E.coli O157:H7 Georgia cluster 🛽 2/4/2

<u>E.coli 0157:H7 in AR</u> 0 1/31/2005 (27, 26 New) **new** + E. coli O157:H7 in MS @ 1/24/2005 (27, 52 New) ne

E. coli 0157 non motile in Quebec 🛽 12/22/2004 (1 coli Multistate Cluster#2 on NatDbs @ 12/17

+ 0412NY-1c NY E coli O157;H7 @ 1/3/2005 (24, 46

+ MA_E, coli O157;H7 @ 12/17/2004 (23, 44 New) new

1 c Multistate E. coli O157:H7

+ 0412NJ-1c E, coli O157 is NJ @ 12/14/2004 (22, 42

+ 0411ml-2c- multistate E, coli cluster @ 11/29/2004 + VA E.coli isolate clusters to others on Nat Dbs ❶ + 0411FL-1c E. coli O157:H7 in FL @ 11/22/2004 (24

+ 0411CA-1c E coli O157 H7 Cluster in Northern I

+ 0411NC-2ml- E, coli outbreak in NC 0 11/4/2004

0411NC-1 E. coli O157:H7 cluster in NC 11/4/200

+ IL E. coli O157:H7 - Gnd. Beef Pattern @ 10/4/200

E.coli O157:H7 cluster in NC 🛿 12/6/2004 (21, 20 t

<u>/lichigan O157:H7 cluster</u> **0** 11/17/2004 (26, 50 Ne

Ecoli O157:H7 VA matches other states @ 10/21/. + E coli O111 cluster in NY- orchard assoc @ 10/13

+ 0412MA-1c MA E, coli O157:H7 9 12/8/2004 (29)

+ 0412OK-1c E, coli O157:H7 in OK

E. coil Database offline 12 16 2004 12/16/2004 (2.

BioNumerics Server Status (0)

Ecoli (658, 644 New) new

WebBoard

🕂 TOP ... 🖉 Post ... 🤊 Reply ... 🌠 Reply/Quote ... 🛥 Email Reply ... 🛪 Delete ... 🖉 Edit → Previous ... → Next ... → Previous Topic ... → Next Topic ... ■ Entire Topic

Topic: 0411NC-2ml- E, coli outbreak in NC (1 of 22), Read 236 times, 2 File Attachments new Conf: Ecoli

From: Denise Griffin denise.griffin@ncmail.net

Date: Thursday, November 04, 2004 08:24 AM Originally Posted 3-Nov-2004 15:52

NC is investigating a statewide outbreak of shiga toxin producing E, coli. The outbreak appears to be linked to a petting zoo and currently includes three different strains of E, coli O157:H7 and an E, coli 045;?. To date, twenty eight patients meet the case definition, eight of these have been pulsed and four children are hospitalized with HUS. Dates of collection range from 10/20/04 to 10/26/04. We have five additional isolates pending analysis and more on the way. Please find attached gel NC04112 with Xba I patterns and gel NC04113 with Blns. H9812 reference is in lanes 1, 6 and 11 and patient's Xba I and Bln I patterns are in corresponding lanes. The 045? isolate patterns are in lane 8. Key #s are 2004-002900. 2004-002962. 2004-002963, 2004-002964, 2004-002965, 2004-002978 (the 045:? isolate), 2004-002979 and 2004-002980; all have been uploaded. Our epi contact is Parn Jenkins and she can be reached at Pamela Jenkins@ncmail.net or (919)715-4818. Wish us luck!

Denise

Denise L. Griffin, BSMT(ASCP)

The PFGE pattern related to the outbreak is submitted for comparison to patterns in other states.



Medical Laboratory Specialist NC State Lab of Public Health (919)807-8763 Denise.Griffin@ncmail.net





Next = Bottom

Salmonella (2915, 2767 New) new

A 60 day search within the *E. coli* national database shows isolates that appear indistinguishable


65.27%	PFGE-Xbal	36 entries		
PFGE-Xbal				
		Кеу	UploadDate	PFGE-Xbal-pattern
		NC 2004-002978	2004-11-03	EH2X01.0002
		NC 2004-002979	2004-11-03	EXHX01.2168
	NY BAC0400012557	2004-10-26	EXDX01.0080	
		SD SD149804	2004-10-06	EXHX01.1968
	MN E2004002334	2004-10-06	EXHX01.0373	
	OR G04-1039	2004-10-26	EXHX01.0013	
		NE REF 6550	2004-10-27	EXHX01.0087
	PA 04E02064	2004-10-07	EXHX01.0130	
	PA 04E02116	2004-10-20	EXHX01.0221	
	V/I 04BC023453	2004-10-19	EXHX01.1206	
	<u>VVY 19767</u>	2004-10-21	EXHX01.1453	
		NLEP_EC 1654-1483,2	2004-10-21	EXHX01.1343
		UT 70401686	2004-10-01	EXHX01.1271
		NC 2004-003008	2004-11-06	EXHX01.0802
		UT 70401875	2004-10-01	EXHX01.1935
		VM 04BC013630	2004-10-01	EXHX01.1929
		MO MOENT1408-04	2004-10-12	EXHX01.0541
		• <u>NC 2004-003002</u>	2004-11-06	EXHX01.0224
	NC 2004-003006	2004-11-06	EXHX01.0224	
	NC 2004-003007	2004-11-06	EXHX01.0224	
	NC 2004-003039	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224	
	NC 2004-003044	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224	
	NC 2004-003045	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224	
	NC 2004-003047A	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224	
		NC 2004-003047B	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224
IIIII ⊢ <mark>I</mark> I'		NC 2004-003077A	2004-11-07	EXHX01.0224
		PA 04E01776	2004-10-21	EXHX01.0042
		<u>wa 7426</u>	2004-10-15	EXHX01.2072
ПР		NC 2004-002904	2004-10-29	EXHX01.0102
		NY BAC0400011492	2004-10-07	EXHX01.0047
		NC 2004-002678	2004-10-19	EXHX01.0206
		MO 544-04	2004-10-12	EXHX01.2021



Cluster of indistinguisha ble isolates in NC



PulseNet - Listeriosis




- role in dispersed outbreaks
- role in implicating vehicle





BioNumerics PFGE Pattern Analysis



PFGE results excluded turkey and cheese sandwiches as suspect vehicle






Detecting Outbreaks: Considerations




PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE – A MODEL








THRESHOLD INCIDENCE MODEL TO DETECT EPIDEMICS







The Relationship Between Specificity* and PPV





Sensitivity fixed at 95%

Prevalence



Skilled, Attentive People

- Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, 1993 Cases of acute illness characterized by fever, myalgias, headache, and cough, followed by rapid development of respiratory failure reported to health departments in NM, AZ, CO, UT. (MMWR June 11, 1993)
- West Nile Virus, 1999 Infectious disease physician in Queens contacted the NYC Department of Health to report two patients with encephalitis (MMWR October 1, 1999)
- Inhalational anthrax, 2001 Local infectious disease physician Larry Bush promptly notified Jean Malecki, director, Palm Beach County Health Department. (EID Oct. 2002)





General Considerations

- Process improvements and health outcomes
 - Surveillance for health outcomes may inform quality improvement of production and distribution processes, but they're not the same thing
- Understand, adapt to, take advantage of evolving standards and information technology
- Understand and frame the questions; know what needs to be counted and why; then design

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Public Health Surveillance: Considerations for the Advisory Committee for Blood Safety and Availability

Robert W. Pinner, MD August 30, 2006



