GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

 OBJECTIVE

1.     With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity" or an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity." In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. The Guidelines are not designed to impede international cooperation as long as such cooperation will not contribute to a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

 BASIC PRINCIPLE

2.     Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:

--     for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or

        --     in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

 EXPLANATION OF TERMS

 3.         (a) "Nuclear explosive activity" includes research on or development, design, manufacture,
                    construction, testing or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or components or
                    subsystems of such a device.

 (b) "Unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material, or separate storage installation, where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation, existing or future, when it contains any source or special fissionable material; or of any heavy water production plant where there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom; or where any such obligation is not met.

 ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES

 4.     Suppliers should establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of equipment, materials, software, and related technology identified in the Annex. These procedures should include enforcement measures for violations. In considering whether to authorize such transfers, suppliers should exercise prudence in order to carry out the Basic Principle and should take relevant factors into account, including:

 (a)   Whether the recipient state is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities;

 (b)   Whether any recipient state that is not party to the NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, or a similar international legally-binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement has any facilities or installations listed in paragraph 3(b) above that are operational or being designed or constructed that are not, or will not be, subject to IAEA safeguards;

 (c)   Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;

 (d)   Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is to be used in research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility;

 (e)   Whether governmental actions, statements, and policies of the recipient state are supportive of nuclear non-proliferation and whether the recipient state is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation;

 (f)    Whether the recipients have been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities; and

(g)   Whether a transfer has not been authorized to the end-user or whether the end-user has diverted for purposes inconsistent with the Guidelines any transfer previously authorized.

CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFERS

5.     In the process of determining that the transfer will not pose any unacceptable risk of diversion, in accordance with the Basic Principle and to meet the objectives of the Guidelines, the supplier should obtain, before authorizing the transfer and in a manner consistent with its national law and practices, the following:

 (a)   a statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end-use locations of the proposed transfers; and

(b)   an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.

CONSENT RIGHTS OVER RETRANSFERS

6.     Before authorizing the transfer of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex to a country not adhering to the Guidelines, suppliers should obtain assurances that their consent will be secured, in a manner consistent with their national law and practices, prior to any retransfer to a third country of the equipment, materials, software, or related technology, or any replica thereof.

CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

7.     The supplier reserves to itself discretion as to the application of the Guidelines to other items of significance in addition to those identified in the Annex, and as to the application of other conditions for transfer that it may consider necessary in addition to those provided for in paragraph 5 of the Guidelines.

8.     In furtherance of the effective implementation of the Guidelines, suppliers should, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information and consult with other states adhering to the Guidelines.

9.     In the interest of international peace and security, the adherence of all states to the Guidelines would be welcome.