GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS

 

1.          The following fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to nuclear
             transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State and, in the case of controls on
             retransfer, to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have deĀ£med an export trigger list.

 Prohibition on nuclear explosives

 2.          Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only upon
             formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses which would result in any
             nuclear explosive device.

 Physical protection

 3.          (a)     All nuclear materials and facilities identified by the agreed trigger list should be placed under
                       effective physical protection to prevent unauthorized use and handling. The levels of physical
                       protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, equipment and facilities, have been
                       agreed by the suppliers, taking account of intemational recommendations.

              (b)    The implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the
                      responsibility of the Government of that country. However, in order to implement the terms
                      agreed upon amongst suppliers, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have
                      to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and recipient.

              (c)     In each case special arrangements should be made for a clear definition of responsibilities for
                      the transport of trigger list items.

 Safeguards

 4.          (a)        Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear-weapon State
                          only when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiting the
                          application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future
                          peaceful activities.

              (b)       Transfers covered by paragraph 4 (a) to a non-nuclear-weapon State without such a safeguards
                          agreement should be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for
                          the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards are applied to those facilities.
                          Suppliers should inform and, if appropriate, consult in the event that they intend to authorize or
                          to deny such transfers.

              (c)      The policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b) does not apply to agreements or contracts
                          drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992. In case of countries that have adhered or will adhere to
                          INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1 later than April 3, 1992, the policy only applies to agreements (to
                          be) drawn up after their date of adherence.

              (d)       Under agreements to which the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) does not apply (see
                          paragraphs 4 (b) and (c)) suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology only
                          when covered by IAEA safeguards with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with
                          IAEA doc. GOV/1621. However, suppliers undertake to strive for the earliest possible
                          implementation of the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) under such agreements.

              (e)        Suppliers reserve the fight to apply additional conditions of supply as a matter of national
                          policy.

 5.     Suppliers will jointly reconsider their common safeguards requirements, whenever appropriate.

Safeguards triggered by the transfer of certain technology

6.          (a)        The requirements of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above should also apply to facilities for
                          reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy-water production, utilizing technology directly transferred
                          by the supplier or derived from transferred facilities, or major critical components thereof.

             (b)        The transfer of such facilities, or major critical components thereof, or related technology,
                          should require an undertaking (1) that IAEA safeguards apply to any facilities of the same type
                         (i.e. if the design, construction or operating processes are based on the same or similar physical
                          or chemical processes, as defined in the trigger list) constructed during an agreed period in the
                          recipient country and (2) that there should at all times be in effect a safeguards agreement
                          permitting the IAEA to apply Agency safeguards with respect to such facilities identified by the
                          recipient, or by the supplier in consultation with the recipient, as using transferred technology.

 Special controls on sensitive exports

 7.          Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable
             materials. If enrichment or repmcessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred,
             suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an altemative to national plants, supplier
             involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers
             should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concemed with multinational regional
             fuel cycle centres.

 Special controls on export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology

 8.          For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or technology therefor, the recipient nation should agree that
             neither the transferred facility, nor any facility based on such technology, will be designed or operated
             for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium without the consent of the supplier nation, of
             which the IAEA should be advised.

 Controls on supplied or derived weapons-usable material

 9.          Suppliers recognize the importance, in order to advance the objectives of these guidelines and to
             provide opportunities further to reduce the risks of proliferation, of including in agreements on supply
             of nuclear materials or of facilities which produce weapons-usable material, provisions calling for
             mutual agreement between the supplier and the recipient on arrangements for reprocessing, storage,
             alteration, use, transfer or retransfer of any weapons-usable material involved. Suppliers should
             endeavor to include such provisions whenever appropriate and practicable.

Controls on retransfer

 10.      (a)   Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology, including technology defined
                    under paragraph 6, only upon file recipient's assurance that in the case of:

                    (1) transfer of such items or related technology,  or

                    (2) transfer of trigger list items derived from facilities originally transferred by the supplier, or with the help of equipment or                           technology originally transferred by the supplier.

                   (3)    the recipient of the retransfer or transfer will have provided the same assurances as those
                           required by the supplier for the original transfer.

(b)   In addition the supplier's consent should be required for: (1) any retransfer of trigger list items or related technology and any transfer referred to under paragraph 10 (a) (2) from any State which does not require full scope safeguards, in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) of these Guidelines, as a condition of supply; (2) any retransfer of the facilities, major critical components, or technology described in paragraph 6; (3) any transfer of facilities or major critical components derived from those items; (4) any retransfer of heavy water or weapons-usable material.

              (c)     To ensure the consent fight as defined under paragraph 10 (b), government to government assurances will be required for               any relevant original transfer.

 Non-proliferation Principle

 11. Notwithstanding other provisions of these Guidelines, suppliers should authorize transfer of items or
       related technology identified in the trigger list only when they are satisfied that the transfers would not
       contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

 SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

 Physical Security

 12.      Suppliers should promote international co-operation on the exchange of physical security information,
             protection of nuclear materials in transit, and recovery of stolen nuclear materials and equipment.

 Support for effective IAEA safeguards

 13.      Suppliers should make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards.
            Suppliers should also support the Agency's efforts to assist Member States in the improvement of their
            national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and to increase the technical
            effectiveness of safeguards.

              Similarly, they should make every effort to support the IAEA in increasing further the adequacy of
             safeguards in the light of technical developments and the rapidly growing number of nuclear facilities,
             and to support appropriate initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.

 Sensitive plant design features

 14.      Suppliers should encourage the designers and makers of sensitive equipment to construct it in such a
            way as to facilitate the application of safeguards.

Consultations

15. (a)  Suppliers should maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected
            with the implementation of these Guidelines.

        (b)  Suppliers should consult, as each deems appropriate, with other Governments concemed on
             specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or
             instability.

       (c)  In the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of
             supplier/recipient understandings resulting from these Guidelines, particularly in the case of an
             explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards by a
             recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order to determine
             and assess the reality and extent of the alleged violation.

Pending the early outcome of such consultations, suppliers will not act in a manner that could prejudice any measure that may be adopted by other suppliers concerning their current contacts with that recipient.

Upon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, beating in mind Article XII of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.

 16.      Unanimous consent is required for any changes in these Guidelines, including any which might result
             from the reconsideration mentioned in paragraph 5.